The proactive brain and the fate of dead hypotheses

More than words: can free reports adequately measure the richness of perception?

The question of the richness (or sparseness) of conscious experience has evoked ongoing debate and discussion. Claims for both richness and sparseness are supported by empirical data, yet they are often indirect, and alternative explanations have been put forward. Recently, it has been suggested that current experimental methods limit participants' responses, thereby preventing researchers from assessing the actual richness of perception. Instead, free verbal reports were presented as a possible way to overcome this limitation. As part of this approach, a novel paradigm of freely reported words was developed using a new metric, intersubjective agreement (IA), with experimental results interpreted as capturing aspects of conscious perception. Here, we challenge the validity of freely reported words as a tool for studying the richness of conscious experience. We base our claims on two studies (each composed of three experiments), where we manipulated the richness of percepts and tested whether IA changed accordingly. Five additional control experiments were conducted to validate the experimental logic and examine alternative explanations. Our results suggest otherwise, presenting four challenges to the free verbal report paradigm: first, impoverished stimuli did not evoke lower IA scores. Second, the IA score was correlated with word frequency in English. Third, the original positive relationship between IA scores and rated confidence was not found in any of the six experiments. Fourth, a high rate of nonexisting words was found, some of which described items that matched the gist of the scene but did not appear in the image. We conclude that a metric based on freely reported words might be better explained by vocabulary conventions and gist-based reports than by capturing the richness of perception.

Awareness is needed for contextual effects in ambiguous object recognition

Despite its centrality to human experience, the functional role of conscious awareness is not yet known. One hypothesis suggests that consciousness is necessary for allowing high-level information to refine low-level processing in a "top-down" manner. To test this hypothesis, in this work we examined whether consciousness is needed for integrating contextual information with sensory information during visual object recognition, a case of top-down processing that is automatic and ubiquitous to our daily visual experience. In three experiments, 137 participants were asked to determine the identity of an ambiguous object presented to them. Crucially, a scene biasing the interpretation of the object towards one option over another (e.g., a picture of a tree when the object could equally be perceived as a fish or a leaf) was presented either before, after, or alongside the ambiguous object. In all three experiments, the scene biased perception of the ambiguous object when it was consciously perceived, but not when it was processed unconsciously. The results therefore suggest that conscious awareness may be needed for top-down contextual processes.

The reach of reactivation: Effects of consciously triggered versus unconsciously triggered reactivation of associative memory

Consolidating memories for long-term storage depends on reactivation. Reactivation occurs both consciously, during wakefulness, and unconsciously, during wakefulness and sleep. While considerable work has examined conscious awake and unconscious sleep reactivation, in this study, we directly compare the consequences of conscious and unconscious reactivation during wakefulness. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., fruits, vehicles) such that we could examine consequences of reactivation on semantically related memories. After an intensive learning protocol, we systematically reactivated some of the triads by presenting the adjective as a cue. Reactivation was done so that it was consciously experienced for some triads, and only unconsciously processed for others. Memory for spatial positions, the most distal part of the association, was affected by reactivation in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. Conscious reactivation resulted in weakening of semantically related memories that were strong initially, resonating with prior findings of retrieval-induced forgetting. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, selectively benefited weak reactivated memories, as previously shown for reactivation during sleep. Semantically linked memories were not impaired, but rather were integrated with the reactivated memory. These results taken together demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation have qualitatively different consequences. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, whereby unconscious reactivation entails less inhibition than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of conscious experience in memory storage and structuring.

Spatial frequency tuning of motor responses reveals differential contribution of dorsal and ventral systems to action comprehension

Understanding object-directed actions performed by others is central to everyday life. This ability is thought to rely on the interaction between the dorsal action observation network (AON) and a ventral object recognition pathway. On this view, the AON would encode action kinematics, and the ventral pathway, the most likely intention afforded by the objects. However, experimental evidence supporting this model is still scarce. Here, we aimed to disentangle the contribution of dorsal vs. ventral pathways to action comprehension by exploiting their differential tuning to low-spatial frequencies (LSFs) and high-spatial frequencies (HSFs). We filtered naturalistic action images to contain only LSF or HSF and measured behavioral performance and corticospinal excitability (CSE) using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Actions were embedded in congruent or incongruent scenarios as defined by the compatibility between grips and intentions afforded by the contextual objects. Behaviorally, participants were better at discriminating congruent actions in intact than LSF images. This effect was reversed for incongruent actions, with better performance for LSF than intact and HSF. These modulations were mirrored at the neurophysiological level, with greater CSE facilitation for congruent than incongruent actions for HSF and the opposite pattern for LSF images. Finally, only for LSF did we observe CSE modulations according to grip kinematics. While results point to differential dorsal (LSF) and ventral (HSF) contributions to action comprehension for grip and context encoding, respectively, the negative congruency effect for LSF images suggests that object processing may influence action perception not only through ventral-to-dorsal connections, but also through a dorsal-to-dorsal route involved in predictive processing.