Responses to Economic Games of Cooperation and Conflict in Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis)

Some dogs can find the payoff-dominant outcome in the Assurance game

Studies on coordination often present animals with the choice of either cooperating or remaining inactive; however, in nature, animals may also choose to act alone. This can be modeled with the Assurance game, an economic game that has recently been used to explore decision-making in primates. We investigated whether dyads of pet dogs coordinate in the Assurance game. Pairs were presented with two alternatives: they could individually solve an apparatus baited with a low-value reward (Hare) or they could coordinate to solve a cooperative apparatus baited with a high-value reward for each dog (Stag). All individuals matched their partner's choices, but after controlling for side bias, only four out of eleven dyads consistently coordinated on the payoff-dominant strategy (Stag-Stag). Thus, some dogs are capable of finding coordinated outcomes, as do primates, at least when their partner's actions are visible and coordination results in the biggest payoff for both individuals.

Competitive and cooperative games for probing the neural basis of social decision-making in animals

In a social environment, it is essential for animals to consider the behavior of others when making decisions. To quantitatively assess such social decisions, games offer unique advantages. Games may have competitive and cooperative components, modeling situations with antagonistic and shared objectives between players. Games can be analyzed by mathematical frameworks, including game theory and reinforcement learning, such that an animal's choice behavior can be compared against the optimal strategy. However, so far games have been underappreciated in neuroscience research, particularly for rodent studies. In this review, we survey the varieties of competitive and cooperative games that have been tested, contrasting strategies employed by non-human primates and birds with rodents. We provide examples of how games can be used to uncover neural mechanisms and explore species-specific behavioral differences. We assess critically the limitations of current paradigms and propose improvements. Together, the synthesis of current literature highlights the advantages of using games to probe the neural basis of social decisions for neuroscience studies.

Comparative economics: how studying other primates helps us better understand the evolution of our own economic decision making

The origins of evolutionary games are rooted in both economics and animal behaviour, but economics has, until recently, focused primarily on humans. Although historically, specific games were used in targeted circumstances with non-human species (i.e. the Prisoner's Dilemma), experimental economics has been increasingly recognized as a valuable method for directly comparing both the outcomes of economic decisions and their underlying mechanisms across species, particularly in comparison with humans, thanks to the structured procedures that allow for them to be instantiated across a variety of animals. So far, results in non-human primates suggest that even when outcomes are shared, underlying proximate mechanisms can vary substantially. Intriguingly, in some contexts non-human primates more easily find a Nash equilibrium than do humans, possibly owing to their greater willingness to explore the parameter space, but humans excel at more complex outcomes, such as alternating between two Nash equilibria, even when deprived of language or instruction, suggesting potential mechanisms that humans have evolved to allow us to solve complex social problems. We consider what these results suggest about the evolution of economic decision-making and suggest future directions, in particular the need to expand taxonomic diversity, to expand this promising approach. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Female squirrel monkeys' (Saimiri boliviensis) responses to inequity in a group context; testing a link between cooperation and inequity responses

Primates of several species respond negatively to receiving less preferred rewards than a partner for completing the same task (inequity responses), either rejecting rewards or refusing to participate in the task when disadvantaged. This has been linked to cooperation, with species that cooperate frequently refusing to participate in inequity tasks (the 'cooperation hypothesis'). However, inequity is a social response, and previous research has involved dyads, precluding studying the effects of additional social partners. While dyads allow for tighter control in experimental settings, dyadic interactions in nature do not take place in a social vacuum, so understanding the role of the social context is needed to verify that the pattern of results supports the cooperation hypothesis. Here we focus on Bolivian squirrel monkeys, Saimiri boliviensis, a highly social species that does not generally cooperate and has not responded to inequity in previous dyadic research, although they do respond to receiving a lower reward than they expected. In the current study, we provide a more nuanced test by studying female Bolivian squirrel monkeys, the demographic most likely to cooperate in both field and laboratory contexts, in a more socially relevant group setting. For some reward values, females responded in both the inequity condition, rejecting less preferred rewards when they were disadvantaged relative to their social group, and a contrast condition, wherein all animals received a lower reward than they expected, making it difficult to disentangle contrast from inequity. As in capuchin monkeys, refusals increased when monkeys were to receive low-value rewards compared to medium-value rewards. These results suggest that the relationship between cooperation and inequity responses may be more nuanced than previously suggested, with demographic, social context and reward value potentially influencing outcomes even within species.

Anything for a cheerio: Brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) consistently coordinate in an Assurance Game for unequal payoffs

Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner. Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas coordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated play results in the lowest payoff when playing Stag. We varied this structure such that one capuchin received double the rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome; thus, it was still both animals' best option, but no longer equally rewarding. Despite the inequality, capuchins coordinated on Stag in 78% of trials, and neither payoff structure nor their partner's choice impacted their decision. Additionally, there was no relationship between self-scratching, a measure of stress in capuchins, and choices. After completing the study, we discovered our reward, cheerios, was sufficiently valuable that in another study, capuchins never refused it, so post hoc we repeated the study using a lower value reward, banana flavored pellets. Capuchins completed only 26% of the pellet trials (compared to 98% with cheerios), constraining our ability to interpret the results, but nonetheless the monkeys showed a decrease in preference for Stag, particularly when they received fewer rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome. These results reinforce capuchins' ability to find coordinated outcomes in the Stag Hunt game, but more work is needed to determine whether the monkeys did not mind the inequality or were unwilling to sacrifice a highly preferred food to rectify it. In either case, researchers should carefully consider the impact of their chosen rewards on subjects' choices.

Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) do not show an aversion to inequity in a token exchange task

Although individuals in some species refuse foods they normally accept if their partner receives a more preferred one, this is not true across all species. The cooperation hypothesis proposes that this species-level variability evolved because inequity aversion is a mechanism to identify situations in which cooperation is not paying off, and that species regularly observed cooperating should be more likely to be averse to inequity. To rule out other potential explanations of inequity aversion, we need to test the converse as well: species rarely observed cooperating, especially those phylogenetically close to more cooperative species, should be less likely to be inequity averse. To this end, we tested eight zoo-housed Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) on a token exchange task in which subjects received either the same food reward or a less-preferred reward for the same or more effort than their partner, recording both refusals to participate in the exchange and refusals to accept the reward. Supporting the cooperation hypothesis, even with procedural differences across sessions, gorillas were significantly more likely to refuse in all conditions in which they received a low-value food reward after completing an exchange, regardless of what their partner received, suggesting that gorillas were not inequity averse, but instead would not work for a low-value reward. Additionally, gorillas were more likely to refuse later in the session; while the pattern of refusals remained unchanged after accounting for this, this suggests that species should be tested on as many trials as is practical.

Gibbon strategies in a food competition task

Social primates face conflicts of interest with other partners when their individual and collective interests collide. Despite living in small, primarily bonded, groups compared to other social primates, gibbons are not exempt from these conflicts in their everyday lives. In the current task, we asked whether dyads of gibbons would solve a conflict of interest over food rewards. We presented dyads of gibbons with a situation in which they could decide whether to take an active role and pull a handle to release food rewards at a distance or take a passive role and avoid action. In this situation, the passive partner could take an advantageous position to obtain the rewards over the active partner. Gibbons participated in three conditions: a control condition with no food rewards, a test condition with indirect food rewards and a test condition with direct food rewards. In both test conditions, five rewards were released at a distance from the handle. In addition, the active individual could obtain one extra food reward from the handle in the direct food condition. We found that gibbons acted more often in the two conditions involving food rewards, and waited longer in the indirect compared to the direct food condition, thus suggesting that they understood the task contingencies. Surprisingly, we found that in a majority of dyads, individuals in the active role obtained most of the payoff compared to individuals in the passive role in both food conditions. Furthermore, in some occasions individuals in the active role did not approach the location where the food was released. These results suggest that while gibbons may strategize to maximize benefits in a competitive food task, they often allowed their partners to obtain better rewards. Our results highlight the importance of social tolerance and motivation as drivers promoting cooperation in these species.

Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency

Non-human primates evaluate choices based on quantitative information and subjective valuation of options. Non-human primates can learn to value tokens as placeholders for primary rewards (such as food). With those tokens established as a potential form of 'currency', it is then possible to examine how they respond to opportunities to earn and use tokens in ways such as accumulating tokens or exchanging tokens with each other or with human experimenters to gain primary rewards. Sometimes, individuals make efficient and beneficial choices to obtain tokens and then exchange them at the right moments to gain optimal reward. Sometimes, they even accumulate such rewards through extended delay of gratification, or through other exchange-based interactions. Thus, non-human primates are capable of associating value to arbitrary tokens that may function as currency-like stimuli, but there also are strong limitations on how non-human primates can integrate such tokens into choice situations or use such tokens to fully 'symbolize' economic decision-making. These limitations are important to acknowledge when considering the evolutionary emergence of currency use in our species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

What behaviour in economic games tells us about the evolution of non-human species' economic decision-making behaviour

In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species' propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Investigating reactions of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) towards unequal food distributions in a tray-pulling paradigm

The fact that squirrel monkeys do not routinely cooperate in the wild has been proposed to explain their failure to show disadvantageous inequity aversion (i.e., negative reactions when receiving less than a partner) in an experimental exchange. Here we assessed whether the use of a tray-pulling paradigm, allowing for a larger variety of unequal testing situations, would bring additional insights into inequity aversion in this species. Squirrel monkeys were tested in pairs in which only the donor could pull a tray baited with food to within reach of itself and a recipient. Using pairs with different social relationships, we examined donors' frequencies of pulling both in the presence and absence of a recipient, as well as across three different food distributions: equal, qualitative inequity (higher-value reward for the recipient), and quantitative inequity (no food reward for the donor). Results showed that female donors pulled the tray less often in the quantitative inequity condition with an out-group female recipient than when alone. However, such discrimination was not observed when females were with female in-group and male out-group recipients. By contrast, male donors did not adjust their pull frequencies according to the recipient's presence or identity (female and male out-group recipients). These results point towards possible disadvantageous inequity aversion in female squirrel monkeys. However, alternative hypotheses such as increased arousal caused by out-group female recipients cannot be ruled out. We discuss the data in line with major theories of inequity aversion and cooperation in primates.

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates?

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.