Free Energy and Virtual Reality in Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis: A Complexity Theory of Dreaming and Mental Disorder

Meaningfulness and attachment: what dreams, psychosis and psychedelic states tell us about our need for connection

The human need to find meaning in life and the human need for connection may be two sides of the same coin, a coin forged in the developmental crucible of attachment. Our need for meaningfulness can be traced to our developmental need for connection in the attachment relationship. The free energy principle dictates that in order to resist a natural tendency towards disorder self-organizing systems must generate models that predict the hidden causes of phenomenal experience. In other words, they must make sense of things. In both an evolutionary and ontogenetic sense, the narrative self develops as a model that makes sense of experience. However, the self-model skews the interpretation of experience towards that which is predictable, or already "known." One may say it causes us to "take things personally." Meaning is felt more acutely when defenses are compromised, when the narrative self is offline. This enables meaning-making that is less egocentrically motivated. Dreams, psychosis, and psychedelic states offer glimpses of how we make sense of things absent a coherent narrative self. This has implications for the way we understand such states, and lays bare the powerful reach of attachment in shaping what we experience as meaningful.

Visual perspective, distance, and felt presence of others in dreams

The peripersonal space, that is, the limited space surrounding the body, involves multisensory coding and representation of the self in space. Previous studies have shown that peripersonal space representation and the visual perspective on the environment can be dramatically altered when neurotypical individuals self-identify with a distant avatar (i.e., in virtual reality) or during clinical conditions (i.e., out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, depersonalization). Despite its role in many cognitive/social functions, the perception of peripersonal space in dreams, and its relationship with the perception of other characters (interpersonal distance in dreams), remain largely uncharted. The present study aimed to explore the visuospatial properties of this space, which is likely to underlie self-location as well as self/other distinction in dreams. 530 healthy volunteers answered a web-based questionnaire to measure their dominant visuo-spatial perspective in dreams, the frequency of recall for felt distances between their dream self and other dream characters, and the dreamers' viewing angle of other dream characters. Most participants reported dream experiences from a first-person perspective (1PP) (82%) compared to a third-person perspective (3PP) (18%). Independent of their dream perspective, participants reported that they generally perceived other dream characters in their close space, that is, at distance of either between 0 and 90 cm, or 90-180 cm, than in further spaces (180-270 cm). Regardless of the perspective (1PP or 3PP), both groups also reported more frequently seeing other dream characters from eye level (0° angle of viewing) than from above (30° and 60°) or below eye level (-30° and -60°). Moreover, the intensity of sensory experiences in dreams, as measured by the Bodily Self-Consciousness in Dreams Questionnaire, was higher in individuals who habitually see other dream characters closer to their personal dream self (i.e., within 0-90 cm and 90-180 cm). These preliminary findings offer a new, phenomenological account of space representation in dreams with regards to the felt presence of others. They might provide insights not only to our understanding of how dreams are formed, but also to the type of neurocomputations involved in self/other distinction.

The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy

Coherence Therapy is an empirically derived experiential psychotherapy based on Psychological Constructivism. Symptoms are viewed as necessary output from an implicit model of the world. The therapist curates experiences and directs attention toward discovering the model. Rendered explicit, the model is juxtaposed with contradictory knowledge driving memory re-consolidation with resolution of the symptom. The Bayesian Brain views perception and action as inferential processes. Prior beliefs are combined in a generative model to explain the hidden causes of sensations through a process of Active Inference. Prior beliefs that are poor fits to the real world are suboptimal. Suboptimal priors with optimal inference produce Bayes Optimal Pathology with behavioral symptoms. The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy posits that Coherence Therapy is a dyadic act of therapist guided Active Inference that renders the (probable) hidden causes of a client's behavior conscious. The therapist's sustained attention on the goal of inference helps to overcome memory control bias against retrieval of the affectively charged suboptimal prior. Serial experiences cue memory retrieval and re-instantiation of the physiological/affective state that necessitates production of the symptom in a particular context. As this process continues there is a break in modularity with assimilation into broader networks of experience. Typically, the symptom produced by optimal inference with the suboptimal prior is experienced as unnecessary/inappropriate when taken out of the particular context. The implicit construct has been re-represented and rendered consciously accessible, by a more complex but more accurate model in which the symptom is necessary in some contexts but not others. There is an experience of agency and control in symptom creation, accompanied by the spontaneous production of context appropriate behavior. The capacity for inference has been restored. The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy provides a framework for Coherence Therapy as a computational process which can serve as the basis for new therapeutic interventions and experimental designs integrating biological, cognitive, behavioral, and environmental factors.

