Mammalian and avian neuroanatomy and the question of consciousness in birds

Assessing brain neuroplasticity: Surface morphometric analysis of cortical changes induced by Quadrato motor training

Morphological markers for brain plasticity are still lacking and their findings are challenged by the extreme variability of cortical brain surface. Trying to overcome the "correspondence problem," we applied a landmark-free method (the generalized procrustes surface analysis (GPSA)) for investigating the shape variation of cortical surface in a group of 40 healthy volunteers (i.e., the practice group) subjected to daily motor training known as Quadrato motor training (QMT). QMT is a sensorimotor walking meditation that aims at balancing body, cognition, and emotion. More specifically, QMT requires coordination and attention and consists of moving in one of three possible directions on corners of a 50 × 50 cm2. Brain magnetic resonance images (MRIs) of practice group (acquired at baseline, as well as after 6 and 12 weeks of QMT), were 3D reconstructed and here compared with brain MRIs of six more volunteers never practicing the QMT (naïve group). Cortical regions mostly affected by morphological variations were visualized on a 3D average color-scaled brain surface indicating from higher (red) to lower (blue) levels of variation. Cortical regions interested in most of the shape variations were as follows: (1) the supplementary motor cortex; (2) the inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercolaris) and the anterior insula; (3) the visual cortex; (4) the inferior parietal lobule (supramarginal gyrus and angular gyrus). Our results show that surface morphometric analysis (i.e., GPSA) can be applied to assess brain neuroplasticity processes, such as those stimulated by QMT.

Continuity and change in neural plasticity through embryonic morphogenesis, fetal activity-dependent synaptogenesis, and infant memory consolidation

There is an apparent continuity in human neural development that can be traced to venerable themes of vertebrate morphogenesis that have shaped the evolution of the reptilian telencephalon (including both primitive three-layered cortex and basal ganglia) and then the subsequent evolution of the mammalian six-layered neocortex. In this theoretical analysis, we propose that an evolutionary-developmental analysis of these general morphogenetic themes can help to explain the embryonic development of the dual divisions of the limbic system that control the dorsal and ventral networks of the human neocortex. These include the archicortical (dorsal limbic) Papez circuits regulated by the hippocampus that organize spatial, contextual memory, as well as the paleocortical (ventral limbic) circuits that organize object memory. We review evidence that these dorsal and ventral limbic divisions are controlled by the differential actions of brainstem lemnothalamic and midbrain collothalamic arousal control systems, respectively, thereby traversing the vertebrate subcortical neuraxis. These dual control systems are first seen shaping the phyletic morphogenesis of the archicortical and paleocortical foundations of the forebrain in embryogenesis. They then provide dual modes of activity-dependent synaptic organization in the active (lemnothalamic) and quiet (collothalamic) stages of fetal sleep. Finally, these regulatory systems mature to form the major systems of memory consolidation of postnatal development, including the rapid eye movement (lemnothalamic) consolidation of implicit memory and social attachment in the first year, and then-in a subsequent stage-the non-REM (collothalamic) consolidation of explicit memory that is integral to the autonomy and individuation of the second year of life.

Nociception in Chicken Embryos, Part II: Embryonal Development of Electroencephalic Neuronal Activity In Ovo as a Prerequisite for Nociception

Chicken culling has been forbidden in Germany since 2022; male/female selection and male elimination must be brought to an embryonic status prior to the onset of nociception. The present study evaluated the ontogenetic point at which noxious stimuli could potentially be perceived/processed in the brain in ovo. EEG recordings from randomized hyperpallial brain sites were recorded in ovo and noxious stimuli were applied. Temporal and spectral analyses of the EEG were performed. The onset of physiological neuronal signals could be determined at developmental day 13. ERP/ERSP/ITC analysis did not reveal phase-locked nociceptive responses. Although no central nociceptive responses were documented, adequate EEG responses to noxious stimuli from other brain areas cannot be excluded. The extreme stress impact on the embryo during the recording may overwrite the perception of noniceptive stimuli. The results suggest developmental day 13 as the earliest embryonal stage being able to receive and process nociceptive stimuli.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

Neuronal satellitosis is a common finding in the avian brain

AbstractPerineuronal or neuronal satellitosis is the term describing the presence of glial cells in the satellite space surrounding the neuronal perikaryon. Confusingly, this finding has been described both as a physiologic and pathologic condition in humans and animals. In animals, neuronal satellitosis has been described in mammals, as well as in avian species. For the latter, authors wondered whether this finding can be expressed in the normal telencephalon of different avian orders and families and whether this pattern in different species shows a specific brain-region association. For these aims, this study explored the presence of neuronal satellitosis in the major areas of the healthy telencephalon in wild avian species of different orders and families, evaluating its grade in different brain regions. Neuronal satellitosis was seen in the Hyperpallium and Mesopallium as areas with the highest grade. Passeriformes showed the highest grade of neuronal satellitosis compared to Diurnal, Nocturnal raptors, and Charadriiformes. To clarify the exact role of neuronal satellitosis in animals without neurological disease further studies are needed.

