Dissociating Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing: The P300 Is Not a Reliable Marker of Somatosensory Target Detection

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

Somatosensory omissions reveal action-related predictive processing

The intricate relation between action and somatosensory perception has been studied extensively in the past decades. Generally, a forward model is thought to predict the somatosensory consequences of an action. These models propose that when an action is reliably coupled to a tactile stimulus, unexpected absence of the stimulus should elicit prediction error. Although such omission responses have been demonstrated in the auditory modality, it remains unknown whether this mechanism generalizes across modalities. This study therefore aimed to record action-induced somatosensory omission responses using EEG in humans. Self-paced button presses were coupled to somatosensory stimuli in 88% of trials, allowing a prediction, or in 50% of trials, not allowing a prediction. In the 88% condition, stimulus omission resulted in a neural response consisting of multiple components, as revealed by temporal principal component analysis. The oN1 response suggests similar sensory sources as stimulus-evoked activity, but an origin outside primary cortex. Subsequent oN2 and oP3 responses, as previously observed in the auditory domain, likely reflect modality-unspecific higher order processes. Together, findings straightforwardly demonstrate somatosensory predictions during action and provide evidence for a partially amodal mechanism of prediction error generation.

Multimodal acoustic-electric trigeminal nerve stimulation modulates conscious perception

Multimodal stimulation can reverse pathological neural activity and improve symptoms in neuropsychiatric diseases. Recent research shows that multimodal acoustic-electric trigeminal-nerve stimulation (TNS) (i.e., musical stimulation synchronized to electrical stimulation of the trigeminal nerve) can improve consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness. However, the reliability and mechanism of this novel approach remain largely unknown. We explored the effects of multimodal acoustic-electric TNS in healthy human participants by assessing conscious perception before and after stimulation using behavioral and neural measures in tactile and auditory target-detection tasks. To explore the mechanisms underlying the putative effects of acoustic-electric stimulation, we fitted a biologically plausible neural network model to the neural data using dynamic causal modeling. We observed that (1) acoustic-electric stimulation improves conscious tactile perception without a concomitant change in auditory perception, (2) this improvement is caused by the interplay of the acoustic and electric stimulation rather than any of the unimodal stimulation alone, and (3) the effect of acoustic-electric stimulation on conscious perception correlates with inter-regional connection changes in a recurrent neural processing model. These results provide evidence that acoustic-electric TNS can promote conscious perception. Alterations in inter-regional cortical connections might be the mechanism by which acoustic-electric TNS achieves its consciousness benefits.

Stimulus awareness is associated with secondary somatosensory cortex activation in an inattentional numbness paradigm

While inattentional blindness and deafness studies have revealed neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) without the confound of task relevance in the visual and auditory modality, comparable studies for the somatosensory modality are lacking. Here, we investigated NCC using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in an inattentional numbness paradigm. Participants (N = 44) received weak electrical stimulation on the left hand while solving a demanding visual task. Half of the participants were informed that task-irrelevant weak tactile stimuli above the detection threshold would be applied during the experiment, while the other half expected stimuli below the detection threshold. Unexpected awareness assessments after the experiment revealed that altogether 10 participants did not consciously perceive the somatosensory stimuli during the visual task. Awareness was not significantly modulated by prior information. The fMRI data show that awareness of stimuli led to increased activation in the contralateral secondary somatosensory cortex. We found no significant effects of stimulus awareness in the primary somatosensory cortex or frontoparietal areas. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that somatosensory stimulus awareness is mainly based on activation in higher areas of the somatosensory cortex and does not require strong activation in extended anterior or posterior networks, which is usually seen when perceived stimuli are task-relevant.

The Current of Consciousness: Neural Correlates and Clinical Aspects

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

In this review, we summarize the current understanding of consciousness including its neuroanatomic basis. We discuss major theories of consciousness, physical exam-based and electroencephalographic metrics used to stratify levels of consciousness, and tools used to shed light on the neural correlates of the conscious experience. Lastly, we review an expanded category of 'disorders of consciousness,' which includes disorders that impact either the level or experience of consciousness.

RECENT FINDINGS

Recent studies have revealed many of the requisite EEG, ERP, and fMRI signals to predict aspects of the conscious experience. Neurological disorders that disrupt the reticular activating system can affect the level of consciousness, whereas cortical disorders from seizures and migraines to strokes and dementia may disrupt phenomenal consciousness. The recently introduced memory theory of consciousness provides a new explanation of phenomenal consciousness that may explain better than prior theories both experimental studies and the neurologist's clinical experience. Although the complete neurobiological basis of consciousness remains a mystery, recent advances have improved our understanding of the physiology underlying level of consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

Neural correlates of consciousness in an attentional blink paradigm with uncertain target relevance

