Action Costs Rapidly and Automatically Interfere with Reward-Based Decision-Making in a Reaching Task

Biomechanical costs influence decisions made during ongoing actions

Accurate interaction with the environment relies on the integration of external information about the spatial layout of potential actions and knowledge of their costs and benefits. Previous studies have shown that when given a choice between voluntary reaching movements, humans tend to prefer actions with lower biomechanical costs. However, these studies primarily focused on decisions made before the onset of movement ("decide-then-act" scenarios), and it is not known to what extent their conclusions generalize to many real-life situations, in which decisions occur during ongoing actions ("decide-while-acting"). For example, one recent study found that biomechanical costs did not influence decisions to switch from a continuous manual tracking movement to a point-to-point movement, suggesting that biomechanical costs may be disregarded in decide-while-acting scenarios. To better understand this surprising result, we designed an experiment in which participants were faced with the decision between continuing to track a target moving along a straight path or changing paths to track a new target that gradually moved along a direction that deviated from the initial one. We manipulated tracking direction, angular deviation rate, and side of deviation, allowing us to compare scenarios where biomechanical costs favored either continuing or changing the path. Crucially, here the choice was always between two continuous tracking actions. Our results show that in this situation decisions clearly took biomechanical costs into account. Thus we conclude that biomechanics are not disregarded during decide-while-acting scenarios but rather that cost comparisons can only be made between similar types of actions.NEW & NOTEWORTHY In this study, we aim to shed light on how biomechanical factors influence decisions made during ongoing actions. Previous work suggested that decisions made during actions disregard biomechanical costs, in contrast to decisions made before movement. Our results challenge that proposal and suggest instead that the effect of biomechanical factors is dependent on the types of actions being compared (e.g., continuous tracking vs. point-to-point reaching). These findings contribute to our understanding of the dynamic interplay between biomechanical considerations and action choices during ongoing interactions with the environment.

Dual-tasking modulates movement speed but not value-based choices during walking

Value-based decision-making often occurs in multitasking scenarios relying on both cognitive and motor processes. Yet, laboratory experiments often isolate these processes, thereby neglecting potential interactions. This isolated approach reveals a dichotomy: the cognitive process by which reward influences decision-making is capacity-limited, whereas the influence of motor cost is free of such constraints. If true, dual-tasking should predominantly impair reward processing but not affect the impact of motor costs. To test this hypothesis, we designed a decision-making task in which participants made choices to walk toward targets for rewards while navigating past an obstacle. The motor cost to reach these rewards varied in real-time. Participants either solely performed the decision-making task, or additionally performed a secondary pitch-recall task. Results revealed that while both reward and motor costs influenced decision-making, the secondary task did not affect these factors. Instead, dual-tasking slowed down participants' walking, thereby reducing the overall reward rate. Hence, contrary to the prediction that the added cognitive demand would affect the weighing of reward or motor cost differentially, these processes seem to be maintained at the expense of slowing down the motor system. This slowdown may be indicative of interference at the locomotor level, thereby underpinning motor-cognitive interactions during decision-making.

Explicit effort may not influence perceptuomotor decision-making

Many decisions that humans make are enacted by the action system. For example, humans use reach-to-grasp movements when making perceptuomotor decisions between and obtaining fruits of varying quality from a pile. Recent work suggests that the characteristics of each action alternative may influence the decision itself-there may be a bias away from making perceptuomotor alternatives associated with high effort when participants are unaware of the effort differences between responses. The present study examined if perceptuomotor decisions were influenced by explicit reaching effort differences. Neurotypical human participants were presented with random dot motion stimuli in which most dots moved in random directions and varying percentages of remaining dots moved coherently left- or rightward. Participants reported leftward motion judgements by performing leftward (or left hand) reaching movements and rightward motion judgements by performing rightward (or right hand) reaching movements. A resistance band was affixed to participants' wrists and to the table in different configurations. The configurations allowed for one movement/motion direction judgement to always require stretching of the band and, therefore, require relatively more effort. Across a set of experiments, the response context (i.e. selecting directions within a limb or selecting between limbs) and the effort difference between responses were manipulated. Overall, no experiment revealed a bias away from the perceptuomotor decision associated with high effort. Based on these results, it is concluded that, in this biomechanical context, explicit effort may not influence perceptuomotor decision-making and may point to a contextual influence of action effort on perceptuomotor decision-making.

Adversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy

What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the "attention economy," a user's lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action.

Prelimbic neuron assemblies with delayed activation encode the economic decision-making process in a bandit game

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is critical to an animal's value-based decision-making process. However, due to heterogeneity of local mPFC neurons, which neuron group and how it contributes to the alteration of the animal's decision is yet to be explored. And the effect of empty reward in this process is often neglected. Here, we adopted a two-port bandit game paradigm for mice and applied synchronized calcium imaging to the prelimbic area of the mPFC. The results showed that neurons recruited in the bandit game exhibit three distinct firing patterns. Specially, neurons with delayed activation (deA neurons¹) carried exclusive information on reward type and changes of choice value. We demonstrated that these deA neurons were essential for the construction of choice-outcome correlation and the trial-to-trial modification of decision. Additionally, we found that in a long-term gambling game, members of the deA neuron assembly were dynamically shifting while maintaining the function, and the importance of empty reward feedbacks were gradually elevated to the same level as reward. Together, these results revealed a vital role for prelimbic deA neurons in the gambling tasks and a new perspective on the encoding of economic decision-making.