Avian cognition and the implications for captive parrot welfare

Previously assumed to be unintelligent animals, many species of birds display high levels of cognition and may even possess conscious awareness. In particular, both corvids and parrots have been the focus of cognitive research including studies on problem-solving, social intelligence, and sentience. Despite their similar neural architecture and cognitive abilities, the laws regarding these two families of birds differ greatly. In the United States, it is illegal to keep corvids as pets. Parrots, however, are one of the most commonly kept pets in America, although their care in captivity remains largely unregulated. Captive parrots suffer from a number of medical and psychological issues and experience high rates of neglect and abandonment. At the same time, wild parrot populations are dwindling due both to habitat loss and capture for the pet trade. This review examines the novel findings on avian cognition and applies them to the potential ethical implications of keeping parrots in captivity. In addition, suggestions for future directions are presented, including the development of legislation to protect captive and wild parrots.

Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients

BACKGROUND

Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches.

MAIN BODY

We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity.

CONCLUSIONS

Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.

The Ecological View of Selective Attention

Accumulating evidence is supporting the hypothesis that our selective attention is a manifestation of mechanisms that evolved early in evolution and are shared by many organisms from different taxa. This surge of new data calls for the re-examination of our notions about attention, which have been dominated mostly by human psychology. Here, we present an hypothesis that challenges, based on evolutionary grounds, a common view of attention as a means to manage limited brain resources. We begin by arguing that evolutionary considerations do not favor the basic proposition of the limited brain resources view of attention, namely, that the capacity of the sensory organs to provide information exceeds the capacity of the brain to process this information. Moreover, physiological studies in animals and humans show that mechanisms of selective attention are highly demanding of brain resources, making it paradoxical to see attention as a means to release brain resources. Next, we build on the above arguments to address the question why attention evolved in evolution. We hypothesize that, to a certain extent, limiting sensory processing is adaptive irrespective of brain capacity. We call this hypothesis the ecological view of attention (EVA) because it is centered on interactions of an animal with its environment rather than on internal brain resources. In its essence is the notion that inherently noisy and degraded sensory inputs serve the animal's adaptive, dynamic interactions with its environment. Attention primarily functions to resolve behavioral conflicts and false distractions. Hence, we evolved to focus on a particular target at the expense of others, not because of internal limitations, but to ensure that behavior is properly oriented and committed to its goals. Here, we expand on this notion and review evidence supporting it. We show how common results in human psychophysics and physiology can be reconciled with an EVA and discuss possible implications of the notion for interpreting current results and guiding future research.

Working Memory: From Neural Activity to the Sentient Mind

Working memory (WM) is the ability to maintain and manipulate information in the conscious mind over a timescale of seconds. This ability is thought to be maintained through the persistent discharges of neurons in a network of brain areas centered on the prefrontal cortex, as evidenced by neurophysiological recordings in nonhuman primates, though both the localization and the neural basis of WM has been a matter of debate in recent years. Neural correlates of WM are evident in species other than primates, including rodents and corvids. A specialized network of excitatory and inhibitory neurons, aided by neuromodulatory influences of dopamine, is critical for the maintenance of neuronal activity. Limitations in WM capacity and duration, as well as its enhancement during development, can be attributed to properties of neural activity and circuits. Changes in these factors can be observed through training-induced improvements and in pathological impairments. WM thus provides a prototypical cognitive function whose properties can be tied to the spiking activity of brain neurons. © 2021 American Physiological Society. Compr Physiol 11:1-41, 2021.

Cadmium induced cerebral toxicity via modulating MTF1-MTs regulatory axis

Metal-responsive transcription factor 1 (MTF1) participates in redox homeostasis and heavy metals detoxification via regulating the expression of metal responsive genes. However, the exact role of MTF1 in Cd-induced cerebral toxicity remains unclear. Herein, we explored the mechanism of Cd-elicited cerebral toxicity through modulating MTF1/MTs pathway in chicken cerebrum exposed to different concentrations of Cd (35 mg, 70 mg, and 140 mg/kg CdCl₂) via diet. Notably, cerebral tissues showed varying degrees of microstructural changes under Cd exposure. Cd exposure significantly up-regulated the expression of metal transporters (DMT1, ZIP8, and ZIP10) with concomitant elevated Cd level, as determined by ICP-MS. Cd significantly altered other cerebral biometals concentrations (particularly, Zn, Fe, Se, Cr, Mo, and Pb) and redox balance, resulting in increased cerebral oxidative stress. More importantly, Cd exposure suppressed MTF1 mRNA and nuclear protein levels and its target metal-responsive genes, notably metallothioneins (MT1 and MT2), and Fe and Cu transporter genes (FPN1, ATOX1, and XIAP). Moreover, Cd disrupted the regulation of expression of selenoproteome (particularly, GPxs and SelW), and cerebral Se level. Overall, our data revealed that molecular mechanisms associated with Cd-induced cerebral damage might include over-expression of DMT1, ZIP8 and ZIP10, and suppression of MTF1 and its main target metal-responsive genes as well as several selenoproteins.

