A qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the Advancing Quality pay-for-performance programme in the NHS North West

Pay-for-performance and patient safety in acute care: A systematic review

Pay-for-performance (p4p) has been tried in all healthcare settings to address ongoing deficiencies in the quality and outcomes of care. The evidence for the effect of these policies has been inconclusive, especially in acute care. This systematic review focused on patient safety p4p in the hospital setting. Using the PRISMA guidelines, we searched five biomedical databases for quantitative studies using at least one outcome metric from database inception to March 2023, supplemented by reference tracking and internet searches. We identified 6,122 potential titles of which 53 were included: 39 original investigations, eight literature reviews and six grey literature reports. Only five system-wide p4p policies have been implemented, and the quality of evidence was low overall. Just over half of the studies (52 %) included failed to observe improvement in outcomes, with positive findings heavily skewed towards poor quality evaluations. The exception was the Fragility Hip Fracture Best Practice Tariff (BPT) in England, where sustained improvement was observed across various evaluations. All policies had a miniscule impact on total hospital revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of simple and transparent design, involvement of the clinical community, explicit links to other quality improvement initiatives, and gradual implementation of p4p initatives. We also propose a research agenda to lift the quality of evidence in this field.

How do hospitals respond to payment unbundling for diagnostic imaging of suspected cancer patients?

Payments for some diagnostic scans undertaken in outpatient settings were unbundled from Diagnosis Related Group based payments in England in April 2013 to address under-provision. Unbundled scans attracted additional payments of between £45 and £748 directly following the reform. We examined the effect on utilization of these scans for patients with suspected cancer. We also explored whether any detected effects represented real increases in use of scans or better coding of activity. We applied difference-in-differences regression to patient-level data from Hospital Episodes Statistics for 180 NHS hospital Trusts in England, between April 2010 and March 2018. We also explored heterogeneity in recorded use of scans before and after the unbundling at hospital Trust-level. Use of scans increased by 0.137 scans per patient following unbundling, a 134% relative increase. This increased annual national provider payments by £79.2 million. Over 15% of scans recorded after the unbundling were at providers that previously recorded no scans, suggesting some of the observed increase in activity reflected previous under-coding. Hospitals recorded substantial increases in diagnostic imaging for suspected cancer in response to payment unbundling. Results suggest that the reform also encouraged improvements in recording, so the real increase in testing is likely lower than detected.

Pay for performance system in Turkey and the world; a global overview

Objective: This study aimed to compare the pay for performance system applied nationally in Turkey and in other countries around the world and to reveal the effects of the system applied in our country on the general surgery.

Material and Methods: Current literature and countries’ programs on the implementation of the pay for performance system were recorded. The results of the Turkish Surgical Association’s performance and Healthcare Implementation Communique (HIC) commission studies were evaluated in light of the literature.

Results: Many countries have implemented performance systems on a limited scale to improve quality, speed up the diagnosis, treatment, and control of certain diseases, and they have generally applied it as a financial promotion by receiving the support of health insurance companies and nongovernmental organizations. It turns out that surgeons in our country feel that they are being wronged because of the injustice in the current system because the property of their works is not appreciated and they cannot get the reward for the work they do. This is also the reason for the reluctance of medical school graduates to choose general surgery.

Conclusion: Authorities should pay attention to the opinions of associations and experts in the related field when creating lists of interventional procedures related to surgery. Equal pay should be given to equal work nationally, and surgeons should be encouraged by incentives to perform detailed, qualified surgeries. There is a possibility that the staff positions opened for general surgery, as well as, all surgical branches will remain empty in the near future.

Humanized COVID-19 decoy antibody effectively blocks viral entry and prevents SARS-CoV-2 infection

To circumvent the devastating pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, a humanized decoy antibody (ACE2-Fc fusion protein) was designed to target the interaction between viral spike protein and its cellular receptor, angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2). First, we demonstrated that ACE2-Fc could specifically abrogate virus replication by blocking the entry of SARS-CoV-2 spike-expressing pseudotyped virus into both ACE2-expressing lung cells and lung organoids. The impairment of viral entry was not affected by virus variants, since efficient inhibition was also observed in six SARS-CoV-2 clinical strains, including the D614G variants which have been shown to exhibit increased infectivity. The preservation of peptidase activity also enables ACE2-Fc to reduce the angiotensin II-mediated cytokine cascade. Furthermore, this Fc domain of ACE2-Fc was shown to activate NK cell degranulation after co-incubation with Spike-expressing H1975 cells. These promising characteristics potentiate the therapeutic prospects of ACE2-Fc as an effective treatment for COVID-19.

Effect of data validation audit on hospital mortality ranking and pay for performance

Background

Quality improvement and epidemiology studies often rely on database codes to measure performance or impact of adjusted risk factors, but how validity issues can bias those estimates is seldom quantified.

Objectives

To evaluate whether and how much interhospital administrative coding variations influence a typical performance measure (adjusted mortality) and potential incentives based on it.

Design

National cross-sectional study comparing hospital mortality ranking and simulated pay-for-performance incentives before/after recoding discharge abstracts using medical records.

Setting

Twenty-four public and private hospitals located in France

Participants

All inpatient stays from the 78 deadliest diagnosis-related groups over 1 year.

