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Higher emotional awareness is associated with greater domain-general reflective tendencies. Sci Rep 2022; 12:3123. [PMID: 35210517 PMCID: PMC8873306 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-07141-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2021] [Accepted: 02/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
The tendency to reflect on the emotions of self and others is a key aspect of emotional awareness (EA)—a trait widely recognized as relevant to mental health. However, the degree to which EA draws on general reflective cognition vs. specialized socio-emotional mechanisms remains unclear. Based on a synthesis of work in neuroscience and psychology, we recently proposed that EA is best understood as a learned application of domain-general cognitive processes to socio-emotional information. In this paper, we report a study in which we tested this hypothesis in 448 (125 male) individuals who completed measures of EA and both general reflective cognition and socio-emotional performance. As predicted, we observed a significant relationship between EA measures and both general reflectiveness and socio-emotional measures, with the strongest contribution from measures of the general tendency to engage in effortful, reflective cognition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that EA corresponds to the application of general reflective cognitive processes to socio-emotional signals.
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Ward RT, Lotfi S, Stout DM, Mattson S, Lee HJ, Larson CL. Working Memory Performance for Differentially Conditioned Stimuli. Front Psychol 2022; 12:811233. [PMID: 35145464 PMCID: PMC8821888 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.811233] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2021] [Accepted: 12/29/2021] [Indexed: 01/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Previous work suggests that threat-related stimuli are stored to a greater degree in working memory compared to neutral stimuli. However, most of this research has focused on stimuli with physically salient threat attributes (e.g., angry faces), failing to account for how a "neutral" stimulus that has acquired threat-related associations through differential aversive conditioning influences working memory. The current study examined how differentially conditioned safe (i.e., CS-) and threat (i.e., CS+) stimuli are stored in working memory relative to a novel, non-associated (i.e., N) stimuli. Participants (n = 69) completed a differential fear conditioning task followed by a change detection task consisting of three conditions (CS+, CS-, N) across two loads (small, large). Results revealed individuals successfully learned to distinguishing CS+ from CS- conditions during the differential aversive conditioning task. Our working memory outcomes indicated successful load manipulation effects, but no statistically significant differences in accuracy, response time (RT), or Pashler's K measures of working memory capacity between CS+, CS-, or N conditions. However, we observed significantly reduced RT difference scores for the CS+ compared to CS- condition, indicating greater RT differences between the CS+ and N condition vs. the CS- and N condition. These findings suggest that differentially conditioned stimuli have little impact on behavioral outcomes of working memory compared to novel stimuli that had not been associated with previous safe of aversive outcomes, at least in healthy populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Richard T. Ward
- Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, United States,Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, United States,*Correspondence: Richard T. Ward,
| | - Salahadin Lotfi
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, United States
| | - Daniel M. Stout
- Center of Excellence for Stress and Mental Health, VA San Diego Healthcare System, San Diego, CA, United States,Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, United States
| | - Sofia Mattson
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, United States
| | - Han-Joo Lee
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, United States
| | - Christine L. Larson
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, United States
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Lane RD, Smith R. Levels of Emotional Awareness: Theory and Measurement of a Socio-Emotional Skill. J Intell 2021; 9:42. [PMID: 34449662 PMCID: PMC8395748 DOI: 10.3390/jintelligence9030042] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/02/2021] [Revised: 08/02/2021] [Accepted: 08/09/2021] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Emotional awareness is the ability to conceptualize and describe one's own emotions and those of others. Over thirty years ago, a cognitive-developmental theory of emotional awareness patterned after Piaget's theory of cognitive development was created as well as a performance measure of this ability called the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS). Since then, a large number of studies have been completed in healthy volunteers and clinical populations including those with mental health or systemic medical disorders. Along the way, there have also been further refinements and adaptations of the LEAS such as the creation of a digital version in addition to further advances in the theory itself. This review aims to provide a comprehensive summary of the evolving theoretical background, measurement methods, and empirical findings with the LEAS. The LEAS is a reliable and valid measure of emotional awareness. Evidence suggests that emotional awareness facilitates better emotion self-regulation, better ability to navigate complex social situations and enjoy relationships, and better physical and mental health. This is a relatively new but promising area of research in the domain of socio-emotional skills. The paper concludes with some recommendations for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Richard D. Lane