Hyperactivity of the default mode network in schizophrenia and free energy: A dialogue between Freudian theory of psychosis and neuroscience

The economic conceptualization of Freudian metapsychology, based on an energetics model of the psyche's workings, offers remarkable commonalities with some recent discoveries in neuroscience, notably in the field of neuroenergetics. The pattern of cerebral activity at resting state and the identification of a default mode network (DMN), a network of areas whose activity is detectable at baseline conditions by neuroimaging techniques, offers a promising field of research in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. In this article we study one significant clinical application of this interdisciplinary dialogue by looking at the role of the DMN in the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Anomalies in the functioning of the DMN have been observed in schizophrenia. Studies have evidenced the existence of hyperactivity in this network in schizophrenia patients, particularly among those for whom a positive symptomatology is dominant. These data are particularly interesting when considered from the perspective of the psychoanalytic understanding of the positive symptoms of psychosis, most notably the Freudian hypothesis of delusions as an "attempt at recovery." Combining the data from research in neuroimaging of schizophrenia patients with the Freudian hypothesis, we propose considering the hyperactivity of the DMN as a consequence of a process of massive reassociation of traces occurring in schizophrenia. This is a process that may constitute an attempt at minimizing the excess of free energy present in psychosis. Modern models of active inference and the free energy principle (FEP) may shed some light on these processes.

An economic model of the drives from Friston's free energy perspective

This paper is focused on the theory of drives, particularly on its economic model, which was an integral part of Freud's original formulation. Freud was aiming to make a link between the psychic energy of drives and the biophysical rules of nature. However, he was not able to develop this model into a comprehensive system linking the body and the mind. The further development of psychoanalytic theory, in various attempts to comprehend the theory of drives, can be described as taking different approaches. Some of them equate drives with bodily impulses, others abandon the economic model, a few stay with Freud's original model. I believe that the Friston notion of free energy and the hierarchical model of the brain allows us to develop this model and to integrate the economic model into some contemporary theories of drives. I argue against those theories equating drives with biological impulses. My arguments are supported by Freud's project itself but also by recent developments within neuro-psychoanalysis describing the process of mentalizing homeostasis, interoceptive signals and relations with caregivers. I argue for those theories which see the drives as psychic forces, which through developmental processes and cathexes acquire aims and objects, and become intertwined with impulses originating internally and externally, such as affect, interoceptive impulses, perception of the external world, and impulses from erotogenic zones in particular. Here, I present my analysis of the compatibility and consistency of free energy and the hierarchical model perspective, and two psychoanalytical traditions of thoughts: French psychoanalysis and the post-Kleinian school of British psychoanalysis. In particular, my analysis focuses on the contemporary Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasies, especially Bronstein's description of their semiotic aspects. Secondly, I look at Segal's view of drives as dialectic forces of adaptation vs. conservatism. Analyzing the French tradition, I focus on Green's perspective on the drives, Lacan's distinction between drives and desire, and Penot's description of the process of subjectivation. I conclude that free energy, as described by Friston, can be seen as a source of the drives' energy and the process of minimizing it is an equivalent of what Freud described as binding the free energy, in which psychic unbound energy acquires distinctive features and becomes bound.

Psychoanalytic psychotherapies and the free energy principle

In this paper I propose a model of the fundamental components of psychoanalytic psychotherapies that I try to explicate with contemporary theories of the Bayesian brain and the Free Energy Principle (FEP). I first show that psychoanalytic therapies require a setting (made up of several envelopes), a particular psychic state and specific processes (transference, free association, dreaming, play, reflexivity and narrativity) in order to induce psychic transformations. I then analyze how these processes of transformations operate and how they can be enlightened by the FEP. I first underline the fact that psychoanalytic therapies imply non-linear processes taking time to unfold and require a setting containing high entropy processes. More precisely, these processes are characterized by an interplay between extension and reduction of free energy. This interplay also favors the emergence of new orders of subjective experience, which occur following states of disorder, according to a certain energetic threshold allowing the modification and improvement of mental functioning. These high entropy states are also characterized by random functioning and psychic malleability which favors the exploration of subjective experience in an original manner. Overall, the approach proposed in this paper support the dialogue between psychoanalysis and other fields of research while underlining how psychoanalytical theoretical and conceptual constructs can also be useful to other disciplines, in particular the neurosciences of subjectivity.

