Evidence Accumulator or Decision Threshold - Which Cortical Mechanism are We Observing?

Computational analysis of speed-accuracy tradeoff

Speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) in the decision making of humans and animals is a well-documented phenomenon, but its underlying neuronal mechanism remains unclear. Modeling approaches have conceptualized SAT through the threshold hypothesis as adjustments to the decision threshold. However, the leading neurophysiological view is the gain modulation hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that the SAT mechanism is implemented through changes in the dynamics of the choice circuit, which increase the baseline firing rate and the speed of neuronal integration. In this paper, I investigated alternative computational mechanisms of SAT and showed that the threshold hypothesis was qualitatively consistent with the behavioral data, but the gain modulation hypothesis was not. In order to reconcile the threshold hypothesis with the neurophysiological evidence, I considered the interference of alpha oscillations with the decision process and showed that alpha oscillations could increase the discriminatory power of the decision system, although they slowed down the decision process. This suggests that the magnitude of alpha waves suppression during the event related desynchronization (ERD) of alpha oscillations depends on a SAT condition and the amplitude of alpha oscillations is lower in the speed condition. I also showed that the lower amplitude of alpha oscillations resulted in an increase in the baseline firing rate and the speed of neuronal intergration. Thus, the interference of the event related desynchronization of alpha oscillations with a SAT condition explains why an increase in the baseline firing rate and the speed of neuronal integration accompany the speed condition.

Oscillation/Coincidence-Detection Models of Reward-Related Timing in Corticostriatal Circuits

The major tenets of beat-frequency/coincidence-detection models of reward-related timing are reviewed in light of recent behavioral and neurobiological findings. This includes the emphasis on a core timing network embedded in the motor system that is comprised of a corticothalamic-basal ganglia circuit. Therein, a central hub provides timing pulses (i.e., predictive signals) to the entire brain, including a set of distributed satellite regions in the cerebellum, cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus that are selectively engaged in timing in a manner that is more dependent upon the specific sensory, behavioral, and contextual requirements of the task. Oscillation/coincidence-detection models also emphasize the importance of a tuned ‘perception’ learning and memory system whereby target durations are detected by striatal networks of medium spiny neurons (MSNs) through the coincidental activation of different neural populations, typically utilizing patterns of oscillatory input from the cortex and thalamus or derivations thereof (e.g., population coding) as a time base. The measure of success of beat-frequency/coincidence-detection accounts, such as the Striatal Beat-Frequency model of reward-related timing (SBF), is their ability to accommodate new experimental findings while maintaining their original framework, thereby making testable experimental predictions concerning diagnosis and treatment of issues related to a variety of dopamine-dependent basal ganglia disorders, including Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease.

Confidence in predicted position error explains saccadic decisions during pursuit

A fundamental problem in motor control is the coordination of complementary movement types to achieve a common goal. As a common example, humans view moving objects through coordinated pursuit and saccadic eye movements. Pursuit is initiated and continuously controlled by retinal image velocity. During pursuit, eye position may lag behind the target. This can be compensated by the discrete execution of a catch-up saccade. The decision to trigger a saccade is influenced by both position and velocity errors, and the timing of saccades can be highly variable. The observed distributions of saccade frequency and trigger time remain poorly understood, and this decision process remains imprecisely quantified. Here, we propose a predictive, probabilistic model explaining the decision to trigger saccades during pursuit to foveate moving targets. In this model, expected position error and its associated uncertainty are predicted through Bayesian inference across noisy, delayed sensory observations (Kalman filtering). This probabilistic prediction is used to estimate the confidence that a saccade is needed (quantified through log-probability ratio), triggering a saccade upon accumulating to a fixed threshold. The model qualitatively explains behavioral observations on the frequency and trigger time distributions of saccades during pursuit over a range of target motion trajectories. Furthermore, this model makes novel predictions that saccade decisions are highly sensitive to uncertainty for small predicted position errors, but this influence diminishes as the magnitude of predicted position error increases. We suggest that this predictive, confidence-based decision-making strategy represents a fundamental principle for the probabilistic neural control of coordinated movements.NEW & NOTEWORTHY This is the first stochastic dynamical systems model of pursuit-saccade coordination accounting for noise and delays in the sensorimotor system. The model uses Bayesian inference to predictively estimate visual motion, triggering saccades when confidence in predicted position error accumulates to a threshold. This model explains saccade frequency and trigger time distributions across target trajectories and makes novel predictions about the influence of sensory uncertainty in saccade decisions during pursuit.

