Inferring reward prediction errors in patients with schizophrenia: a dynamic reward task for reinforcement learning

Aberrant uncertainty processing is linked to psychotic-like experiences, autistic traits, and is reflected in pupil dilation during probabilistic learning

Aberrant belief updating due to misestimation of uncertainty and an increased perception of the world as volatile (i.e., unstable) has been found in autism and psychotic disorders. Pupil dilation tracks events that warrant belief updating, likely reflecting the adjustment of neural gain. However, whether subclinical autistic or psychotic symptoms affect this adjustment and how they relate to learning in volatile environments remains to be unraveled. We investigated the relationship between behavioral and pupillometric markers of subjective volatility (i.e., experience of the world as unstable), autistic traits, and psychotic-like experiences in 52 neurotypical adults with a probabilistic reversal learning task. Computational modeling revealed that participants with higher psychotic-like experience scores overestimated volatility in low-volatile task periods. This was not the case for participants scoring high on autistic-like traits, who instead showed a diminished adaptation of choice-switching behavior in response to risk. Pupillometric data indicated that individuals with higher autistic- or psychotic-like trait and experience scores differentiated less between events that warrant belief updating and those that do not when volatility was high. These findings are in line with misestimation of uncertainty accounts of psychosis and autism spectrum disorders and indicate that aberrancies are already present at the subclinical level.

Spared performance but increased uncertainty in schizophrenia: Evidence from a probabilistic decision-making task

Aberrant attribution of salience to in fact little informative events might explain the emergence of positive symptoms in schizophrenia and has been linked to belief uncertainty. Uncertainty is thought to be encoded by neuromodulators, including norepinephrine. However, norepinephrinergic encoding of uncertainty, measured as task-related pupil dilation, has rarely been explored in schizophrenia. Here, we addressed this question by comparing individuals with a disorder from the schizophrenia spectrum to a non-psychiatric control group on behavioral and pupillometric measures in a probabilistic prediction task, where different levels of uncertainty were introduced. Behaviorally, patients performed similar to controls, but their belief uncertainty was higher, particularly when instability of the task environment was high, suggesting an increased sensitivity to this instability. Furthermore, while pupil dilation scaled positively with uncertainty, this was less the case for patients, suggesting aberrant neuromodulatory regulation of neural gain, which may hinder the reduction of uncertainty in the long run. Together, the findings point to abnormal uncertainty processing and norepinephrinergic signaling in schizophrenia, potentially informing future development of both psychopharmacological therapies and psychotherapeutic approaches that deal with the processing of uncertain information.

All or nothing belief updating in patients with schizophrenia reduces precision and flexibility of beliefs

Schizophrenia is characterized by abnormal perceptions and beliefs, but the computational mechanisms through which these abnormalities emerge remain unclear. One prominent hypothesis asserts that such abnormalities result from overly precise representations of prior knowledge, which in turn lead beliefs to become insensitive to feedback. In contrast, another prominent hypothesis asserts that such abnormalities result from a tendency to interpret prediction errors as indicating meaningful change, leading to the assignment of aberrant salience to noisy or misleading information. Here we examine behaviour of patients and control subjects in a behavioural paradigm capable of adjudicating between these competing hypotheses and characterizing belief updates directly on individual trials. We show that patients are more prone to completely ignoring new information and perseverating on previous responses, but when they do update, tend to do so completely. This updating strategy limits the integration of information over time, reducing both the flexibility and precision of beliefs and provides a potential explanation for how patients could simultaneously show over-sensitivity and under-sensitivity to feedback in different paradigms.

Overestimation of volatility in schizophrenia and autism? A comparative study using a probabilistic reasoning task

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

A plethora of studies has investigated and compared social cognition in autism and schizophrenia ever since both conditions were first described in conjunction more than a century ago. Recent computational theories have proposed similar mechanistic explanations for various symptoms beyond social cognition. They are grounded in the idea of a general misestimation of uncertainty but so far, almost no studies have directly compared both conditions regarding uncertainty processing. The current study aimed to do so with a particular focus on estimation of volatility, i.e. the probability for the environment to change.

