Deontological Dilemma Response Tendencies and Sensorimotor Representations of Harm to Others

The Implications of Moral Neuroscience for Brain Disease: Review and Update

The last 2 decades have seen an explosion of neuroscience research on morality, with significant implications for brain disease. Many studies have proposed a neuromorality based on intuitive sentiments or emotions aimed at maintaining collaborative social groups. These moral emotions are normative, deontological, and action based, with a rapid evaluation of intentionality. The neuromoral circuitry interacts with the basic mechanisms of socioemotional cognition, including social perception, behavioral control, theory of mind, and social emotions such as empathy. Moral transgressions may result from primary disorders of moral intuitions, or they may be secondary moral impairments from disturbances in these other socioemotional cognitive mechanisms. The proposed neuromoral system for moral intuitions has its major hub in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and engages other frontal regions as well as the anterior insulae, anterior temporal lobe structures, and right temporoparietal junction and adjacent posterior superior temporal sulcus. Brain diseases that affect these regions, such as behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia, may result in primary disturbances of moral behavior, including criminal behavior. Individuals with focal brain tumors and other lesions in the right temporal and medial frontal regions have committed moral violations. These transgressions can have social and legal consequences for the individuals and require increased awareness of neuromoral disturbances among such individuals with brain diseases.

Altruistic responses to the most vulnerable involve sensorimotor processes

Introduction

Why do people help strangers? Prior research suggests that empathy motivates bystanders to respond to victims in distress. However, this work has revealed relatively little about the role of the motor system in human altruism, even though altruism is thought to have originated as an active, physical response to close others in immediate need. We therefore investigated whether a motor preparatory response contributes to costly helping.

Methods

To accomplish this objective, we contrasted three charity conditions that were more versus less likely to elicit an active motor response, based on the Altruistic Response Model. These conditions described charities that (1) aided neonates versus adults, (2) aided victims requiring immediate versus preparatory support, and (3) provided heroic versus nurturant aid. We hypothesized that observing neonates in immediate need would elicit stronger brain activation in motor-preparatory regions.

Results

Consistent with an evolutionary, caregiving-based theory of altruism, participants donated the most to charities that provided neonates with immediate, nurturant aid. Critically, this three-way donation interaction was associated with increased BOLD signal and gray matter volume in motor-preparatory regions, which we identified in an independent motor retrieval task.

Discussion

These findings advance the field of altruism by shifting the spotlight from passive emotional states toward action processes that evolved to protect the most vulnerable members of our group.

Effects of Instrumentality and Personal Force on Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Harm-Related Moral Dilemmas

Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

Compassionate Conservation Clashes With Conservation Biology: Should Empathy, Compassion, and Deontological Moral Principles Drive Conservation Practice?

“Compassionate Conservation” is an emerging movement within conservation science that is gaining attention through its promotion of “ethical” conservation practices that place empathy and compassion and the moral principles of “first, do no harm” and “individuals matter” at the forefront of conservation practice. We have articulated elsewhere how Compassionate Conservation, if adopted, could be more harmful for native biodiversity than any other conservation action implemented thus far, while also causing more net harm to individuals than it aims to stop. Here, we examine whether empathy, compassion and inflexible adherence to moral principles form a solid basis upon which to meet the goals of conservation biology as specified by pioneers in the discipline. Specifically, we examine a large empirical literature demonstrating that empathy is subject to significant biases and that inflexible adherence to moral rules can result in a “do nothing” approach. In light of this literature, we argue that our emotional systems have not evolved to provide a reliable basis for making decisions as to how best to ensure the long-term persistence of our planet. Consequently, in its most radical form, the Compassionate Conservation philosophy should not be enshrined as a legalized guiding principle for conservation action.

Predicting Empathy From Resting State Brain Connectivity: A Multivariate Approach

Recent task fMRI studies suggest that individual differences in trait empathy and empathic concern are mediated by patterns of connectivity between self-other resonance and top-down control networks that are stable across task demands. An untested implication of this hypothesis is that these stable patterns of connectivity should be visible even in the absence of empathy tasks. Using machine learning, we demonstrate that patterns of resting state fMRI connectivity (i.e. the degree of synchronous BOLD activity across multiple cortical areas in the absence of explicit task demands) of resonance and control networks predict trait empathic concern (n = 58). Empathic concern was also predicted by connectivity patterns within the somatomotor network. These findings further support the role of resonance-control network interactions and of somatomotor function in our vicariously driven concern for others. Furthermore, a practical implication of these results is that it is possible to assess empathic predispositions in individuals without needing to perform conventional empathy assessments.

A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on pain empathy: investigating the role of visual information and observers' perspective

Empathy relies on brain systems that support the interaction between an observer's mental state and cues about the others' experience. Beyond the core brain areas typically activated in pain empathy studies (insular and anterior cingulate cortices), the diversity of paradigms used may reveal secondary networks that subserve other more specific processes. A coordinate-based meta-analysis of fMRI experiments on pain empathy was conducted to obtain activation likelihood estimates along three factors and seven conditions: visual cues (body parts, facial expressions), visuospatial (first-person, thirdperson), and cognitive (self-, stimuli-, other-oriented tasks) perspectives. The core network was found across cues and perspectives, and common activation was observed in higher-order visual areas. Body-parts distinctly activated areas related with sensorimotor processing (superior and inferior parietal lobules, anterior insula) while facial expression distinctly involved the inferior frontal gyrus. Self- compared to other-perspective produced distinct activations in the left insula while stimulus- versus other-perspective produced distinctive responses in the inferior frontal and parietal lobules, precentral gyrus, and cerebellum. Pain empathy relies on a core network which is modulated by several secondary networks. The involvement of the latter seems to depend on the visual cues available and the observer's mental state that can be influenced by specific instructions.