Piloting the Update: The Use of Therapeutic Relationship for Change - A Free Energy Account

We apply the Free Energy Principle (FEP) to cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). FEP describes the basic functioning of the brain as a predictive organ and states that any self-organizing system that is in equilibrium with its environment must minimize its free energy. Based on an internal model of the world and the self, predictions-so-called priors-are created, which are matched with the information input. The sum of prediction errors corresponds to the Free Energy, which must be minimized. Internal models can be identified with the cognitive-affective schemas of the individual that has become dysfunctional in patients. The role of CBT in this picture is to help the patient update her/his priors. They have evolved in learning history and no longer provide adaptive predictions. We discuss the process of updating in terms of the exploration-exploitation dilemma. This consists of the extent to which one relies on what one already has, i.e., whether one continues to maintain and "exploit" one's previous priors ("better safe than sorry") or whether one does explore new data that lead to an update of priors. Questioning previous priors triggers stress, which is associated with increases in Free Energy in short term. The role of therapeutic relationship is to buffer this increase in Free Energy, thereby increasing the level of perceived safety. The therapeutic relationship is represented in a dual model of affective alliance and goal attainment alliance and is aligned with FEP. Both forms of alliance support exploration and updating of priors. All aspects are illustrated with the help of a clinical case example.

Instability and Uncertainty Are Critical for Psychotherapy: How the Therapeutic Alliance Opens Us Up

Tschacher and Haken have recently applied a systems-based approach to modeling psychotherapy process in terms of potentially beneficial tendencies toward deterministic as well as chaotic forms of change in the client's behavioral, cognitive and affective experience during the course of therapy. A chaotic change process refers to a greater exploration of the states that a client can be in, and it may have a potential positive role to play in their development. A distinction is made between on the one hand, specific instances of instability which are due to techniques employed by the therapist, and on the other, a more general instability which is due to the therapeutic relationship, and a key, necessary result of a successful therapeutic alliance. Drawing on Friston's systems-based model of free energy minimization and predictive coding, it is proposed here that the increase in the instability of a client's functioning due to therapy can be conceptualized as a reduction in the precisions (certainty) with which the client's prior beliefs about themselves and their world, are held. It is shown how a good therapeutic alliance (characterized by successful interpersonal synchrony of the sort described by Friston and Frith) results in the emergence of a new hierarchical level in the client's generative model of themselves and their relationship with the world. The emergence of this new level of functioning permits the reduction of the precisions of the client's priors, which allows the client to 'open up': to experience thoughts, emotions and experiences they did not have before. It is proposed that this process is a necessary precursor to change due to psychotherapy. A good consilience can be found between this approach to understanding the role of the therapeutic alliance, and the role of epistemic trust in psychotherapy as described by Fonagy and Allison. It is suggested that beneficial forms of instability in clients are an underappreciated influence on psychotherapy process, and thoughts about the implications, as well as situations in which instability may not be beneficial (or potentially harmful) for therapy, are considered.

The Emergence of Psychoanalytic Metaneuropsychology: A Neuropsychoanalytically Informed Reconsideration of Early Psychic Development

This paper is principally concerned with reappraising some of the major disagreements that separated the Viennese and the London Kleinians during the British Psychoanalytical Society's Controversial Discussions. Of particular focus are questions pertaining to the genesis of ego development, the beginnings of object-relating, and the role of unconscious phantasy in respect of these phenomena. The aim of the investigation is to inquire into the light that may be shed on the once intractable conflicts surrounding these questions by bringing to bear more recent developments from psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. First, various key issues from the Controversial Discussions are outlined, before the paper turns to work by Jaak Panksepp and Mark Solms that bears on these older arguments and the Freudian theories that underpinned them. With these conceptual foundations established, three questions are posed and discussed with a view to understanding the implications of recent neuropsychoanalytic thinking for some of the entrenched conflicts that divided the British Society. These questions include: (1) what does it mean for the ego if the id is conscious? (2) What does recent neuroscientific knowledge tell us about whether the ego should be thought of as present from birth? (3) How can we understand and locate unconscious phantasy if the main part of the mind that Freud thought of as unconscious is not so? Research from the arena of infant development-particularly the material and analysis of infant observation-is drawn on to illustrate various conclusions. The paper ultimately concludes that taking such an interdisciplinary approach can reveal renewed justification for aspects of the Kleinian metapsychology.

