What I Say is What I Get: Stronger Effects of Self-Generated vs. Cue-Induced Expectations in Event-Related Potentials

Action-outcome delays modulate the temporal expansion of intended outcomes

The phenomenon of intentional binding pertains to the perceived connection between a voluntary action and its anticipated result. When an individual intends an outcome, it appears to subjectively extend in time due to a pre-activation of the intended result, particularly evident at shorter action-outcome delays. However, there is a concern that the operationalisation of intention might have led to a mixed interpretation of the outcome expansion attributed to the pre-activation of intention, given the sensitivity of time perception and intentional binding to external cues that could accelerate the realisation of expectations. To investigate the expansion dynamics of an intended outcome, we employed a modified version of the temporal bisection task in two experiments. Experiment 1 considered the action-outcome delay as a within-subject factor, while experiment 2 treated it as a between-subject factor. The results revealed that the temporal expansion of an intended outcome was only evident under the longer action-outcome delay condition. We attribute this observation to working memory demands and attentional allocation due to temporal relevancy and not due to pre-activation. The discrepancy in effects across studies is explained by operationalising different components of the intentional binding effect, guided by the cue integration theory. Moreover, we discussed speculative ideas regarding the involvement of specific intentions based on the proximal intent distal intent (PIDI) theory and whether causality plays a role in temporal binding. Our study contributes to the understanding of how intention influences time perception and sheds light on how various methodological factors, cues, and delays can impact the dynamics of temporal expansion associated with an intended outcome.

Hyperreactivity to uncertainty is a key feature of subjective cognitive impairment

With an increasingly ageing global population, more people are presenting with concerns about their cognitive function, but not all have an underlying neurodegenerative diagnosis. Subjective cognitive impairment (SCI) is a common condition describing self-reported deficits in cognition without objective evidence of cognitive impairment. Many individuals with SCI suffer from depression and anxiety, which have been hypothesised to account for their cognitive complaints. Despite this association between SCI and affective features, the cognitive and brain mechanisms underlying SCI are poorly understood. Here, we show that people with SCI are hyperreactive to uncertainty and that this might be a key mechanism accounting for their affective burden. Twenty-seven individuals with SCI performed an information sampling task, where they could actively gather information prior to decisions. Across different conditions, SCI participants sampled faster and obtained more information than matched controls to resolve uncertainty. Remarkably, despite their ‘urgent’ sampling behaviour, SCI participants were able to maintain their efficiency. Hyperreactivity to uncertainty indexed by this sampling behaviour correlated with the severity of affective burden including depression and anxiety. Analysis of MRI resting functional connectivity revealed that SCI participants had stronger insular-hippocampal connectivity compared to controls, which also correlated with faster sampling. These results suggest that altered uncertainty processing is a key mechanism underlying the psycho-cognitive manifestations in SCI and implicate a specific brain network target for future treatment.

Additive Effects of Prior Knowledge and Predictive Visual Information in Improving Continuous Tracking Performance

Visual information and prior knowledge represent two different sources of predictability for tasks which each have been reported to have a beneficial effect on dual-task performance. What if the two were combined? Adding multiple sources of predictability might, on the one hand, lead to additive, beneficial effects on dual-tasking. On the other hand, it is conceivable that multiple sources of predictability do not increase dual-task performance further, as they complicate performance due to having to process information from multiple sources. In this study, we combined two sources of predictability, predictive visual information and prior knowledge (implicit learning and explicit learning) in a dual-task setup. 22 participants performed a continuous tracking task together with an auditory reaction time task over three days. The middle segment of the tracking task was repeating to promote motor learning, but only half of the participants was informed about this. After the practice blocks (day 3), we provided participants with predictive visual information about the tracking path to test whether visual information would add to beneficial effects of prior knowledge (additive effects of predictability). Results show that both predictive visual information and prior knowledge improved dual-task performance, presented simultaneously or in absence of each other. These results show that processing of information relevant for enhancement of task performance is unhindered by dual-task demands.