Sex differences in somatomotor representations of others' pain: a permutation-based analysis

Sex differences in empathy for pain have been repeatedly observed. However, it is unclear whether this is due to sex differences in "bottom-up" somatomotor representations of others' pain (self-other resonance) or to "top-down" prefrontal control of such responses. Here, we provide data from 70 subjects suggesting that sex differences in empathy for pain lie primarily in pre-reflective, bottom-up resonance mechanisms. Subjects viewed a right hand pierced by a needle during fMRI. They also filled out a self-report measure of trait empathy, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. A permutation-based analysis (FSL's Randomise) found that females showed greater signal in a cluster in primary somatomotor cortex that includes the motor hand area. No significant differences were observed in other task-implicated areas. An examination of condition-specific parameter estimates found that this difference was due to reduced signal in this cluster in males. No significant differences in resting connectivity or within-task (generalized psychophysiological interaction analysis or gPPI) dynamic connectivity of this region with prefrontal areas were observed. While female subjects scored higher on affective subscales of the IRI, there were no sex differences in Perspective-Taking, the primary index of cognitive, top-down empathy processes. These findings suggest that localized internal somatomotor representations of others' pain, a functional index of bottom-up resonance processes, are stronger in female subjects.

Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers

Researchers have used "sacrificial" trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) to model competing influences on moral judgment: affective reactions to causing harm that motivate characteristically deontological judgments ("the ends don't justify the means") and deliberate cost-benefit reasoning that motivates characteristically utilitarian judgments ("better to save more lives"). Recently, Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu (2015) argued that sacrificial judgments reflect antisociality rather than "genuine utilitarianism," but this work employs a different definition of "utilitarian judgment." We introduce a five-level taxonomy of "utilitarian judgment" and clarify our longstanding usage, according to which judgments are "utilitarian" simply because they favor the greater good, regardless of judges' motivations or philosophical commitments. Moreover, we present seven studies revisiting Kahane and colleagues' empirical claims. Studies 1a-1b demonstrate that dilemma judgments indeed relate to utilitarian philosophy, as philosophers identifying as utilitarian/consequentialist were especially likely to endorse utilitarian sacrifices. Studies 2-6 replicate, clarify, and extend Kahane and colleagues' findings using process dissociation to independently assess deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in lay people. Using conventional analyses that treat deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we replicate many of Kahane and colleagues' key findings. However, process dissociation reveals that antisociality predicts reduced deontological inclinations, not increased utilitarian inclinations. Critically, we provide evidence that lay people's sacrificial utilitarian judgments also reflect moral concerns about minimizing harm. This work clarifies the conceptual and empirical links between moral philosophy and moral psychology and indicates that sacrificial utilitarian judgments reflect genuine moral concern, in both philosophers and ordinary people.

Neurophysiological Effects of Trait Empathy in Music Listening

The social cognitive basis of music processing has long been noted, and recent research has shown that trait empathy is linked to musical preferences and listening style. Does empathy modulate neural responses to musical sounds? We designed two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments to address this question. In Experiment 1, subjects listened to brief isolated musical timbres while being scanned. In Experiment 2, subjects listened to excerpts of music in four conditions (familiar liked (FL)/disliked and unfamiliar liked (UL)/disliked). For both types of musical stimuli, emotional and cognitive forms of trait empathy modulated activity in sensorimotor and cognitive areas: in the first experiment, empathy was primarily correlated with activity in supplementary motor area (SMA), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and insula; in Experiment 2, empathy was mainly correlated with activity in prefrontal, temporo-parietal and reward areas. Taken together, these findings reveal the interactions between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of empathy in response to musical sounds, in line with recent findings from other cognitive domains.

Functional Specificity and Sex Differences in the Neural Circuits Supporting the Inhibition of Automatic Imitation

Humans show an involuntary tendency to copy other people's actions. Although automatic imitation builds rapport and affiliation between individuals, we do not copy actions indiscriminately. Instead, copying behaviors are guided by a selection mechanism, which inhibits some actions and prioritizes others. To date, the neural underpinnings of the inhibition of automatic imitation and differences between the sexes in imitation control are not well understood. Previous studies involved small sample sizes and low statistical power, which produced mixed findings regarding the involvement of domain-general and domain-specific neural architectures. Here, we used data from Experiment 1 ( N = 28) to perform a power analysis to determine the sample size required for Experiment 2 ( N = 50; 80% power). Using independent functional localizers and an analysis pipeline that bolsters sensitivity, during imitation control we show clear engagement of the multiple-demand network (domain-general), but no sensitivity in the theory-of-mind network (domain-specific). Weaker effects were observed with regard to sex differences, suggesting that there are more similarities than differences between the sexes in terms of the neural systems engaged during imitation control. In summary, neurocognitive models of imitation require revision to reflect that the inhibition of imitation relies to a greater extent on a domain-general selection system rather than a domain-specific system that supports social cognition.