Enhanced Neural Responses to Imagined Primary Rewards Predict Reduced Monetary Temporal Discounting

Not all discounts are created equal: Regional activity and brain networks in temporal and effort discounting

Reward outcomes associated with costs like time delay and effort investment are generally discounted in decision-making. Standard economic models predict rewards associated with different types of costs are devalued in a similar manner. However, our review of rodent lesion studies indicated partial dissociations between brain regions supporting temporal- and effort-based decision-making. Another debate is whether options involving low and high costs are processed in different brain substrates (dual-system) or in the same regions (single-system). This research addressed these issues using coordinate-based, connectivity-based, and activation network-based meta-analyses to identify overlapping and separable neural systems supporting temporal (39 studies) and effort (20 studies) discounting. Coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation and resting-state connectivity analyses showed immediate-small reward and delayed-large reward choices engaged distinct regions with unique connectivity profiles, but their activation network mapping was found to engage the default mode network. For effort discounting, salience and sensorimotor networks supported low-effort choices, while the frontoparietal network supported high-effort choices. There was little overlap between the temporal and effort networks. Our findings underscore the importance of differentiating different types of costs in decision-making and understanding discounting at both regional and network levels.

Evidence accumulation, not 'self-control', explains dorsolateral prefrontal activation during normative choice

What role do regions like the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) play in normative behavior (e.g., generosity, healthy eating)? Some models suggest that dlPFC activation during normative choice reflects controlled inhibition or modulation of default hedonistic preferences. Here, we develop an alternative account, showing that evidence accumulation models predict trial-by-trial variation in dlPFC response across three fMRI paradigms and two self-control contexts (altruistic sacrifice and healthy eating). Using these models to simulate a variety of self-control dilemmas generated a novel prediction: although dlPFC activity might typically increase for norm-consistent choices, deliberate self-regulation focused on normative goals should decrease or even reverse this pattern (i.e., greater dlPFC response for hedonistic, self-interested choices). We confirmed these predictions in both altruistic and dietary choice contexts. Our results suggest that dlPFC response during normative choice may depend more on value-based evidence accumulation than inhibition of our baser instincts.

Exploring the impacts of implicit context association and arithmetic booster in impulsivity reduction

People have a higher preference for immediate over delayed rewards, and it is suggested that such an impulsive tendency is governed by one's ability to simulate future rewards. Consistent with this view, recent studies have shown that enforcing individuals to focus on episodic future thoughts reduces their impulsivity. Inspired by these reports, we hypothesized that administration of a simple cognitive task linked to future thinking might effectively modulate individuals' delay discounting. Specifically, we used one associative memory task targeting intervention of context information, and one working memory task targeting enhancement of individual's ability to construct a coherent future event. To measure whether each type of cognitive task reduces individuals' impulsivity, a classic intertemporal choice task was used to quantify individuals' baseline and post-intervention impulsivity. Across two experiments and data from 216 healthy young adult participants, we observed that the impacts of intervention tasks were inconsistent. Still, we observed a significant task repetition effect such that the participants showed more patient choices in the second impulsivity assessment. In conclusion, there was no clear evidence supporting that our suggested intervention tasks reduce individuals' impulsivity, and that the current results call attention to the importance of taking into account task repetition effects in studying the impacts of cognitive training and intervention.

Advances in the computational understanding of mental illness

Computational psychiatry is a rapidly growing field attempting to translate advances in computational neuroscience and machine learning into improved outcomes for patients suffering from mental illness. It encompasses both data-driven and theory-driven efforts. Here, recent advances in theory-driven work are reviewed. We argue that the brain is a computational organ. As such, an understanding of the illnesses arising from it will require a computational framework. The review divides work up into three theoretical approaches that have deep mathematical connections: dynamical systems, Bayesian inference and reinforcement learning. We discuss both general and specific challenges for the field, and suggest ways forward.