Drift-diffusion explains response variability and capacity for tracking objects

Being able to track objects that surround us is key for planning actions in dynamic environments. However, rigorous cognitive models for tracking of one or more objects are currently lacking. In this study, we asked human subjects to judge the time to contact (TTC) a finish line for one or two objects that became invisible shortly after moving. We showed that the pattern of subject responses had an error variance best explained by an inverse Gaussian distribution and consistent with the output of a biased drift-diffusion model. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the pattern of errors made when tracking two objects showed a level of dependence that was consistent with subjects using a single decision variable for reporting the TTC for two objects. This finding reveals a serious limitation in the capacity for tracking multiple objects resulting in error propagation between objects. Apart from explaining our own data, our approach helps interpret previous findings such as asymmetric interference when tracking multiple objects.

The Neuro-Computational Architecture of Value-Based Selection in the Human Brain

Current neural models of value-based decision-making consider choices as a 2-stage process, proceeding from the "valuation" of each option under consideration to the "selection" of the best option on the basis of their subjective values. However, little is known about the computational mechanisms at play at the selection stage and its implementation in the human brain. Here, we used drift-diffusion models combined with model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging, effective connectivity, and multivariate pattern analysis to characterize the neuro-computational architecture of value-based decisions. We found that 2 key drift-diffusion computations at the selection stage, namely integration and choice readout, engage distinct brain regions, with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex integrating a decision value signal computed in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the posterior parietal cortex reading out choice outcomes. Our findings suggest that this prefronto-parietal network acts as a hub implementing behavioral selection through a distributed drift-diffusion process.

Value-based decision making via sequential sampling with hierarchical competition and attentional modulation

In principle, formal dynamical models of decision making hold the potential to represent fundamental computations underpinning value-based (i.e., preferential) decisions in addition to perceptual decisions. Sequential-sampling models such as the race model and the drift-diffusion model that are grounded in simplicity, analytical tractability, and optimality remain popular, but some of their more recent counterparts have instead been designed with an aim for more feasibility as architectures to be implemented by actual neural systems. Connectionist models are proposed herein at an intermediate level of analysis that bridges mental phenomena and underlying neurophysiological mechanisms. Several such models drawing elements from the established race, drift-diffusion, feedforward-inhibition, divisive-normalization, and competing-accumulator models were tested with respect to fitting empirical data from human participants making choices between foods on the basis of hedonic value rather than a traditional perceptual attribute. Even when considering performance at emulating behavior alone, more neurally plausible models were set apart from more normative race or drift-diffusion models both quantitatively and qualitatively despite remaining parsimonious. To best capture the paradigm, a novel six-parameter computational model was formulated with features including hierarchical levels of competition via mutual inhibition as well as a static approximation of attentional modulation, which promotes "winner-take-all" processing. Moreover, a meta-analysis encompassing several related experiments validated the robustness of model-predicted trends in humans' value-based choices and concomitant reaction times. These findings have yet further implications for analysis of neurophysiological data in accordance with computational modeling, which is also discussed in this new light.

Laminar differences in decision-related neural activity in dorsal premotor cortex

Dorsal premotor cortex is implicated in somatomotor decisions. However, we do not understand the temporal patterns and laminar organization of decision-related firing rates in dorsal premotor cortex. We recorded neurons from dorsal premotor cortex of monkeys performing a visual discrimination task with reaches as the behavioral report. We show that these neurons can be organized along a bidirectional visuomotor continuum based on task-related firing rates. “Increased” neurons at one end of the continuum increased their firing rates ~150 ms after stimulus onset and these firing rates covaried systematically with choice, stimulus difficulty, and reaction time—characteristics of a candidate decision variable. “Decreased” neurons at the other end of the continuum reduced their firing rate after stimulus onset, while “perimovement” neurons at the center of the continuum responded only ~150 ms before movement initiation. These neurons did not show decision variable-like characteristics. “Increased” neurons were more prevalent in superficial layers of dorsal premotor cortex; deeper layers contained more “decreased” and “perimovement” neurons. These results suggest a laminar organization for decision-related responses in dorsal premotor cortex.

Dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) is thought to be involved in making somatomotor decisions. Chandrasekaran et al. investigated the temporal response dynamics of PMd neurons across cortical layers and show stronger and earlier decision-related responses in the superficial layers and more action execution-related signals in the deeper layers.

Rat Prefrontal Cortex Inactivations during Decision Making Are Explained by Bistable Attractor Dynamics

Two-node attractor networks are flexible models for neural activity during decision making. Depending on the network configuration, these networks can model distinct aspects of decisions including evidence integration, evidence categorization, and decision memory. Here, we use attractor networks to model recent causal perturbations of the frontal orienting fields (FOF) in rat cortex during a perceptual decision-making task (Erlich, Brunton, Duan, Hanks, & Brody, 2015 ). We focus on a striking feature of the perturbation results. Pharmacological silencing of the FOF resulted in a stimulus-independent bias. We fit several models to test whether integration, categorization, or decision memory could account for this bias and found that only the memory configuration successfully accounts for it. This memory model naturally accounts for optogenetic perturbations of FOF in the same task and correctly predicts a memory-duration-dependent deficit caused by silencing FOF in a different task. Our results provide mechanistic support for a "postcategorization" memory role of the FOF in upcoming choices.

The Complexity of Dynamics in Small Neural Circuits

Mean-field approximations are a powerful tool for studying large neural networks. However, they do not describe well the behavior of networks composed of a small number of neurons. In this case, major differences between the mean-field approximation and the real behavior of the network can arise. Yet, many interesting problems in neuroscience involve the study of mesoscopic networks composed of a few tens of neurons. Nonetheless, mathematical methods that correctly describe networks of small size are still rare, and this prevents us to make progress in understanding neural dynamics at these intermediate scales. Here we develop a novel systematic analysis of the dynamics of arbitrarily small networks composed of homogeneous populations of excitatory and inhibitory firing-rate neurons. We study the local bifurcations of their neural activity with an approach that is largely analytically tractable, and we numerically determine the global bifurcations. We find that for strong inhibition these networks give rise to very complex dynamics, caused by the formation of multiple branching solutions of the neural dynamics equations that emerge through spontaneous symmetry-breaking. This qualitative change of the neural dynamics is a finite-size effect of the network, that reveals qualitative and previously unexplored differences between mesoscopic cortical circuits and their mean-field approximation. The most important consequence of spontaneous symmetry-breaking is the ability of mesoscopic networks to regulate their degree of functional heterogeneity, which is thought to help reducing the detrimental effect of noise correlations on cortical information processing.

The mesoscopic level of brain organization, describing the organization and dynamics of small circuits of neurons including from few tens to few thousands, has recently received considerable experimental attention. It is useful for describing small neural systems of invertebrates, and in mammalian neural systems it is often seen as a middle ground that is fundamental to link single neuron activity to complex functions and behavior. However, and somewhat counter-intuitively, the behavior of neural networks of small and intermediate size can be much more difficult to study mathematically than that of large networks, and appropriate mathematical methods to study the dynamics of such networks have not been developed yet. Here we consider a model of a network of firing-rate neurons with arbitrary finite size, and we study its local bifurcations using an analytical approach. This analysis, complemented by numerical studies for both the local and global bifurcations, shows the emergence of strong and previously unexplored finite-size effects that are particularly hard to detect in large networks. This study advances the tools available for the comprehension of finite-size neural circuits, going beyond the insights provided by the mean-field approximation and the current techniques for the quantification of finite-size effects.

