Altruism under Stress: Cortisol Negatively Predicts Charitable Giving and Neural Value Representations Depending on Mentalizing Capacity

The convergence between defence and care in mammals

The motivations to protect oneself and others have often been seen as conflicting. Here, we discuss recent evidence that self-defensive mechanisms may in fact be recruited to enable the helping of others. In some instances, the defensive response to a threat may even be more decisive in promoting helping than the response to a conspecific's distress (as predicted by empathy-altruism models). In light of this evidence, we propose that neural mechanisms implicated in self-defence may have been repurposed through evolution to enable the protection of others, and that defence and care may be convergent rather than conflicting functions. Finally, we present and discuss a working model of the shared brain mechanisms implicated in defence of both self and others.

No effects of acute stress on monetary delay discounting: A systematic literature review and meta-analysis

Many everyday decisions, including those concerning our health, finances and the environment, involve choosing between a smaller but imminent reward (e.g., €20 now) and a later but larger reward (e.g., €40 in a month). The extent to which an individual prefers smaller imminent rewards over larger delayed rewards can be measured using delay discounting tasks. Acute stress induces a cascade of biological and psychological responses with potential consequences for how individuals think about the future, process rewards, and make decisions, all of which can impact delay discounting. Several studies have shown that individuals focus more on imminent rewards under stress. These findings have been used to explain why individuals make detrimental choices under acute stress. Yet, the evidence linking acute stress to delay discounting is equivocal. To address this uncertainty, we conducted a meta-analysis of 11 studies (14 effects) to systematically quantify the effects of acute stress on monetary delay discounting. Overall, we find no effect of acute stress on delay discounting, compared to control conditions (SMD = -0.18, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.20], p = 0.32). We also find that neither the gender/sex of the participants, the type of stressor (e.g., physical vs. psychosocial) nor whether monetary decisions were hypothetical or incentivized (i.e. monetary decisions were actually paid out) moderated the impact of acute stress on monetary delay discounting. We argue that establishing the effects of acute stress on the separate processes involved in delay discounting, such as reward valuation and prospection, will help to resolve the inconsistencies in the field.

Acute stress during witnessing injustice shifts third-party interventions from punishing the perpetrator to helping the victim

People tend to intervene in others' injustices by either punishing the transgressor or helping the victim. Injustice events often occur under stressful circumstances. However, how acute stress affects a third party's intervention in injustice events remains open. Here, we show a stress-induced shift in third parties' willingness to engage in help instead of punishment by acting on emotional salience and central-executive and theory-of-mind networks. Acute stress decreased the third party's willingness to punish the violator and the severity of the punishment and increased their willingness to help the victim. Computational modeling revealed a shift in preference of justice recovery from punishment the offender toward help the victim under stress. This finding is consistent with the increased dorsolateral prefrontal engagement observed with higher amygdala activity and greater connectivity with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the stress group. A brain connectivity theory-of-mind network predicted stress-induced justice recovery in punishment. Our findings suggest a neurocomputational mechanism of how acute stress reshapes third parties' decisions by reallocating neural resources in emotional, executive, and mentalizing networks to inhibit punishment bias and decrease punishment severity.

Acute stress reduces effortful prosocial behaviour

Acute stress can change our cognition and emotions, but what specific consequences this has for human prosocial behaviour is unclear. Previous studies have mainly investigated prosociality with financial transfers in economic games and produced conflicting results. Yet a core feature of many types of prosocial behaviour is that they are effortful. We therefore examined how acute stress changes our willingness to exert effort that benefits others. Healthy male participants - half of whom were put under acute stress - made decisions whether to exert physical effort to gain money for themselves or another person. With this design, we could independently assess the effects of acute stress on prosocial, compared to self-benefitting, effortful behaviour. Compared to controls (n = 45), participants in the stress group (n = 46) chose to exert effort more often for self- than for other-benefitting rewards at a low level of effort. Additionally, the adverse effects of stress on prosocial effort were particularly pronounced in more selfish participants. Neuroimaging combined with computational modelling revealed a putative neural mechanism underlying these effects: more stressed participants showed increased activation to subjective value in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula when they themselves could benefit from their exerted effort relative to when someone else could. By using an effort-based task that better approximates real-life prosocial behaviour and incorporating trait differences in prosocial tendencies, our study provides important insights into how acute stress affects prosociality and its associated neural mechanisms.