Temporal Discounting Impulsivity and Its Association with Conduct Disorder and Irritability

Objectives: Temporal reward discounting impulsivity (TDI) reflects a propensity to choose smaller immediate rather than larger delayed rewards relative to age/IQ-matched peers. Previous work with adults has linked TDI to an increased risk for antisocial behavior but also psychopathology in general. However, little work has examined TDI in adolescents with conduct disorder (CD), or considered whether TDI might be associated dimensionally with traits associated with antisocial behavior, that is, impulsivity, irritability, and/or callous-unemotional traits. In this study TDI was investigated in a large adolescent group with varying levels of antisocial behavior. Methods: Participants consisted of 195 adolescents (67 with CD, 77 in a psychiatric comparison group and 51 typically developing adolescents). Participants performed a temporal discounting task and individual differences were measured through the Connors rating scale for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (impulsivity), Affective Reactivity Index (irritability), and Inventory of Callous-Unemotional traits. Results: The adolescents with CD and those in the psychiatric comparison group showed significantly greater TDI than typically developing adolescents. However, these group differences were abolished when dimensional covariates were included. Irritability was significantly associated with TDI. Conclusions: We conclude that TDI reflects a transdiagnostic form of dysfunction that particularly manifests in adolescents with increased irritability.

The value of what's to come: Neural mechanisms coupling prediction error and the utility of anticipation

Having something to look forward to is a keystone of well-being. Anticipation of future reward, such as an upcoming vacation, can often be more gratifying than the experience itself. Theories suggest the utility of anticipation underpins various behaviors, ranging from beneficial information-seeking to harmful addiction. However, how neural systems compute anticipatory utility remains unclear. We analyzed the brain activity of human participants as they performed a task involving choosing whether to receive information predictive of future pleasant outcomes. Using a computational model, we show three brain regions orchestrate anticipatory utility. Specifically, ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracks the value of anticipatory utility, dopaminergic midbrain correlates with information that enhances anticipation, while sustained hippocampal activity mediates a functional coupling between these regions. Our findings suggest a previously unidentified neural underpinning for anticipation's influence over decision-making and unify a range of phenomena associated with risk and time-delay preference.

Neural correlates of delay discount alterations in addiction and psychiatric disorders: A systematic review of magnetic resonance imaging studies

Delay discounting (DD) represents decreased subjective value for delayed reward relative to the same reward at present. The concept of DD has been applied for pathophysiology of addiction and psychiatric disorders. However, the detailed neuroimaging correlates of DD underlying pathophysiology still remain unclear. Thus, we conducted a systematic review to investigate neural correlates of DD on magnetic resonance imaging studies among addiction and psychiatric disorders. Specific search terms were set on PubMed to identify relevant articles. Initial search identified 551 records and 31 studies met the inclusion criteria. The present review revealed that greater DD was correlated with increased activity in areas related to reward evaluation and prediction as well as decreased activity in areas related to cognitive control. Healthy controls showed smaller changes in activities of these areas associated with DD when compared to patient groups. As the neural basis related to DD, three neural networks have been proposed that are associated with the actions of short-term interests and long-term benefits. Among the three potential neural networks on DD, the first one included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum and implicated in evaluating reward values, the second network included the anterior cingulate cortex and linked to cognitive control, and the third network included the middle temporal gyrus and was involved in predictions and affection. This review generated consistent findings on the neural basis of DD among patients with addiction and psychiatric disorders, which may represent the pathophysiology related to DD and impulsivity of mental illness.

Deliberating trade-offs with the future

Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation-particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)-to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.

Imagining Events Alternative to the Present Can Attenuate Delay Discounting

Previous studies have shown that delay discounting (DD), the tendency to prefer smaller-immediate to larger-delayed rewards, decreases following vivid imagination of future events. Here, we test the hypothesis that imagining complex events alternative to direct (perceptual) experience, whether located in the future, the past, or even the present, would reduce DD. Participants (N = 250) imagined future events (Future condition), remembered past events (Past condition), imagined present events (Present-imagine condition), or reported on the current events (Present-attend condition), and then made a series of intertemporal choices about money and food. Compared to attending to the present, imagining the future reduced DD, but this only held for individuals who claimed vivid pre-experiencing of future events. Importantly, a similar attenuation of DD was found in the Past and Present-imagine conditions, suggesting that a shift in perspective from the perceptual present towards mentally constructed experience can downplay the appraisal of immediate rewards in favor of larger-delayed rewards, regardless of the location of the imagined experience in subjective time.

