Can a Population Targeted by a CRISPR-Based Homing Gene Drive Be Rescued?

Gene drives for the extinction of wild metapopulations

Population-suppressing gene drives may be capable of extinguishing wild populations, with proposed applications in conservation, agriculture, and public health. However, unintended and potentially disastrous consequences of release of drive-engineered individuals are extremely difficult to predict. We propose a model for the dynamics of a sex ratio-biasing drive, and using simulations, we show that failure of the suppression drive is often a natural outcome due to stochastic and spatial effects. We further demonstrate rock-paper-scissors dynamics among wild-type, drive-infected, and extinct populations that can persist for arbitrarily long times. Gene drive-mediated extinction of wild populations entails critical complications that lurk far beyond the reach of laboratory-based studies. Our findings help in addressing these challenges.

Repeat mediated excision of gene drive elements for restoring wild-type populations

We demonstrate here that single strand annealing (SSA) repair can be co-opted for the precise autocatalytic excision of a drive element. Although SSA is not the predominant form of DNA repair in eukaryotic organisms, we increased the likelihood of its use by engineering direct repeats at sites flanking the drive allele, and then introducing a double-strand DNA break (DSB) at a second endonuclease target site encoded within the drive allele. We have termed this technology Re peat M ediated E xcision of a D rive E lement (ReMEDE). Incorporation of ReMEDE into the previously described mutagenic chain reaction (MCR) gene drive, targeting the yellow gene of Drosophila melanogaster , replaced drive alleles with wild-type alleles demonstrating proof-of-principle. Although the ReMEDE system requires further research and development, the technology has a number of attractive features as a gene drive mitigation strategy, chief among these the potential to restore a wild-type population without releasing additional transgenic organisms or large-scale environmental engineering efforts.

Leveraging eco-evolutionary models for gene drive risk assessment

Engineered gene drives create potential for both widespread benefits and irreversible harms to ecosystems. CRISPR-based systems of allelic conversion have rapidly accelerated gene drive research across diverse taxa, putting field trials and their necessary risk assessments on the horizon. Dynamic process-based models provide flexible quantitative platforms to predict gene drive outcomes in the context of system-specific ecological and evolutionary features. Here, we synthesize gene drive dynamic modeling studies to highlight research trends, knowledge gaps, and emergent principles, organized around their genetic, demographic, spatial, environmental, and implementation features. We identify the phenomena that most significantly influence model predictions, discuss limitations of biological complexity and uncertainty, and provide insights to promote responsible development and model-assisted risk assessment of gene drives.

Genetic Approaches for Controlling CRISPR-based Autonomous Homing Gene Drives

CRISPR-based autonomous homing gene drives are a potentially transformative technology with the power to reduce the prevalence of, or even eliminate, vector-borne diseases, agricultural pests, and invasive species. However, there are a number of regulatory, ethical, environmental, and sociopolitical concerns surrounding the potential use of gene drives, particularly regarding the possibility for any unintended outcomes that might result from such a powerful technology. Therefore, there is an imminent need for countermeasures or technologies capable of exerting precise spatiotemporal control of gene drives, if their transformative potential is ever to be fully realized. This review summarizes the current state of the art in the development of technologies to prevent the uncontrolled spread of CRISPR-based autonomous homing gene drives.

The spore killers, fungal meiotic driver elements

During meiosis, both alleles of any given gene should have equal chances of being inherited by the progeny. There are a number of reasons why, however, this is not the case, with one of the most intriguing instances presenting itself as the phenomenon of meiotic drive. Genes that are capable of driving can manipulate the ratio of alleles among viable meiotic products so that they are inherited in more than half of them. In many cases, this effect is achieved by direct antagonistic interactions, where the driving allele inhibits or otherwise eliminates the alternative allele. In ascomycete fungi, meiotic products are packaged directly into ascospores; thus, the effect of meiotic drive has been given the nefarious moniker, "spore killing." In recent years, many of the known spore killers have been elevated from mysterious phenotypes to well-described systems at genetic, genomic, and molecular levels. In this review, we describe the known diversity of spore killers and synthesize the varied pieces of data from each system into broader trends regarding genome architecture, mechanisms of resistance, the role of transposable elements, their effect on population dynamics, speciation and gene flow, and finally how they may be developed as synthetic drivers. We propose that spore killing is common, but that it is under-observed because of a lack of studies on natural populations. We encourage researchers to seek new spore killers to build on the knowledge that these remarkable genetic elements can teach us about meiotic drive, genomic conflict, and evolution more broadly.

