Cognitive Control Promotes Either Honesty or Dishonesty, Depending on One's Moral Default

On "intent" in research misconduct

Research misconduct, broadly defined as acts of fabrication, falsification and/or plagiarism, violate the value system of science, cost significant wastage of public resources, and in more extreme cases endanger research participants or members of the society at large. Determination of culpability in research misconduct requires establishment of intent on the part of the respondent or perpetrator. However, "intent" is a state of mind, and its perception is subjective, unequivocal evidence for which would not be as readily established compared to the objective evidence available for the acts themselves. Here, we explore the concept of "intent" in research misconduct, how it is framed in criminological/legal terms, and narrated from a psychological perspective. Based on these, we propose a framework whereby lines of questioning and investigation, as defined by legislative terms and informed by the models and tools of psychology, could help in establishing a preponderance of evidence for culpable intent. Such a framework could be useful in research misconduct adjudications and in delivering sanctions.

Behavioral dishonesty in multiscenes: Associations with trait honesty and neural patterns during (dis)honesty video-watching

Cross-situational inconsistency is common in the expression of honesty traits; yet, there is insufficient emphasis on behavioral dishonesty across multiple contexts. The current study aimed to investigate behavioral dishonesty in various contexts and reveal the associations between trait honesty, behavioral dishonesty, and neural patterns of observing others behave honestly or dishonestly in videos (abbr.: (dis)honesty video-watching). First, the results revealed limitations in using trait honesty to reflect variations in dishonest behaviors and predict behavioral dishonesty. The finding highlights the importance of considering neural patterns in understanding and predicting dishonest behaviors. Second, by comparing the predictive performance of seven types of data across three neural networks, the results showed that functional connectivity in the hypothesis-driven network during (dis)honesty video-watching provided the highest predictive power in predicting multitask behavioral dishonesty. Last, by applying the feature elimination method, the midline self-referential regions (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex), anterior insula, and striatum were identified as the most informative brain regions in predicting behavioral dishonesty. In summary, the study offered insights into individual differences in deception and the intricate connections among trait honesty, behavioral dishonesty, and neural patterns during (dis)honesty video-watching.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

The acute effects of stress on dishonesty are moderated by individual differences in moral default

In daily life we regularly must decide whether to act dishonestly for personal gain or to be honest and maintain a positive image of ourselves. While evidence suggests that acute stress influences moral decisions, it is unclear whether stress increases or decreases immoral behavior. Here, we hypothesize that stress, through its effects on cognitive control, has different effects on moral decision making for different individuals, depending on their moral default. We test this hypothesis by combining a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating with a well-established stress induction task. Our findings confirm our hypothesis, revealing that effects of stress on dishonesty are not uniform, but instead depend on the individual: for those who are relatively dishonest, stress increases dishonesty, whereas for participants who are relatively honest stress makes them more honest. These findings go a long way in resolving the conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of stress on moral decisions, suggesting that stress affects dishonesty differently for different individuals, depending on their moral default.

A straightforward graphical/statistical approach to help substantiate cheating on multiple-choice examinations

Academic dishonesty is prevalent in universities in the form of cheating on examinations, with the problem being much greater in classes that have a large number of students that require close seating arrangements for in-class exams. The scenario described below was experienced during an in-class exam that included the possibility of an Honor Code violation between two students that was observed independently by three different faculty proctors. Herein we detail an objective, statistical approach taken to maintain exam and academic integrity that is compelling and transparent to students and the University Honor Council. Using the established error-similarity analysis for multiple-choice exams, it was determined that the number of identical incorrect answers found on the exams of the two individuals in question was sufficiently greater than the number expected by chance (probability of P < 0.00001). The number of total identical incorrect answers found on the remaining exams (across 65 students, n = 89 comparisons) was plotted as function of the number of total incorrect answers found on these exams (incorrect answers ranged from 1 to 22) and clearly supported that there was an Honor Code violation between the two students in question. The techniques used herein established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a form of cheating had occurred between these students. However, caution must be taken as further investigation is requisite to establish whether the Honor Code violation was unidirectional (one student copying off the other) or bidirectional (collusion between the two students) in nature.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Academic dishonesty is prevalent in universities, especially on examinations with a large number of students in close seating arrangements. Cheating on a multiple-choice exam was suspected by observations from proctors of the examination. Application of error-similarity analysis associated with identical incorrect answers demonstrated that the probability of cheating was confirmed (P < 0.00001) between two examinees. Further comparisons with the remaining exams provided graphic evidence that a violation of the University's Honor Code had occurred.

The Role of Cognition in Dishonest Behavior

Dishonesty has received increased attention from many professionals in recent years for its relevance in many social areas such as finance and psychology, among others. Understanding the mechanisms underlying dishonesty and the channels in which dishonesty operates could enable the detection and even prevention of dishonest behavior. However, the study of dishonesty is a challenging endeavor; dishonesty is a complex behavior because it imposes a psychological and cognitive burden. The study of this burden has fostered a new research trend that focuses on cognition’s role in dishonesty. This paper reviews the theoretical aspects of how such cognitive processes modulate dishonest behavior. We will pay special attention to executive functions such as inhibitory processes, working memory, or set-shifting that may modulate the decision to be (dis)honest. We also account for some frameworks in cognitive and social psychology that may help understand dishonesty, such as the Theory of Mind, the role of creative processes, and discourse analyses within language studies. Finally, we will discuss some specific cognitive-based models that integrate cognitive mechanisms to explain dishonesty. We show that cognition and dishonest behavior are firmly related and that there are several important milestones to reach in the future to advance the understanding of dishonesty in our society.

Honesty as a trait

The purpose of this paper is to review recent research about the possibility that some people are more honest than others and about the causes of them being so. We tackle four big questions about the consistency of honest behavior, the content and breadth of trait honesty, the mechanisms underlying trait honesty, and the measurement of trait honesty. Recent research reveals we are only at the beginning states of answering these questions about honesty. Invigorated research is needed to firmly resolve whether individuals differ in honesty and if so, integrate the determining mechanisms and develop strong measurements.

Cognitive control and dishonesty

Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one's 'moral default': for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

Individual differences in (dis)honesty are represented in the brain's functional connectivity at rest

Measurement of the determinants of socially undesirable behaviors, such as dishonesty, are complicated and obscured by social desirability biases. To circumvent these biases, we used connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) on resting state functional connectivity patterns in combination with a novel task which inconspicuously measures voluntary cheating to gain access to the neurocognitive determinants of (dis)honesty. Specifically, we investigated whether task-independent neural patterns within the brain at rest could be used to predict a propensity for (dis)honest behavior. Our analyses revealed that functional connectivity, especially between brain networks linked to self-referential thinking (vmPFC, temporal poles, and PCC) and reward processing (caudate nucleus), reliably correlates, in an independent sample, with participants' propensity to cheat. Participants who cheated the most also scored highest on several self-report measures of impulsivity which underscores the generalizability of our results. Notably, when comparing neural and self-report measures, the neural measures were found to be more important in predicting cheating propensity.