Introduction to the Special Section on Working on dreams, from psychotherapy to neuroscience

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Beyond the death drive: Entropy and free energy

In this paper I offer an overview of the possible links between psychoanalytical metapsychology and contemporary work in neuroscience concerning entropy and the free energy principle. After briefly describing the theory of living systems put forward by the neuroscientist Karl Friston based on the notion of entropy, we sum up the use of the notion of free energy by Friston and Freud. I then analyze how these notions improve the intelligibility of psychic functioning and can be associated with several psychoanalytical concepts, in particular the death drive. I approach from the same perspective the regulation of free energy associated with psychic envelopes and early intersubjectivity. It thus appears that the psychic apparatus can be considered at its different levels, from the most primary to the most secondary, as having the essential function of reducing entropy and free energy. Various forms of "failure" of this process of linking, regulation and transformation of energy within the psychic apparatus could be considered as the origin of different psychopathological manifestations as suggested in the last part of this paper.

Brain Entropy During Aging Through a Free Energy Principle Approach

Neural complexity and brain entropy (BEN) have gained greater interest in recent years. The dynamics of neural signals and their relations with information processing continue to be investigated through different measures in a variety of noteworthy studies. The BEN of spontaneous neural activity decreases during states of reduced consciousness. This evidence has been showed in primary consciousness states, such as psychedelic states, under the name of "the entropic brain hypothesis." In this manuscript we propose an extension of this hypothesis to physiological and pathological aging. We review this particular facet of the complexity of the brain, mentioning studies that have investigated BEN in primary consciousness states, and extending this view to the field of neuroaging with a focus on resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We first introduce historic and conceptual ideas about entropy and neural complexity, treating the mindbrain as a complex nonlinear dynamic adaptive system, in light of the free energy principle. Then, we review the studies in this field, analyzing the idea that the aim of the neurocognitive system is to maintain a dynamic state of balance between order and chaos, both in terms of dynamics of neural signals and functional connectivity. In our exploration we will review studies both on acute psychedelic states and more chronic psychotic states and traits, such as those in schizophrenia, in order to show the increase of entropy in those states. Then we extend our exploration to physiological and pathological aging, where BEN is reduced. Finally, we propose an interpretation of these results, defining a general trend of BEN in primary states and cognitive aging.

The Digital Phenotyping Project: A Psychoanalytical and Network Theory Perspective

A new method of observation is currently emerging in psychiatry, based on data collection and behavioral profiling of smartphone users. Numerical phenotyping is a paradigmatic example. This behavioral investigation method uses computerized measurement tools in order to collect characteristics of different psychiatric disorders. First, it is necessary to contextualize the emergence of these new methods and to question their promises and expectations. The international mental health research framework invites us to reflect on methodological issues and to draw conclusions from certain impasses related to the clinical complexity of this field. From this contextualization, the investigation method relating to digital phenotyping can be questioned in order to identify some of its potentials. These new methods are also an opportunity to test psychoanalysis. It is then necessary to identify the elements of fruitful analysis that clinical experience and research in psychoanalysis have been able to deploy regarding the challenges of digital technology. An analysis of this theme’s literature shows that psychoanalysis facilitates a reflection on the psychological effects related to digital methods. It also shows how it can profit from the research potential offered by new technical tools, considering the progress that has been made over the past 50 years. This cross-fertilization of the potentials and limitations of digital methods in mental health intervention in the context of theoretical issues at the international level invites us to take a resolutely non-reductionist position. In the field of research, psychoanalysis offers a specific perspective that can well be articulated to an epistemology of networks. Rather than aiming at a numerical phenotyping of patients according to the geneticists’ model, the case formulation method appears to be a serious prerequisite to give a limited and specific place to the integration of smartphones in clinical investigation.

Unconscious Emotion and Free-Energy: A Philosophical and Neuroscientific Exploration

Unconscious emotions are of central importance to psychoanalysis. They do, however, raise conceptual problems. The most pertinent concerns the intuition, shared by Freud, that consciousness is essential to emotion, which makes the idea of unconscious emotion seem paradoxical. In this paper, I address this paradox from the perspective of the philosopher R. C. Roberts' account of emotions as concern-based construals. I provide an interpretation of this account in the context of affective neuroscience and explore the form of Freudian repression that emotions may be subject to under such an interpretation. This exploration draws on evidence from research on alexithymia and utilises ideas from free-energy neuroscience. The free-energy framework, moreover, facilitates an account of repression that avoids the homunculus objection and coheres with recent work on hysteria.