Believer-Skeptic Meets Actor-Critic: Rethinking the Role of Basal Ganglia Pathways during Decision-Making and Reinforcement Learning

The flexibility of behavioral control is a testament to the brain's capacity for dynamically resolving uncertainty during goal-directed actions. This ability to select actions and learn from immediate feedback is driven by the dynamics of basal ganglia (BG) pathways. A growing body of empirical evidence conflicts with the traditional view that these pathways act as independent levers for facilitating (i.e., direct pathway) or suppressing (i.e., indirect pathway) motor output, suggesting instead that they engage in a dynamic competition during action decisions that computationally captures action uncertainty. Here we discuss the utility of encoding action uncertainty as a dynamic competition between opposing control pathways and provide evidence that this simple mechanism may have powerful implications for bridging neurocomputational theories of decision making and reinforcement learning.

Decisions reduce sensitivity to subsequent information

Behavioural studies over half a century indicate that making categorical choices alters beliefs about the state of the world. People seem biased to confirm previous choices, and to suppress contradicting information. These choice-dependent biases imply a fundamental bound of human rationality. However, it remains unclear whether these effects extend to lower level decisions, and only little is known about the computational mechanisms underlying them. Building on the framework of sequential-sampling models of decision-making, we developed novel psychophysical protocols that enable us to dissect quantitatively how choices affect the way decision-makers accumulate additional noisy evidence. We find robust choice-induced biases in the accumulation of abstract numerical (experiment 1) and low-level perceptual (experiment 2) evidence. These biases deteriorate estimations of the mean value of the numerical sequence (experiment 1) and reduce the likelihood to revise decisions (experiment 2). Computational modelling reveals that choices trigger a reduction of sensitivity to subsequent evidence via multiplicative gain modulation, rather than shifting the decision variable towards the chosen alternative in an additive fashion. Our results thus show that categorical choices alter the evidence accumulation mechanism itself, rather than just its outcome, rendering the decision-maker less sensitive to new information.

Categorical evidence, confidence, and urgency during probabilistic categorization

We used a temporally extended categorization task to investigate the neural substrates underlying our ability to integrate information over time and across multiple stimulus features. Using model-based fMRI, we tracked the temporal evolution of two important variables as participants deliberated about impending choices: (1) categorical evidence, and (2) confidence (the total amount of evidence provided by the stimuli, irrespective of the particular category favored). Importantly, in each model, we also included a covariate that allowed us to differentiate signals related to information accumulation from other, evidence-independent functions that increased monotonically with time (such as urgency or cognitive load). We found that somatomotor regions tracked the temporal evolution of categorical evidence, while regions in both medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and the striatum tracked decision confidence. As both theory and experimental work suggest that patterns of activity thought to be related to information-accumulation may reflect, in whole or in part, an interaction between sensory evidence and urgency, we additionally investigated whether urgency might modulate the slopes of the two evidence-dependent functions. We found that the slopes of both functions were likely modulated by urgency such that the difference between the high and low evidence states increased as the response deadline loomed.

Delineating the effects of anodal transcranial direct current stimulation on myoelectric control based on slow cortical potentials

Active cortical participation in rehabilitation procedures may be facilitated by modulating neuromuscular electrical stimulation (NMES) with electromyogram (EMG) and electroencephalogram (EEG) derived biopotentials, that represent simultaneous volitional effort. Here, the ability of the nervous system to respond to intrinsic or extrinsic stimuli by reorganizing its structure, function, and connections is called neuroplasticity. Neuroplasticity is involved in post-stroke functional disturbances, but also in rehabilitation. Beneficial neuroplastic changes may be facilitated with an adjuvant treatment with non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS). This paper presents the results from a motor cortex anodal tDCS-EEG/EMG study in healthy volunteers. We investigated slow cortical potentials (SCP) during self-initiated movements. In this preliminary study, we found that anodal tDCS increased baseline-normalized post-tDCS mean power in the Theta band (4-8 Hz) of resting state EEG (60.71% vs. 8.36%; p<0.01), and decreased the slope of post-tDCS SCP from motor task-related EEG (-6.43 au/sec vs. -4.86 au/sec; p=0.021) when compared to sham tDCS. These preliminary results are discussed based on an accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity which postulates that a decision threshold applied to auto-correlated noise—in this case the output of a leaky stochastic accumulator—can account for the specific shape of the SCP prior to movement. We postulate that the anodal tDCS facilitated change in the slope of SCP may be related to the reaction times during a cued movement task since our prior work showed that anodal tDCS decreases the delay in initiation of muscle contraction and increases the delay in termination of muscle activity.