Renewed Perspectives on the Deep Roots and Broad Distribution of Animal Consciousness

The vast majority of neurobiologists have long abandoned the Cartesian view of non-human animals as unconscious automatons-acknowledging instead the high likelihood that mammals and birds have mental experiences akin to subjective consciousness. Several lines of evidence are now extending those limits to all vertebrates and even some invertebrates, though graded in degrees as argued originally by Darwin, correlated with the complexity of the animal's brain. A principal argument for this view is that the function of consciousness is to promote the survival of an animal-especially one actively moving about-in the face of dynamic changes and real-time contingencies. Cognitive ecologists point to the unique features of each animal's environment and the specific behavioral capabilities that different environments invoke, thereby suggesting that consciousness must take on a great variety of forms, many of which differ substantially from human subjective experience.

Molecular and cellular evolution of corticogenesis in amniotes

The cerebral cortex varies dramatically in size and complexity between amniotes due to differences in neuron number and composition. These differences emerge during embryonic development as a result of variations in neurogenesis, which are thought to recapitulate modifications occurred during evolution that culminated in the human neocortex. Here, we review work from the last few decades leading to our current understanding of the evolution of neurogenesis and size of the cerebral cortex. Focused on specific examples across vertebrate and amniote phylogeny, we discuss developmental mechanisms regulating the emergence, lineage, complexification and fate of cortical germinal layers and progenitor cell types. At the cellular level, we discuss the fundamental impact of basal progenitor cells and the advent of indirect neurogenesis on the increased number and diversity of cortical neurons and layers in mammals, and on cortex folding. Finally, we discuss recent work that unveils genetic and molecular mechanisms underlying this progressive expansion and increased complexity of the amniote cerebral cortex during evolution, with a particular focus on those leading to human-specific features. Whereas new genes important in human brain development emerged the recent hominid lineage, regulation of the patterns and levels of activity of highly conserved signaling pathways are beginning to emerge as mechanisms of central importance in the evolutionary increase in cortical size and complexity across amniotes.

The autonomic nervous system and the brainstem: A fundamental role or the background actors for consciousness generation? Hypothesis, evidence, and future directions for rehabilitation and theoretical approaches

INTRODUCTION

One of the hardest challenges of the third century is to develop theories that could joint different results for a global explanation of human consciousness. Some important theories have been proposed, trying to explain the emergence of consciousness as the result of different progressive changes in the elaboration of information during brain processing, giving particular attention to the thalamocortical system.

METHODS

In this article, a summary review of results that highlighted as cerebral cortex could not be so fundamental for consciousness generation is proposed. In detail, three topics were analyzed: (a) studies using experimental approach (manipulating stimuli or brain areas), such as decorticated animals or subliminal presentation of stimuli; (b) studies using anatomo-clinical method (conscious inferenced from observed behaviors); and (c) data from neurostimulation of subcortical areas or of the autonomic nervous system.

RESULTS

We sketch two speculative hypothesis relative, firstly, to the possible independence from cortical areas of the on/off mechanism for consciousness generation and, secondly, to the possible role of information variability generated by the bottom-up exchange of information among neural systems as a switch for consciousness.

CONCLUSIONS

A broad range of evidence regarding the functional role of the brainstem and autonomic nervous system is reviewed for its bearing on a future hypothesis regarding the generation of consciousness experience.

Rapid learning of a spatial memory task in a lacertid lizard (Podarcis liolepis)

Mammals and birds are capable of navigating to a goal using learned map-like representations of space (i.e. place learning), but research assessing this navigational strategy in reptiles has produced inconclusive results, in part due to the use of procedures that do not take account of the peculiarities of reptilian behavior and physiology. Here I present a procedure suitable for testing spatial cognition that exploits a naturally evolved, ethologically relevant ability common to many lizards (i.e. refuge seeking behavior). The procedure requires lizards to learn the location of an open refuge inside a rectangular arena containing artificial refuges in every corner, using distal extramaze visual cues and with no local cues marking the location of the open refuge. The procedure probes the lizards' place learning ability and effectively rules out the use of egocentric and response-based strategies. The described procedure was successfully used to demonstrate place learning in a lacertid lizard (Podarcis liolepis). Over the course of two weeks of training both the latency to entering the open refuge and the number of corners visited in each trial decreased gradually, indicating that learning had taken place in over 60% of the lizards tested. These results confirm that, under certain circumstances, lizards are capable of navigating to a goal using a place learning strategy.

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach

In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.