Current approaches to modeling the virtual reality in rodents for the assessment of brain plasticity and behavior

Virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) have become valuable tools to study brains and behaviors resulting in development of new methods of diagnostics and treatment. Neurodegenerаtion is one of the best examples demonstrating efficacy of VR/АR technologies in modern neurology. Development of novel VR systems for rodents and combination of VR tools with up-to-date imaging techniques (i.e. MRI, imaging of neural networks etc.), brain electrophysiology (EEG, patch-clamp), precise analytics (microdialysis) allowed implementing of VR protocols into the animal neurobiology to study brain plasticity, sensorimotor integration, spatial navigation, memory, and decision-making. VR/AR for rodents is а young field of experimental neuroscience and has already provided more consistent testing conditions, less human-animal interaction, opportunities to use a wider variety of experimental parameters. Here we discuss present and future perspectives of using VR/AR to assess brain plasticity, neurogenesis and complex behavior in rodent and human study, and their advantages for translational neuroscience.

Entropy, Free Energy, and Symbolization: Free Association at the Intersection of Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience

Both a method of therapy and an exploration of psychic reality, free association is a fundamental element of psychoanalytical practices that refers to the way a patient is asked to describe what comes spontaneously to mind in the therapeutic setting. This paper examines the role of free association from the point of view of psychoanalysis and neuroscience in order to improve our understanding of therapeutic effects induced by psychoanalytic therapies and psychoanalysis. In this regard, we first propose a global overview of the historical origins of the concept of free association in psychoanalysis and examine how Freud established its principles. Then, from Freud's distinction between primary and secondary processes, we proceed to compare the psychoanalytic model with research originating from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The notions of entropy and free energy appear particularly relevant at the intersection of these different domains. Finally, we propose the notion of symbolizing transmodality to describe certain specificities of symbolization processes within free association and we summarize the main functions of free association in psychoanalytic practices.

The Gravity of Objects: How Affectively Organized Generative Models Influence Perception and Social Behavior

Friston's (2010) free energy principle (FEP) offers an opportunity to rethink what is meant by the psychoanalytic concept of an object or discrete mental representation (Ogden, 1992). The significance of such objects in psychoanalysis is that they may be superimposed on current experience so that perceptions are partly composed of projected fantasy and partly of more realistic perception. From a free energy perspective, the psychoanalytic (person) object may be understood as a bounded set of prior beliefs about a "platonic" sort of person that provides a free energy minimizing, evidence maximizing, hypothesis to explain inference about - or dyadic interactions with - another. The degree to which realistic perception supervenes - relative to a platonic person object - will depend upon the precision assigned to the sensory evidence (concerning the person) relative to the prior beliefs about a platonic form. This provides a basis for not only explaining projection and transference phenomena but also conceptualizing a central assumption within the object relations psychoanalysis. As an example, the paper examines the Kleinian theory of split good or bad part objects as affectively organized generative models (or platonic part-object models) formed in early infancy. This also provides a basis for building on work by Kernberg (1984, 1996) by conceptualizing the role of the part object(s) in a continuum of reality testing, from mild errors in perception that are relatively easily corrected, through borderline affective instability and frequent shifts between part-object experience, to psychotic failures of reality testing, where Friston et al. (2016) proposed that aberrant precisions bias perception to high precision false beliefs (here cast as platonic part objects), such as stable perceptions of others (and possibly oneself) as persecutory agents of some sort. The paper demonstrates the value that the history of clinical insights into psychoanalysis (including object relations) and a system-based approach to the brain (including the free energy principle) can have for one another. This is offered as a demonstration of the potential value of an "Integrative Clinical Systems Psychology" proposed by Tretter and Lo¨ffler-Stastka (2018), which has the potential to integrate the major theoretical frameworks in the field today.

Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: The Bridge Between Mind and Brain