Competing basal ganglia pathways determine the difference between stopping and deciding not to go

The architecture of corticobasal ganglia pathways allows for many routes to inhibit a planned action: the hyperdirect pathway performs fast action cancellation and the indirect pathway competitively constrains execution signals from the direct pathway. We present a novel model, principled off of basal ganglia circuitry, that differentiates control dynamics of reactive stopping from intrinsic no-go decisions. Using a nested diffusion model, we show how reactive braking depends on the state of an execution process. In contrast, no-go decisions are best captured by a failure of the execution process to reach the decision threshold due to increasing constraints on the drift rate. This model accounts for both behavioral and functional MRI (fMRI) responses during inhibitory control tasks better than alternative models. The advantage of this framework is that it allows for incorporating the effects of context in reactive and proactive control into a single unifying parameter, while distinguishing action cancellation from no-go decisions.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.08723.001

Imagine you are playing baseball. You can decide not to swing the bat at the incoming ball if you see that it is a wild pitch that will be way outside the strike zone; this is known as reactive control. Alternatively, you may decide not to move because you were coached never to swing at the first pitch (proactive control). It is thought that the brain processes these signals separately with reactive control being a quick way to put the brakes on a planned movement and proactive control being a more specific suppression of unwanted actions. However, some researchers have argued that real-life “inhibitory” control decisions are more likely to be made using a combination of both reactive and proactive signals.

In primates, reactive and proactive signals are both processed by a region of the brain called the basal ganglia. However, it is not clear whether these signals pass through the same set of nerve cells, or whether they use separate sets of cells that run in parallel. Dunovan et al. studied how these signals are processed in the human basal ganglia using a combination of experiments and computational models.

The model assumes that reactive and proactive signals are carried by two pathways that are initially separate but eventually converge in the basal ganglia. If these pathways converge, then proactive control signals should complement reactive decisions to “apply the brakes”. For example, if reactive signals suggest that the ball may not come over the home plate, the fact that it is also the first pitch would make it easier for the brain to decide not to swing the bat.

Dunovan et al. tested this model by asking human volunteers to complete two tasks where the decision to respond to a stimulus is made proactively using prior knowledge, or reactively using an explicit stop cue. The experiments also used a technique called functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure the activity in the basal ganglia of each volunteer. Simulations from the model were able to predict the observed patterns of behavior and brain activity in several regions that are key to inhibitory control, including the output of the basal ganglia.

These findings provide a possible mechanism for how reactive and proactive control may interact in the brain. Because of the limitations in imaging the human brain, the next step will be to test whether the model is able to predict the behavior of individual nerve cells in the brains of other animals.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.08723.002

A Multi-Area Stochastic Model for a Covert Visual Search Task

Decisions typically comprise several elements. For example, attention must be directed towards specific objects, their identities recognized, and a choice made among alternatives. Pairs of competing accumulators and drift-diffusion processes provide good models of evidence integration in two-alternative perceptual choices, but more complex tasks requiring the coordination of attention and decision making involve multistage processing and multiple brain areas. Here we consider a task in which a target is located among distractors and its identity reported by lever release. The data comprise reaction times, accuracies, and single unit recordings from two monkeys’ lateral interparietal area (LIP) neurons. LIP firing rates distinguish between targets and distractors, exhibit stimulus set size effects, and show response-hemifield congruence effects. These data motivate our model, which uses coupled sets of leaky competing accumulators to represent processes hypothesized to occur in feature-selective areas and limb motor and pre-motor areas, together with the visual selection process occurring in LIP. Model simulations capture the electrophysiological and behavioral data, and fitted parameters suggest that different connection weights between LIP and the other cortical areas may account for the observed behavioral differences between the animals.