Interventions

Elixhauser and Charlson comorbidities were derived, and mortality ratios were computed for each hospital. Thirty random stays per hospital were then recoded by two central reviewers and used in a Bayesian hierarchical model to estimate hospital-specific and comorbidity-specific predictive values. Simulations then estimated shifts in adjusted mortality and proportion of incentives that would be unfairly distributed by a typical pay-for-performance programme in this situation.

Main outcome measures

Positive and negative predictive values of routine coding of comorbidities in hospital databases, variations in hospitals’ mortality league table and proportion of unfair incentives.

Results

A total of 70 402 hospital discharge abstracts were analysed, of which 715 were recoded from full medical records. Hospital comorbidity-level positive predictive values ranged from 64.4% to 96.4% and negative ones from 88.0% to 99.9%. Using Elixhauser comorbidities for adjustment, 70.3% of hospitals changed position in the mortality league table after correction, which added up to a mean 6.5% (SD 3.6) of a total pay-for-performance budget being allocated to the wrong hospitals. Using Charlson, 61.5% of hospitals changed position, with 7.3% (SD 4.0) budget misallocation.

Conclusions

Variations in administrative data coding can bias mortality comparisons and budget allocation across hospitals. Such heterogeneity in data validity may be corrected using a centralised coding strategy from a random sample of observations.

Effectiveness of UK provider financial incentives on quality of care: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Provider financial incentives are being increasingly adopted to help improve standards of care while promoting efficiency.

AIM

To review the UK evidence on whether provider financial incentives are an effective way of improving the quality of health care.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Systematic review of UK evidence, undertaken in accordance with Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) recommendations.

METHOD

MEDLINE and Embase databases were searched in August 2016. Original articles that assessed the relationship between UK provider financial incentives and a quantitative measure of quality of health care were included. Studies showing improvement for all measures of quality of care were defined as 'positive', those that were 'intermediate' showed improvement in some measures, and those classified as 'negative' showed a worsening of measures. Studies showing no effect were documented as such. Quality was assessed using the Downs and Black quality checklist.

RESULTS

Of the 232 published articles identified by the systematic search, 28 were included. Of these, nine reported positive effects of incentives on quality of care, 16 reported intermediate effects, two reported no effect, and one reported a negative effect. Quality assessment scores for included articles ranged from 15 to 19, out of a maximum of 22 points.

CONCLUSION

The effects of UK provider financial incentives on healthcare quality are unclear. Owing to this uncertainty and their significant costs, use of them may be counterproductive to their goal of improving healthcare quality and efficiency. UK policymakers should be cautious when implementing these incentives - if used, they should be subject to careful long-term monitoring and evaluation. Further research is needed to assess whether provider financial incentives represent a cost-effective intervention to improve the quality of care delivered in the UK.

Using Survival Analysis to Improve Estimates of Life Year Gains in Policy Evaluations

Background. Policy evaluations taking a lifetime horizon have converted estimated changes in short-term mortality to expected life year gains using general population life expectancy. However, the life expectancy of the affected patients may differ from the general population. In trials, survival models are commonly used to extrapolate life year gains. The objective was to demonstrate the feasibility and materiality of using parametric survival models to extrapolate future survival in health care policy evaluations. Methods. We used our previous cost-effectiveness analysis of a pay-for-performance program as a motivating example. We first used the cohort of patients admitted prior to the program to compare 3 methods for estimating remaining life expectancy. We then used a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the life year gains associated with the program using general population life expectancy and survival models. Patient-level data from Hospital Episode Statistics was utilized for patients admitted to hospitals in England for pneumonia between 1 April 2007 and 31 March 2008 and between 1 April 2009 and 31 March 2010, and linked to death records for the period from 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2011. Results. In our cohort of patients, using parametric survival models rather than general population life expectancy figures reduced the estimated mean life years remaining by 30% (9.19 v. 13.15 years, respectively). However, the estimated mean life year gains associated with the program are larger using survival models (0.380 years) compared to using general population life expectancy (0.154 years). Conclusions. Using general population life expectancy to estimate the impact of health care policies can overestimate life expectancy but underestimate the impact of policies on life year gains. Using a longer follow-up period improved the accuracy of estimated survival and program impact considerably.

The role of cost-effectiveness analysis in the development of indicators to support incentive-based behaviour in primary care in England

In England, general practitioners are incentivized through a national pay-for-performance scheme to adopt evidence-based quality improvement initiatives using a portfolio of Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) indicators. We describe the development of the methods used to assess the cost-effectiveness of these pay-for-performance indicators and how they have contributed to the development of new indicators. Prior to analysis of new potential indicators, an economic subgroup of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) Indicator Advisory Committee is formed to assess evidence on the cost-effectiveness of potential indicators in terms of the health benefits gained, compared to the cost of the intervention and the cost of the incentive. The expert subgroup is convened to reach consensus on the amounts that could potentially be paid to general practices for achieving new indicators. Indicators are also piloted in selected general practices and evidence gathered about their practical implementation. The methods used to assess economic viability of new pilot indicators represent a pragmatic and effective way of providing information to inform recommendations. Current policy to reduce QOF funding could shift the focus from national (QOF) to local schemes, with economic appraisal remaining central.

Challenges, solutions and future directions in the evaluation of service innovations in health care and public health

Evaluating service innovations in health care and public health requires flexibility, collaboration and pragmatism; this collection identifies robust, innovative and mixed methods to inform such evaluations.