In 1895 in the Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud tried to integrate psychology and neurology in order to develop a neuroscientific psychology. Since 1880, Freud made no distinction between psychology and physiology. His papers from the end of the 1880s to 1890 were very clear on this scientific overlap: as with many of his contemporaries, Freud thought about psychology essentially as the physiology of the brain. Years later he had to surrender, realizing a technological delay, not capable of pursuing its ambitious aim, and until that moment psychoanalysis would have to use its more suitable clinical method. Also, he seemed skeptical about phrenology drift, typical of that time, in which any psychological function needed to be located in its neuroanatomical area. He could not see the progresses of neuroscience and its fruitful dialogue with psychoanalysis, which occurred also thanks to the improvements in the field of neuroimaging, which has made possible a remarkable advance in the knowledge of the mind-brain system and a better observation of the psychoanalytical theories. After years of investigations, deriving from research and clinical work of the last century, the discovery of neural networks, together with the free energy principle, we are observing under a new light psychodynamic neuroscience in its exploration of the mind-brain system. In this manuscript, we summarize the important developments of psychodynamic neuroscience, with particular regard to the free energy principle, the resting state networks, especially the Default Mode Network in its link with the Self, emphasizing our view of a bridge between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Finally, we suggest a discussion by approaching the concept of Alpha Function, proposed by the psychoanalyst Wilfred Ruprecht Bion, continuing the association with neuroscience.

"Surprise" and the Bayesian Brain: Implications for Psychotherapy Theory and Practice

The free energy principle (FEP) has gained widespread interest and growing acceptance as a new paradigm of brain function, but has had little impact on the theory and practice of psychotherapy. The aim of this paper is to redress this. Brains rely on Bayesian inference during which “bottom-up” sensations are matched with “top-down” predictions. Discrepancies result in “prediction error.” The brain abhors informational “surprise,” which is minimized by (1) action enhancing the statistical likelihood of sensory samples, (2) revising inferences in the light of experience, updating “priors” to reality-aligned “posteriors,” and (3) optimizing the complexity of our generative models of a capricious world. In all three, free energy is converted to bound energy. In psychopathology energy either remains unbound, as in trauma and inhibition of agency, or manifests restricted, anachronistic “top-down” narratives. Psychotherapy fosters client agency, linguistic and practical. Temporary uncoupling bottom-up from top-down automatism and fostering scrutinized simulations sets a number of salutary processes in train. Mentalising enriches Bayesian inference, enabling experience and feeling states to be “metabolized” and assimilated. “Free association” enhances more inclusive sensory sampling, while dream analysis foregrounds salient emotional themes as “attractors.” FEP parallels with psychoanalytic theory are outlined, including Freud’s unpublished project, Bion’s “contact barrier” concept, the Fonagy/Target model of sexuality, Laplanche’s therapist as “enigmatic signifier,” and the role of projective identification. The therapy stimulates patients to become aware of and revise the priors’ they bring to interpersonal experience. In the therapeutic “duet for one,” the energy binding skills and non-partisan stance of the analyst help sufferers face trauma without being overwhelmed by psychic entropy. Overall, the FEP provides a sound theoretical basis for psychotherapy practice, training, and research.

The "Instinct" of Imagination. A Neuro-Ethological Approach to the Evolution of the Reflective Mind and Its Application to Psychotherapy

Recent neuro-psychoanalytic literature has emphasized the view that our subjective identity rests on ancient subcortical neuro-psychic processes expressing unthinking forms of experience, which are “affectively intense without being known” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012). Devoid of internal representations, the emotional states of our “core-Self” (Panksepp, 1998b) are entirely “projected” towards the external world and tend to be discharged through instinctual action-patterns. However, due to the close connections between the subcortical and the cortical midline brain, the emotional drives may also find a way to be reflected within an intrinsic self-referential processing, evident when the organism is not actively engaged with the external world. Thanks to such endogenous functioning, the core-Self emotional dispositions are not overtly executed, but they are organized within coherent dynamic mental structures, called “feeling-toned complexes” by C. G. Jung and “unconscious phantasies” by Melanie Klein. The intrinsic self-referential dynamism of the “brainmind” originated from REM sleep arousal and then evolved in the resting-state activity of a complex of cortico-limbic midline brain structures (CMS), also called Default Mode Network (DMN). From our neuro-ethological perspective, it is sustained by an “introverted” SEEKING activity leading to the subjective exploration of internally constructed virtual scenarios. This “mind wandering” function, implicated in dreaming, fantasy processing, remembering and thinking, is the essence of the imaginative function and constitutes the first form of reflection, where intentions and drives gain a primordial form of conscious (but not self-conscious) representation. During postnatal development, this original (“archetypal”) imaginative function is slowly attuned in a relational “transitional” space and may be expressed first in non-verbal and eventually in abstract-verbal social communicative patterns. Our view has noticeable implications for psychotherapy. Instead of trying to directly modify interpersonal, extrinsic relationships (a top-down approach), dysfunctional emotional-relational patterns may be modified by a process in which the patient is helped to let-go of the perceived feeling-objects in favor of an immersion, via the actual feeling, from the superficial level of perception towards a void feeling-state, empty of images. Only starting from this “anoetic” feeling-state, the deep imaginal creative and re-structuring self-referential activity may be reactivated by a process of spontaneous imagination.

