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Gönül G, Kammermeier M, Paulus M. What is in an action? Preschool children predict that agents take previous paths and not previous goals. Dev Sci 2024; 27:e13466. [PMID: 38054272 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13466] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2021] [Revised: 11/17/2023] [Accepted: 11/27/2023] [Indexed: 12/07/2023]
Abstract
Developmental science has experienced a vivid debate on whether young children prioritize goals over means in their prediction of others' actions. Influential developmental theories highlight the role of goal objects for action understanding. Yet, recent infant studies report evidence for the opposite. The empirical evidence is therefore inconclusive. The current study advanced this debate by assessing preschool children's verbal predictions of others' actions. In five experiments (N = 302), we investigated whether preschool children and adults predict agents to move towards their previous goal (that is, show goal-related predictions) or predict agents to move along the same movement path that they pursued before. While Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c presented young children and adults with animated agents, Experiments 2a and 2b presented participants with human grasping action. An integrative analysis across experiments revealed that children were more likely to predict the agent to move along the same movement path, Z = -4.574, p ≤ 0.0001 (r = 0.304). That is, preschool children were more likely to predict that agents would move along the same trajectory even though this action would lead to a new goal object. Thus, our findings suggest that young children's action prediction relies on the detection of spatial and movement information. Overall, we discuss our findings in terms of theoretical frameworks that conceive of action understanding as an umbrella term that comprises different forms and facets in which humans understand others' actions. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: We investigated whether preschool children predict agents to move towards their previous goal or to move along the same movement path that they pursued before. Unlike adults, preschool children predicted that agents would move along the same trajectory even though this action would lead to a new goal. Adults' goal-based predictions were affected from contextual details, whereas children systematically made path-based predictions. Young children's action prediction relies on the detection of spatial and movement information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gökhan Gönül
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
- Cognitive Science Centre, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchatel, Switzerland
| | - Marina Kammermeier
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | - Markus Paulus
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
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2
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Margoni F, Cho I, Gutchess A. Intent-Based Moral Judgment in Old Age. J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci 2023; 78:1136-1141. [PMID: 35973063 PMCID: PMC10292836 DOI: 10.1093/geronb/gbac114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
OBJECTIVES Recent studies support the idea of an intent-to-outcome shift in moral judgments with age. We further assessed whether a reduced reliance on intentions is associated with aging in a preregistered study with 73 younger (20-41 years) and 79 older (70-84 years) adults, group-matched on education level. METHOD Participants were presented with a set of moral cases to evaluate, created by varying orthogonally the valence (neutral, negative) of the information regarding the agent's intentions and the action's outcomes. RESULTS The two age groups did not differ in the extent they relied on intentions in moral judgment. DISCUSSION These results suggest that an intent-to-outcome shift might not be found in all aging populations, challenging prevailing theories suggesting that aging is necessarily associated with a reduced reliance on intentions.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Isu Cho
- Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
| | - Angela Gutchess
- Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
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3
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Marlow C, Kelsey C, Vaish A. Cheat to win: Children’s judgements of advantageous vs. disadvantageous rule breaking. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2023.101328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/31/2023]
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4
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Woo BM, Spelke ES. Toddlers' social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13314. [PMID: 35998080 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13314] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2022] [Revised: 08/02/2022] [Accepted: 08/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Mature social evaluations privilege agents' intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes' contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brandon M Woo
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Elizabeth S Spelke
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
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5