Effect of EU electrical stunning conditions on breast meat quality of broiler chickens

Electrical stunning is still the main stunning method used worldwide in commercial poultry plants. The stunning procedures in water bath stunners affect both bird welfare and meat quality attributes. The European Union (EU) Council Regulation 1099/2009 on the protection of the animal at the time of killing established the minimum current flow through an individual bird at a specified frequency to assure an effective stun that must last until the bird's death. The aim of this study was to compare the effect of the application of different stunning current flows on the prevalence of hemorrhages (classified as 1 = no lesion, 2 = moderate, and 3 = severe lesion) and some quality traits (pHu, color, drip and cooking losses, and shear force) of chicken breast meat. A total of 12 flocks of broiler chickens, each equally divided into light, medium, and heavy sizes, was submitted either to the stunning condition usually adopted before the entry into force of the current EU regulation (90 mA/bird, 400 Hz) (OLD) or to that enforced by it (150 mA/bird, 400 Hz) (NEW). Overall, the prevalence of severe hemorrhages dramatically increased in the NEW group in comparison with the OLD one (55 vs. 27%; P < 0.001) and particularly in heavy-sized birds (72 vs. 25%; P < 0.001). In general, meat quality attributes were not affected by the stunning conditions with the exception of drip loss that resulted lower in NEW than OLD birds (1.01 vs. 1.27; P < 0.001). In conclusion, the adoption of a higher current flow, as suggested by the EU regulation to protect animals at the time of killing, increases the prevalence of breast hemorrhages while maintaining meat quality traits with a possible beneficial effect on water holding capacity of fresh meat.

Effects of noxious stimuli on the electroencephalogram of anaesthetised chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus)

The reliable assessment and management of avian pain is important in the context of animal welfare. Overtly expressed signs of pain vary substantially between and within species, strains and individuals, limiting the use of behaviour in pain studies. Similarly, physiological indices of pain can also vary and may be confounded by influence from non-painful stimuli. In mammals, changes in the frequency spectrum of the electroencephalogram (EEG) recorded under light anaesthesia (the minimal anaesthesia model; MAM) have been shown to reliably indicate cerebral responses to noxious stimuli in a range of species. The aim of the current study was to determine whether the MAM can be applied to the study of nociception in birds. Ten chickens were lightly anaesthetised with halothane and their EEG recorded using surface electrodes during the application of supramaximal mechanical, thermal and electrical noxious stimuli. Spectral analysis revealed no EEG responses to any of these stimuli. Given that birds possess the neural apparatus to detect and process pain, and that the applied noxious stimuli elicit behavioural signs of pain in conscious chickens, this lack of response probably relates to methodological limitations. Anatomical differences between the avian and mammalian brains, along with a paucity of knowledge regarding specific sites of pain processing in the avian brain, could mean that EEG recorded from the head surface is insensitive to changes in neural activity in the pain processing regions of the avian brain. Future investigations should examine alternative electrode placement sites, based on avian homologues of the mammalian brain regions involved in pain processing.

Effects of halothane on the electroencephalogram of the chicken

Little is known about the effects of inhalant anaesthetics on the avian electroencephalogram (EEG). The effects of halothane on the avian EEG are of interest, as this agent has been widely used to study nociception and analgesia in mammals. The objective of this study was to characterize the effects of halothane anaesthesia on the EEG of the chicken. Twelve female Hyline Brown chickens aged 8–10 weeks were anaesthetized with halothane in oxygen. For each bird, anaesthesia was progressively increased from 1–1.5 to 2 times the Minimum Anesthetic Concentration (MAC), then progressively decreased again. At each concentration, a sample of EEG was recorded after a 10‐min stabilization period. The mean Total Power (P_TOT), Median Frequency (F50) and 95% Spectral Edge Frequency (F95) were calculated at each halothane MAC, along with the Burst Suppression Ratio (BSR). Burst suppression was rare and BSR did not differ between halothane concentrations. Increasing halothane concentration from 1 to 2 MAC resulted in a decrease in F50 and increase in P_TOT, while F95 increased when MAC was reduced from 1.5 to 1. The results indicate dose‐dependent spectral EEG changes consistent with deepening anaesthesia in response to increasing halothane MAC. As burst suppression was rare, even at 1.5 or 2 times MAC, halothane may be a suitable anaesthetic agent for use in future studies exploring EEG activity in anaesthetized birds.

The Functioning of a Cortex without Layers

A major hallmark of cortical organization is the existence of a variable number of layers, i.e., sheets of neurons stacked on top of each other, in which neurons have certain commonalities. However, even for the neocortex, variable numbers of layers have been described and it is just a convention to distinguish six layers from each other. Whether cortical layers are a structural epiphenomenon caused by developmental dynamics or represent a functionally important modularization of cortical computation is still unknown. Here we present our insights from the reeler mutant mouse, a model for a developmental, “molecular lesion”-induced loss of cortical layering that could serve as ground truth of what an intact layering adds to the cortex in terms of functionality. We could demonstrate that the reeler neocortex shows no inversion of cortical layers but rather a severe disorganization that in the primary somatosensory cortex leads to the complete loss of layers. Nevertheless, the somatosensory system is well organized. When exploring an enriched environment with specific sets of whiskers, activity-dependent gene expression takes place in the corresponding modules. Precise whisker stimuli lead to the functional activation of somatotopically organized barrel columns as visualized by intrinsic signal optical imaging. Similar results were obtained in the reeler visual system. When analyzing pathways that could be responsible for preservation of tactile perception, lemniscal thalamic projections were found to be largely intact, despite the smearing of target neurons across the cortical mantle. However, with optogenetic experiments we found evidence for a mild dispersion of thalamic synapse targeting on layer IV-spiny stellate cells, together with a general weakening in thalamocortical input strength. This weakening of thalamic inputs was compensated by intracortical mechanisms involving increased recurrent excitation and/or reduced feedforward inhibition. In conclusion, a layer loss so far only led to the detection of subtle defects in sensory processing by reeler mice. This argues in favor of a view in which cortical layers are not an essential component for basic perception and cognition. A view also supported by recent studies in birds, which can have remarkable cognitive capacities despite the lack of a neocortex with multiple cortical layers. In conclusion, we suggest that future studies directed toward understanding cortical functions should rather focus on circuits specified by functional cell type composition than mere laminar location.