Preference-based serial decisions are counterintuitively influenced by emotion regulation and conscientiousness

Our decisions have a temporally distributed order, and different choice orders (e.g., choosing preferred items first or last) can lead to vastly different experiences. We previously found two dominant strategies (favorite-first and favorite-last) in a preference-based serial choice setting (the 'sushi problem'). However, it remains unclear why these two opposite behavioral patterns arise: i.e., the mechanisms underlying them. Here we developed a novel serial-choice task, using pictures based on attractiveness, to test for a possible shared mechanism with delay discounting, the 'peak-end' bias (i.e., preference for experienced sequences that end well), or working-memory capacity. We also collected psychological and clinical metric data on personality, depression, anxiety, and emotion regulation. We again found the two dominant selection strategies. However, the results of the delay, peak-end bias, and memory capacity tasks were not related to serial choice, while two key psychological metrics were: emotion regulation and conscientiousness (with agreeableness also marginally related). Favorite-first strategists actually regulated emotions better, suggesting better tolerance of negative outcomes. Whereas participants with more varied strategies across trials were more conscientious (and perhaps agreeable), suggesting that they were less willing to settle for a single, simpler strategy. Our findings clarify mechanisms underlying serial choice and show that it may reflect a unique ability to organize choices into sequences of events.

Self-regulation of the dopaminergic reward circuit in cocaine users with mental imagery and neurofeedback

BACKGROUND

Enhanced drug-related reward sensitivity accompanied by impaired sensitivity to non-drug related rewards in the mesolimbic dopamine system are thought to underlie the broad motivational deficits and dysfunctional decision-making frequently observed in cocaine use disorder (CUD). Effective approaches to modify this imbalance and reinstate non-drug reward responsiveness are urgently needed. Here, we examined whether cocaine users (CU) can use mental imagery of non-drug rewards to self-regulate the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra (VTA/SN). We expected that obsessive and compulsive thoughts about cocaine consumption would hamper the ability to self-regulate the VTA/SN activity and tested if real-time fMRI (rtfMRI) neurofeedback (NFB) can improve self-regulation of the VTA/SN.

METHODS

Twenty-two CU and 28 healthy controls (HC) were asked to voluntarily up-regulate VTA/SN activity with non-drug reward imagery alone, or combined with rtfMRI NFB.

RESULTS

On a group level, HC and CU were able to activate the dopaminergic midbrain and other reward regions with reward imagery. In CU, the individual ability to self-regulate the VTA/SN was reduced in those with more severe obsessive-compulsive drug use. NFB enhanced the effect of reward imagery but did not result in transfer effects at the end of the session.

CONCLUSION

CU can voluntary activate their reward system with non-drug reward imagery and improve this ability with rtfMRI NFB. Combining mental imagery and rtFMRI NFB has great potential for modifying the maladapted reward sensitivity and reinstating non-drug reward responsiveness. This motivates further work to examine the use of rtfMRI NFB in the treatment of CUD.

Mental Imagery Training Increases Wanting of Rewards and Reward Sensitivity and Reduces Depressive Symptoms

High reward sensitivity and wanting of rewarding stimuli help to identify and motivate repetition of pleasant activities. This behavioral activation is thought to increase positive emotions. Therefore, both mechanisms are highly relevant for resilience against depressive symptoms. Yet, these mechanisms have not been targeted by psychotherapeutic interventions. In the present study, we tested a mental imagery training comprising eight 10-minute sessions every second day and delivered via the Internet to healthy volunteers (N = 30, 21 female, mean age of 23.8 years, Caucasian) who were preselected for low reward sensitivity. Participants were paired according to age, sex, reward sensitivity, and mental imagery ability. Then, members of each pair were randomly assigned to either the intervention or wait condition. Ratings of wanting and response bias toward probabilistic reward cues (Probabilistic Reward Task) served as primary outcomes. We further tested whether training effects extended to approach behavior (Approach Avoidance Task) and depressive symptoms (Beck Depression Inventory). The intervention led to an increase in wanting (p < .001, η²_p= .45) and reward sensitivity (p = .004, η²_p= .27). Further, the training group displayed faster approach toward positive edibles and activities (p = .025, η²_p= .18) and reductions in depressive symptoms (p = .028, η²_p= .16). Results extend existing literature by showing that mental imagery training can increase wanting of rewarding stimuli and reward sensitivity. Further, the training appears to reduce depressive symptoms and thus may foster the successful implementation of exsiting treatments for depression such as behavioral activation and could also increase resilience against depressive symptoms.

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.