Embodied decision biases: individually stable across different tasks?

In everyday life, action and decision-making often run in parallel. Action-based models argue that action and decision-making strongly interact and, more specifically, that action can bias decision-making. This embodied decision bias is thought to originate from changes in motor costs and/or cognitive crosstalk. Recent research confirmed embodied decision biases for different tasks including walking and manual movements. Yet, whether such biases generalize within individuals across different tasks remains to be determined. To test this, we used two different decision-making tasks that have independently been shown to reliably produce embodied decision biases. In a within-participant design, participants performed two tasks in a counterbalanced fashion: (i) a walking paradigm for which it is known that motor costs systematically influence reward decisions, and (ii) a manual movement task in which motor costs and cognitive crosstalk have been shown to impact reward decisions. In both tasks, we successfully replicated the predicted embodied decision biases. However, there was no evidence that the strength of the biases correlated between tasks. Hence, our findings do not confirm that embodied decision biases transfer between tasks. Future research is needed to examine whether this lack of transfer may be due to different causes underlying the impact of motor costs on decisions and the impact of cognitive crosstalk or task-specific differences.

Motor demands influence conflict processing in a mouse-tracking Simon task

Previous studies have shown incorrect motor activation when making perceptual decisions under conflict, but the potential involvement of motor processes in conflict resolution is still unclear. The present study tested whether the effects of distracting information may be reduced when anticipated motor processing demands increase. Specifically, across two mouse-tracking Simon experiments, we manipulated blockwise motor demands (high vs. low) by requiring participants to move a mouse cursor to either large versus small (Experiment 1) or near versus far (Experiment 2) response boxes presented on the screen. We reasoned that participants would increase action control in blocks with high versus low motor demands and that this would reduce the distracting effect of location-based activation. The results support this hypothesis: Simon effects were reduced under high versus low motor demands and this modulation held even when controlling for time-varying fluctuations in distractor-based activation via distributional analyses (i.e., delta plots). Thus, the present findings indicate that anticipation of different motor costs can influence conflict processing. We propose that the competition between distractor-based and target-based activation is biased at premotor and/or motor stages in anticipation of motor demands, but also discuss alternative implementations of action control.

Hyperreactivity to uncertainty is a key feature of subjective cognitive impairment

With an increasingly ageing global population, more people are presenting with concerns about their cognitive function, but not all have an underlying neurodegenerative diagnosis. Subjective cognitive impairment (SCI) is a common condition describing self-reported deficits in cognition without objective evidence of cognitive impairment. Many individuals with SCI suffer from depression and anxiety, which have been hypothesised to account for their cognitive complaints. Despite this association between SCI and affective features, the cognitive and brain mechanisms underlying SCI are poorly understood. Here, we show that people with SCI are hyperreactive to uncertainty and that this might be a key mechanism accounting for their affective burden. Twenty-seven individuals with SCI performed an information sampling task, where they could actively gather information prior to decisions. Across different conditions, SCI participants sampled faster and obtained more information than matched controls to resolve uncertainty. Remarkably, despite their ‘urgent’ sampling behaviour, SCI participants were able to maintain their efficiency. Hyperreactivity to uncertainty indexed by this sampling behaviour correlated with the severity of affective burden including depression and anxiety. Analysis of MRI resting functional connectivity revealed that SCI participants had stronger insular-hippocampal connectivity compared to controls, which also correlated with faster sampling. These results suggest that altered uncertainty processing is a key mechanism underlying the psycho-cognitive manifestations in SCI and implicate a specific brain network target for future treatment.

The Cost of Imagined Actions in a Reward-Valuation Task

Growing evidence suggests that humans and other animals assign value to a stimulus based not only on its inherent rewarding properties, but also on the costs of the action required to obtain it, such as the cost of time. Here, we examined whether such cost also occurs for mentally simulated actions. Healthy volunteers indicated their subjective value for snack foods while the time to imagine performing the action to obtain the different stimuli was manipulated. In each trial, the picture of one food item and a home position connected through a path were displayed on a computer screen. The path could be either large or thin. Participants first rated the stimulus, and then imagined moving the mouse cursor along the path from the starting position to the food location. They reported the onset and offset of the imagined movements with a button press. Two main results emerged. First, imagery times were significantly longer for the thin than the large path. Second, participants liked significantly less the snack foods associated with the thin path (i.e., with longer imagery time), possibly because the passage of time strictly associated with action imagery discounts the value of the reward. Importantly, such effects were absent in a control group of participants who performed an identical valuation task, except that no action imagery was required. Our findings hint at the idea that imagined actions, like real actions, carry a cost that affects deeply how people assign value to the stimuli in their environment.