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Spaccasassi C, Cenka K, Petkovic S, Avenanti A. Sense of agency predicts severity of moral judgments. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1070742. [PMID: 36817371 PMCID: PMC9932714 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1070742] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2022] [Accepted: 12/13/2022] [Indexed: 02/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the awareness of being the agent of our own actions. A key feature of SoA relies on the perceived temporal compression between our own actions and their sensory consequences, a phenomenon known as "Intentional Binding." Prior studies have linked SoA to the sense of responsibility for our own actions. However, it is unclear whether SoA predicts the way we judge the actions of others - including judgments of morally wrong actions like harming others. To address this issue, we ran an on-line pilot experiment where participants underwent two different tasks designed to tap into SoA and moral cognition. SoA was measured using the Intentional Binding task which allowed us to obtain both implicit (Intentional Binding) and explicit (Agency Rating) measures of SoA. Moral cognition was assessed by asking the same participants to evaluate videoclips where an agent could deliberately or inadvertently cause suffering to a victim (Intentional vs. Accidental Harm) compared with Neutral scenarios. Results showed a significant relation between both implicit and explicit measures of SoA and moral evaluation of the Accidental Harm scenarios, with stronger SoA predicting stricter moral judgments. These findings suggest that our capacity to feel in control of our actions predicts the way we judge others' actions, with stronger feelings of responsibility over our own actions predicting the severity of our moral evaluations of other actions. This was particularly true in ambiguous scenarios characterized by an incongruency between an apparently innocent intention and a negative action outcome.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chiara Spaccasassi
- Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Cesena, Italy,*Correspondence: Chiara Spaccasassi, ;
| | - Kamela Cenka
- Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Cesena, Italy
| | - Stella Petkovic
- Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Cesena, Italy,"Sapienza" University of Rome and CLN2S@SAPIENZA, Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, Rome, Italy
| | - Alessio Avenanti
- Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Cesena, Italy,Centro de Investigación en Neuropsicología y Neurosciencias Cognitivas, Universidad Católica Del Maule, Talca, Chile
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6
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The development and validation of a positive and negative outcome expectation scale for re-donation among blood donors. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-022-03370-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
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7
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Nobes G, Martin JW. They should have known better: The roles of negligence and outcome in moral judgements of accidental actions. Br J Psychol 2021; 113:370-395. [PMID: 34719018 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2021] [Accepted: 09/27/2021] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
Two experiments were conducted to investigate the relative influence of agents' negligence and their actions' unintended outcomes on moral judgements. In Study 1, 343 participants were asked in an online questionnaire about a driver whose level of negligence, and the severity of the outcome, were varied systematically. Each judged how much punishment and blame the driver deserved, and rated her negligence, causal responsibility, and intentionality. In Study 2, 341 participants completed the same questionnaire, and also judged the driver's wrongness and the outcome's severity. In both studies, judgements were strongly influenced by negligence; blame was also affected by causal responsibility, and wrongness by intention, but the relatively slight outcome effect on blame and wrongness was largely mediated by negligence. In contrast, both negligence and outcome had substantial effects on punishment judgements; most participants assigned high levels of punishment when, and only when, the outcome was negative and the agent was negligent. These findings shed light on the intriguing phenomenon of moral luck, and indicate that it applies more to punishment judgements than to blame and wrongness. They also indicate that when no negligence information is provided in the description of accidents (as in many previous studies), participants often attribute negligence to agents and judge them accordingly. It seems that the effect of outcome on moral judgements has often been overestimated by researchers, and that of negligence underestimated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gavin Nobes
- School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
| | - Justin W Martin
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
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Gönültaş S, Richardson CB, Mulvey KL. But they weren't being careful! Role of theory of mind in moral judgments about victim and transgressor negligence. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 212:105234. [PMID: 34325352 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105234] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2021] [Revised: 06/25/2021] [Accepted: 06/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Previous research showed that children are influenced not only by intentions and outcomes but also by transgressor negligence in their moral judgments. The current study investigated the role of transgressor and victim negligence on children's moral judgments. Children's false-belief theory of mind understanding (FBU ToM) was examined as a possible factor that might shape moral judgments in contexts involving negligence. Children (N = 117, Mage = 5.41 years, range = 3-8) were presented with two stories involving property damage and physical harm where negligence was manipulated and with a series of questions assessing moral judgments regarding act acceptability of the transgressor and victim, punishment, and assessments of alternative actions. FBU ToM was measured with a false-content task. Children with higher FBU ToM were more likely to consider both transgressor and victim negligence in their moral judgments across different transgressions. The findings have implications for how social cognitive abilities interact with transgressor and victim negligence in moral decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Seçil Gönültaş
- Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695, USA.