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, 1501 N. Campbell Ave., Tucson, AZ 85724, USA
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, 6655 South Yale Ave., Tulsa, OK 74136, USA;
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Meyer ML, Collier E. Theory of minds: managing mental state inferences in working memory is associated with the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network and social integration. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2021; 15:63-73. [PMID: 32064502 PMCID: PMC7171370 DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsaa022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2019] [Revised: 01/08/2020] [Accepted: 02/06/2020] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
We often interact with multiple people at a time and consider their various points of view to facilitate smooth social interaction. Yet, how our brains track multiple mental states at once, and whether skill in this domain links to social integration, remains underspecified. To fill this gap, we developed a novel social working memory paradigm in which participants manage two- or four-people’s mental states in working memory, as well as control trials in which they alphabetize two- or four-people’s names in working memory. In Study 1, we found that the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network shows relative increases in activity with more mental states managed in working memory. In contrast, this subsystem shows relative decreases in activity with more non-mental state information (the number of names alphabetized) managed in working memory. In Study 2, only individual differences in managing mental states in working memory, specifically on trials that posed the greatest mental state load to working memory, correlated with social integration. Collectively, these findings add further support to the hypothesis that social working memory relies on partially distinct brain systems and may be a key ingredient to success in a social world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Meghan L Meyer
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, HB 6207 Moore Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, USA
| | - Eleanor Collier
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, HB 6207 Moore Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, USA
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Cieri F, Zhuang X, Caldwell JZK, Cordes D. Brain Entropy During Aging Through a Free Energy Principle Approach. Front Hum Neurosci 2021; 15:647513. [PMID: 33828471 PMCID: PMC8019811 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2021.647513] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/30/2020] [Accepted: 02/25/2021] [Indexed: 02/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Neural complexity and brain entropy (BEN) have gained greater interest in recent years. The dynamics of neural signals and their relations with information processing continue to be investigated through different measures in a variety of noteworthy studies. The BEN of spontaneous neural activity decreases during states of reduced consciousness. This evidence has been showed in primary consciousness states, such as psychedelic states, under the name of "the entropic brain hypothesis." In this manuscript we propose an extension of this hypothesis to physiological and pathological aging. We review this particular facet of the complexity of the brain, mentioning studies that have investigated BEN in primary consciousness states, and extending this view to the field of neuroaging with a focus on resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We first introduce historic and conceptual ideas about entropy and neural complexity, treating the mindbrain as a complex nonlinear dynamic adaptive system, in light of the free energy principle. Then, we review the studies in this field, analyzing the idea that the aim of the neurocognitive system is to maintain a dynamic state of balance between order and chaos, both in terms of dynamics of neural signals and functional connectivity. In our exploration we will review studies both on acute psychedelic states and more chronic psychotic states and traits, such as those in schizophrenia, in order to show the increase of entropy in those states. Then we extend our exploration to physiological and pathological aging, where BEN is reduced. Finally, we propose an interpretation of these results, defining a general trend of BEN in primary states and cognitive aging.