METHODS

A probabilistic decision-making task and a visual working (meta-)memory task were administered to a sample of 86 participants (19 with a diagnosis of high-functioning autism, 21 with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and 46 neurotypically developing individuals).

RESULTS

While persons with schizophrenia showed lower visual working memory accuracy than neurotypical individuals, no significant group differences were found for metamemory or any of the probabilistic decision-making task variables. Nevertheless, exploratory analyses suggest that there may be an overestimation of volatility in subgroups of participants with autism and schizophrenia. Correlations revealed relationships between different variables reflecting (mis)estimation of uncertainty, visual working memory accuracy and metamemory.

LIMITATIONS

Limitations include the comparably small sample sizes of the autism and the schizophrenia group as well as the lack of cognitive ability and clinical symptom measures.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the current study provide partial support for the notion of a general uncertainty misestimation account of autism and schizophrenia.

Misfortune may be a blessing in disguise: Fairness perception and emotion modulate decision making

Fairness perception and equality during social interactions frequently elicit affective arousal and affect decision making. By integrating the dictator game and a probabilistic gambling task, this study aimed to investigate the effects of a negative experience induced by perceived unfairness on decision making using behavioral, model fitting, and electrophysiological approaches. Participants were randomly assigned to the neutral, harsh, or kind groups, which consisted of various asset allocation scenarios to induce different levels of perceived unfairness. The monetary gain was subsequently considered the initial asset in a negatively rewarded, probabilistic gambling task in which the participants were instructed to maintain as much asset as possible. Our behavioral results indicated that the participants in the harsh group exhibited increased levels of negative emotions but retained greater total game scores than the participants in the other two groups. Parameter estimation of a reinforcement learning model using a Bayesian approach indicated that these participants were more loss aversive and consistent in decision making. Data from simultaneous ERP recordings further demonstrated that these participants exhibited larger feedback-related negativity to unexpected outcomes in the gambling task, which suggests enhanced reward sensitivity and signaling of reward prediction error. Collectively, our study suggests that a negative experience may be an advantage in the modulation of reward-based decision making.

Effects of affective arousal on choice behavior, reward prediction errors, and feedback-related negativities in human reward-based decision making

Emotional experience has a pervasive impact on choice behavior, yet the underlying mechanism remains unclear. Introducing facial-expression primes into a probabilistic learning task, we investigated how affective arousal regulates reward-related choice based on behavioral, model fitting, and feedback-related negativity (FRN) data. Sixty-six paid subjects were randomly assigned to the Neutral-Neutral (NN), Angry-Neutral (AN), and Happy-Neutral (HN) groups. A total of 960 trials were conducted. Subjects in each group were randomly exposed to half trials of the pre-determined emotional faces and another half of the neutral faces before choosing between two cards drawn from two decks with different assigned reward probabilities. Trial-by-trial data were fit with a standard reinforcement learning model using the Bayesian estimation approach. The temporal dynamics of brain activity were simultaneously recorded and analyzed using event-related potentials. Our analyses revealed that subjects in the NN group gained more reward values than those in the other two groups; they also exhibited comparatively differential estimated model-parameter values for reward prediction errors. Computing the difference wave of FRNs in reward vs. non-reward trials, we found that, compared to the NN group, subjects in the AN and HN groups had larger “General” FRNs (i.e., FRNs in no-reward trials minus FRNs in reward trials) and “Expected” FRNs (i.e., FRNs in expected reward-omission trials minus FRNs in expected reward-delivery trials), indicating an interruption in predicting reward. Further, both AN and HN groups appeared to be more sensitive to negative outcomes than the NN group. Collectively, our study suggests that affective arousal negatively regulates reward-related choice, probably through overweighting with negative feedback.