Content-specific evidence accumulation in inferior temporal cortex during perceptual decision-making

During a perceptual decision, neuronal activity can change as a function of time-integrated evidence. Such neurons may serve as decision variables, signaling a choice when activity reaches a boundary. Because the signals occur on a millisecond timescale, translating to human decision-making using functional neuroimaging has been challenging. Previous neuroimaging work in humans has identified patterns of neural activity consistent with an accumulation account. However, the degree to which the accumulating neuroimaging signals reflect specific sources of perceptual evidence is unknown. Using an extended face/house discrimination task in conjunction with cognitive modeling, we tested whether accumulation signals, as measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), are stimulus-specific. Accumulation signals were defined as a change in the slope of the rising edge of activation corresponding with response time (RT), with higher slopes associated with faster RTs. Consistent with an accumulation account, fMRI activity in face- and house-selective regions in the inferior temporal cortex increased at a rate proportional to decision time in favor of the preferred stimulus. This finding indicates that stimulus-specific regions perform an evidence integrative function during goal-directed behavior and that different sources of evidence accumulate separately. We also assessed the decision-related function of other regions throughout the brain and found that several regions were consistent with classifications from prior work, suggesting a degree of domain generality in decision processing. Taken together, these results provide support for an integration-to-boundary decision mechanism and highlight possible roles of both domain-specific and domain-general regions in decision evidence evaluation.

Early evidence affects later decisions: why evidence accumulation is required to explain response time data

Models of decision making differ in how they treat early evidence as it recedes in time. Standard models, such as the drift diffusion model, assume that evidence is gradually accumulated until it reaches a boundary and a decision is initiated. One recent model, the urgency gating model, has proposed that decision making does not require the accumulation of evidence at all. Instead, accumulation could be replaced by a simple urgency factor that scales with time. To distinguish between these fundamentally different accounts of decision making, we performed an experiment in which we manipulated the presence, duration, and valence of early evidence. We simulated the associated response time and error rate predictions from the drift diffusion model and the urgency gating model, fitting the models to the empirical data. The drift diffusion model predicted that variations in the evidence presented early in the trial would affect decisions later in that same trial. The urgency gating model predicted that none of these variations would have any effect. The behavioral data showed clear effects of early evidence on the subsequent decisions, in a manner consistent with the drift diffusion model. Our results cannot be explained by the urgency gating model, and they provide support for an evidence accumulation account of perceptual decision making.

Neural dynamics implement a flexible decision bound with a fixed firing rate for choice: a model-based hypothesis

Decisions are faster and less accurate when conditions favor speed, and are slower and more accurate when they favor accuracy. This speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) can be explained by the principles of bounded integration, where noisy evidence is integrated until it reaches a bound. Higher bounds reduce the impact of noise by increasing integration times, supporting higher accuracy (vice versa for speed). These computations are hypothesized to be implemented by feedback inhibition between neural populations selective for the decision alternatives, each of which corresponds to an attractor in the space of network states. Since decision-correlated neural activity typically reaches a fixed rate at the time of commitment to a choice, it has been hypothesized that the neural implementation of the bound is fixed, and that the SAT is supported by a common input to the populations integrating evidence. According to this hypothesis, a stronger common input reduces the difference between a baseline firing rate and a threshold rate for enacting a choice. In simulations of a two-choice decision task, we use a reduced version of a biophysically-based network model (Wong and Wang, 2006) to show that a common input can control the SAT, but that changes to the threshold-baseline difference are epiphenomenal. Rather, the SAT is controlled by changes to network dynamics. A stronger common input decreases the model's effective time constant of integration and changes the shape of the attractor landscape, so the initial state is in a more error-prone position. Thus, a stronger common input reduces decision time and lowers accuracy. The change in dynamics also renders firing rates higher under speed conditions at the time that an ideal observer can make a decision from network activity. The difference between this rate and the baseline rate is actually greater under speed conditions than accuracy conditions, suggesting that the bound is not implemented by firing rates per se.

