The Einstellung effect in anagram problem solving: evidence from eye movements

The involvement of decomposition and composition processes in restructuring during problem solving

Decomposition of chunks has been widely accepted as a critical proxy of restructuring, but the role of composition in forming new representations has been largely neglected. This study aims to investigate the roles of both decomposition and composition processes in chunk restructuring, as well as their relationships with "aha" experiences during problem-solving. Participants were asked to move a part of a character to another character to create two new characters. Across three experiments, the characters to be decomposed or composed were varied in terms of tight or loose chunks. The results showed that decomposition or composition of tight chunks led to lower success rates, longer response times, and significantly stronger "Aha!" emotional experiences (mainly in terms of surprise and suddenness). This study provides evidence for the contribution of both decomposition and composition processes to restructuring in creative insight.

Effect of cognitive load and working memory capacity on the efficiency of discovering better alternatives: A survival analysis

Why do humans attempt to discover better alternatives to solve a problem even when they know the way to solve it? This question is related to the flexibility of thinking and is the subject of studies on the Einstellung effect. This study focuses on cognitive load for familiar trained procedure as a factor that influences the discovery of alternatives in Einstellung situations, where the problem can be solved using a trained procedure. Many studies on creative problem solving and strategy selection demonstrate that cognitive load for facilitates the discovery of alternatives. However, findings are inconsistent regarding Einstellung situations. We argue that the reason for such inconsistent results were the use of manipulations such as the double task, which both load on the trained and alternative procedure and the lack of perspective on efficiency in analysis. Therefore, we examine the relationship between cognitive load manipulated by the complexity of the trained procedure and time-based performance measured by the number of trials prior to finding alternatives. The results illustrate that higher cognitive load increased the efficiency of discovery of alternatives and that this effect was significant for participants with high working memory capacity. This study provides empirical evidence that high cognitive load for trained procedure facilitates the discovery of alternatives and suggests the importance of considering temporal properties, such as efficiency, when examining the effects of working memory on problem solving, which requires cognitive flexibility.

Temporal expectations mediated the repetition effect in a sequence in two ways

The repetition priming effect generally refers to facilitated responding in instances where the same stimulus or a very similar stimulus repeats after an initial occurrence. Prior studies showed that the repetition priming effect was greater when repetitive stimuli appeared at expected times than when they appeared at less expected times. However, in addition to the expectation for repetition, the expectation for nonrepetitive stimuli may also arise in a sequence, especially after repetitive stimuli continuously appeared several times. This study was designed to further reveal how these two kinds of expectations influence the repetition effect in a sequence. Participants were asked to solve 3, 4 or 5 repetitive tasks followed by a novel task in the experimental group, a situation where the expectations for repetitive events arise in the first three serial positions but that for nonrepetitive events arise in the fourth, fifth and sixth serial positions, or were asked to continuously solve 3-5 repetitive tasks in the control group, a situation where only the expectation for repetitive events appears. The results showed that the repetition effect appeared steadily in the whole sequence for the control group, whereas the repetition effect appeared in the early serial positions but was reduced in the later serial position for the experimental group. The findings revealed the dual influences of temporal expectations on repetition effects in a sequence.

Tracing Cognitive Processes in Insight Problem Solving: Using GAMs and Change Point Analysis to Uncover Restructuring

Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, incorrect mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption that this restructuring process happens suddenly, leading to the typical "Aha!" experience, the evidence is inconclusive. Among the reasons for this lack of clarity is that many measures of insight rely solely on the solvers' subjective experience of the solution process. In our previous paper, we used matchstick arithmetic problems to demonstrate that it is possible to objectively trace problem-solving processes by combining eye movements with new analytical and statistical approaches. Specifically, we divided the problem-solving process into ten (relative) temporal phases to better capture possible small changes in problem representation. Here, we go a step further to demonstrate that classical statistical procedures, such as ANOVA, cannot capture sudden representational change processes, which are typical for insight problems. Only nonlinear statistical models, such as generalized additive (mixed) models (GAMs) and change points analysis, correctly identified the abrupt representational change. Additionally, we demonstrate that explicit hints reorient participants' focus in a qualitatively different manner, changing the dynamics of restructuring in insight problem solving. While insight problems may indeed require a sudden restructuring of the initial mental representation, more sophisticated analytical and statistical approaches are necessary to uncover their true nature.

Mechanism Models of the Conventional and Advanced Methods of Construction Safety Training. Is the Traditional Method of Safety Training Sufficient?

