Own-race and own-age biases facilitate visual awareness of faces under interocular suppression

A cognitive template for human face detection

Faces are highly informative social stimuli, yet before any information can be accessed, the face must first be detected in the visual field. A detection template that serves this purpose must be able to accommodate the wide variety of face images we encounter, but how this generality could be achieved remains unknown. In this study, we investigate whether statistical averages of previously encountered faces can form the basis of a general face detection template. We provide converging evidence from a range of methods-human similarity judgements and PCA-based image analysis of face averages (Experiment 1-3), human detection behaviour for faces embedded in complex scenes (Experiment 4 and 5), and simulations with a template-matching algorithm (Experiment 6 and 7)-to examine the formation, stability and robustness of statistical image averages as cognitive templates for human face detection. We integrate these findings with existing knowledge of face identification, ensemble coding, and the development of face perception.

Guns Are Not Faster to Enter Awareness After Seeing a Black Face: Absence of Race-Priming in a Gun/Tool Task During Continuous Flash Suppression

In the Weapon Identification Task (WIT), Black faces prime the identification of guns compared with tools. We measured race-induced changes in visual awareness of guns and tools using continuous flash suppression (CFS). Eighty-four participants, primed with Black or Asian faces, indicated the location of a gun or tool target that was temporarily rendered invisible through CFS, which provides a sensitive measure of effects on early visual processing. The same participants also completed a standard (non-CFS) WIT. We replicated the standard race-priming effect in the WIT. In the CFS task, Black and Asian primes did not affect the time guns and tools needed to enter awareness. Thus, race priming does not alter early visual processing but does change the identification of guns and tools. This confirms that race-priming originates from later post-perceptual memory- or response-related processing.

The importance of awareness in face processing: A critical review of interocular suppression studies

Human faces convey essential information for understanding others' mental states and intentions. The importance of faces in social interaction has prompted suggestions that some relevant facial features such as configural information, emotional expression, and gaze direction may promote preferential access to awareness. This evidence has predominantly come from interocular suppression studies, with the most common method being the Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (bCFS) procedure, which measures the time it takes different stimuli to overcome interocular suppression. However, the procedures employed in such studies suffer from multiple methodological limitations. For example, they are unable to disentangle detection from identification processes, their results may be confounded by participants' response bias and decision criteria, they typically use small stimulus sets, and some of their results attributed to detecting high-level facial features (e.g., emotional expression) may be confounded by differences in low-level visual features (e.g., contrast, spatial frequency). In this article, we review the evidence from the bCFS procedure on whether relevant facial features promote access to awareness, discuss the main limitations of this very popular method, and propose strategies to address these issues.

Ingroup and outgroup differences in face detection

Humans show improved recognition for faces from their own social group relative to faces from another social group. Yet before faces can be recognized, they must first be detected in the visual field. Here, we tested whether humans also show an ingroup bias at the earliest stage of face processing - the point at which the presence of a face is first detected. To this end, we measured viewers' ability to detect ingroup (Black and White) and outgroup faces (Asian, Black, and White) in everyday scenes. Ingroup faces were detected with greater speed and accuracy relative to outgroup faces (Experiment 1). Removing face hue impaired detection generally, but the ingroup detection advantage was undiminished (Experiment 2). This same pattern was replicated by a detection algorithm using face templates derived from human data (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that the established ingroup bias in face processing can extend to the early process of detection. This effect is 'colour blind', in the sense that group membership effects are independent of general effects of image hue. Moreover, it can be captured by tuning visual templates to reflect the statistics of observers' social experience. We conclude that group bias in face detection is both a visual and a social phenomenon.

Unconscious social relation threats: Invisible boss face biases attention

Threatening stimuli as a kind of salient information often guide attentional orienting. Besides physically threatening stimuli, social threats can also strongly bias attention, even in the absence of conscious awareness. However, the available evidence mainly came from studies on an emotional face. It is unclear whether social relation threats, such as a boss face without emotional expressions, can also direct attentional orienting unconsciously. This study aimed to reveal the extent to which the attentional system has developed to process threatening stimuli by exploring whether invisible social relation threats unconsciously biased attention. We asked graduate and undergraduate students to perform a modified Posner's cue-target task, in which the probe was preceded by a pair of competitive face cues (an advisor's face and another faculty member's face), rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Experiment 1a's results showed that the advisor's face reflexively oriented graduate students' spatial attention, which was significantly correlated with subjective social threat evaluation. However, Experiment 1b showed that an invisible advisor's face did not induce the same effect in undergraduate students, as they reported significantly fewer threats from their advisors than graduates. To ensure the robustness of this new effect, we preregistered a replicate study and successfully replicated the above results in Experiments 2a and 2b. Our findings provide evidence for the existence of an attentional orienting bias toward invisible social relation threats. These results suggest that the attentional system evolved to promote the exploration of our visual environment for threatening social relation signals.

