Is Mental Privacy a Component of Personal Identity?

Monitored and Cared for at Home? Privacy Concerns When Using Smart Home Health Technologies to Care for Older Persons

BACKGROUND

States and families are facing growing challenges provide adequate care for older persons. Smart home health technologies (SHHTs) in the forms of sensor or robotic devices have been discussed as technical solutions for caregiving. Ethical and social concerns are raised with the use of such technologies for caregiving purposes, a particularly prominent one being privacy. This paper contributes to the literature by distinguishing privacy concerns into both the type of technologies and conceptual dimensions.

METHODS

Data for this paper stem from sixty semi-structured interviews with older persons, informal, and formal caregivers living in the German-speaking regions of Switzerland. All information related to privacy, that were initially inductively coded, were thematically sorted into four dimensions of privacy (physical, psychological, social, and informational) and by the type of technologies studied.

RESULTS

Participants were especially concerned about privacy intrusions from smart wearables and ambient sensors than robotic technologies, which may be due to the relative lack of familiarity with the latter. Informational privacy was evident in the context of data collection capacities and potential for misuses of data. The installation and implementation of both visual and ambient sensors induced discomfort to their senses of physical space. Alerts of smart wearables and obtrusive sightings of SHHTs garnered worries related to stigmatization and manipulation, indicating intrusions into end-users' psychological privacy. Little discussions of social dimensions of privacy were evident in the data, even toward robotic technologies for their functions to promote social interactions for older persons.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper is one of the first that use the stratification approach on empirical data to highlight the multi-faceted privacy concerns when technologies may be implemented in elder care. Our paper could thus supports potential end-users in deciding which technologies to use and how to balance different privacy concerns against other values that they may hold important.

Chilean Supreme Court ruling on the protection of brain activity: neurorights, personal data protection, and neurodata

This paper discusses a landmark ruling by the Chilean Supreme Court of August 9, 2023 dealing with the right to mental privacy, originated with an action for constitutional protection filed on behalf of Guido Girardi Lavin against Emotiv Inc., a North American company based in San Francisco, California that is commercializing the device "Insight." This wireless device functions as a headset with sensors that collect information about the brain's electrical activity (i.e., neurodata). The discussion revolves around whether neurodata can be considered personal data and whether they could be classified into a special category. The application of the present legislation on data (the most obsolete, such as the Chilean law, and the most recent EU law) does not seem adequate to protect neurodata. The use of neurodata raises ethical and legal concerns that are not fully addressed by current regulations on personal data protection. Despite not being necessarily considered personal data, neurodata represent the most intimate aspects of human personality and should be protected in light of potential new risks. The unique characteristics of neurodata, including their interpretive nature and potential for revealing thoughts and intentions, pose challenges for regulation. Current data protection laws do not differentiate between different types of data based on their informational content, which is relevant for protecting individual rights. The development of new technologies involving neurodata requires particular attention and careful consideration to prevent possible harm to human dignity. The regulation of neurodata must account for their specific characteristics and the potential risks they pose to privacy, confidentiality, and individual rights. The answer lies in the reconfiguration of human rights known as "neurorights" that goes beyond the protection of personal data.

Ethical considerations for integrating multimodal computer perception and neurotechnology

Background

Artificial intelligence (AI)-based computer perception technologies (e.g., digital phenotyping and affective computing) promise to transform clinical approaches to personalized care in psychiatry and beyond by offering more objective measures of emotional states and behavior, enabling precision treatment, diagnosis, and symptom monitoring. At the same time, passive and continuous nature by which they often collect data from patients in non-clinical settings raises ethical issues related to privacy and self-determination. Little is known about how such concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data, as parallel advances in computer perception, AI, and neurotechnology enable new insights into subjective states. Here, we present findings from a multi-site NCATS-funded study of ethical considerations for translating computer perception into clinical care and contextualize them within the neuroethics and neurorights literatures.

Methods

We conducted qualitative interviews with patients (n = 20), caregivers (n = 20), clinicians (n = 12), developers (n = 12), and clinician developers (n = 2) regarding their perspective toward using PC in clinical care. Transcripts were analyzed in MAXQDA using Thematic Content Analysis.

Results

Stakeholder groups voiced concerns related to (1) perceived invasiveness of passive and continuous data collection in private settings; (2) data protection and security and the potential for negative downstream/future impacts on patients of unintended disclosure; and (3) ethical issues related to patients' limited versus hyper awareness of passive and continuous data collection and monitoring. Clinicians and developers highlighted that these concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data with other computer perception data.

Discussion

Our findings suggest that the integration of neurotechnologies with existing computer perception technologies raises novel concerns around dignity-related and other harms (e.g., stigma, discrimination) that stem from data security threats and the growing potential for reidentification of sensitive data. Further, our findings suggest that patients' awareness and preoccupation with feeling monitored via computer sensors ranges from hypo- to hyper-awareness, with either extreme accompanied by ethical concerns (consent vs. anxiety and preoccupation). These results highlight the need for systematic research into how best to implement these technologies into clinical care in ways that reduce disruption, maximize patient benefits, and mitigate long-term risks associated with the passive collection of sensitive emotional, behavioral and neural data.

Philosophical foundation of the right to mental integrity in the age of neurotechnologies

Neurotechnologies broadly understood are tools that have the capability to read, record and modify our mental activity by acting on its brain correlates. The emergence of increasingly powerful and sophisticated techniques has given rise to the proposal to introduce new rights specifically directed to protect mental privacy, freedom of thought, and mental integrity. These rights, also proposed as basic human rights, are conceived in direct relation to tools that threaten mental privacy, freedom of thought, mental integrity, and personal identity. In this paper, our goal is to give a philosophical foundation to a specific right that we will call right to mental integrity. It encapsulates both the classical concepts of privacy and non-interference in our mind/brain. Such a philosophical foundation refers to certain features of the mind that hitherto could not be reached directly from the outside: intentionality, first-person perspective, personal autonomy in moral choices and in the construction of one's narrative, and relational identity. A variety of neurotechnologies or other tools, including artificial intelligence, alone or in combination can, by their very availability, threaten our mental integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a specific right and provide it with a theoretical foundation and justification. It will be up to a subsequent treatment to define the moral and legal boundaries of such a right and its application.