The stability of visual perspective and vividness during mental time travel

When remembering or imagining, people can experience an event from their own eyes, or as an outside observer, with differing levels of vividness. The perspective from, and vividness with, which a person remembers or imagines has been related to numerous individual difference characteristics. These findings require that phenomenology during mental time travel be trait-like-that people consistently experience similar perspectives and levels of vividness. This assumption remains untested. Across two studies (combined N = 295), we examined the stability of visual perspective and vividness across multiple trials and timepoints. Perspective and vividness showed weak within-session stability when reported across just a few trials but showed strong within-session stability when sufficient trials were collected. Importantly, both visual perspective and vividness demonstrated good-to-excellent across-session stability across different delay intervals (two days to six weeks). Overall, our results suggest that people dependably experience similar visual phenomenology across occurrences of mental time travel.

Visual perspective in autobiographical memories: reliability, consistency, and relationship to objective memory performance

Visual perspective in autobiographical memories was examined in terms of reliability, consistency, and relationship to objective memory performance in a sample of 99 individuals. Autobiographical memories may be recalled from two visual perspectives--a field perspective in which individuals experience the memory through their own eyes, or an observer perspective in which individuals experience the memory from the viewpoint of an observer in which they can see themselves. Participants recalled nine word-cued memories that differed in emotional valence (positive, negative and neutral) and rated their memories on 18 scales. Results indicate that visual perspective was the most reliable memory characteristic overall and is consistently related to emotional intensity at the time of recall and amount of emotion experienced during the memory. Visual perspective is unrelated to memory for words, stories, abstract line drawings or faces.

I can see it both ways: first- and third-person visual perspectives at retrieval

The number of studies examining visual perspective during retrieval has recently grown. However, the way in which perspective has been conceptualized differs across studies. Some studies have suggested perspective is experienced as either a first-person or a third-person perspective, whereas others have suggested both perspectives can be experienced during a single retrieval attempt. This aspect of perspective was examined across three studies, which used different measurement techniques commonly used in studies of perspective. Results suggest that individuals can experience more than one perspective when recalling events. Furthermore, the experience of the two perspectives correlated differentially with ratings of vividness, suggesting that the two perspectives should not be considered in opposition of one another. We also found evidence of a gender effect in the experience of perspective, with females experiencing third-person perspectives more often than males. Future studies should allow for the experience of more than one perspective during retrieval.

When the "I" looks at the "Me": autobiographical memory, visual perspective, and the self

This article presents a theoretical model of the self processes involved in autobiographical memories and proposes competing hypotheses for the role of visual perspective in autobiographical memory retrieval. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved from either the 1st person perspective, in which individuals see the event through their own eyes, or from the 3rd person perspective, in which individuals see themselves and the event from the perspective of an external observer. A growing body of research suggests that the visual perspective from which a memory is retrieved has important implications for a person's thoughts, feelings, and goals, and is integrally related to a host of self-evaluative processes. We review the relevant research literature, present our theoretical model, and outline directions for future research.

Cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories: recall vantage perspective and associations with depression

Although recent research demonstrates that intrusive memories represent an overlapping cognitive feature of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), there is still a general paucity of research investigating the prevalence and maintenance of intrusive memories in depression. The current study investigated the association between a range of cognitive avoidant mechanisms that characterize PTSD samples (i.e., suppression, rumination, emotional detachment, and an observer vantage perspective) and intrusive memories of negative autobiographical events in relation to dysphoria. Hypotheses were based on the proposition that employment of these cognitive mechanisms would hinder the emotional processing of the negative event, thus contributing to the maintenance of intrusions. Results supported an association between negative intrusive memories, dysphoria, and avoidant mechanisms. Significant differences were also found between field and observer memories and measures of emotional detachment and rumination. Implications relating to intrusive memory maintenance and treatment approaches are discussed.

Anxiety and repression in attention and retention

High- and low-anxious college students (as determined by scores on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale; A. W. Bendig, 1956) and repressors (low anxiety and high scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; D. P. Crowne & D. Marlowe, 1964) were compared on 3 cognitive tasks. High-anxious participants more often spelled the negative emotional meaning of ambiguous homophones (e.g., pane/pain) and forgot more of their free associations to emotional cue words than did the low-anxious participants. The repressors also detected the emotional meaning of the homophones but unlike the anxious, the repressors did recall their associations to the emotional words. In a working memory task using nonemotional items, the moderately anxious participants recalled fewer words than did the low- and high-anxious participants. The results confirm that both trait anxiety and repression affect information processing at a variety of stages but not in the same way. Repressors were sensitive to, and retentive of, negative emotional stimuli.