Expected Free Energy Formalizes Conflict Underlying Defense in Freudian Psychoanalysis

Freud's core interest in the psyche was the dynamic unconscious: that part of the psyche which is unconscious due to conflict (Freud, 1923/1961). Over the course of his career, Freud variously described conflict as an opposition to the discharge of activation (Freud, 1950), opposition to psychic activity due to the release of unpleasure (Freud, 1990/1991), opposition between the primary principle and the reality principle (Freud, 1911/1963), structural conflict between id, ego, and superego (Freud, 1923/1961), and ambivalence (Freud, 1912/1963). Besides this difficulty of the shifting description of conflict, an underlying question remained the specific shared terrain in which emotions, thoughts, intentions or wishes could come into conflict with one another (the neuronal homolog of conflict), and most especially how they may exist as quantities in opposition within that terrain. Friston's free-energy principle (FEP henceforth) connected to the work of Friston (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010) has provided the potential for a powerful unifying theory in psychology, neuroscience, and related fields that has been shown to have tremendous consilience with psychoanalytic concepts (Hopkins, 2012). Hopkins (2016), drawing on a formulation by Hobson et al. (2014), suggests that conflict may be potentially quantifiable as free energy from a FEP perspective. More recently, work by Friston et al. (2017a) has framed the selection of action as a gradient descent of expected free energy under different policies of action. From this perspective, the article describes how conflict could potentially be formalized as a situation where opposing action policies have similar expected free energy, for example between actions driven by competing basic prototype emotion systems as described by Panksepp (1998). This conflict state may be avoided in the future through updating the relative precision of a particular set of prior beliefs about outcomes: this has the result of tending to favor one of the policies of action over others in future instances, a situation analogous to defense. Through acting as a constraint on the further development of the person, the defensive operation can become entrenched, and resistant to alteration. The implications that this formalization has for psychoanalysis is explored.

Hierarchical Recursive Organization and the Free Energy Principle: From Biological Self-Organization to the Psychoanalytic Mind

The present paper argues that a systems theory epistemology (and particularly the notion of hierarchical recursive organization) provides the critical theoretical context within which the significance of Friston's (2010a) Free Energy Principle (FEP) for both evolution and psychoanalysis is best understood. Within this perspective, the FEP occupies a particular level of the hierarchical organization of the organism, which is the level of biological self-organization. This form of biological self-organization is in turn understood as foundational and pervasive to the higher levels of organization of the human organism that are of interest to both neuroscience as well as psychoanalysis. Consequently, central psychoanalytic claims should be restated, in order to be located in their proper place within a hierarchical recursive organization of the (situated) organism. In light of the FEP the realization of the psychoanalytic mind by the brain should be seen in terms of the evolution of different levels of systematic organization where the concepts of psychoanalysis describe a level of hierarchical recursive organization superordinate to that of biological self-organization and the FEP. The implication of this formulation is that while “psychoanalytic” mental processes are fundamentally subject to the FEP, they nonetheless also add their own principles of process over and above that of the FEP. A model found in Grobbelaar (1989) offers a recursive bottom-up description of the self-organization of the psychoanalytic ego as dependent on the organization of language (and affect), which is itself founded upon the tendency toward autopoiesis (self-making) within the organism, which is in turn described as formally similar to the FEP. Meaningful consilience between Grobbelaar's model and the hierarchical recursive description available in Friston's (2010a) theory is described. The paper concludes that the valuable contribution of the FEP to psychoanalysis underscores the necessity of reengagement with the core concepts of psychoanalytic theory, and the usefulness that a systems theory epistemology—particularly hierarchical recursive description—can have for this goal.

A mathematical model of embodied consciousness

We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), which is based on the hypothesis that the spatial field of consciousness (FoC) is structured by a projective geometry and under the control of a process of active inference. The FoC in the PCM combines multisensory evidence with prior beliefs in memory and frames them by selecting points of view and perspectives according to preferences. The choice of projective frames governs how expectations are transformed by consciousness. Violations of expectation are encoded as free energy. Free energy minimization drives perspective taking, and controls the switch between perception, imagination and action. In the PCM, consciousness functions as an algorithm for the maximization of resilience, using projective perspective taking and imagination in order to escape local minima of free energy. The PCM can account for a variety of psychological phenomena: the characteristic spatial phenomenology of subjective experience, the distinctions and integral relationships between perception, imagination and action, the role of affective processes in intentionality, but also perceptual phenomena such as the dynamics of bistable figures and body swap illusions in virtual reality. It relates phenomenology to function, showing the computational advantages of consciousness. It suggests that changes of brain states from unconscious to conscious reflect the action of projective transformations and suggests specific neurophenomenological hypotheses about the brain, guidelines for designing artificial systems, and formal principles for psychology.