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Hesp C, Smith R, Parr T, Allen M, Friston KJ, Ramstead MJD. Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference. Neural Comput 2021; 33:398-446. [PMID: 33253028 PMCID: PMC8594962 DOI: 10.1162/neco_a_01341] [Citation(s) in RCA: 74] [Impact Index Per Article: 24.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2020] [Accepted: 08/17/2020] [Indexed: 01/20/2023]
Abstract
The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model-an internal estimate of overall model fitness ("subjective fitness"). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Casper Hesp
- Department of Psychology and Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, 1012 GC Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK 74136, U.S.A.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Micah Allen
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus 8000, Denmark; Centre of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus 8200, Denmark; and Cambridge Psychiatry, Cambridge University, Cambridge CB2 8AH, U.K.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Maxwell J D Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.; Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry and Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal H3A 0G4, QC, Canada
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Smith R, Badcock P, Friston KJ. Recent advances in the application of predictive coding and active inference models within clinical neuroscience. Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 2021; 75:3-13. [PMID: 32860285 DOI: 10.1111/pcn.13138] [Citation(s) in RCA: 52] [Impact Index Per Article: 17.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2020] [Revised: 08/01/2020] [Accepted: 08/25/2020] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Research in clinical neuroscience is founded on the idea that a better understanding of brain (dys)function will improve our ability to diagnose and treat neurological and psychiatric disorders. In recent years, neuroscience has converged on the notion that the brain is a 'prediction machine,' in that it actively predicts the sensory input that it will receive if one or another course of action is chosen. These predictions are used to select actions that will (most often, and in the long run) maintain the body within the narrow range of physiological states consistent with survival. This insight has given rise to an area of clinical computational neuroscience research that focuses on characterizing neural circuit architectures that can accomplish these predictive functions, and on how the associated processes may break down or become aberrant within clinical conditions. Here, we provide a brief review of examples of recent work on the application of predictive processing models of brain function to study clinical (psychiatric) disorders, with the aim of highlighting current directions and their potential clinical utility. We offer examples of recent conceptual models, formal mathematical models, and applications of such models in empirical research in clinical populations, with a focus on making this material accessible to clinicians without expertise in computational neuroscience. In doing so, we aim to highlight the potential insights and opportunities that understanding the brain as a prediction machine may offer to clinical research and practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Oklahoma, USA
| | - Paul Badcock
- Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.,Orygen, Victoria, Australia.,Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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Smith R, Kuplicki R, Feinstein J, Forthman KL, Stewart JL, Paulus MP, Khalsa SS. A Bayesian computational model reveals a failure to adapt interoceptive precision estimates across depression, anxiety, eating, and substance use disorders. PLoS Comput Biol 2020; 16:e1008484. [PMID: 33315893 PMCID: PMC7769623 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008484] [Citation(s) in RCA: 64] [Impact Index Per Article: 16.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2020] [Revised: 12/28/2020] [Accepted: 10/31/2020] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent neurocomputational theories have hypothesized that abnormalities in prior beliefs and/or the precision-weighting of afferent interoceptive signals may facilitate the transdiagnostic emergence of psychopathology. Specifically, it has been suggested that, in certain psychiatric disorders, interoceptive processing mechanisms either over-weight prior beliefs or under-weight signals from the viscera (or both), leading to a failure to accurately update beliefs about the body. However, this has not been directly tested empirically. To evaluate the potential roles of prior beliefs and interoceptive precision in this context, we fit a Bayesian computational model to behavior in a transdiagnostic patient sample during an interoceptive awareness (heartbeat tapping) task. Modelling revealed that, during an interoceptive perturbation condition (inspiratory breath-holding during heartbeat tapping), healthy individuals (N = 52) assigned greater precision to ascending cardiac signals than individuals with symptoms of anxiety (N = 15), depression (N = 69), co-morbid depression/anxiety (N = 153), substance use disorders (N = 131), and eating disorders (N = 14)-who failed to increase their precision estimates from resting levels. In contrast, we did not find strong evidence for differences in prior beliefs. These results provide the first empirical computational modeling evidence of a selective dysfunction in adaptive interoceptive processing in psychiatric conditions, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining how reduced interoceptive precision influences visceral regulation and interoceptively-guided decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
| | - Rayus Kuplicki
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
| | - Justin Feinstein
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
- Oxley College of Health Sciences, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