| | - Cameron B Richardson
- Clearinghouse for Military Family Readiness, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
| | - Kelly Lynn Mulvey
- Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695, USA
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9
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Martin JW, Buon M, Cushman F. The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e12965. [PMID: 33873240 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12965] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2020] [Revised: 02/12/2021] [Accepted: 02/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the "intent-to-outcome" shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Marine Buon
- Department of Psychology, Paul Valéry University
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10
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Wang Z, Frye DA. When a Circle Becomes the Letter O: Young Children's Conceptualization of Learning and Its Relation With Theory of Mind Development. Front Psychol 2021; 11:596419. [PMID: 33519605 PMCID: PMC7841392 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.596419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2020] [Accepted: 12/22/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In two independent yet complementary studies, the current research explored the developmental changes of young children’s conceptualization of learning, focusing the role of knowledge change and learning intention, and its association with their developing theory of mind (ToM) ability. In study 1, 75 children between 48 and 86 months of age (M = 65.45, SD = 11.45, 36 girls) judged whether a character with or without a genuine knowledge change had learned. The results showed that younger children randomly attributed learning between genuine knowledge change and accidental coincidence that did not involve knowledge change. Children’s learning judgments in familiar contexts improved with age and correlated with their ToM understanding. However, the correlation was no longer significant once age was held constant. Another sample of 72 children aged between 40 and 90 months (M = 66.87, SD = 11.83, 31 girls) participated in study 2, where children were asked to judge whether the story protagonists intended to learn and whether they eventually learned. The results suggested that children over-attributed learning intention to discovery and implicit learning. Stories with conflict between the learning intention and outcome appeared to be most challenging for children. Children’s intention judgment was correlated with their ToM understanding, and ToM marginally predicted intention judgment when the effect of age was accounted for. The implication of the findings for school readiness was discussed. Training studies and longitudinal designs in the future are warranted to better understand the relation between ToM development and children’s learning understanding.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhenlin Wang
- Department of Psychology, The Education University of Hong Kong, Tai Po, Hong Kong
| | - Douglas A Frye
- Graduate School of Education, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States
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11
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Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-020-01334-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
AbstractBoth in philosophy and in cognitive psychology, models of moral judgment posit that individuals take into account both agents’ intentions and actions’ outcomes. The present research focused on a third crucial piece of information, agents’ negligence. In Study 1, participants judged the moral wrongness and punishability of agents’ actions that resulted in negative side effects. In the scenarios, we orthogonally manipulated whether the agent acted with or without due care and whether she had or did not have information to foresee the negative side effects of her actions. Participants judged careless agents more condemnable than careful agents, especially when negative side effects could have been easily foreseen. In Study 2, we manipulated due care in acting in cases where the agent’s primary intention was to bring about a certain outcome without knowing that such outcome would actually be harmful. Here information about the foreseeability of negative outcomes was not provided, and participants judged actions performed with care more wrong and punishable than actions performed without care. This suggests that sometimes acting carefully and nevertheless causing harm may constitute evidence of the presence of negative intentions in the agents or evidence of the fact that agents indeed could have foreseen the negative effects of their actions. Together, these findings indicate that carefulness in acting and foreseeability are highly intertwined in moral judgment, and highlight the need to improve existing processing models of moral judgment to account for people’s evaluation of agents and actions whenever negligence can be attributed.
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12
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Conscience and theory of mind in children aged 4 to 7 years. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 203:105007. [PMID: 33259967 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.105007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2020] [Revised: 07/16/2020] [Accepted: 09/13/2020] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
Associations between three dimensions of early conscience-moral reasoning, the capacity to experience guilt, and the moral self-and theory of mind (ToM) were examined in children aged 4-7 years (N = 80). Participants were administered a task assessing their understanding of the intentions and actions of a transgressor in situations entailing intentional and accidental wrongdoing, a moral self scale, and a battery of first-order and second-order false belief tasks. Children's capacity to experience guilt was measured via parent report. Expressive vocabulary was also measured. Repeated-measures analysis of covariance with ToM, age, and their interaction as covariates revealed that children who had higher ToM scores attributed more positive intentions to the accidental transgressor than to the intentional transgressor and judged the intentional transgressor's action as more wrongful than children who scored lower on these tasks. Ηierarchical regression analyses also indicated that a more advanced ToM performance predicted higher levels of guilt and the moral self after accounting for age and expressive vocabulary.