Effects of Cognitive Expectation on Sound-Induced Flash Illusion

Sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI) is an auditory-dominated multisensory integration phenomenon in which flashes presented in conjunction with an unequal number of auditory sounds are illusorily perceived as equal in number to the auditory sounds. Previous studies on the factors that impact SIFI have mainly focused on top-down and bottom-up factors. This study aimed to explore the effects of top-down cognitive expectations on the SIFI by manipulating the proportion of trial types. The results showed that the accuracy of judgment was improved and reaction times were shortened when the instructions were consistent with the actual proportion of trial type. When the instructions were not consistent with the actual proportion of trial types, the instructions could still regulate the accuracy and reaction times in judging the fission illusion (i.e., a brief flash accompanied by two auditory stimuli tends to be perceived as two flashes) regardless of the actual proportion of trial types. The results indicated that top-down cognitive expectations could significantly reduce the fission illusion and accelerate the judgment, but the effect was not significant in the fusion illusion (i.e., two brief flashes accompanied by single auditory stimuli tend to be perceived as a single flash) due to the instability of the illusion.

More Than Hitting the Correct Key Quickly

Many studies have documented that multitasking reduces Response Time (RT) indicators of implicit sequence learning as well as the expression of acquired sequence knowledge in RT benefits. In these tasks it is only relevant that the correct key is hit quickly, not where it is hit. We explored how variability in response location is influenced by (a) breaking a repeating sequence of target locations, (b) multitasking demands in the current trial, and (c) presence of multitasking in the block. Participants performed a Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT) on a touchscreen while shutting down a beep tone by pressing the space bar with their non-dominant hand (throughout Experiment 1 and in the second half of Experiment 2). The first-order sequence of four response locations on the screen was broken by off-sequence deviants in 1/6th of the trials. Our results show a dissociation between RT and response location variability. While the effect of breaking the sequence on RT was larger under single- than under multitasking, breaking the sequence only led to an increase in response location variability under multitasking. Experiment 3 suggested that the impact of sequence knowledge on either aspect of performance in the SRTT is limited by interference from an additional task.

How Do Price and Quantity Promotions Affect Hedonic Purchases? An ERPs Study

Due to consuming hedonic products unnecessary to basic well-being, consumers need justifications for pleasure. However, different justifications have differential influences in promoting hedonic purchases, such as price and quantity promotions (PP and QP), the difference being that the latter requires purchasing additional units to get the same discount as the former. In the present study, even-related potentials (ERPs) was applied to reveal the timing of brain activities to further understand how promotion information consisting of promotion type (PP and QP) and discount depth, deep and shallow discounts (DD and SD) on hedonic products was processed. Behaviorally, consumers were more willing to purchase items in PP and DD conditions than QP and SD conditions, respectively, and spent more time making final purchase decisions in QP and DD condition or PP and SD condition compared to PP and DD condition. Neurophysiologically, DD automatically recruited more attentional resources than SD and led to a higher P2 amplitude. QP and DD condition or PP and SD condition evoked a larger N2 amplitude and enhanced perceptual conflict compared to PP and DD condition. During late stage, PP and DD elicited a more positive LPP amplitude in contrast to QP and SD, respectively, indicating that people have stronger purchase intention and positive affect in PP and DD contexts. These findings provided evidence for the differential influences between PP and QP and what ultimately made consumers buy hedonic products or not.

Early onset cigarette smokers exhibit greater P300 reactivity to smoking-related stimuli and report greater craving

Adolescence is a period during which a number of critical neuromaturation processes occur and the vulnerability for developing nicotine dependence is extremely high. Thus, early-onset (EO; age < 16 years old), relative to late-onset (LO; age ≥ 16 years old), tobacco smoking may be uniquely deleterious for developmentally immature systems that regulate neural signaling reactivity. This study investigated how age of tobacco smoking onset affects neurophysiological measures of smoking cue reactivity and reported craving in adult smokers. EO smokers (EOS; n = 8; 4 females), LO smokers (LOS; n = 10; 5 females), and healthy non-smokers (HNS; n = 10; 5 females) participated in an event-related potential (ERP) cue reactivity study with tactile and image stimuli. Participants handled neutral objects during one interval and smoking-related objects during a second interval. After each interval, they viewed smoking-related, neutral, or arousing images using an oddball paradigm. P300 ERPs and craving for tobacco were recorded during each session. P300 amplitudes were significantly higher in central midline (Cz) channel to smoking, but not neutral or arousing, images after handling smoking objects. Specifically, Cz P300 smoking amplitudes were significantly greater in EOS, relative to LOS and HNS, and associated with greater craving at baseline. There were no other group differences in mood or craving. EOS exhibited greater P300 reactivity to smoking-related stimuli, relative to LOS, suggesting a more sensitized neural response. EO smoking during early neuromaturation may alter neurophysiological signaling involved in responding to smoking-related stimuli, which could impact the outcome of smoking cessation interventions.

