Seeing Social: A Neural Signature for Conscious Perception of Social Interactions

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex prioritizes social learning during rest

Sociality is a defining feature of the human experience: We rely on others to ensure survival and cooperate in complex social networks to thrive. Are there brain mechanisms that help ensure we quickly learn about our social world to optimally navigate it? We tested whether portions of the brain's default network engage "by default" to quickly prioritize social learning during the memory consolidation process. To test this possibility, participants underwent functional MRI (fMRI) while viewing scenes from the documentary film, Samsara. This film shows footage of real people and places from around the world. We normed the footage to select scenes that differed along the dimension of sociality, while matched on valence, arousal, interestingness, and familiarity. During fMRI, participants watched the "social" and "nonsocial" scenes, completed a rest scan, and a surprise recognition memory test. Participants showed superior social (vs. nonsocial) memory performance, and the social memory advantage was associated with neural pattern reinstatement during rest in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a key node of the default network. Moreover, it was during early rest that DMPFC social pattern reinstatement was greatest and predicted subsequent social memory performance most strongly, consistent with the "prioritization" account. Results simultaneously update 1) theories of memory consolidation, which have not addressed how social information may be prioritized in the learning process, and 2) understanding of default network function, which remains to be fully characterized. More broadly, the results underscore the inherent human drive to understand our vastly social world.

Individuals who see the good in the bad engage distinctive default network coordination during post-encoding rest

Focusing on the upside of negative events often promotes resilience. Yet, the underlying mechanisms that allow some people to spontaneously see the good in the bad remain unclear. The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotion has long suggested that positive affect, including positivity in the face of negative events, is linked to idiosyncratic thought patterns (i.e., atypical cognitive responses). Yet, evidence in support of this view has been limited, in part, due to difficulty in measuring idiosyncratic cognitive processes as they unfold. To overcome this barrier, we applied Inter-Subject Representational Similarity Analysis to test whether and how idiosyncratic neural responding supports positive reactions to negative experience. We found that idiosyncratic functional connectivity patterns in the brain's default network while resting after a negative experience predicts more positive descriptions of the event. This effect persisted when controlling for connectivity 1) before and during the negative experience, 2) before, during, and after a neutral experience, and 3) between other relevant brain regions (i.e., the limbic system). The relationship between idiosyncratic default network responding and positive affect was largely driven by functional connectivity patterns between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the rest of the default network and occurred relatively quickly during rest. We identified post-encoding rest as a key moment and the default network as a key brain system in which idiosyncratic responses correspond with seeing the good in the bad.

Hierarchical organization of social action features along the lateral visual pathway

Recent theoretical work has argued that in addition to the classical ventral (what) and dorsal (where/how) visual streams, there is a third visual stream on the lateral surface of the brain specialized for processing social information. Like visual representations in the ventral and dorsal streams, representations in the lateral stream are thought to be hierarchically organized. However, no prior studies have comprehensively investigated the organization of naturalistic, social visual content in the lateral stream. To address this question, we curated a naturalistic stimulus set of 250 3-s videos of two people engaged in everyday actions. Each clip was richly annotated for its low-level visual features, mid-level scene and object properties, visual social primitives (including the distance between people and the extent to which they were facing), and high-level information about social interactions and affective content. Using a condition-rich fMRI experiment and a within-subject encoding model approach, we found that low-level visual features are represented in early visual cortex (EVC) and middle temporal (MT) area, mid-level visual social features in extrastriate body area (EBA) and lateral occipital complex (LOC), and high-level social interaction information along the superior temporal sulcus (STS). Communicative interactions, in particular, explained unique variance in regions of the STS after accounting for variance explained by all other labeled features. Taken together, these results provide support for representation of increasingly abstract social visual content-consistent with hierarchical organization-along the lateral visual stream and suggest that recognizing communicative actions may be a key computational goal of the lateral visual pathway.

Seeing social interactions

Seeing the interactions between other people is a critical part of our everyday visual experience, but recognizing the social interactions of others is often considered outside the scope of vision and grouped with higher-level social cognition like theory of mind. Recent work, however, has revealed that recognition of social interactions is efficient and automatic, is well modeled by bottom-up computational algorithms, and occurs in visually-selective regions of the brain. We review recent evidence from these three methodologies (behavioral, computational, and neural) that converge to suggest the core of social interaction perception is visual. We propose a computational framework for how this process is carried out in the brain and offer directions for future interdisciplinary investigations of social perception.

A neural signature of social support mitigates negative emotion

Social support can mitigate the impact of distressing events. Such stress buffering elicits activity in many brain regions, but it remains unclear (1) whether this activity constitutes a stable brain signature, and (2) whether brain activity can predict buffering across people. Here, we developed a neural signature that predicted social buffering of negative emotion in response to real life stressors. During neuroimaging, participants (n = 95) responded to stressful autobiographical memories either naturally, or by imagining a conversation with a peer. Using supervised dimensionality reduction and machine learning techniques, we identified a spatio-temporal neural signature that distinguished between these two trials. Activation of this signature was associated with less negative affect across trials, and people who most activated the signature reported more supportive social connections and lower loneliness outside the lab. Together, this work provides a behaviorally relevant neurophysiological marker for social support that underlies stress buffering.

TMS-induced inhibition of the left premotor cortex modulates illusory social perception

Communicative actions from one person are used to predict another person's response. However, in some cases, these predictions can outweigh the processing of sensory information and lead to illusory social perception such as seeing two people interact, although only one is present (i.e., seeing a Bayesian ghost). We applied either inhibitory brain stimulation over the left premotor cortex (i.e., real TMS) or sham TMS. Then, participants indicated the presence or absence of a masked agent that followed a communicative or individual gesture of another agent. As expected, participants had more false alarms in the communicative (i.e., Bayesian ghosts) than individual condition in the sham TMS session and this difference between conditions vanished after real TMS. In contrast to our hypothesis, the number of false alarms increased (rather than decreased) after real TMS. These pre-registered findings confirm the significance of the premotor cortex for social action predictions and illusory social perception.