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13
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Loheide‐Niesmann L, Lijster J, Hall R, Bakel H, Cima M. Toddlers' preference for prosocial versus antisocial agents: No associations with empathy or attachment security. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 2020. [DOI: 10.1111/sode.12487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Jasmijn Lijster
- Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry/Psychology Erasmus MC–Sophia Children's HospitalErasmus University Medical Center Rotterdam The Netherlands
- Department of Tranzo Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences Tilburg University Tilburg The Netherlands
| | - Ruby Hall
- Department of Tranzo Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences Tilburg University Tilburg The Netherlands
| | - Hedwig Bakel
- Department of Tranzo Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences Tilburg University Tilburg The Netherlands
| | - Maaike Cima
- Behavioural Science Institute Radboud University Nijmegen The Netherlands
- Conrisq Group Juvenile Youth Institutions (YouthCarePLUS) Zetten The Netherlands
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Strid K, Meristo M. Infants Consider the Distributor's Intentions in Resource Allocation. Front Psychol 2020; 11:596213. [PMID: 33192941 PMCID: PMC7661776 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.596213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/18/2020] [Accepted: 09/25/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent experimental studies suggest that preverbal infants are able to evaluate agents on the basis of their distributive actions. Here we asked whether such evaluations are based on infants' understanding of the distributors' intentions, or only the outcome of their actions. Ten-month-old infants observed animated movies of unequal resource allocations by distributors who attempted but failed to distribute resources equally or unequally between two individuals. We found that infants attended longer to the test event showing a third agent approaching a distributor who was unable to make an unequal distribution, compared to the test event where the third agent approached a distributor who was unable to make an equal distribution of resources. Our results suggest that infants' ability to encode distributive actions goes beyond an analysis of the outcome of these actions, by including the intentions of the distributors whose actions lead to these outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karin Strid
- Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
| | - Marek Meristo
- Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
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15
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Conceptual continuity in the development of intent-based moral judgment. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 194:104812. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104812] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2019] [Revised: 01/16/2020] [Accepted: 01/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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16
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Mulvey KL, Gönültaş S, Richardson CB. Who Is to Blame? Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence. Cogn Sci 2020; 44:e12833. [DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12833] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2019] [Revised: 02/10/2020] [Accepted: 02/28/2020] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Seçil Gönültaş
- Department of Psychology North Carolina State University
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17
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Surian L, Margoni F. First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness. Dev Sci 2020; 23:e12939. [PMID: 31971644 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12939] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2018] [Revised: 12/11/2019] [Accepted: 01/14/2020] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
In four experiments, we tested whether 20-month-old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, Italy
| | - Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, Italy
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Jaroslawska AJ, McCormack T, Burns P, Caruso EM. Outcomes versus intentions in fairness-related decision making: School-aged children's decisions are just like those of adults. J Exp Child Psychol 2019; 189:104704. [PMID: 31634734 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2019] [Revised: 08/25/2019] [Accepted: 08/26/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
The notion of what constitutes fairness has been assumed to change during childhood, in line with a marked shift from outcome-based to intention-based moral reasoning. However, the precise developmental profile of such a shift is still subject to debate. This study sought to determine the age at which the perceived intentions of others begin to influence fairness-related decision making in children (aged 6-8 and 9-11 years) and adolescents (aged 14 and 15 years) in the context of the mini-ultimatum game. The mini-ultimatum game has a forced-choice design, whereby a proposer needs to select one of two predetermined offers that a responder can either accept or reject. Due to these constraints, the procedure measures sensitivity to unfair intentions in addition to unfair outcomes. Participants needed to make judgments about how likely they would be to reject various offers, how fair they judged these offers to be, and the emotion they experienced when thinking about the offers. Contrary to previous published reports, we found that even 6- to 8-year-olds employed a sophisticated notion of fairness that took into account the alternatives the proposer had available. Crucially, decision making did not differ as a function of age. A further, and novel, aim was to trace the developmental origins of temporal asymmetries in judgments ab out fairness by testing the implications of adopting a past or future temporal perspective. Across all ages, we found no evidence that fairness-based decision making varies as a function of temporal location.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Teresa McCormack
- School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK
| | - Patrick Burns
- School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK
| | - Eugene M Caruso
- UCLA Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
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Margoni F, Guglielmetti G, Surian L. Brief Report: Young Children with Autism Can Generate Intent-Based Moral Judgments. J Autism Dev Disord 2019; 49:5078-5085. [PMID: 31489539 DOI: 10.1007/s10803-019-04212-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Past research suggested that, due to difficulties in mentalistic reasoning, individuals with autism tend to base their moral judgments on the outcome of agents' actions rather than on agents' intentions. In a novel task, aimed at reducing the processing demands required to represent intentions and generate a judgment, autistic children were presented with agents that accidentally harmed or attempted but failed to harm others and were asked to judge those agents. Most of the times, children blamed the character who attempted to harm and exculpated the accidental wrongdoer, suggesting that they generated intent-based moral judgments. These findings suggest that processing limitations rather than lack of conceptual competence explain the poor performance reported in previous research on moral judgment in autism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Corso Bettini 31, 38068, Rovereto, TN, Italy.
| | | | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Corso Bettini 31, 38068, Rovereto, TN, Italy.