The Neuroethological Paradox of Animal Consciousness

The more advanced our understanding of the brain of an animal is, the less likely that this animal is a conscious being. This provocative logical paradox is explained and analyzed, leading to the conclusion that to advance understanding of animal consciousness it is necessary to resolve first how our consciousness is produced by our brain.

The effect of brumation on memory retention

Long-term torpor is an adaptive strategy that allows animals to survive harsh winter conditions. However, the impact that prolonged torpor has on cognitive function is poorly understood. Hibernation causes reduced synaptic activity and experiments with mammals reveal that this can have adverse effects on memories formed prior to hibernation. The impact of brumation, the winter dormancy that is observed in ectotherms, on memory remains unknown. The aim of this study was to examine whether an amphibian, the fire salamander (Salamandra salamandra), was able to retain learned spatial information after a period of brumation. Twelve fire salamanders were trained to make a simple spatial discrimination using a T-maze. All subjects learned the initial task. Upon reaching criterion, half of the subjects were placed into brumation for 100 days while the other half served as controls and were maintained under normal conditions. A post-brumation memory retention test revealed that animals from both conditions retained the learned response. Control tests showed that they solved the task using learned information and not olfactory cues. This finding contrasts with much of the mammalian research and suggests that the processes involved in prolonged torpor may have a fundamentally different impact on memory in mammals and amphibians.

Distribution of calcium-binding proteins in the pigeon visual thalamic centers and related pretectal and mesencephalic nuclei. Phylogenetic and functional determinants

Multichannel processing of environmental information constitutes a fundamental basis of functioning of sensory systems in the vertebrate brain. Two distinct parallel visual systems - the tectofugal and thalamofugal exist in all amniotes. The vertebrate central nervous system contains high concentrations of intracellular calcium-binding proteins (CaBPrs) and each of them has a restricted expression pattern in different brain regions and specific neuronal subpopulations. This study aimed at describing the patterns of distribution of parvalbumin (PV) and calbindin (CB) in the visual thalamic and mesencephalic centers of the pigeon (Columba livia). We used a combination of immunohistochemistry and double labeling immunofluorescent technique. Structures studied included the thalamic relay centers involved in the tectofugal (nucleus rotundus, Rot) and thalamofugal (nucleus geniculatus lateralis, pars dorsalis, GLd) visual pathways as well as pretectal, mesencephalic, isthmic and thalamic structures inducing the driver and/or modulatory action to the visual processing. We showed that neither of these proteins was unique to the Rot or GLd. The Rot contained i) numerous PV-immunoreactive (ir) neurons and a dense neuropil, and ii) a few CB-ir neurons mostly located in the anterior dorsal part and associated with a light neuropil. These latter neurons partially overlapped with the former and some of them colocalized both proteins. The distinct subnuclei of the GLd were also characterized by different patterns of distribution of CaBPrs. Some (nucleus dorsolateralis anterior, pars magnocellularis, DLAmc; pars lateralis, DLL; pars rostrolateralis, DLAlr; nucleus lateralis anterior thalami, LA) contained both CB- and PV-ir neurons in different proportions with a predominance of the former in the DLAmc and DLL. The nucleus lateralis dorsalis of nuclei optici principalis thalami only contained PV-ir neurons and a neuropil similar to the interstitial pretectal/thalamic nuclei of the tectothalamic tract, nucleus pretectalis and thalamic reticular nucleus. The overlapping distribution of PV and CB immunoreactivity was typical for the pretectal nucleus lentiformis mesencephali and the nucleus ectomamillaris as well as for the visual isthmic nuclei. The findings are discussed in the light of the contributive role of the phylogenetic and functional factors determining the circuits׳ specificity of the different CaBPr types.

Evolutionary aspects of self- and world consciousness in vertebrates

Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective, neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and neuropsychological data supporting the hypothesis that different levels of self and world representation in vertebrates rely upon (i) a “basal” subcortical system that includes brainstem, hypothalamus and central thalamic nuclei and that may underpin the primary (or anoetic) consciousness likely present in all vertebrates; and (ii) a forebrain system that include the medial and lateral structures of the cerebral hemispheres and may sustain the most sophisticated forms of consciousness [e.g., noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic, reflective knowledge]. We posit a mutual, bidirectional functional influence between these two major brain circuits. We conclude that basic aspects of consciousness like primary self and core self (based on anoetic and noetic consciousness) are present in many species of vertebrates and that, even self-consciousness (autonoetic consciousness) does not seem to be a prerogative of humans and of some non-human primates but may, to a certain extent, be present in some other mammals and birds

Effects of isoflurane, sevoflurane and methoxyflurane on the electroencephalogram of the chicken

OBJECTIVE

Anaesthetics have differing effects on mammalian electroencephalogram (EEG) but little is known about the effects on avian EEG. This study explored how inhalant anaesthetics affect chicken EEG.