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach

The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

Social categorization modulates own-age bias in face recognition and ERP correlates of face processing

The aim of the present study was to further understanding of how social categorization influences face recognition. According to the categorization-individuation model, face recognition can either be biased toward categorization or individuation. We hypothesized that the face recognition bias associated with a social category (e.g., the own-age bias) would be larger when faces were initially categorized according to that category. To examine this hypothesis, young adults (N = 63) completed a face recognition task after either making age or sex judgments while encoding child and adult faces. Young adults showed the own-age and own-sex biases in face recognition. Consistent with our hypothesis, the magnitude of the own-age bias in face recognition was larger when individuals made age, rather than sex, judgments at encoding. To probe the mechanisms underlying this effect, we examined ERP responses to child and adult faces across the social categorization conditions. Neither the P1 nor the N170 ERP components were modulated by the social categorization task or the social category membership of the face. However, the P2, which is associated with second-order configural processing, was larger to adult faces than child faces only in the age categorization condition. The N250, which is associated with individuation, was larger (i.e., more negative) to adult than child faces and during age categorization than sex categorization. These results are interpreted within the context of the categorization-individuation model and current research on biases in face recognition.

One of us? how facial and symbolic cues to own- versus other-race membership influence access to perceptual awareness

Information that conveys racial group membership plays a powerful role in influencing people's information processing including perceptual, memory and evaluative judgments. Yet whether own- and other-race information can differentially impact people's perceptual awareness at a preconscious level remains unclear. Employing a breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) paradigm, we investigated whether compared with other-race stimuli, participants' own-race stimuli would be prioritized to gain privileged access to perceptual awareness. Across five experiments (N = 136), we firstly found that participants' own-race faces enjoyed privileged access to perceptual awareness (Experiment 1). In Experiments 2-5, we employed an associative training task to establish associations between otherwise arbitrary visual stimuli and own- vs. other-racial groups. Although otherwise arbitrary visual stimuli were prioritized to represent one's own race (vs. other-race) during the training, own- and other-race representing stimuli did not differ in their potency in entering perceptual awareness. This dissociation was further corroborated by Bayesian analyses and an internal meta-analysis. Taken together, our findings suggest that people's perceptual expertise with their own-race members' faces plays a determining role in shaping perceptual awareness. In contrast, newly learned race-representing stimuli did not influence early perceptual selection processes as indicated by the time they take to emerge into perceptual awareness.

Can emotional content be extracted under interocular suppression?

Previous studies showed that emotional faces break through interocular suppression more easily compared to neutral faces under the continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm. However, there is controversy over whether emotional content or low-level properties contributed to the results. In this study, we directly manipulated the meaningfulness of facial expression to test the role of emotional content in breaking CFS (b-CFS). In addition, an explicit emotion judgment for different facial expressions (happy, neutral, and fearful) used in the b-CFS task was also conducted afterwards to examine the relationship between b-CFS time and emotion judgment. In Experiment 1, face orientation and luminance polarity were manipulated to generate upright-positive and inverted-negative faces. In Experiment 2, Asian and Caucasian faces were presented to Taiwanese participants so that these stimuli served as own-race and other-race faces, respectively. We found robust face familiarity effects in both experiments within the same experimental framework: upright-positive and own-race faces had shorter b-CFS times than inverted-negative and other-race faces, respectively. This indicates potential involvement of high-level processing under interocular suppression. In Experiment 1, different b-CFS times were found between emotional and neutral faces in both upright-positive and inverted-negative conditions. Furthermore, with sufficient duration (1000 ms) participants could still extract emotional content in explicit valence judgment even from inverted-negative faces, though with a smaller degree than upright-positive faces. In Experiment 2, differential b-CFS times were found between emotional and neutral faces with own-race but not other-race faces. Correlation analyses from both experiments showed that the magnitude of emotion judgment was correlated with b-CFS time only for familiar (upright-positive / own-race) but not unfamiliar (inverted-negative / other-race) faces. These results suggest that emotional content can be extracted under interocular suppression with familiar faces, and low-level properties in unfamiliar faces may play a major role in the b-CFS time.

