Subjectivity as an Emergent Property of Information Processing by Neuronal Networks

The emergence of identity, agency and consciousness from the temporal dynamics of neural elaboration

Identity-differentiating self from external reality-and agency-being the author of one's acts-are generally considered intrinsic properties of awareness and looked at as mental constructs generated by consciousness. Here a different view is proposed. All physiological systems display complex time-dependent regulations to adapt or anticipate external changes. To interact with rapid changes, an animal needs a nervous system capable of modelling and predicting (not simply representing) it. Different algorithms must be employed to predict the momentary location of an object based on sensory information (received with a delay), or to design in advance and direct the trajectory of movement. Thus, the temporal dynamics of external events and action must be handled in differential ways, thereby generating the distinction between self and non-self ("identity") as an intrinsic computational construct in neuronal elaboration. Handling time is not what neurons are designed for. Neuronal circuits are based on parallel processing: each bit of information diverges on many neurons, each of which combines it with many other data. Spike firing reports the likelihood that the specific pattern the neuron is designed to respond to is present in the incoming data. This organization seems designed to process synchronous datasets. However, since neural networks can introduce delays in processing, time sequences can be transformed into simultaneous patterns and analysed as such. This way predictive algorithms can be implemented, and continually improved through neuronal plasticity. To successfully interact with the external reality, the nervous system must model and predict, but also differentially handle perceptual functions or motor activity, by putting in register information that becomes available at different time moments. Also, to learn through positive/negative reinforcement, modelling must establish a causal relation between motor control and its consequences: the contrast between phase lag in perception and phase lead (and control) in motor programming produces the emergence of identity (discerning self from surrounding) and agency (control on actions) as necessary computational constructs to model reality. This does not require any form of awareness. In a brain, capable of producing awareness, these constructs may evolve from mere computational requirements into mental (conscious) constructs.

Imagination: The dawn of consciousness: Fighting some misconceptions in the discussion about consciousness

Several theories of consciousness (ToC) have been proposed, but it is hard to integrate them into a consensus theory. Each theory has its merits, in dealing with some aspects of the question, but the terminology is inconsistent, each ToC aims at answering a different question, and there is not even a reasonable agreement about what 'consciousness' is in the first place. Some common implicit assumptions, and the way some critical words - such as 'sensation', 'perception', 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC) - are thought to relate to consciousness, have introduced a series of misconceptions that make it difficult to pinpoint what consciousness consists in and how it arises in the brain. The purpose of this contribution is twofold: firstly, to discern the various steps that lead from the detection of a stimulus to a conscious experience, by redefining terms such as sensation and perception with an adequate operative meaning; secondly, to emphasize the inevitable contribution of emotions and the active role of imagination in this process. The diffuse view, for the layperson but among scientists as well, is that the brain produces an internal 'representation' of the external reality and of oneself. This tends to consign one to a Cartesian perspective, i.e., the idea that some entity must be there to witness and interpret such representation. This approach splits the conscious experience into brain activity, which generates a (possible) content of consciousness (still unconscious), and a vaguely defined entity or process that 'generates' consciousness and injects (or sheds the light of) consciousness onto the content of brain activity. This way, however, we learn nothing about how such consciousness would arise. We propose here that consciousness is the function that generates a subjectively relevant and emotionally coloured internal image of the experience one is living. In this process, endogenous, spontaneous activity (imaginative activity, consisting in recalling and reviving memories, prefiguring consequences, analysing conjectures) produces many vague and ambiguous hints, rich of symbolic links, which compete in giving rise to an implicit, emotionally characterized, and semantically pleiotropic, internal experience. Cognitive elaboration may extract from this a defined and univocal, complete and consistent, explicit experience, that can be verbally reported ('what it is like to...').

Defining rehabilitation: An exploration of why it is attempted, and why it will always fail

The problem:

Over 187 definitions of rehabilitation exist, none widely agreed or used. Why?

The word:

Words represent a core concept, with a penumbra of associated meanings. A word means what is agreed among those who use it. The precise meaning will vary between different groups. Words evolve, the meaning changing with use. Other words may capture some of the concepts or meanings.

A definition:

A definition is used to control the unstable, nebulous meaning of a word. It delineates, creating a boundary. A non-binary spectrum of meaning is transformed into binary categories: rehabilitation, or not rehabilitation. In clinical terms, it is a diagnostic test to identify rehabilitation. There are many different reasons for categorising something as rehabilitation. Each will need its own definition.

Categorisation:

The ability of a definition to distinguish cases accurately must be validated by comparison with ‘the truth’. If there were an external ‘true’ test to identify rehabilitation, a definition would not be needed. As with most concepts, the only truth is agreement by people familiar with the required distinction. Any definition will generate misclassification. People familiar with the required distinction will also need to resolve mis-categorisation.

Description:

An alternative is a ‘descriptive definition’, listing features over several domains which must be present. This fails logically. Rehabilitation is an emergent concept, more than the sum of its parts.

Conclusion:

A useful definition cannot be achieved because no definition will cover all needs, and a specific definition for a purpose will misclassify some cases.