On the neural implementation of the speed-accuracy trade-off

Decisions are faster and less accurate when conditions favor speed, and are slower and more accurate when they favor accuracy. This phenomenon is referred to as the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). Behavioral studies of the SAT have a long history, and the data from these studies are well characterized within the framework of bounded integration. According to this framework, decision makers accumulate noisy evidence until the running total for one of the alternatives reaches a bound. Lower and higher bounds favor speed and accuracy respectively, each at the expense of the other. Studies addressing the neural implementation of these computations are a recent development in neuroscience. In this review, we describe the experimental and theoretical evidence provided by these studies. We structure the review according to the framework of bounded integration, describing evidence for (1) the modulation of the encoding of evidence under conditions favoring speed or accuracy, (2) the modulation of the integration of encoded evidence, and (3) the modulation of the amount of integrated evidence sufficient to make a choice. We discuss commonalities and differences between the proposed neural mechanisms, some of their assumptions and simplifications, and open questions for future work. We close by offering a unifying hypothesis on the present state of play in this nascent research field.

Prior probability and feature predictability interactively bias perceptual decisions

Anticipating a forthcoming sensory experience facilitates perception for expected stimuli but also hinders perception for less likely alternatives. Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that expectation biases arise from feature-level predictions that enhance early sensory representations and facilitate evidence accumulation for contextually probable stimuli while suppressing alternatives. Reasonably then, the extent to which prior knowledge biases subsequent sensory processing should depend on the precision of expectations at the feature level as well as the degree to which expected features match those of an observed stimulus. In the present study we investigated how these two sources of uncertainty modulated pre- and post-stimulus bias mechanisms in the drift-diffusion model during a probabilistic face/house discrimination task. We tested several plausible models of choice bias, concluding that predictive cues led to a bias in both the starting-point and rate of evidence accumulation favoring the more probable stimulus category. We further tested the hypotheses that prior bias in the starting-point was conditional on the feature-level uncertainty of category expectations and that dynamic bias in the drift-rate was modulated by the match between expected and observed stimulus features. Starting-point estimates suggested that subjects formed a constant prior bias in favor of the face category, which exhibits less feature-level variability, that was strengthened or weakened by trial-wise predictive cues. Furthermore, we found that the gain on face/house evidence was increased for stimuli with less ambiguous features and that this relationship was enhanced by valid category expectations. These findings offer new evidence that bridges psychological models of decision-making with recent predictive coding theories of perception.

Lateralized readiness potentials reveal properties of a neural mechanism for implementing a decision threshold

Many perceptual decision making models posit that participants accumulate noisy evidence over time to improve the accuracy of their decisions, and that in free response tasks, participants respond when the accumulated evidence reaches a decision threshold. Research on the neural correlates of these models' components focuses primarily on evidence accumulation. Far less attention has been paid to the neural correlates of decision thresholds, reflecting the final commitment to a decision. Inspired by a model of bistable neural activity that implements a decision threshold, we reinterpret human lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) as reflecting the crossing of a decision threshold. Interestingly, this threshold crossing preserves signatures of a drift-diffusion process of evidence accumulation that feeds in to the threshold mechanism. We show that, as our model predicts, LRP amplitudes and growth rates recorded while participants performed a motion discrimination task correlate with individual differences in behaviorally-estimated prior beliefs, decision thresholds and evidence accumulation rates. As such LRPs provide a useful measure to test dynamical models of both evidence accumulation and decision commitment processes non-invasively.

The effects of evidence bounds on decision-making: theoretical and empirical developments

Converging findings from behavioral, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging studies suggest an integration-to-boundary mechanism governing decision formation and choice selection. This mechanism is supported by sequential sampling models of choice decisions, which can implement statistically optimal decision strategies for selecting between multiple alternative options on the basis of sensory evidence. This review focuses on recent developments in understanding the evidence boundary, an important component of decision-making raised by experimental findings and models. The article starts by reviewing the neurobiology of perceptual decisions and several influential sequential sampling models, in particular the drift-diffusion model, the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck model and the leaky-competing-accumulator model. In the second part, the article examines how the boundary may affect a model’s dynamics and performance and to what extent it may improve a model’s fits to experimental data. In the third part, the article examines recent findings that support the presence and site of boundaries in the brain. The article considers two questions: (1) whether the boundary is a spontaneous property of neural integrators, or is controlled by dedicated neural circuits; (2) if the boundary is variable, what could be the driving factors behind boundary changes? The review brings together studies using different experimental methods in seeking answers to these questions, highlights psychological and physiological factors that may be associated with the boundary and its changes, and further considers the evidence boundary as a generic mechanism to guide complex behavior.