Cognitive failures at the information acquiring (safety training), comprehension, or application stages led to near-miss or accidents on-site. The previous studies rarely considered the cognitive processes of two different kinds of construction safety training. Cognitive processes are a series of chemical and electrical brain impulses that allow you to perceive your surroundings and acquire knowledge. Additionally, their attention was more inclined toward the worker's behavior during hazard identification on-site while on duty. A study is proposed to fill the knowledge gap by developing the mechanism models of the two safety training approaches. The mechanism models were developed based on cognitive psychology and Bloom's taxonomy and six steps of cognitive learning theory. A worker's safety training is vital in acquiring, storing, retrieving, and utilizing the appropriate information for hazard identification on-site. It is assumed that those trained by advanced techniques may quickly identify and avoid hazards on construction sites because of the fundamental nature of the training, and when they come across threats, they may promptly use their working memory and prevent them, especially for more complex projects. The main benefit of making such a model, from a cognitive point of view, is that it can help us learn more about the mental processes of two different types of construction safety training, and it can also help us come up with specific management suggestions to make up for the approaches' flaws. Future research will concentrate on the organizational aspects and other cognitive failures that could lead to accidents.

Where Does Eureka Come From? The Effect of Unreportable Hints on the Phenomenology of Insight

Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on "Eureka!" moments.

Differences in the distribution of attention to trained procedure between finders and non-finders of the alternative better procedure

The human ability to flexibly discover alternatives without fixating on a known solution supports a variety of human creative activities. Previous research has shown that people who discover an alternative procedure relax their attentional bias to information regarding the known solutions just prior to the discovery. This study examined whether the difference in the distribution of attention between the finders and non-finders of the alternative procedure is observed from the phase of solving the problem using the trained procedure. We evaluated the characteristics of the finders' distribution of attention in situations where problem solving using a trained procedure was successful. This aspect has been little examined in previous research. Our study obtained empirical evidence for the fact that, compared to non-finders, finders pay more attention to information unrelated to the trained procedure acquired through knowledge and experience, even time when using a trained procedure. We also confirmed that this difference does not exist from the beginning of the task, but emerges during repeated use of familiar procedures. These findings indicate that in order to find an alternative procedure, one should not only divert attention from a familiar procedure just before the discovery but also pay a certain amount of attention to information unrelated to the familiar procedure even when the familiar procedure is functioning well.

Overcoming cognitive set bias requires more than seeing an alternative strategy

Determining when to switch from one strategy to another is at the heart of adaptive decision-making. Previous research shows that humans exhibit a 'cognitive set' bias, which occurs when a familiar strategy occludes-even much better-alternatives. Here we examined the mechanisms underlying cognitive set by investigating whether better solutions are visually overlooked, or fixated on but disregarded. We analyzed gaze data from 67 American undergraduates (91% female) while they completed the learned strategy-direct strategy (LS-DS) task, which measures their ability to switch from a learned strategy (LS) to a more efficient direct strategy (DS or shortcut). We found that, in the first trial block, participants fixated on the location of the shortcut more when it was available but most (89.6%) did not adopt it. Next, participants watched a video demonstrating either the DS (N = 34 Informed participants) or the familiar LS (N = 33 Controls). In post-video trials, Informed participants used the DS more than pre-video trials and compared to Controls. Notably, 29.4% of Informed participants continued to use the LS despite watching the DS video. We suggest that cognitive set in the LS-DS task does not stem from an inability to see the shortcut but rather a failure to try it.

When working memory mechanisms compete: Predicting cognitive flexibility versus mental set

Cognitive flexibility is a hallmark of individuals with higher working memory capacity (WMC). Yet, individuals with higher WMC sometimes demonstrate greater rigidity in problem solving. The present research examines a novel account for these contradictory findings-that different WMC mechanisms support versus constrain cognitive flexibility. Across three studies, participants completed the water jug task-a problem-solving task requiring them to first establish and then break mental set. Predictor measures targeted three WMC mechanisms: attention control, primary memory, and secondary memory. In Study 1, primary and secondary memory predicted breaking mental set in opposite directions. Higher primary memory facilitated breaking mental set, whereas higher secondary memory hindered it. Study 2 demonstrated that attention control moderates these effects. Study 3 replicated these results using a less restrictive sampling procedure (i.e., participants were provided the strategy needed to establish mental set). The present research supports the proposed theory of functional opponency in WMC.

