The Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance

Being good to look good: Self-reported moral character predicts moral double standards among reputation-seeking individuals

Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions-that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement.

Collaborative Cheating in Hierarchical Teams: Effects of Incentive Structure and Leader Behavior on Subordinate Behavior and Perceptions of Leaders

What facilitates collaborative cheating in hierarchical teams, and what are its outcomes for those engaged? In two preregistered studies (N = 724), we investigated how subordinates are influenced by leaders signaling a willingness to engage in collaborative cheating, and how subordinates perceive such leaders. Participants performed a task in which they could either report their performance honestly, or cheat for financial gain. Each participant was assigned a leader who could choose to check the report's veracity. In Study 1, leaders who checked less often were perceived as more moral, trustworthy, competent, and psychologically closer than leaders who checked more often. This trustworthiness bonus translated to investments in a subsequent trust game. Study 2 revealed that these relationship benefits specifically arise for collaborative cheating, compared to competitive cheating (at the leader's expense). We conclude that collaborative cheating in subordinate-leader dyads strengthens in-group bonds, bringing people closer together and cultivating trust.

Optimistic Expectations and Proactivity: Can they be the Key to Successful Strategies in Entrepreneurship?

The most valuable thing we learned from expectation theories is that expectations affect behaviors significantly. This study deepens this knowledge, and proposes a model that puts forward the idea that optimistic expectations stimulate proactive personality characteristics and in this way activate strategic vigilance which forms the basis of behavioral decisions. In order to test this model, research was carried out with 280 entrepreneurs participating. Data obtained from the sample were analyzed using statistical programs which examine mediating effect. The research findings have shown that optimistic expectations affect strategic vigilance significantly and positively, and proactive personality traits have a fully mediating role in this effect. This is the first study that examines the relationships among optimistic expectations, personality characteristics, and cognitive abilities. To find out other relations between optimistic expectations and personality characteristics and cognitive abilities, there should be more researches. The findings can help provide a different perspective both in analyzing entrepreneurship success and in developing other management practices that increase positive work outputs.

Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communication to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species' social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species comparisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmatics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.

The evolution of morality and the role of commitment

A considerable share of the literature on the evolution of human cooperation considers the question why we have not evolved to play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners' dilemmas or public goods games. In order to understand human morality and pro-social behaviour, we suggest that it would actually be more informative to investigate why we have not evolved to play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in sequential games, such as the ultimatum game and the trust game. The 'rationally irrational' behaviour that can evolve in such games gives a much better match with actual human behaviour, including elements of morality such as honesty, responsibility and sincerity, as well as the more hostile aspects of human nature, such as anger and vengefulness. The mechanism at work here is commitment, which does not need population structure, nor does it need interactions to be repeated. We argue that this shift in focus can not only help explain why humans have evolved to know wrong from right, but also why other animals, with similar population structures and similar rates of repetition, have not evolved similar moral sentiments. The suggestion that the evolutionary function of morality is to help us commit to otherwise irrational behaviour stems from the work of Robert Frank (American Economic Review, 77(4), 593-604, 1987; Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions, WW Norton, 1988), which has played a surprisingly modest role in the scientific debate to date.

Understanding Independence: Board of Directors and CSR

On August Business Roundtable (2019), the Business Roundtable redefined the purpose and social responsibility of the corporation. Yet, this statement must be followed by substantial changes in the business models of corporations for it to avoid becoming empty rhetoric. We believe that the figure of the independent director may be one of the catalysts needed for this change of paradigm for corporations. In spite of the positive correlation between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and board independence, the development of the independence of boards during the last decade has not lead to the expected CSR results. Academics and regulators point to a weak definition and the non-standardized measurement of both independence and board independence (BI) as one possible explanation, and agree that a broader definition is needed. This paper aims to contribute to this debate. We develop a second-generation definition of independence based on a positive approximation to the concept by integrating an Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics with the best practices of corporate governance. Thus, we define independence as a virtue guided by practical wisdom, that implies autonomy and autarky and which enables a person to act with integrity, fairness and truthfulness. In the context of corporate governance, independence is associated with an honest disposition to serve. Our proposal has political implications for supervisors that make decisions relating to the suitability of board members.