STUDY DESIGN

Experimental study.

ANIMALS

Twelve female Hyline Brown chickens aged 6-11 weeks.

METHODS

Each chicken was anaesthetized with isoflurane, sevoflurane, and methoxyflurane. For each, anaesthesia was adjusted to 1, 1.5 and 2 times Minimum Anaesthetic Concentration (MAC). Total Power (Ptot), Median Frequency (F50), Spectral Edge Frequency (F95) and Burst Suppression Ratio (BSR) were calculated at each volume concentration. BSR data were analyzed using doubly repeated measures anova. Neither isoflurane nor sevoflurane could be included in analysis of F50, F95 and Ptot because of extensive burst suppression; Methoxyflurane data were analyzed using RM anova.

RESULTS

There was a significant interaction between anaesthetic and concentration on BSR [F(4,22) = 10.65, p < 0.0001]. For both isoflurane and sevoflurane, BSR increased with concentration. Isoflurane caused less suppression than sevoflurane at 1.5 MAC and at final 1 MAC while methoxyflurane caused virtually no burst suppression. Methoxyflurane concentration had a significant effect on F50 [F(2,20) = 3.83, p = 0.04], F95 [F(2,20) = 4.03, p = 0.03] and Ptot [F(2,20) = 5.22, p = 0.02]. Decreasing methoxyflurane from 2 to 1 MAC increased F50 and F95. Ptot increased when concentration decreased from 1.5 to 1 MAC and tended to be higher at 1 MAC than at 2 MAC.

CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE

Isoflurane and sevoflurane suppressed chicken EEG in a dose-dependent manner. Higher concentrations of methoxyflurane caused an increasing degree of synchronization of EEG. Isoflurane and sevoflurane suppressed EEG activity to a greater extent than did methoxyflurane at equivalent MAC multiples. Isoflurane caused less suppression than sevoflurane at intermediate concentrations. These results indicate the similarity between avian and mammalian EEG responses to inhalant anaesthetics and reinforce the difference between MAC and anaesthetic effects on brain activity in birds.

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived from ectodermal placodes and neural crest, transformed primitive reflexive systems into image forming brains that map and perceive the external world and the body's interior. We posit that the minimum requirement for sensory consciousness and qualia is a brain including a forebrain (but not necessarily a developed cerebral cortex/pallium), midbrain, and hindbrain. This brain must also have (1) hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically organized, processing nuclei that extensively integrate the different senses into representations that emerge in upper levels of the neural hierarchy; and (2) a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and contributes to attention, awareness, and neural synchronization. We propose a two-step evolutionary history, in which the optic tectum was the original center of multi-sensory conscious perception (as in fish and amphibians: step 1), followed by a gradual shift of this center to the dorsal pallium or its cerebral cortex (in mammals, reptiles, birds: step 2). We address objections to the hypothesis and call for more studies of fish and amphibians. In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known.

Evolution of consciousness: phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

Are animals conscious? If so, when did consciousness evolve? We address these long-standing and essential questions using a modern neuroscientific approach that draws on diverse fields such as consciousness studies, evolutionary neurobiology, animal psychology, and anesthesiology. We propose that the stepwise emergence from general anesthesia can serve as a reproducible model to study the evolution of consciousness across various species and use current data from anesthesiology to shed light on the phylogeny of consciousness. Ultimately, we conclude that the neurobiological structure of the vertebrate central nervous system is evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved across species and that the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution. Thus, in agreement with Darwin's insight and the recent "Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals," a review of modern scientific data suggests that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind.

Brain imaging reveals neuronal circuitry underlying the crow's perception of human faces

Crows pay close attention to people and can remember specific faces for several years after a single encounter. In mammals, including humans, faces are evaluated by an integrated neural system involving the sensory cortex, limbic system, and striatum. Here we test the hypothesis that birds use a similar system by providing an imaging analysis of an awake, wild animal's brain as it performs an adaptive, complex cognitive task. We show that in vivo imaging of crow brain activity during exposure to familiar human faces previously associated with either capture (threatening) or caretaking (caring) activated several brain regions that allow birds to discriminate, associate, and remember visual stimuli, including the rostral hyperpallium, nidopallium, mesopallium, and lateral striatum. Perception of threatening faces activated circuitry including amygdalar, thalamic, and brainstem regions, known in humans and other vertebrates to be related to emotion, motivation, and conditioned fear learning. In contrast, perception of caring faces activated motivation and striatal regions. In our experiments and in nature, when perceiving a threatening face, crows froze and fixed their gaze (decreased blink rate), which was associated with activation of brain regions known in birds to regulate perception, attention, fear, and escape behavior. These findings indicate that, similar to humans, crows use sophisticated visual sensory systems to recognize faces and modulate behavioral responses by integrating visual information with expectation and emotion. Our approach has wide applicability and potential to improve our understanding of the neural basis for animal behavior.