Typical visual-field locations facilitate access to awareness for everyday objects

In real-world vision, humans are constantly confronted with complex environments that contain a multitude of objects. These environments are spatially structured, so that objects have different likelihoods of appearing in specific parts of the visual space. Our massive experience with such positional regularities prompts the hypothesis that the processing of individual objects varies in efficiency across the visual field: when objects are encountered in their typical locations (e.g., we are used to seeing lamps in the upper visual field and carpets in the lower visual field), they should be more efficiently perceived than when they are encountered in atypical locations (e.g., a lamp in the lower visual field and a carpet in the upper visual field). Here, we provide evidence for this hypothesis by showing that typical positioning facilitates an object's access to awareness. In two continuous flash suppression experiments, objects more efficiently overcame inter-ocular suppression when they were presented in visual-field locations that matched their typical locations in the environment, as compared to non-typical locations. This finding suggests that through extensive experience the visual system has adapted to the statistics of the environment. This adaptation may be particularly useful for rapid object individuation in natural scenes.

The Two-Systems Account of Theory of Mind: Testing the Links to Social- Perceptual and Cognitive Abilities

According to the two-systems account of theory of mind (ToM), understanding mental states of others involves both fast social-perceptual processes, as well as slower, reflexive cognitive operations (Frith and Frith, 2008; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). To test the respective roles of specific abilities in either of these processes we administered 15 experimental procedures to a large sample of 343 participants, testing ability in face recognition and holistic perception, language, and reasoning. ToM was measured by a set of tasks requiring ability to track and to infer complex emotional and mental states of others from faces, eyes, spoken language, and prosody. We used structural equation modeling to test the relative strengths of a social-perceptual (face processing related) and reflexive-cognitive (language and reasoning related) path in predicting ToM ability. The two paths accounted for 58% of ToM variance, thus validating a general two-systems framework. Testing specific predictor paths revealed language and face recognition as strong and significant predictors of ToM. For reasoning, there were neither direct nor mediated effects, albeit reasoning was strongly associated with language. Holistic face perception also failed to show a direct link with ToM ability, while there was a mediated effect via face recognition. These results highlight the respective roles of face recognition and language for the social brain, and contribute closer empirical specification of the general two-systems account.

Choice of analysis pathway dramatically affects statistical outcomes in breaking continuous flash suppression

Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (bCFS) has been adopted as an appealing means to study human visual awareness, but the literature is beclouded by inconsistent and contradictory results. Although previous reviews have focused chiefly on design pitfalls and instances of false reasoning, we show in this study that the choice of analysis pathway can have severe effects on the statistical output when applied to bCFS data. Using a representative dataset designed to address a specific controversy in the realm of language processing under bCFS, namely whether psycholinguistic variables affect access to awareness, we present a range of analysis methods based on real instances in the published literature, and indicate how each approach affects the perceived outcome. We provide a summary of published bCFS studies indicating the use of data transformation and trimming, and highlight that more compelling analysis methods are sparsely used in this field. We discuss potential interpretations based on both classical and more complex analyses, to highlight how these differ. We conclude that an adherence to openly available data and analysis pathways could provide a great benefit to this field, so that conclusions can be tested against multiple analyses as standard practices are updated.

Invisible own- and other-race faces presented under continuous flash suppression produce affective response biases

One triumph of the human mind is the ability to place the multitudinous array of people we encounter into in- and out-group members based on racial characteristics. One fundamental question that remains to be answered is whether invisible own- and other-race faces can nevertheless influence subsequent affective judgments. Here, we employed continuous flash suppression (CFS) to render own- and other-race faces unperceivable in an affective priming task. Both on-line and off-line awareness checks were employed to provide more stringent control of partial awareness. Results revealed that relative to own-race faces, imperceptible other-race faces significantly facilitated participants' identification of negative words, suggesting an other-race derogation bias. When faces were presented consciously, we found that not only other-race faces facilitated detection of negative words, but also own-race faces facilitated detection of positive words. These findings together provide novel and strong evidence suggesting that invisible racial faces can bias affective responses.