Arousal in Nocturnal Consciousness: How Dream- and Sleep-Experiences May Inform Us of Poor Sleep Quality, Stress, and Psychopathology

The term "sleep experiences," coined by Watson (2001), denotes an array of unusual nocturnal consciousness phenomena; for example, nightmares, vivid or recurrent dreams, hypnagogic hallucinations, dreams of falling or flying, confusional arousals, and lucid dreams. Excluding the latter, these experiences reflect a single factor of atypical oneiric cognitions ("general sleep experiences"). The current study is an opinionated mini-review on the associations of this factor-measured with the Iowa sleep experiences survey (ISES, Watson, 2001)-with psychopathological symptoms and stress. Findings support a strong relation between psychological distress and general sleep experiences. It is suggested that that they should be viewed as a sleep disturbance; they seem to represent involuntary intrusions of wakefulness into sleep, resulting in aroused sleep. These intrusions may stem from excessively thin boundaries between consciousness states (e.g., "transliminality"), or, conversely, they may follow an attempt at disconnecting mental elements (e.g., dissociation), which paradoxically results in a "rebound effect." The extent to which unusual dreaming is experienced as intrusive, rather than controlled, may explain why general sleep experiences are related to psychopathology, whereas lucid dreams are related to psychological resilience. In conclusion, the exploration of the interplay between psychopathology and sleep should be expanded from focusing almost exclusively on quantitative aspects (e.g., sleep efficiency, latency) to including qualitative conscious experiences which may reflect poor sleep quality. Taking into account nocturnal consciousness-including unusual dreaming and permeable sleep-wake boundaries-may unveil rich information on night-time emotional states and broaden our definition of poor sleep quality.

Opposite Impact of REM Sleep on Neurobehavioral Functioning in Children with Common Psychiatric Disorders Compared to Typically Developing Children

Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep has been shown to be related to many adaptive cognitive and behavioral functions. However, its precise functions are still elusive, particularly in developmental psychiatric disorders. The present study aims at investigating associations between polysomnographic (PSG) REM sleep measurements and neurobehavioral functions in children with common developmental psychiatric conditions compared to typically developing children (TDC). Twenty-four children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 21 with Tourette syndrome/tic disorder (TD), 21 with ADHD/TD comorbidity, and 22 TDC, matched for age and gender, underwent a two-night PSG, and their psychopathological scores and intelligence quotient (IQ) were assessed. Major PSG findings showed more REM sleep and shorter REM latency in the children with psychiatric disorders than in the TDC. Multiple regression analyses revealed that in groups with developmental psychopathology, REM sleep proportion correlated positively with scores of inattention and negatively with performance IQ. In contrast, in the group of TDC, REM sleep proportion correlated negatively with scores of inattention and positively with performance IQ. Whilst shorter REM latency was associated with greater inattention scores in children with psychopathology, no such an association existed in the group of TDC. Altogether, these results indicate an opposite impact of REM sleep on neurobehavioral functioning, related to presence or absence of developmental psychiatric disorders. Our findings suggest that during development, REM sleep functions may interact dissimilarly with different pathways of brain maturation.

On Dreams and Motivation: Comparison of Freud's and Hobson's Views

The merits of Freudian dream theory continue to be debated and both supporters and critics appeal to empirical evidence to support their respective positions. What receives much less attention is the theoretical coherency of either Freudian dream theory or alternative perspectives. This paper examines Freudian dream theory and J. Allan Hobson's alternative position by addressing the role of motivation in dreams. This paper first discusses motivation in Freudian theory and its relation to dreams and disguise-censorship. The role of motivation in Hobson's theory is then considered. Hobson's claim that dream plot and content selection is random and based on design error and functional imbalance is then discussed in relation to the protoconsciousness theory proposal that dreams serve an adaptive function. While there are apparent inconsistencies in Hobson's position, his appeal to emotions and instincts provides a preliminary platform for understanding the role of motivation in dreams that is consonant with the Freudian position.