Intended outcome expands in time

Intentional agents desire specific outcomes and perform actions to obtain those outcomes. However, whether getting such desired (intended) outcomes change our subjective experience of the duration of that outcome is unknown. Using a temporal bisection task, we investigated the changes in temporal perception of the outcome as a function of whether it was intended or not. Before each trial, participants intended to see one of two possible outcomes but received the intended outcome only in half of the trials. Results showed that intended outcomes were perceived as longer than unintended outcomes. Interestingly, this temporal expansion was present only when the intended outcome appeared after short action-outcome delays (250 ms-Exp 1 and 500 ms-Exp 2), but not when it appeared after long action-outcome delay (1000 ms-Exp 3). The effect was absent when participants did not intend and performed instruction-based action (Exp 4). Finally, Exp 5 (verbal estimation task) revealed that intention induced temporal expansion occurs via altering the gating or switch mechanism and not the pacemaker speed. Results are explained based on intention-induced pre-activation resulting in extended temporal experience. Our study not only suggests inclusion of intention as a potential factor influencing time perception but also indicates a close link between intentional binding and the intention induced temporal expansion of its outcome.

Tied to expectations: Predicting features speeds processing even under adverse circumstances

When participants predict the upcoming stimulus in a randomized choice reaction task, a match between prediction and stimulus increases processing speed at a level similar to that observed in cueing studies with highly valid cues. This might be taken to suggest that people cannot help but fully use their self-generated, verbalized predictions for preparing task processing. Thus, we tested how flexibly participants can control formation and implementation of predictions. In Experiment 1, we varied validity and response-relevance of predictions. We observed that prediction effects on RT can be boosted by increasing validity, but prevail under adverse circumstances. This was not the case in a control group who read rather than predicted the feature words, suggesting that the effect was specific to predictions as such. Experiment 2 provided further evidence for limited control of participants over implementing and forming predictions. Participants were provided with practice on stimuli occurring with varying frequency, but neither learned to strategically choose predictions to maximize the number of match trials, nor did they reduce the amount of prediction-based preparation when predicting an infrequent stimulus. As sequential aftereffects of prediction match did not vary with validity, they were identified as an independent effect of verbalizing a response-relevant stimulus feature. The results are consistent with the view that the predicted stimulus feature is represented in the focus of attention in working memory and that the amount of implementation can be subject to weighting.

Can Psychological Expectation Models Be Adapted for Placebo Research?

Placebo responses contribute substantially to the effect and clinical outcome of medical treatments. Patients' expectations have been identified as one of the major mechanisms contributing to placebo effects. However, to date a general theoretical framework to better understand how patient expectations interact with features of medical treatment has not been developed. In this paper we outline an expectation model that can be used as framework for experimental studies on both placebo and nocebo mechanisms. This model is based on psychological concepts of expectation development, expectation maintenance, and expectation change within the typical paradigms used in placebo research. This theoretical framework reflects the dynamic aspects of the interaction between expectations and medical treatment, and offers a platform to combine psychological and neurophysiological research activities. Moreover, this model can be used to identify important future research questions. For example, we argue that the dynamic processes of expectation maintenance vs. expectation changes are not sufficiently addressed in current research on placebo mechanisms. Therefore, the question about how to change and optimize patients' expectations prior to treatment should be a special focus of future clinical research.

The benefit of expecting no conflict--Stronger influence of self-generated than cue-induced conflict expectations on Stroop performance

The role of expectations in sequential adaptation to cognitive conflict has been debated controversially in prior studies. On the one hand, a sequential congruency effect (SCE) has been reported for trials in which participants expect a repetition of conflict level. On the other hand, conflict level expectations vs. the SCE have been shown to develop differentially across runs of trials with the same conflict level, arguing against the theory that the SCE is purely driven by expectation. The current verbal Stroop experiment addresses this controversy by two means. First, we tested which specific type of expectation (cue-induced expectations vs. self-generated predictions) might affect the SCE. Second, we assessed the impact of expectation on the SCE as well as the development of SCE and expectation with congruency level run length in one design. We observed a dissociation between expectations and SCE, demonstrating that the SCE is not exclusively driven by expectations. At the same time, we found evidence that (self-generated) expectations do have an impact on the SCE. Our data document especially high performance for one specific combination of task events: congruent trial accompanied by congruent prediction and conflict level repetition. Our results are in line with theories attributing conflict adaptation effects to the "adaption to the lack of conflict". We discuss our results in a broader context of theories about conflict monitoring.

