Adults and children with high imagery show more pronounced perceptual priming effect

The Internal Representations Questionnaire: Measuring modes of thinking

Does the format in which we experience our moment-to-moment thoughts vary from person to person? Many people claim that their thinking takes place in an inner voice and that using language outside of interpersonal communication is a regular experience for them. Other people disagree. We present a novel measure, the Internal Representation Questionnaire (IRQ) designed to assess people's subjective mode of internal representations, and to quantify individual differences in "modes of thinking" along multiple factors in a single questionnaire. Exploratory factor analysis identified four factors: Internal Verbalization, Visual Imagery, Orthographic Imagery, and Representational Manipulation. All four factors were positively correlated with one another, but accounted for unique predictions. We describe the properties of the IRQ and report a test of its ability to predict patterns of interference in a speeded word-picture verification task. Taken together, the results suggest that self-reported differences in how people internally represent their thoughts relates to differences in processing familiar images and written words.

Refractive errors affect the vividness of visual mental images

The hypothesis that visual perception and mental imagery are equivalent has never been explored in individuals with vision defects not preventing the visual perception of the world, such as refractive errors. Refractive error (i.e., myopia, hyperopia or astigmatism) is a condition where the refracting system of the eye fails to focus objects sharply on the retina. As a consequence refractive errors cause blurred vision. We subdivided 84 individuals according to their spherical equivalent refraction into Emmetropes (control individuals without refractive errors) and Ametropes (individuals with refractive errors). Participants performed a vividness task and completed a questionnaire that explored their cognitive style of thinking before their vision was checked by an ophthalmologist. Although results showed that Ametropes had less vivid mental images than Emmetropes this did not affect the development of their cognitive style of thinking; in fact, Ametropes were able to use both verbal and visual strategies to acquire and retrieve information. Present data are consistent with the hypothesis of equivalence between imagery and perception.

Identity adaptation is mediated and moderated by visualisation ability

Depending on the previous research one reads, face aftereffects may or may not partially transfer across viewpoints. Two experiments are reported that explore this face-identity aftereffect by varying the adaptor type. Adaptation occurs when different views of the identity are used and even when the person's name is the adaptor. Brief exposure or nationality did not produce adaptation. In a third experiment, the role of visualisation was explored. Participants with higher visualisation scores showed greater adaptation to names than those with lower scores. These findings suggest non-facial identity cues can lead to a facial adaptation effect and that visualisation may be the mechanism behind this.

Vividness of mental imagery: individual variability can be measured objectively

When asked to imagine a visual scene, such as an ant crawling on a checkered table cloth toward a jar of jelly, individuals subjectively report different vividness in their mental visualization. We show that reported vividness can be correlated with two objective measures: the early visual cortex activity relative to the whole brain activity measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the performance on a novel psychophysical task. These results show that individual differences in the vividness of mental imagery are quantifiable even in the absence of subjective report.

The effects of priming on children's attitudes toward older individuals

The purpose of the present research was to examine younger (7-years-old) and older (10-years-old) children's attitudes toward older individuals following one type of five primes: positive prime, negative prime, elderly prime, grandparent prime, or neutral prime. Overall, children's attitudes on three tests--Apperception, Semantic Differential, and Attribute Salience--were affected by the type of prime children were given, with positive and grandparent primes resulting in more positive views toward older individuals than negative, elderly, or neutral (control group) primes. The present research provides evidence that priming the most accessible cognitions about an individual can affect even young children's perception of the individual. These results are discussed in terms of category-based and data-driven processing and may explain the disparate findings obtained in previous studies that have shown the children's attitudes toward older individuals are sometimes negative, whereas other studies have shown that children's attitudes are more positive or neutral.