Weak transhumanism: moderate enhancement as a non-radical path to radical enhancement

Transhumanism aims to bring about radical human enhancement. In 'Truly Human Enhancement' Agar (2014) provides a strong argument against producing radically enhancing effects in agents. This leaves the transhumanist in a quandary-how to achieve radical enhancement whilst avoiding the problem of radically enhancing effects? This paper aims to show that transhumanism can overcome the worries of radically enhancing effects by instead pursuing radical human enhancement via incremental moderate human enhancements (Weak Transhumanism). In this sense, weak transhumanism is much like traditional transhumanism in its aims, but starkly different in its execution. This version of transhumanism is weaker given the limitations brought about by having to avoid radically enhancing effects. I consider numerous objections to weak transhumanism and conclude that the account survives each one. This paper's proposal of 'weak transhumanism' has the upshot of providing a way out of the 'problem of radically enhancing effects' for the transhumanist, but this comes at a cost-the restrictive process involved in applying multiple moderate enhancements in order to achieve radical enhancement will most likely be dissatisfying for the transhumanist, however, it is, I contend, the best option available.

Closing the Loop With Cortical Sensing: The Development of Adaptive Deep Brain Stimulation for Essential Tremor Using the Activa PC+S

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an important tool in the treatment of pharmacologically resistant neurological movement disorders such as essential tremor (ET) and Parkinson's disease (PD). However, the open-loop design of current systems may be holding back the true potential of invasive neuromodulation. In the last decade we have seen an explosion of activity in the use of feedback to "close the loop" on neuromodulation in the form of adaptive DBS (aDBS) systems that can respond to the patient's therapeutic needs. In this paper we summarize the accomplishments of a 5-year study at the University of Washington in the use of neural feedback from an electrocorticography strip placed over the sensorimotor cortex. We document our progress from an initial proof of hardware all the way to a fully implanted adaptive stimulation system that leverages machine-learning approaches to simplify the programming process. In certain cases, our systems out-performed current open-loop approaches in both power consumption and symptom suppression. Throughout this effort, we collaborated with neuroethicists to capture patient experiences and take them into account whilst developing ethical aDBS approaches. Based on our results we identify several key areas for future work. "Graded" aDBS will allow the system to smoothly tune the stimulation level to symptom severity, and frequent automatic calibration of the algorithm will allow aDBS to adapt to the time-varying dynamics of the disease without additional input from a clinician. Additionally, robust computational models of the pathophysiology of ET will allow stimulation to be optimized to the nuances of an individual patient's symptoms. We also outline the unique advantages of using cortical electrodes for control and the remaining hardware limitations that need to be overcome to facilitate further development in this field. Over the course of this study we have verified the potential of fully-implanted, cortically driven aDBS as a feasibly translatable treatment for pharmacologically resistant ET.

Neurotechnology ethics and relational agency

Novel neurotechnologies, like deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interface, offer great hope for treating, curing, and preventing disease, but raise important questions about effects these devices may have on human identity, authenticity, and autonomy. After briefly assessing recent narrative work in these areas, we show that agency is a phenomenon key to all three goods and highlight the ways in which neural devices can help to draw attention to the relational nature of our agency. Drawing on insights from disability theory, we argue that neural devices provide a kind of agential assistance, similar to that provided by caregivers, family, and others. As such, users and devices participate in a kind of co-agency. We conclude by suggesting the need for developing relational agency-competencies-skills for reflecting on the influence of devices on agency, for adapting to novel circumstances ushered in by devices, and for incorporating the feedback of loved ones and others about device effects on agency.