Expectation mismatch: differences between self-generated and cue-induced expectations

Expectation of upcoming stimuli and tasks can lead to improved performance, if the anticipated situation occurs, while expectation mismatch can lead to less efficient processing. Researchers have used methodological approaches that rely on either self-generated expectations (predictions) or cue-induced expectations to investigate expectation mismatch effects. Differentiating these two types of expectations for different contents of expectation such as stimuli, responses, task sets and conflict level, we review evidence suggesting that self-generated expectations lead to larger facilitating effects and conflict effects on the behavioral and neural level - as compared to cue-based expectations. On a methodological level, we suggest that self-generated as compared to cue-induced expectations allow for a higher amount of experimental control in many experimental designs on expectation effects. On a theoretical level, we argue for qualitative differences in how cues vs. self-generated expectations influence performance. While self-generated expectations might generally involve representing the expected event in the focus of attention in working memory, cues might only lead to such representations under supportive circumstances (i.e., cue of high validity and attended).

Instructed task demands and utilization of action effect anticipation

Automatic acquisition of action effect associations may serve as a parsimonious account of how people acquire the basis for intentionally controlled action. However, recent research suggests that learning or the expression of action effect links might depend on whether task demands impose either a stimulus based mode of action control or an intention based action control mode. In the current study we develop a paradigm that allows the mode of action control to be varied via instructions while keeping stimuli identical. Participants were to respond to the location of a cloud of dots. Their actions were followed by predictable visual effects, either consistently congruent or incongruent with the location of the action. In Experiment 1, a displaced new cloud of random dots was presented as a spatial action effect. In Experiment 2 an arrow was presented as effect with a pointing direction congruent or incongruent to the response position. The location of the stimulus in the reference frame was easy to detect in some of the trials while the location of the cloud of dots was completely ambiguous in others. The instruction manipulation targeted the latter trials, suggesting to one group of participants to freely choose a key in a difficult trial, while asking another group to react to their spontaneous impression in the event of a difficult stimulus. In this way, we aimed at rendering actions either as stimulus driven or internally generated. By this we could investigate how effect anticipation changed with practice depending on action mode. We employed the impact of action effect compatibility on speed and choice of action as a measure for action effect anticipation. Our results suggest that action effect associations can be acquired when instructions suggest stimulus based action control or intention based action control. Instructions aiming at the mode of task processing can influence when and how action effect links influence behavior.

Does explicit expectation really affect preparation?

Expectation enables preparation for an upcoming event and supports performance if the anticipated situation occurs, as manifested in behavioral effects (e.g., decreased RT). However, demonstrating coincidence between expectation and preparation is not sufficient for attributing a causal role to the former. The content of explicit expectation may simply reflect the present preparation state. We targeted this issue by experimentally teasing apart demands for preparation and explicit expectations. Expectations often originate from our experience: we expect that events occurring with a high frequency in the past are more likely to occur again. In addition to expectation, other task demands can feed into action preparation. In four experiments, frequency-based expectation was pitted against a selective response deadline. In a three-choice reaction time task, participants responded to stimuli that appeared with varying frequency (60, 30, 10%). Trial-by-trial stimulus expectations were either captured via verbal predictions or induced by visual cues. Predictions as well as response times quickly conformed to the variation in stimulus frequency. After two (of five) experimental blocks we forced participants by selective time pressure to respond faster to a less frequent stimulus. Therefore, participants had to prepare for one stimulus (medium frequency) while often explicitly expecting a different one (high frequency). Response times for the less frequent stimulus decreased immediately, while explicit expectations continued to indicate the (unchanged) presentation frequencies. Explicit expectations were thus not just reflecting preparation. In fact, participants responded faster when the stimulus matched the trial-wise expectations, even when task demands discouraged their use. In conclusion, we argue that explicit expectation feeds into preparatory processes instead of being a mere by-product.