Higher subjective socioeconomic status is linked to increased charitable giving and mentalizing-related neural value coding

Socioeconomic status (SES), a concept related to an individual's economic and social position relative to others, can shape social interactions like altruistic behaviors. However, little is known about the exact neurocognitive mechanisms that link SES with altruism. Our study aimed to provide a comprehensive account of the sociocognitive and neural mechanisms through which SES affects charitable giving - an important variant of human altruism. To this end, participants completed a charitable donation task while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We also assessed participants' socio-cognitive ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) - a driver of prosocial behavior - in an independent social task. Behaviorally, we found that both charitable giving and social cognition were status-dependent, as subjective SES positively predicted donations and mentalizing capacity. Moreover, the link between SES and charitable giving was mediated by individuals' mentalizing capacity. At the neural level, a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data revealed that higher subjective SES was associated with stronger value coding in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). The strength of this value representation predicted charitable giving and was linked to mentalizing. Furthermore, we observed an increased negative functional coupling between rTPJ and left putamen with higher SES. Together, increased charitable giving in higher-status individuals could be explained by status-dependent recruitment of mentalizing-related value coding and altered functional connectivity in the brain. Our findings provide insights into the socio- and neurocognitive mechanisms explaining why and when higher SES leads to prosociality, which might ultimately inform targeted interventions to promote prosocial behavior in human societies.

Neural signatures of social inferences predict the number of real-life social contacts and autism severity

We regularly infer other people's thoughts and feelings from observing their actions, but how this ability contributes to successful social behavior and interactions remains unknown. We show that neural activation patterns during social inferences obtained in the laboratory predict the number of social contacts in the real world, as measured by the social network index, in three neurotypical samples (total n = 126) and one sample of autistic adults (n = 23). We also show that brain patterns during social inference generalize across individuals in these groups. Cross-validated associations between brain activations and social inference localize selectively to the right posterior superior temporal sulcus and were specific for social, but not nonsocial, inference. Activation within this same brain region also predicts autism-like trait scores from questionnaires and autism symptom severity. Thus, neural activations produced while thinking about other people's mental states predict variance in multiple indices of social functioning in the real world.

Acute Social Stress Influences Moral Decision-Making Under Different Social Distances in Young Healthy Men

Acute social stress has been shown to influence social decision-making. This study aimed to examine how social distance modulates the influence of acute social stress on young male moral decision-making. Sixty healthy male college students were randomly divided to be exposed to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) or a placebo version of the TSST (P-TSST) before they performed moral decision-making tasks. The results showed that participants under acute social stress showed obvious increases in subjective stress perception, negative affect, salivary cortisol, and alpha-amylase and made more altruistic choices for others compared to the control group. However, social distance regulates the promotion of this acute social stress, with the promotion effect being stronger in socially distant others. Furthermore, the interpersonal order difference of different social distances in altruistic decisions is smaller in low-conflict dilemmas than in high-conflict dilemmas. In addition, an increase in salivary cortisol was positively correlated with altruistic choices toward both acquaintances and strangers, whereas an increase in salivary alpha-amylase was only positively correlated with altruistic choices toward friends. The results suggest that social distance modulates the promotion of acute social stress on moral decision-making, which might stem from the divergent effects of cortisol and alpha-amylase.

The acute effects of stress on dishonesty are moderated by individual differences in moral default

In daily life we regularly must decide whether to act dishonestly for personal gain or to be honest and maintain a positive image of ourselves. While evidence suggests that acute stress influences moral decisions, it is unclear whether stress increases or decreases immoral behavior. Here, we hypothesize that stress, through its effects on cognitive control, has different effects on moral decision making for different individuals, depending on their moral default. We test this hypothesis by combining a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating with a well-established stress induction task. Our findings confirm our hypothesis, revealing that effects of stress on dishonesty are not uniform, but instead depend on the individual: for those who are relatively dishonest, stress increases dishonesty, whereas for participants who are relatively honest stress makes them more honest. These findings go a long way in resolving the conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of stress on moral decisions, suggesting that stress affects dishonesty differently for different individuals, depending on their moral default.

Sleep loss leads to the withdrawal of human helping across individuals, groups, and large-scale societies

Humans help each other. This fundamental feature of homo sapiens has been one of the most powerful forces sculpting the advent of modern civilizations. But what determines whether humans choose to help one another? Across 3 replicating studies, here, we demonstrate that sleep loss represents one previously unrecognized factor dictating whether humans choose to help each other, observed at 3 different scales (within individuals, across individuals, and across societies). First, at an individual level, 1 night of sleep loss triggers the withdrawal of help from one individual to another. Moreover, fMRI findings revealed that the withdrawal of human helping is associated with deactivation of key nodes within the social cognition brain network that facilitates prosociality. Second, at a group level, ecological night-to-night reductions in sleep across several nights predict corresponding next-day reductions in the choice to help others during day-to-day interactions. Third, at a large-scale national level, we demonstrate that 1 h of lost sleep opportunity, inflicted by the transition to Daylight Saving Time, reduces real-world altruistic helping through the act of donation giving, established through the analysis of over 3 million charitable donations. Therefore, inadequate sleep represents a significant influential force determining whether humans choose to help one another, observable across micro- and macroscopic levels of civilized interaction. The implications of this effect may be non-trivial when considering the essentiality of human helping in the maintenance of cooperative, civil society, combined with the reported decline in sufficient sleep in many first-world nations.