Gene drives gaining speed

Gene drives are selfish genetic elements that are transmitted to progeny at super-Mendelian (>50%) frequencies. Recently developed CRISPR-Cas9-based gene-drive systems are highly efficient in laboratory settings, offering the potential to reduce the prevalence of vector-borne diseases, crop pests and non-native invasive species. However, concerns have been raised regarding the potential unintended impacts of gene-drive systems. This Review summarizes the phenomenal progress in this field, focusing on optimal design features for full-drive elements (drives with linked Cas9 and guide RNA components) that either suppress target mosquito populations or modify them to prevent pathogen transmission, allelic drives for updating genetic elements, mitigating strategies including trans-complementing split-drives and genetic neutralizing elements, and the adaptation of drive technology to other organisms. These scientific advances, combined with ethical and social considerations, will facilitate the transparent and responsible advancement of these technologies towards field implementation.

Gene drive strategies of pest control in agricultural systems: Challenges and opportunities

Recent advances in gene-editing technologies have opened new avenues for genetic pest control strategies, in particular around the use of gene drives to suppress or modify pest populations. Significant uncertainty, however, surrounds the applicability of these strategies to novel target species, their efficacy in natural populations and their eventual safety and acceptability as control methods. In this article, we identify issues associated with the potential use of gene drives in agricultural systems, to control pests and diseases that impose a significant cost to agriculture around the world. We first review the need for innovative approaches and provide an overview of the most relevant biological and ecological traits of agricultural pests that could impact the outcome of gene drive approaches. We then describe the specific challenges associated with using gene drives in agricultural systems, as well as the opportunities that these environments may offer, focusing in particular on the advantages of high-threshold gene drives. Overall, we aim to provide a comprehensive view of the potential opportunities and the remaining uncertainties around the use of gene drives in agricultural systems.

Risk management recommendations for environmental releases of gene drive modified insects

The ability to engineer gene drives (genetic elements that bias their own inheritance) has sparked enthusiasm and concerns. Engineered gene drives could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in the control of insect disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species. However, risk concerns and uncertainty associated with potential environmental release of gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have led some stakeholders to call for a global moratorium on such releases or the application of other strict precautionary measures to mitigate perceived risk assessment and risk management challenges. Instead, we provide recommendations that may help to improve the relevance of risk assessment and risk management frameworks for environmental releases of GDMIs. These recommendations include: (1) developing additional and more practical risk assessment guidance to ensure appropriate levels of safety; (2) making policy goals and regulatory decision-making criteria operational for use in risk assessment so that what constitutes harm is clearly defined; (3) ensuring a more dynamic interplay between risk assessment and risk management to manage uncertainty through closely interlinked pre-release modelling and post-release monitoring; (4) considering potential risks against potential benefits, and comparing them with those of alternative actions to account for a wider (management) context; and (5) implementing a modular, phased approach to authorisations for incremental acceptance and management of risks and uncertainty. Along with providing stakeholder engagement opportunities in the risk analysis process, the recommendations proposed may enable risk managers to make choices that are more proportionate and adaptive to potential risks, uncertainty and benefits of GDMI applications, and socially robust.

A genetically encoded anti-CRISPR protein constrains gene drive spread and prevents population suppression

CRISPR-based gene drives offer promising means to reduce the burden of pests and vector-borne diseases. These techniques consist of releasing genetically modified organisms carrying CRISPR-Cas nucleases designed to bias their inheritance and rapidly propagate desired modifications. Gene drives can be intended to reduce reproductive capacity of harmful insects or spread anti-pathogen effectors through wild populations, even when these confer fitness disadvantages. Technologies capable of halting the spread of gene drives may prove highly valuable in controlling, counteracting, and even reverting their effect on individual organisms as well as entire populations. Here we show engineering and testing of a genetic approach, based on the germline expression of a phage-derived anti-CRISPR protein (AcrIIA4), able to inactivate CRISPR-based gene drives and restore their inheritance to Mendelian rates in the malaria vector Anopheles gambiae. Modeling predictions and cage testing show that a single release of male mosquitoes carrying the AcrIIA4 protein can block the spread of a highly effective suppressive gene drive preventing population collapse of caged malaria mosquitoes.

Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment

Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.