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Zhang Z, Grocke P, Tomasello M. The influence of intention and outcome on young children's reciprocal sharing. J Exp Child Psychol 2019; 187:104645. [PMID: 31323596 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2019.05.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2018] [Revised: 04/14/2019] [Accepted: 05/27/2019] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
This study investigated the influence of underlying intentions and outcomes of a partner's sharing behavior on young children's reciprocity. We provided 3- and 5-year-old children with the opportunity to share with a partner following different treatments of a partner's intention (to share or not to share) that led to different outcomes (children got or did not get stickers from their partner). For the 3-year-olds, we found that the outcome of the previous interaction influenced how much they shared, whereas the intention of their partner affected how readily they initiated sharing in response to social cues. For the 5-year-olds, we found that both outcome and intention affected how much they shared as well as how readily they initiated sharing. This suggests that already 3-year-olds are able to take into account outcome and intention information separately in reciprocal sharing. However, only 5-year-olds can combine both to flexibly maintain social interactions without running the risk of being exploited by others.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhen Zhang
- CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany; Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China.
| | - Patricia Grocke
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany; Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
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22
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Hilton BC, Kuhlmeier VA. Intention Attribution and the Development of Moral Evaluation. Front Psychol 2019; 9:2663. [PMID: 30666225 PMCID: PMC6330285 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02663] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2018] [Accepted: 12/11/2018] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Research with infants and toddlers suggests that even early in development, humans evaluate others by considering the outcome of an action in relation to the intention underlying it. When someone tries but fails to do a good deed, for example, it seems that it is "the thought that counts." However, research with slightly older children in the preschool years has produced mixed results: in some cases, children are solely considering the positive or negative outcome of an action when evaluating others, while in others, intention attributions are integrated. Such contradictory findings have prompted debate about the development of moral reasoning. Here, we examine extant research on early moral evaluation and propose that differences in the way that task procedures present intention and outcome information can (1) support or preclude young children's intention attribution and (2) alter the relative saliency or predominance of each kind of information. In turn, these differences would influence the frequency and degree to which young children generate intention-oriented moral evaluations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brooke C. Hilton
- Department of Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
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23
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Margoni F, Geipel J, Hadjichristidis C, Surian L. The influence of agents’ negligence in shaping younger and older adults’ moral judgment. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2019. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.12.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
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24
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Crime but not punishment? Children are more lenient toward rule-breaking when the "spirit of the law" is unbroken. J Exp Child Psychol 2018; 178:266-282. [PMID: 30415148 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2018.09.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2017] [Revised: 09/28/2018] [Accepted: 09/29/2018] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Even early in development, children understand how rules work, and they harshly evaluate rule violators. Furthermore, we know that adults make nuanced evaluations about rule violations; in many situations, they believe that it can be acceptable to violate the technical language of a rule (the "letter of a rule") if doing so does not violate the reason why the rule was created (the "spirit of the rule"). Distinguishing between the letter and spirit of a rule is critical for a developed normative understanding. We investigated whether and when children begin to believe that it is less wrong to violate the letter of a rule if one does not violate the rule's spirit. Participants (N = 246 4- to 10-year-olds) were asked to evaluate a rule-breaker who either violated the letter of a rule but not the spirit or violated both the letter and spirit of a rule. We found that by 4 years of age, children acknowledged that the rule had technically been broken in both cases, but their evaluations of the rule-breaker were much more lenient in the case where the spirit of the rule remained intact. We also found that children are increasingly more lenient in the case where the spirit of the rule remains intact case as they age, and they are increasingly harsher in the case where the spirit is violated. We discuss how these studies provide insight into early normative reasoning, including implications for future research on social cognitive development, rule learning, and legislative intent.