Several event-related potentials (ERPs) have been proposed as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), most prominently the early visual awareness negativity (VAN) and the late P3b component. Highly influential support for the P3b comes from studies utilizing the attentional blink (AB), where conscious perception of a first visual target (T1) impairs reporting a second target (T2) presented shortly afterwards. Recent no-report studies using other paradigms suggest that the P3b component may reflect post-perceptual processes associated with decision-making rather than awareness. However, no-report studies are limited in their awareness assessment, and their conclusions have not been tested in an AB paradigm. The present study (N = 38) addressed these issues using a novel AB paradigm, which reduced decision-making processes by omitting a discrimination task on T2 stimuli and rendering their relevance uncertain. Nevertheless, awareness was assessed trial by trial. Comparing ERPs in response to seen versus unseen T2 stimuli revealed a VAN but no enhanced P3b regardless of whether they were marked as distinct from distractor stimuli or not. Our results corroborate the VAN and challenge the P3b as NCC despite rigorous trial-by-trial assessment of conscious perception. Thus, they support the idea that awareness emerges during early sensory processing.

More than a feeling: Scalp EEG and eye signals in conscious tactile perception

Understanding the neural basis of consciousness is a fundamental goal of neuroscience, and sensory perception is often used as a proxy for consciousness in empirical studies. However, most studies rely on reported perception of visual stimuli. Here we present behavior, high density scalp EEG and eye metric recordings collected simultaneously during a novel tactile threshold perception task. We found significant N80, N140 and P300 event related potentials in perceived trials and in perceived versus not perceived trials. Significance was limited to a P100 and P300 in not perceived trials. We also found an increase in pupil diameter and blink rate and a decrease in microsaccade rate following perceived relative to not perceived tactile stimuli. These findings support the use of eye metrics as a measure of physiological arousal associated with conscious perception. Eye metrics may also represent a novel path toward the creation of tactile no-report tasks in the future.

Early and late electrophysiological correlates of gradual perceptual awareness in- and outside the Attentional Blink window

There is an ongoing debate on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the attentional blink (AB). Theoretical accounts propose that NCC during the attentional blink occur late in the processing hierarchy and that this quality is specific to the AB. We investigated this question by recording event-related potentials during an AB experiment with faces as T2. We analyzed ERPs to T2 stimuli inside (short lag) and outside (long lag) the AB window after carefully calibrating T2 stimuli to ensure equal visibility ratings across lags. We found that the N170, the visual awareness negativity (VAN), and the P3b showed an increased amplitude for seen compared to unseen face stimuli regardless of stimulus lag and that all these components scale linearly with subjective visibility. These findings suggest similar early and late mechanisms of graded perceptual awareness within and outside the AB across perceptual (N170, VAN) and post-perceptual (P3b) processing stages.

Neural dynamics of illusory tactile pulling sensations

Directional tactile pulling sensations are integral to everyday life, but their neural mechanisms remain unknown. Prior accounts hold that primary somatosensory (SI) activity is sufficient to generate pulling sensations, with alternative proposals suggesting that amodal frontal or parietal regions may be critical. We combined high-density EEG with asymmetric vibration, which creates an illusory pulling sensation, thereby unconfounding pulling sensations from unrelated sensorimotor processes. Oddballs that created opposite direction pulls to common stimuli were compared to the same oddballs after neutral common stimuli (symmetric vibration) and to neutral oddballs. We found evidence against the sensory-frontal N140 and in favor of the midline P200 tracking the emergence of pulling sensations, specifically contralateral parietal lobe activity 264-320ms, centered on the intraparietal sulcus. This suggests that SI is not sufficient to generate pulling sensations, which instead depend on the parietal association cortex, and may reflect the extraction of orientation information and related spatial processing.

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Tactile pulling sensations are difficult to isolate in the human brain

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Illusory pulls from asymmetric vibration allow neural activity to be isolated

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Pulling sensations are driven by parietal lobe activity 264-320ms post-stimulus

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Spatial processing in the parietal lobe may be essential for pulling sensations

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals – neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons’ reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

P3b Does Not Reflect Perceived Contrasts

It has been shown that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness per se but is instead more closely associated with postperceptual processing (Cohen et al., 2020). Here, we seek to investigate whether human participants’ attentional states are different in the report and the no-report conditions. This difference in attentional states, if exists, may lead to degraded consciousness of the stimuli in the no-report condition, and it therefore remains unknown whether the disappearance of P3b is because of a lack of reportability or degraded consciousness. Results of our experiment 1 showed that participants did experience degraded contents of consciousness in the no-report condition. However, results of experiment 2 showed that the degraded contents of consciousness did not influence the amplitude of P3b. These findings strengthen the claim that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness but is associated with postperceptual processing.

Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) - Bridging the gap of neuronal activity and phenomenal states

Consciousness and its neural mechanisms remain a mystery. Current neuroscientific theories focus predominantly on the external input/stimulus and the associated stimulus-related activity during conscious contents. Despite all progress, we encounter two gaps: (i) a gap between spontaneous and stimulus-related activity; (ii) a gap between neuronal and phenomenal features. A novel, different, and unique approach, Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC) aims to bridge both gaps. The TTC focuses on the brain's spontaneous activity and how its spatial topography and temporal dynamic shape stimulus-related activity and resurface in the corresponding spatial and temporal features of consciousness, i.e., 'common currency'. The TTC introduces four temporo-spatial mechanisms: expansion, globalization, alignment, and nestedness. These are associated with distinct dimensions of consciousness including phenomenal content, access, form/structure, and level/state, respectively. Following up on the first introduction of the TTC in 2017, we review updates, further develop these temporo-spatial mechanisms, and postulate specific neurophenomenal hypotheses. We conclude that the TTC offers a viable approach for (i) linking spontaneous and stimulus-related activity in conscious states; (ii) determining specific neuronal and neurophenomenal mechanisms for the distinct dimensions of consciousness; (iii) an integrative and unifying framework of different neuroscientific theories of consciousness; and (iv) offers novel empirically grounded conceptual assumptions about the biological and ontological nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain.

Representational 'touch' and modulatory 'retouch'-two necessary neurobiological processes in thalamocortical interaction for conscious experience

Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

Early and late evoked brain responses differentially reflect feature encoding and perception in the flash-lag illusion

In the flash-lag illusion (FLI), the position of a flash presented ahead of a moving bar is mislocalized, so the flash appears to lag the bar. Currently, it is not clear whether this effect is due to early perceptual-related neural processes such as motion extrapolation or reentrant processing, or due to later feedback processing relating to postdiction, i.e., retroactively altered perception. We presented 17 participants with the FLI paradigm while recording EEG. A central flash occurred either 51 ms ("early") or 16 ms ("late") before the bar moving from left to right reached the screen center. Participants judged whether the flash appeared to the right ("no flash lag illusion") or to the left ("flash-lag illusion") of the bar. Using single-trial linear modeling, we examined the influence of timing ("early" vs. "late") and perception ("illusion" vs. "no illusion") on flash-evoked brain responses and estimated the cortical sources underlying the FLI. An earlier frontal and occipital component (200-276 ms) differentiated time-locked early vs. late stimulus presentation, indicating that early evoked brain responses reflect feature encoding in the FLI. Perception of the FLI was associated with a late window (368-452 ms) in the ERP, with larger deflections for illusion than no illusion trials, localized to the left inferior occipital gyrus. This suggests a postdiction-related reconstruction of ambiguous sensory stimulation involving late processes in the occipito-temporal cortex, previously associated with temporal integration phenomena. Our findings indicate that perception of the FLI relies on an interplay between ongoing stimulus encoding of the moving bar and feedback processing of the flash, which takes place at later integration stages.

ERP signatures of auditory awareness in cross-modal distractor-induced deafness

Previous research showed that dual-task processes such as the attentional blink are not always transferable from unimodal to cross-modal settings. This study investigated whether such a transfer can be stated for a distractor-induced impairment of target detection established in vision (distractor-induced blindness, DIB) and recently observed in the auditory modality (distractor-induced deafness, DID). A cross-modal DID effect was confirmed: The detection of an auditory target indicated by a visual cue was impaired if multiple auditory distractors preceded the target. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to identify psychophysiological correlates of target detection. A frontal negativity about 200 ms succeeded by a sustained, widespread negativity was associated with auditory target awareness. In contrast to unimodal findings, P3 amplitude was not enhanced for hits. The results support the notion that early frontal attentional processes are linked to auditory awareness, whereas the P3 does not seem to be a reliable indicator of target access.

Neural excitability and sensory input determine intensity perception with opposing directions in initial cortical responses

Perception of sensory information is determined by stimulus features (e.g., intensity) and instantaneous neural states (e.g., excitability). Commonly, it is assumed that both are reflected similarly in evoked brain potentials, that is, larger amplitudes are associated with a stronger percept of a stimulus. We tested this assumption in a somatosensory discrimination task in humans, simultaneously assessing (i) single-trial excitatory post-synaptic currents inferred from short-latency somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs), (ii) pre-stimulus alpha oscillations (8–13 Hz), and (iii) peripheral nerve measures. Fluctuations of neural excitability shaped the perceived stimulus intensity already during the very first cortical response (at ~20 ms) yet demonstrating opposite neural signatures as compared to the effect of presented stimulus intensity. We reconcile this discrepancy via a common framework based on the modulation of electro-chemical membrane gradients linking neural states and responses, which calls for reconsidering conventional interpretations of brain potential magnitudes in stimulus intensity encoding.

Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness

Much research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has focused on two evoked potentials, the P3b and the visual or auditory awareness negativity (VAN, AAN). Surveying a broad range of recent experimental evidence, we find that repeated failures to observe the P3b during conscious perception eliminate it as a putative NCC. Neither the VAN nor the AAN have been dissociated from consciousness; furthermore, a similar neural signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities can be maximal contralateral to the evoking stimulus, are likely generated in underlying sensory cortices, and point to the existence of a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) reflecting the onset of sensory consciousness.