| | | | - Jennifer L. Stewart
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
- Oxley College of Health Sciences, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
| | - Martin P. Paulus
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
- Oxley College of Health Sciences, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
| | | | - Sahib S. Khalsa
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
- Oxley College of Health Sciences, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, United States of America
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Lane RD, Solms M, Weihs KL, Hishaw A, Smith R. Affective agnosia: a core affective processing deficit in the alexithymia spectrum. Biopsychosoc Med 2020. [DOI: 10.1186/s13030-020-00184-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
AbstractAffective agnosia, an impairment in knowing how one feels emotionally, has been described as an extreme deficit in the experience and expression of emotion that may confer heightened risk for adverse medical outcomes. Alexithymia, by contrast, has been proposed as an over-arching construct that includes a spectrum of deficits of varying severity, including affective agnosia at the more severe end. This perspective has been challenged by Taylor and colleagues, who argue that the concept of affective agnosia is unnecessary. We compare these two perspectives by highlighting areas of agreement, reasons for asserting the importance of the affective agnosia concept, errors in Taylor and colleagues’ critique, and measurement issues. The need for performance-based measures of the ability to mentally represent emotional states in addition to metacognitive measures is emphasized. We then draw on a previously proposed three-process model of emotional awareness that distinguishes affective response generation, conceptualization and cognitive control processes which interact to produce a variety of emotional awareness and alexithymia phenotypes - including affective agnosia. The tools for measuring these three processes, their neural substrates, the mechanisms of brain-body interactions that confer heightened risk for adverse medical outcomes, and the differential treatment implications for different kinds of deficits are described. By conceptualizing alexithymia as a spectrum of deficits, the opportunity to match specific deficit mechanisms with personalized treatment for patients will be enhanced.
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Smith R, Steklis HD, Steklis NG, Weihs KL, Lane RD. The evolution and development of the uniquely human capacity for emotional awareness: A synthesis of comparative anatomical, cognitive, neurocomputational, and evolutionary psychological perspectives. Biol Psychol 2020; 154:107925. [DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2020.107925] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2020] [Revised: 06/17/2020] [Accepted: 06/23/2020] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
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Smith R, Parr T, Friston KJ. Simulating Emotions: An Active Inference Model of Emotional State Inference and Emotion Concept Learning. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2844. [PMID: 31920873 PMCID: PMC6931387 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02844] [Citation(s) in RCA: 45] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2019] [Accepted: 12/02/2019] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
The ability to conceptualize and understand one's own affective states and responses - or "Emotional awareness" (EA) - is reduced in multiple psychiatric populations; it is also positively correlated with a range of adaptive cognitive and emotional traits. While a growing body of work has investigated the neurocognitive basis of EA, the neurocomputational processes underlying this ability have received limited attention. Here, we present a formal Active Inference (AI) model of emotion conceptualization that can simulate the neurocomputational (Bayesian) processes associated with learning about emotion concepts and inferring the emotions one is feeling in a given moment. We validate the model and inherent constructs by showing (i) it can successfully acquire a repertoire of emotion concepts in its "childhood", as well as (ii) acquire new emotion concepts in synthetic "adulthood," and (iii) that these learning processes depend on early experiences, environmental stability, and habitual patterns of selective attention. These results offer a proof of principle that cognitive-emotional processes can be modeled formally, and highlight the potential for both theoretical and empirical extensions of this line of research on emotion and emotional disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Smith R, Lane RD, Parr T, Friston KJ. Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying emotional awareness: Insights afforded by deep active inference and their potential clinical relevance. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2019; 107:473-491. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.09.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/21/2019] [Revised: 08/30/2019] [Accepted: 09/02/2019] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
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Smith R, Kaszniak AW, Katsanis J, Lane RD, Nielsen L. The importance of identifying underlying process abnormalities in alexithymia: Implications of the three-process model and a single case study illustration. Conscious Cogn 2019; 68:33-46. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.12.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2018] [Revised: 12/14/2018] [Accepted: 12/19/2018] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Smith R, Killgore WD, Alkozei A, Lane RD. A neuro-cognitive process model of emotional intelligence. Biol Psychol 2018; 139:131-151. [DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2018.10.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2017] [Revised: 05/28/2018] [Accepted: 10/19/2018] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
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