Core knowledge of object, number, and geometry: a comparative and neural approach

Studies on the ontogenetic origins of human knowledge provide evidence for a small set of separable systems of core knowledge dealing with the representation of inanimate and animate objects, number, and geometry. Because core knowledge systems are evolutionarily ancient, they can be investigated from a comparative perspective, making use of various animal models. In this review, I discuss evidence showing precocious abilities in nonhuman species to represent (a) objects that move partly or fully out of view and their basic mechanical properties such as solidity, (b) the cardinal and ordinal/sequential aspects of numerical cognition and rudimentary arithmetic with small numerosities, and (c) the geometrical relationships among extended surfaces in the surrounding layout. Controlled rearing studies suggest that the abilities associated with core knowledge systems of objects, number, and geometry are observed in animals in the absence (or with very reduced) experience, supporting a nativistic foundation of such cognitive mechanisms. Animal models also promise a fresh approach to the issue of the neurobiological and genetic mechanisms underlying the expression of core knowledge systems.

Hallmarks of consciousness

Consciousness, ranging from the primary, or perceptual, level to high levels that include a sense of self, can be identified in various organisms by a set of hallmarks that include behavioral, neural and phenomenal and/or informational. Behavioral hallmarks include those that indicate high cognitive abilities, such behavioral flexibility, verbal abilities, episodic memories, theory of mind, object constancy, transitive inference and multistability, all of which have been demonstrated in birds as well as in primates. Neural hallmarks include the thalamocortical model for mammals and similar circuitry in some nonmammalian taxa. Informational hallmarks include sensorimotor awareness, as provided by somatosensory and/or lateral line systems, which may form the basis for the sense of self and distinguishing self from nonself, as well as other sensory information, such as the richness and quantity of color and form information obtained by the visual system. The comparative method reveals a correlation of these different types of hallmarks with each other in their degree of development, which thus may be indicative of the level of consciousness present in a particular species.

Pallio-pallial tangential migrations and growth signaling: new scenario for cortical evolution?

Observations accruing in recent years imply that the areal patterning and size dimensioning of the mammalian neocortex are influenced by diverse sets of tangentially migrating glutamatergic neurons that invade the cortical plate and, in so doing, modify the properties of the neopallial proliferative compartments. This developmental scenario sheds new light upon the old issue of how the mammalian neocortex evolved its more complex structure from nonmammalian antecedent forms. In reviewing these novelties, I first point out the topological position of the neopallial island as a central component of the pallium in all gnathostomes, surrounded by a ring of prospective allocortical pallial regions and a more distant set of peripheral neighboring forebrain areas. Early patterning arises from the periphery via passive planar signaling. This process probably establishes the pallium field and its basic island plus allocortical ring organization, as well as a rough prepatterning of some regional subareas. Afterwards, patterning and modulated growth are also actively influenced by the convergence of separate streams of tangentially migrating subpial cells (partly peripheral and partly allocortical in origin) which collectively form the Cajal-Retzius neuronal population in layer I. Effects of these cells include the inside-out stratification of the cortical plate and they may also contribute to the evolutionary emergence of the 6-layered neocortical structure. The most recent addition to our knowledge of pallio-pallial migrations is the existence of a subsequent deep tangential migration of ventropallial cells into the neopallial primordium, whose signaling influence upon local progenitors magnifies the cortex population by 20%. These glutamatergic cells dispersedly invade the entire cortex but largely die postnatally. The crucial implications of these data for comparative thinking on mammalian neocortex evolution and interpretation of potential homologs in sauropsids are explored. Finally, a new conjecture regarding a possible role of the hitherto disregarded lateral pallium is advanced.

The evolution of social orienting: evidence from chicks (Gallus gallus) and human newborns

BACKGROUND

Converging evidence from different species indicates that some newborn vertebrates, including humans, have visual predispositions to attend to the head region of animate creatures. It has been claimed that newborn preferences for faces are domain-relevant and similar in different species. One of the most common criticisms of the work supporting domain-relevant face biases in human newborns is that in most studies they already have several hours of visual experience when tested. This issue can be addressed by testing newly hatched face-naïve chicks (Gallus gallus) whose preferences can be assessed prior to any other visual experience with faces.

METHODS

In the present study, for the first time, we test the prediction that both newly hatched chicks and human newborns will demonstrate similar preferences for face stimuli over spatial frequency matched structured noise. Chicks and babies were tested using identical stimuli for the two species. Chicks underwent a spontaneous preference task, in which they have to approach one of two stimuli simultaneously presented at the ends of a runway. Human newborns participated in a preferential looking task.

RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE

We observed a significant preference for orienting toward the face stimulus in both species. Further, human newborns spent more time looking at the face stimulus, and chicks preferentially approached and stood near the face-stimulus. These results confirm the view that widely diverging vertebrates possess similar domain-relevant biases toward faces shortly after hatching or birth and provide a behavioural basis for a comparison with neuroimaging studies using similar stimuli.

Unconscious knowledge: A survey

The concept of unconscious knowledge is fundamental for an understanding of human thought processes and mentation in general; however, the psychological community at large is not familiar with it. This paper offers a survey of the main psychological research currently being carried out into cognitive processes, and examines pathways that can be integrated into a discipline of unconscious knowledge. It shows that the field has already a defined history and discusses some of the features that all kinds of unconscious knowledge seem to share at a deeper level. With the aim of promoting further research, we discuss the main challenges which the postulation of unconscious cognition faces within the psychological community.

Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach

Despite anecdotal evidence suggesting conscious states in a variety of non-human animals, no systematic neuroscientific investigation of animal consciousness has yet been undertaken. We set forth a framework for such an investigation that incorporates integration of data from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and behavioral studies, uses evidence from humans as a benchmark, and recognizes the critical role of explicit verbal report of conscious experiences in human studies. We illustrate our framework with reference to two subphyla: one relatively near to mammals - birds - and one quite far -cephalopod molluscs. Consistent with the possibility of conscious states, both subphyla exhibit complex behavior and possess sophisticated nervous systems. Their further investigation may reveal common phyletic conditions and neural substrates underlying the emergence of animal consciousness.

Auditory and multisensory responses in the tectofugal pathway of the barn owl

A common visual pathway in all amniotes is the tectofugal pathway connecting the optic tectum with the forebrain. The tectofugal pathway has been suggested to be involved in tasks such as orienting and attention, tasks that may benefit from integrating information across senses. Nevertheless, previous research has characterized the tectofugal pathway as strictly visual. Here we recorded from two stations along the tectofugal pathway of the barn owl: the thalamic nucleus rotundus (nRt) and the forebrain entopallium (E). We report that neurons in E and nRt respond to auditory stimuli as well as to visual stimuli. Visual tuning to the horizontal position of the stimulus and auditory tuning to the corresponding spatial cue (interaural time difference) were generally broad, covering a large portion of the contralateral space. Responses to spatiotemporally coinciding multisensory stimuli were mostly enhanced above the responses to the single modality stimuli, whereas spatially misaligned stimuli were not. Results from inactivation experiments suggest that the auditory responses in E are of tectal origin. These findings support the notion that the tectofugal pathway is involved in multisensory processing. In addition, the findings suggest that the ascending auditory information to the forebrain is not as bottlenecked through the auditory thalamus as previously thought.

Insight without cortex: lessons from the avian brain

Insight is a cognitive feature that is usually regarded as being generated by the neocortex and being present only in humans and possibly some closely related primates. In this essay we show that especially corvids display behavioral skills within the domains of object permanence, episodic memory, theory of mind, and tool use/causal reasoning that are insightful. These similarities between humans and corvids at the behavioral level are probably the result of a convergent evolution. Similarly, the telencephalic structures involved in higher cognitive functions in both species show a high degree of similarity, although the forebrain of birds has no cortex-like lamination. The neural substrate for insight-related cognitive functions in mammals and birds is thus not necessarily based on a laminated cortical structure but can be generated by differently organized forebrains. Hence, neither is insight restricted to mammals, as predicted from a "scala naturae", nor is the laminated cortex a prerequisite for the highest cognitive functions.

Response to commentary on evolution of slow-wave sleep and palliopallial connectivity in mammals and birds: a hypothesis

Mammals and birds are the only animals that exhibit high-amplitude slow-waves (SWs) in the electroencephalogram during sleep. The SWs that characterize slow-wave sleep (SWS) in mammals and birds reflect the large-scale synchronization of slow neuronal activity. In mammals, this synchronization is dependent upon the high degree of interconnectivity within the neocortex, a cytoarchitectonic trait also found in the avian hyperpallium, but not the reptilian dorsal cortex. Consequently, I recently proposed that the presence of SWs in sleeping mammals and birds, and their absence in sleeping reptiles, is attributable to the greater degree of interconnectivity within the neocortex and hyperpallium when compared to the dorsal cortex [N.C. Rattenborg, Evolution of slow-wave sleep and palliopallial connectivity in mammals and birds: A hypothesis, Brain Res. Bull. 69 (2006) 20-29]. Rial et al. (this issue) challenge this hypothesis by noting that high-amplitude SWs occur in awake reptiles. Based largely on this observation, they suggest that SWS in homeotherms evolved from reptilian wakefulness. SWs in awake reptiles do not seem to reflect neural processes comparable to those that generate sleep-related SWs in homeotherms, however. Moreover, the proposed conversion of reptilian wakefulness into SWS is untenable from behavioral, mechanistic and functional perspectives. A more parsimonious explanation is that the precursor state to SWS in homeotherms was a state comparable to reptilian sleep, rather than wakefulness, with the primary difference being that the reptilian dorsal cortex lacks the interconnectivity necessary to generate sleep-related SWs in the electroencephalogram.