Believing and Beliefs-Neurophysiological Underpinnings

The truth is in there: Belief processes in the human brain

Belief, defined by William James as the mental state or function of cognizing reality, is a core psychological function with strong influence on emotion and behavior. Furthermore, strong and aberrant beliefs about the world and oneself play important roles in mental disorders. The underlying processes of belief have been the matter of a long debate in philosophy and psychology, and modern neuroimaging techniques can provide insight into the underlying neural processes. Here, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with N = 30 healthy participants in which we presented statements about facts, politics, religion, conspiracy theories, and superstition. Participants judged whether they considered them as true (belief) or not (disbelief) and reported their certainty in the decision. We found belief-associated activations in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left superior parietal cortex, and left lateral frontopolar cortex. Disbelief-associated activations were found in an anterior temporal cluster extending into the amygdala. We found a larger deactivation for disbelief than belief in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that was most pronounced during decisions, suggesting a role of the vmPFC in belief-related decision-making. As a category-specific effect, we found disbelief-associated activation in retrosplenial cortex and parahippocampal gyrus for conspiracy theory statements. Exploratory analyses identified networks centered at anterior cingulate cortex for certainty, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for uncertainty. The uncertainty effect identifies a neural substrate for Alexander Bain's notion from 1859 of uncertainty as the real opposite of belief. Taken together, our results suggest a two-factor neural process model of belief with falsehood/veracity and uncertainty/certainty factors.

Default beliefs as a basis of social decision-making

Default beliefs are implicit assumptions about the future existence of oneself, others, and the environment. They differ from individual and cultural beliefs in that they are held universally, implicitly, and with high confidence. What is the content of default beliefs? How are they represented in the brain? And what is their role in social decision-making?

Believing Processes during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Qualitative Analysis

Cognition, emotion, emotional regulation, and believing play a special role in psychosocial functioning, especially in times of crisis. So far, little is known about the process of believing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this study was to examine the process of believing (using the Model of Credition) and the associated psychosocial strain/stress during the first lockdown in the COVID-19 pandemic. An online survey via LimeSurvey was conducted using the Brief Symptom Inventory-18 (BSI-18), the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), and a dedicated Believing Questionnaire, which assesses four parameters of credition (propositions, certainty, emotion, mightiness) between April and June, 2020, in Austria. In total, n = 156 mentally healthy participants completed all questionnaires. Negative credition parameters were associated with higher global symptom load (from BSI-18): narratives: r = 0.29, p < 0.001; emotions r = 0.39, p < 0.001. These findings underline the importance of credition as a link between cognition and emotion and their impact on psychosocial functioning and stress regulation in implementing novel strategies to promote mental health.

Believing is seeing: A Buddhist theory of creditions

The creditions model is incredibly powerful at explaining both how beliefs are formed and how they influence our perceptions. The model contains several cognitive loops, where beliefs not only influence conscious interpretations of perceptions downstream but are active in the subconscious construction of perceptions out of sensory information upstream. This paper shows how this model is mirrored in the epistemology of two central Buddhist figures, Dignāga (480–540 CE) and Dharmakı̄rti (c. 550–650 CE). In addition to showing these parallels, the paper also demonstrates that by drawing on Dignāga and Dharmakı̄rti's theory, we can extend the explanatory power of the creditions model. Namely, while creditions explain how beliefs influence both the conscious interpretation and subconscious construction of sensory information, Dignāga and Dharmakı̄rti suggest beliefs can even be generative of sensory-like information. I recruit ancient Buddhist texts in conjunction with contemporary cognitive science scholarship to offer a hypothesis for the cognitive mechanisms responsible for this.