The effect of recent reminder setting on subsequent strategy and performance in a prospective memory task

The technological advancement that is rapidly taking place in today's society allows increased opportunity for "cognitive offloading" by storing information in external devices rather than relying on internal memory. This opens the way to fundamental questions regarding the interplay between internal and external memory and the potential benefits and costs of placing information in the external environment. This article reports the results of three pre-registered online experiments investigating the consequences of prior cognitive offloading on A) subsequent unaided ability, and B) strategic decisions whether to engage in future cognitive offloading. We administered a web-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions for a brief period and manipulated the possibility of setting reminders to create an external cue. Earlier cognitive offloading had little effect upon individuals' subsequent unaided ability, leading to a small and nonsignificant drop in subsequent performance. However, there was a strong effect on participants' subsequent likelihood of setting reminders. These findings suggest that the short-term impact of cognitive offloading is more likely to be seen on individuals' strategy choices rather than basic memory processes.

Directed forgetting in problem solving

In two experiments, we investigated intentional forgetting of problem-solving routines by adapting the list method of directed forgetting. In Experiment 1, participants practiced solving water-jar problems (Luchins, 1942). After working on a first series of problems that all could be solved by the same formula, one group of participants was instructed to forget the so-far presented items because these, allegedly, had only served as a warm-up, whereas another group did not receive a forget instruction. After practicing a different routine in a second series of problems, participants solved test problems that either could be solved by the formula previously practiced in the first or in the second series of problems. All test problems alternatively could be solved by a more direct formula. The forget instruction significantly reduced the number of test problems solved by the formula of the first series of practice problems. In Experiment 2, participants subsequently practiced two solution formulas in two series of to-be-solved anagrams. Here, a forget instruction regarding the first series of practice anagrams reduced solution speed for test anagrams that had to be solved by the same formula as the to-be-forgotten practice anagrams. Thus, in both experiments, participants relied less on a practiced routine after they had been instructed to intentionally forget the episode of acquiring that routine.

Neural adaptation and cognitive inflexibility in repeated problem-solving behaviors

Repeated stimulus processing is often associated with a reduction in neural activity, known as neural adaptation. Therefore, people are more sensitive to novelty detection but likely lose flexibility in subsequent novelty processing after detection. To demonstrate the dynamic changes in neural adaption in repeated problem-solving behaviors and test its negative influence on subsequent nonrepetitive problem-solving behaviors, we adopted a Chinese character decomposition task in this fMRI study. Participants were asked to repeatedly perform 3-5 practice problems that could be solved by the same loose chunk decomposition (LCD) solution followed by a test problem that could be solved by a tight chunk decomposition (TCD) solution in the enhanced-set condition. The practice problem gradually elicited lower percent signal changes within the cuneus, superior parietal lobule (SPL), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in serial positions -1, -2 and -3 of a set, implying that neural adaptation occurred in repeated practice. Both the test problem and the practice problem that following it recruited greater activation of the SPL and IFG in the enhanced-set condition than in the base-set condition when the practice problem and test problem alternately appeared, implying that the task switching cost from a more dominant task to a less dominant task and vice versa was increased after neural adaptation occurred. In other words, repeatedly solving a set of similar problems with the same solution likely leads to neural adaptation and cognitive inflexibility, which in turn have an undifferentiated impact on task switching. This finding expands existing knowledge about the neurocognitive mechanism underlying the formation of the mental set and sheds light on the influence of neural adaptation on subsequent processing.

People got lost in solving a set of similar problems

A mental set generally refers to the human brain's tendency to persist with a familiar solution and stubbornly ignore alternatives. However, if a familiar solution is unable to solve a problem similar to a previous problem, does it continue to hinder alternative solutions, and if so, how and why? To answer these questions, a Chinese character decomposition task was adopted in this study. Participants were asked to perform a practice problem that could be solved by a familiar loose chunk decomposition (LCD) solution followed by a test problem that was similar to the practice problem but could only be solved by an unfamiliar tight chunk decomposition (TCD) solution or were asked to repeatedly perform 3-5 practice problems followed by a test problem; the former is the base-set condition, and the latter is the enhanced-set condition. The results showed that the test problem recruited more activation of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), middle occipital cortex (MOG), superior parietal lobule (SPL) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) than the practice problem in the latter operation and verification stage, but almost equal activation of the dACC occurred in the early exploration stage. This likely implied that people did not think that the familiar but currently invalid LCD solution could not be used to solve the test problem; thus, it continuously competed for attention with the unfamiliar TCD solution, which required more executive control to suppress. Moreover, compared with the base-set condition, the test problem in the enhanced-set condition recruited greater activations of the IFG, SPL and dACC in the latter verification stage but less activations of regions in the left IFG and MOG in the early exploration stage. These results revealed that people less actively explored and had to work harder to operate the unfamiliar TCD solution, particularly to resolve competition from the familiar but currently invalid LCD solution. In conclusion, people lost the ability to identify errors in the familiar but currently invalid solution, which in turn decreased the exploration efforts and increased the processing demands associated with alternative solutions in the form of attentional bias and competition. This finding broadly explains the dilemma of creative problem solving.