Access to Awareness for Faces during Continuous Flash Suppression Is Not Modulated by Affective Knowledge

It is a controversially debated topic whether stimuli can be analyzed up to the semantic level when they are suppressed from visual awareness during continuous flash suppression (CFS). Here, we investigated whether affective knowledge, i.e., affective biographical information about faces, influences the time it takes for initially invisible faces with neutral expressions to overcome suppression and break into consciousness. To test this, we used negative, positive, and neutral famous faces as well as initially unfamiliar faces, which were associated with negative, positive or neutral biographical information. Affective knowledge influenced ratings of facial expressions, corroborating recent evidence and indicating the success of our affective learning paradigm. Furthermore, we replicated shorter suppression durations for upright than for inverted faces, demonstrating the suitability of our CFS paradigm. However, affective biographical information did not modulate suppression durations for newly learned faces, and even though suppression durations for famous faces were influenced by affective knowledge, these effects did not differ between upright and inverted faces, indicating that they might have been due to low-level visual differences. Thus, we did not obtain unequivocal evidence for genuine influences of affective biographical information on access to visual awareness for faces during CFS.

Faces in commonly experienced configurations enter awareness faster due to their curvature relative to fixation

The extent to which perceptually suppressed face stimuli are still processed has been extensively studied using the continuous flash suppression paradigm (CFS). Studies that rely on breaking CFS (b-CFS), in which the time it takes for an initially suppressed stimulus to become detectable is measured, have provided evidence for relatively complex processing of invisible face stimuli. In contrast, adaptation and neuroimaging studies have shown that perceptually suppressed faces are only processed for a limited set of features, such as its general shape. In this study, we asked whether perceptually suppressed face stimuli presented in their commonly experienced configuration would break suppression faster than when presented in an uncommonly experienced configuration. This study was motivated by a recent neuroimaging study showing that commonly experienced face configurations are more strongly represented in the fusiform face area. Our findings revealed that faces presented in commonly experienced configurations indeed broke suppression faster, yet this effect did not interact with face inversion suggesting that, in a b-CFS context, perceptually suppressed faces are potentially not processed by specialized (high-level) face processing mechanisms. Rather, our pattern of results is consistent with an interpretation based on the processing of more basic visual properties such as convexity.

Preferential awareness of protofacial stimuli in autism

It has been suggested that a subcortically mediated, innate sensitivity to protofacial stimuli leads to specialized face processing and to the development of the social brain. A dysfunction of this face-processing pathway has been associated with atypical social development in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This study investigated whether individuals with ASD exhibit primary sensitivity to monochrome protoface stimuli using continuous flash suppression (CFS). Under CFS, visual stimuli are suppressed from awareness, and cortical processing is strongly reduced while subcortical regions continue to respond to invisible stimuli. We found that both adolescents with ASD and typically developing adolescents showed preferential detection of upright protoface stimuli under CFS but not in a non-CFS control condition. These results challenge the notion that a primitive sensitivity to protoface stimuli is essential for typical social development. Rather, our findings suggest such sensitivity is not a sufficient condition for typical social development and that the presence of other complementary factors is necessary for the development of the social brain.

Psychophysical "blinding" methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing

Numerous non-invasive experimental "blinding" methods exist for suppressing the phenomenal awareness of visual stimuli. Not all of these suppressive methods occur at, and thus index, the same level of unconscious visual processing. This suggests that a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing can in principle be established. The empirical results of extant studies that have used a number of different methods and additional reasonable theoretical considerations suggest the following tentative hierarchy. At the highest levels in this hierarchy is unconscious processing indexed by object-substitution masking. The functional levels indexed by crowding, the attentional blink (and other attentional blinding methods), backward pattern masking, metacontrast masking, continuous flash suppression, sandwich masking, and single-flash interocular suppression, fall at progressively lower levels, while unconscious processing at the lowest levels is indexed by eye-based binocular-rivalry suppression. Although unconscious processing levels indexed by additional blinding methods is yet to be determined, a tentative placement at lower levels in the hierarchy is also given for unconscious processing indexed by Troxler fading and adaptation-induced blindness, and at higher levels in the hierarchy indexed by attentional blinding effects in addition to the level indexed by the attentional blink. The full mapping of levels in the functional hierarchy onto cortical activation sites and levels is yet to be determined. The existence of such a hierarchy bears importantly on the search for, and the distinctions between, neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision.