Modeling spontaneous activity across an excitable epithelium: Support for a coordination scenario of early neural evolution

Active oscillations in microscale navigation

Living organisms routinely navigate their surroundings in search of better conditions, more food, or to avoid predators. Typically, animals do so by integrating sensory cues from the environment with their locomotor apparatuses. For single cells or small organisms that possess motility, fundamental physical constraints imposed by their small size have led to alternative navigation strategies that are specific to the microscopic world. Intriguingly, underlying these myriad exploratory behaviours or sensory functions is the onset of periodic activity at multiple scales, such as the undulations of cilia and flagella, the vibrations of hair cells, or the oscillatory shape modes of migrating neutrophils. Here, I explore oscillatory dynamics in basal microeukaryotes and hypothesize that these active oscillations play a critical role in enhancing the fidelity of adaptive sensorimotor integration.

Cellular Competency during Development Alters Evolutionary Dynamics in an Artificial Embryogeny Model

Biological genotypes do not code directly for phenotypes; developmental physiology is the control layer that separates genomes from capacities ascertained by selection. A key aspect is cellular competency, since cells are not passive materials but descendants of unicellular organisms with complex context-sensitive behavioral capabilities. To probe the effects of different degrees of cellular competency on evolutionary dynamics, we used an evolutionary simulation in the context of minimal artificial embryogeny. Virtual embryos consisted of a single axis of positional information values provided by cells' 'structural genes', operated upon by an evolutionary cycle in which embryos' fitness was proportional to monotonicity of the axial gradient. Evolutionary dynamics were evaluated in two modes: hardwired development (genotype directly encodes phenotype), and a more realistic mode in which cells interact prior to evaluation by the fitness function ("regulative" development). We find that even minimal ability of cells with to improve their position in the embryo results in better performance of the evolutionary search. Crucially, we observed that increasing the behavioral competency masks the raw fitness encoded by structural genes, with selection favoring improvements to its developmental problem-solving capacities over improvements to its structural genome. This suggests the existence of a powerful ratchet mechanism: evolution progressively becomes locked in to improvements in the intelligence of its agential substrate, with reduced pressure on the structural genome. This kind of feedback loop in which evolution increasingly puts more effort into the developmental software than perfecting the hardware explains the very puzzling divergence of genome from anatomy in species like planaria. In addition, it identifies a possible driver for scaling intelligence over evolutionary time, and suggests strategies for engineering novel systems in silico and in bioengineering.

Morphological Coordination: A Common Ancestral Function Unifying Neural and Non-Neural Signaling

Nervous systems are traditionally thought of as providing sensing and behavioral coordination functions at the level of the whole organism. What is the evolutionary origin of the mechanisms enabling the nervous systems’ information processing ability? Here, we review evidence from evolutionary, developmental, and regenerative biology suggesting a deeper, ancestral function of both pre-neural and neural cell-cell communication systems: the long-distance coordination of cell division and differentiation required to create and maintain body-axis symmetries. This conceptualization of the function of nervous system activity sheds new light on the evolutionary transition from the morphologically rudimentary, non-neural Porifera and Placazoa to the complex morphologies of Ctenophores, Cnidarians, and Bilaterians. It further allows a sharp formulation of the distinction between long-distance axis-symmetry coordination based on external coordinates, e.g., by whole-organism scale trophisms as employed by plants and sessile animals, and coordination based on body-centered coordinates as employed by motile animals. Thus we suggest that the systems that control animal behavior evolved from ancient mechanisms adapting preexisting ionic and neurotransmitter mechanisms to regulate individual cell behaviors during morphogenesis. An appreciation of the ancient, non-neural origins of bioelectrically mediated computation suggests new approaches to the study of embryological development, including embryological dysregulation, cancer, regenerative medicine, and synthetic bioengineering.

Modelling the effects of short and random proto-neural elongations

To understand how neurons and nervous systems first evolved, we need an account of the origins of neural elongations: why did neural elongations (axons and dendrites) first originate, such that they could become the central component of both neurons and nervous systems? Two contrasting conceptual accounts provide different answers to this question. Braitenberg's vehicles provide the iconic illustration of the dominant input-output (IO) view. Here, the basic role of neural elongations is to connect sensors to effectors, both situated at different positions within the body. For this function, neural elongations are thought of as comparatively long and specific connections, which require an articulated body involving substantial developmental processes to build. Internal coordination (IC) models stress a different function for early nervous systems. Here, the coordination of activity across extended parts of a multicellular body is held central, in particular, for the contractions of (muscle) tissue. An IC perspective allows the hypothesis that the earliest proto-neural elongations could have been functional even when they were initially simple, short and random connections, as long as they enhanced the patterning of contractile activity across a multicellular surface. The present computational study provides a proof of concept that such short and random neural elongations can play this role. While an excitable epithelium can generate basic forms of patterning for small body configurations, adding elongations allows such patterning to scale up to larger bodies. This result supports a new, more gradual evolutionary route towards the origins of the very first neurons and nervous systems.

Is Empiricism Empirically False? Lessons from Early Nervous Systems

Recent work on skin-brain thesis (de Wiljes et al. 2015; Keijzer 2015; Keijzer et al. 2013) suggests the possibility of empirical evidence that empiricism is false. It implies that early animals need no traditional sensory receptors to be engaged in cognitive activity. The neural structure required to coordinate extensive sheets of contractile tissue for motility provides the starting point for a new multicellular organized form of sensing. Moving a body by muscle contraction provides the basis for a multicellular organization that is sensitive to external surface structure at the scale of the animal body. In other words, the nervous system first evolved for action, not for receiving sensory input. Thus, sensory input is not required for minimal cognition; only action is. The whole body of an organism, in particular its highly specific animal sensorimotor organization, reflects the bodily and environmental spatiotemporal structure. The skin-brain thesis suggests that, in contrast to empiricist claims that cognition is constituted by sensory systems, cognition may be also constituted by action-oriented feedback mechanisms. Instead of positing the reflex arc as the elementary building block of nervous systems, it proposes that endogenous motor activity is crucial for cognitive processes. In the paper, I discuss the issue whether the skin-brain thesis and its supporting evidence can be really used to overthrow the main tenet of empiricism empirically, by pointing out to cognizing agents that fail to have any sensory apparatus.