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25
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Proft M, Rakoczy H. The ontogeny of intent-based normative judgments. Dev Sci 2018; 22:e12728. [PMID: 30276934 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12728] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2017] [Revised: 06/18/2018] [Accepted: 07/26/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent's intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent-based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent-based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent's mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5- and 7-year-old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children's intent-based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children's (but not adults') normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent's intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent's false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief-based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent-based normative judgment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marina Proft
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
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26
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Prabhakar J, Weisberg DS, Leslie AM. The interplay between moral actions and moral judgments in children and adults. Conscious Cogn 2018; 63:183-197. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.05.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2017] [Revised: 04/25/2018] [Accepted: 05/16/2018] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
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27
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Do infant sociomoral evaluation and action studies predict preschool social and behavioral adjustment? J Exp Child Psychol 2018; 176:39-54. [PMID: 30076997 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2018.07.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/05/2018] [Revised: 06/07/2018] [Accepted: 07/03/2018] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Recent studies suggest that infants and toddlers evaluate others based on their prosocial and antisocial behaviors and engage in prosocial behaviors themselves. It is unknown to what extent infants' responses in such studies reveal stable individual differences in social and/or moral competence that persist throughout development. The current study (N = 63) demonstrates that infants' performance in sociomoral evaluation and action studies (mean age = 12 months) predicts social and behavioral adjustment at age 4 years. Specifically, a stronger preference for moral actions as an infant was associated with parent reports of fewer callous-unemotional traits, the domain most conceptually related to sociomoral evaluation and action, during preschool. Critically, preschool moral adjustment was uniquely associated with infants' sociomoral responding and not with other more general aspects of infant functioning. When 2 children with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis were included in the sample, correlations between infant and preschool functioning were more widespread. Taken together, these results provide evidence for developmental continuity in the sociomoral domain and suggest that infants' early behavioral tendencies may be building blocks for subsequent sociomoral development.
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Hinten AE, Labuschagne LG, Boden H, Scarf D. Preschool children and young adults' preferences and expectations for helpers and hinderers. INFANT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 2018. [DOI: 10.1002/icd.2093] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Ashley E. Hinten
- Department of Psychology; University of Otago; Dunedin New Zealand
| | | | - Hannah Boden
- Department of Psychology; University of Otago; Dunedin New Zealand
| | - Damian Scarf
- Department of Psychology; University of Otago; Dunedin New Zealand
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Abstract
Abstract. Younger (21–39 years) and older (63–90 years) adults were presented with scenarios illustrating either harmful or helpful actions. Each scenario provided information about the agent’s intention, either neutral or valenced (harmful/helpful), and the outcome of his or her action, either neutral or valenced. Participants were asked to rate how morally good or bad the agent’s action was. In judging harmful actions, older participants relied less on intentions and more on outcomes compared to younger participants. This age-related difference was associated with a decline in older adults’ theory of mind abilities. However, we did not find evidence of any significant age-related difference in the evaluations of helpful actions. We argue that the selective association of aging with changes in the evaluation of harmful but not helpful actions may be due also to motivational factors and highlight some implications of the present findings for judicial systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento, Italy
| | - Janet Geipel
- Department of Psychology, The University of Chicago, IL, USA
| | - Constantinos Hadjichristidis
- Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy
- Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, UK
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento, Italy
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30
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Li J, Tomasello M. The development of intention-based sociomoral judgment and distribution behavior from a third-party stance. J Exp Child Psychol 2017; 167:78-92. [PMID: 29154032 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.09.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2017] [Revised: 09/25/2017] [Accepted: 09/25/2017] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
The current study investigated children's intention-based sociomoral judgments and distribution behavior from a third-party stance. An actor puppet showed either positive or negative intention toward a target puppet, which had previously performed a prosocial or antisocial action toward others (i.e., children witnessed various types of indirect reciprocity). Children (3- and 5-year-olds) were asked to make sociomoral judgments and to distribute resources to the actor puppet. Results showed that 5-year-olds were more likely than 3-year-olds to be influenced by intention when they made their judgment and distributed resources. The target's previous actions affected only 5-year-olds' intent-based social preference. These results suggest that children's judgments about intent-based indirect reciprocity develop from ages 3 to 5 years.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jing Li
- Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China; Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany.