Unconditional Perseveration of the Short-Term Mental Set in Chunk Decomposition

A mental set generally refers to the brain's tendency to stick with the most familiar solution to a problem and stubbornly ignore alternatives. This tendency is likely driven by previous knowledge (the long-term mental set) or is a temporary by-product of procedural learning (the short-term mental set). A similar problem situation is considered the factor required for perseveration of the long-term mental set, which may not be essential for the short-term mental set. To reveal the boundary conditions for perseveration of the short-term mental set, this study adopted a Chinese character decomposition task. Participants were asked to perform a practice problem that could be solved by a familiar loose chunk decomposition (loose solution) followed by a test problem, or they were asked to repeatedly perform 5-8practice problems followed by a test problem; the former is the base-set condition, and the latter is the enhanced-set condition. In Experiment 1, the test problem situation appeared to be similar to the practice problem and could be solved using the reinforced loose solution and also an unfamiliar tight chunk decomposition (tight solution) (a 2-solution problem). In Experiment 2, the test problem situation differed from the practice problem and could only be solved using an unfamiliar tight solution (a 1-solution problem). The results showed that, when comparing the enhanced-set and base-set conditions, both the accuracy rate and the response times for solving the test problem with a tight solution were worse in Experiment 1, whereas the response times were worse in Experiment 2. We concluded that perseveration of the short-term mental set was independent of the similarity between problem situations and discuss the differences in perseveration between two types of fixation.

Why Can Only 24% Solve Bayesian Reasoning Problems in Natural Frequencies: Frequency Phobia in Spite of Probability Blindness

For more than 20 years, research has proven the beneficial effect of natural frequencies when it comes to solving Bayesian reasoning tasks (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995). In a recent meta-analysis, McDowell and Jacobs (2017) showed that presenting a task in natural frequency format increases performance rates to 24% compared to only 4% when the same task is presented in probability format. Nevertheless, on average three quarters of participants in their meta-analysis failed to obtain the correct solution for such a task in frequency format. In this paper, we present an empirical study on what participants typically do wrong when confronted with natural frequencies. We found that many of them did not actually use natural frequencies for their calculations, but translated them back into complicated probabilities instead. This switch from the intuitive presentation format to a less intuitive calculation format will be discussed within the framework of psychological theories (e.g., the Einstellung effect).

"The Penny Drops": Investigating Insight Through the Medium of Cryptic Crosswords

A new protocol for eliciting insight (“Aha!”/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, anagrams, rebus, and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as “classic” thematic or spatial challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the “Aha!” moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the positive emotional “payback” has an energizing effect on a participant's motivation to continue solving. Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits “Aha!” moments, cryptics should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an “insight problem” per se: typically, problems can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the “Aha!” moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution.

Looking for Creativity: Where Do We Look When We Look for New Ideas?

Recent work using the eye movement monitoring technique has demonstrated that when people are engaged in thought they tend to disengage from the external world by blinking or fixating on an empty portion of the visual field, such as a blank wall, or out the window at the sky. This 'looking at nothing' behavior has been observed during thinking that does not explicitly involve visual imagery (mind wandering, insight in problem solving, memory encoding and search) and it is associated with reduced analysis of the external visual environment. Thus, it appears to indicate (and likely facilitate) a shift of attention from external to internal stimuli that benefits creativity and problem solving by reducing the cognitive load and enhancing attention to internally evolving activation. We briefly mention some possible reasons to collect eye movement data in future studies of creativity.

The Perils of Automaticity

Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967 ). Automaticity is believed to enhance smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation ( Williams & Ford, 2008 ). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001 ). On the basis of this evidence, researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated behaviors can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason's (1990) classification scheme of everyday errors to show how an overreliance on automated procedures may lead to 3 specific performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips, and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterize competitive environments in a range of skill domains.