Designing gene drives to limit spillover to non-target populations

The prospect of utilizing CRISPR-based gene-drive technology for controlling populations has generated much excitement. However, the potential for spillovers of gene-drive alleles from the target population to non-target populations has raised concerns. Here, using mathematical models, we investigate the possibility of limiting spillovers to non-target populations by designing differential-targeting gene drives, in which the expected equilibrium gene-drive allele frequencies are high in the target population but low in the non-target population. We find that achieving differential targeting is possible with certain configurations of gene-drive parameters, but, in most cases, only under relatively low migration rates between populations. Under high migration, differential targeting is possible only in a narrow region of the parameter space. Because fixation of the gene drive in the non-target population could severely disrupt ecosystems, we outline possible ways to avoid this outcome. We apply our model to two potential applications of gene drives—field trials for malaria-vector gene drives and control of invasive species on islands. We discuss theoretical predictions of key requirements for differential targeting and their practical implications.

CRISPR-based gene drive is an emerging genetic engineering technology that enables engineered genetic variants, which are usually designed to be harmful to the organism carrying them, to be spread rapidly in populations. Although this technology is promising for controlling disease vectors and invasive species, there is a considerable risk that a gene drive could unintentionally spillover from the target population, where it was deployed, to non-target populations. We develop mathematical models of gene-drive dynamics that incorporate migration between target and non-target populations to investigate the possibility of effectively applying a gene drive in the target population while limiting its spillover to non-target populations (‘differential targeting’). We observe that the feasibility of differential targeting depends on the gene-drive design specification, as well as on the migration rates between the populations. Even when differential targeting is possible, as migration increases, the possibility for differential targeting disappears. We find that differential targeting can be effective for low migration rates, and that it is sensitive to the design of the gene drive under high migration rates. We suggest that differential targeting could be used, in combination with other mitigation measures, as an additional safeguard to limit gene drive spillovers.

Split versions of Cleave and Rescue selfish genetic elements for measured self limiting gene drive

Gene drive elements promote the spread of linked traits, providing methods for changing the composition or fate of wild populations. Drive mechanisms that are self-limiting are attractive because they allow control over the duration and extent of trait spread in time and space, and are reversible through natural selection as drive wanes. Self-sustaining Cleave and Rescue (ClvR) elements include a DNA sequence-modifying enzyme such as Cas9/gRNAs that disrupts endogenous versions of an essential gene, a tightly linked recoded version of the essential gene resistant to cleavage (the Rescue), and a Cargo. ClvR spreads by creating loss-of-function (LOF) conditions in which those without ClvR die because they lack functional copies of the essential gene. We use modeling to show that when the Rescue-Cargo and one or both components required for LOF allele creation (Cas9 and gRNA) reside at different locations (split ClvR), drive of Rescue-Cargo is self-limiting due to a progressive decrease in Cas9 frequency, and thus opportunities for creation of LOF alleles, as spread occurs. Importantly, drive strength and duration can be extended in a measured manner-which is still self-limiting-by moving the two components close enough to each other that they experience some degree of linkage. With linkage, Cas9 transiently experiences drive by hitchhiking with Rescue-Cargo until linkage disequilibrium between the two disappears, a function of recombination frequency and number of generations, creating a novel point of control. We implement split ClvR in Drosophila, with key elements on different chromosomes. Cargo/Rescue/gRNAs spreads to high frequency in a Cas9-dependent manner, while the frequency of Cas9 decreases. These observations show that measured, transient drive, coupled with a loss of future drive potential, can be achieved using the simple toolkit that make up ClvR elements-Cas9 and gRNAs and a Rescue/Cargo.

Engineering the Composition and Fate of Wild Populations with Gene Drive

Insects play important roles as predators, prey, pollinators, recyclers, hosts, parasitoids, and sources of economically important products. They can also destroy crops; wound animals; and serve as vectors for plant, animal, and human diseases. Gene drive-a process by which genes, gene complexes, or chromosomes encoding specific traits are made to spread through wild populations, even if these traits result in a fitness cost to carriers-provides new opportunities for altering populations to benefit humanity and the environment in ways that are species specific and sustainable. Gene drive can be used to alter the genetic composition of an existing population, referred to as population modification or replacement, or to bring about population suppression or elimination. We describe technologies under consideration, progress that has been made, and remaining technological hurdles, particularly with respect to evolutionary stability and our ability to control the spread and ultimate fate of genes introduced into populations.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.