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
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31
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Woo BM, Steckler CM, Le DT, Hamlin JK. Social evaluation of intentional, truly accidental, and negligently accidental helpers and harmers by 10-month-old infants. Cognition 2017; 168:154-163. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2016] [Revised: 06/28/2017] [Accepted: 06/28/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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32
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Veronese A, Racca M, Pieters RS, Kyrki V. Probabilistic Mapping of Human Visual Attention from Head Pose Estimation. Front Robot AI 2017. [DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2017.00053] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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33
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Surian L, Franchin L. Toddlers Selectively Help Fair Agents. Front Psychol 2017; 8:944. [PMID: 28638363 PMCID: PMC5461303 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00944] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2017] [Accepted: 05/22/2017] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous research showed that infants and toddlers are inclined to help prosocial agents and assign a positive valence to fair distributions. Also, they expect that positive and negative actions directed toward distributors will conform to reciprocity principles. This study investigates whether toddlers are selective in helping others, as a function of others' previous distributive actions. Toddlers were presented with real-life events in which two actresses distributed resources either equally or unequally between two puppets. Then, they played together with a ball that accidentally fell to the ground and asked participants to help them to retrieve it. Participants preferred to help the actress who performed equal distributions. This finding suggests that by the second year children's prosocial actions are modulated by their emerging sense of fairness. HIGHLIGHTS Toddlers (mean age = 25 months) are selective in helping distributors. Toddlers prefer helping a fair rather than an unfair distributor. Toddlers' selective helping provides evidence for an early sense of fairness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of TrentoRovereto, Italy
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34
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Blijd-Hoogewys EMA, van Geert PLC. Non-linearities in Theory-of-Mind Development. Front Psychol 2017; 7:1970. [PMID: 28101065 PMCID: PMC5209372 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01970] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2016] [Accepted: 12/05/2016] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Research on Theory-of-Mind (ToM) has mainly focused on ages of core ToM development. This article follows a quantitative approach focusing on the level of ToM understanding on a measurement scale, the ToM Storybooks, in 324 typically developing children between 3 and 11 years of age. It deals with the eventual occurrence of developmental non-linearities in ToM functioning, using smoothing techniques, dynamic growth model building and additional indicators, namely moving skewness, moving growth rate changes and moving variability. The ToM sum-scores showed an overall developmental trend that leveled off toward the age of 10 years. Within this overall trend two non-linearities in the group-based change pattern were found: a plateau at the age of around 56 months and a dip at the age of 72–78 months. These temporary regressions in ToM sum-score were accompanied by a decrease in growth rate and variability, and a change in skewness of the ToM data, all suggesting a developmental shift in ToM understanding. The temporary decreases also occurred in the different ToM sub-scores and most clearly so in the core ToM component of beliefs. It was also found that girls had an earlier growth spurt than boys and that the underlying developmental path was more salient in girls than in boys. The consequences of these findings are discussed from various theoretical points of view, with an emphasis on a dynamic systems interpretation of the underlying developmental paths.
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Affiliation(s)
- Els M A Blijd-Hoogewys
- INTER-PSYGroningen, Netherlands; Department of Clinical and Developmental Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of GroningenGroningen, Netherlands
| | - Paul L C van Geert
- Department of Clinical and Developmental Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen Groningen, Netherlands
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35
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36
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Buon M, Seara-Cardoso A, Viding E. Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition? Psychon Bull Rev 2016; 23:1660-1680. [PMID: 27169411 PMCID: PMC5133272 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 44] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/03/2022]
Abstract
Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marine Buon
- Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Ana Seara-Cardoso
- Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK
- Neuropsychopysiology Lab, CIPsi, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal
| | - Essi Viding
- Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
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37
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Nobes G, Panagiotaki G, Bartholomew KJ. The influence of intention, outcome and question-wording on children’s and adults’ moral judgments. Cognition 2016; 157:190-204. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2015] [Revised: 08/17/2016] [Accepted: 08/30/2016] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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38
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Margoni F, Surian L. Mental State Understanding and Moral Judgment in Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder. Front Psychol 2016; 7:1478. [PMID: 27729894 PMCID: PMC5037184 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01478] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2016] [Accepted: 09/14/2016] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento Rovereto, Italy
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, University of Trento Rovereto, Italy
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39
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Foreign language affects the contribution of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment. Cognition 2016; 154:34-39. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.05.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 88] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2015] [Revised: 05/05/2016] [Accepted: 05/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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