Changing What You See by Changing What You Know: The Role of Attention

How do students reason about statistical sampling with computer simulations? An integrative review from a grounded cognition perspective

Interactive computer simulations are commonly used as pedagogical tools to support students' statistical reasoning. This paper examines whether and how these simulations enable their intended effects. We begin by contrasting two theoretical frameworks-dual processes and grounded cognition-in the context of people's conceptions about statistical sampling, setting the stage for the potential benefits of simulations in learning such conceptions. Then, we continue with reviewing the educational literature on statistical sampling simulations. Our review tentatively suggests benefits of the simulations for building statistical habits of mind. However, challenges seem to persist when more specific concepts and skills are investigated. With and without simulations, students have difficulty forming an aggregate view of data, interpreting sampling distributions, showing a process-based understanding of the law of large numbers, making statistical inferences, and context-independent reasoning. We propose that grounded cognition offers a framework for understanding these findings, highlighting the bidirectional relationship between perception and conception, perceptual design features, and guided perceptual routines for supporting students' meaning making from simulations. Finally, we propose testable instructional strategies for using simulations in statistics education.

Carving joints into nature: reengineering scientific concepts in light of concept-laden evidence

A new wave of proposals suggests that scientists must reassess scientific concepts in light of accumulated evidence. However, reengineering scientific concepts in light of data is challenging because scientific concepts affect the evidence itself in multiple ways. Among other possible influences, concepts (i) prime scientists to overemphasize within-concept similarities and between-concept differences; (ii) lead scientists to measure conceptually relevant dimensions more accurately; (iii) serve as units of scientific experimentation, communication, and theory-building; and (iv) affect the phenomena themselves. When looking for improved ways to carve nature at its joints, scholars must take the concept-laden nature of evidence into account to avoid entering a vicious circle of concept-evidence mutual substantiation.

A circuit mechanism linking past and future learning through shifts in perception

Long-term memory formation is energetically costly. Neural mechanisms that guide an animal to identify fruitful associations therefore have important survival benefits. Here, we elucidate a circuit mechanism in Lymnaea, which enables past memory to shape new memory formation through changes in perception. Specifically, strong classical conditioning drives a positive shift in perception that facilitates the robust learning of a subsequent and otherwise ineffective weak association. Circuit dissection approaches reveal the neural control network responsible, characterized by a mutual inhibition motif. This both sets perceptual state and acts as the master controller for gating new learning. Pharmacological circuit manipulation in vivo fully substitutes for strong paradigm learning, shifting the network into a more receptive state to enable subsequent weak paradigm learning. Thus, perceptual change provides a conduit to link past and future memory storage. We propose that this mechanism alerts animals to learning-rich periods, lowering the threshold for new memory acquisition.

Perceptual bias contextualized in visually ambiguous stimuli

The visual appearance of an object is a function of stimulus properties as well as perceptual biases imposed by the observer. The context-specific trade-off between both can be measured accurately in a perceptual judgment task, involving grouping by proximity in ambiguous dot lattices. Such grouping depends lawfully on a stimulus parameter of the dot lattices known as their aspect ratio (AR), whose effect is modulated by a perceptual bias representing the preference for a cardinal orientation. In two experiments, we investigated how preceding context can lead to bias modulation, either in a top-down fashion via visual working memory (VWM) or bottom-up via sensory priming. In Experiment 1, we embedded the perceptual judgment task in a change detection paradigm and studied how the factors of VWM load (complexity of the memory array) and content (congruency in orientation to the ensuing dot lattice) affect the prominence of perceptual bias. A robust vertical orientation bias was observed, which was increased by VWM load and modulated by congruent VWM content. In Experiment 2, dot lattices were preceded by oriented primes. Here, primes regardless of orientation elicited a vertical orientation bias in dot lattices compared to a neutral baseline. Taken together, the two experiments demonstrate that top-down context (VWM load and content) effectively controls orientation bias modulation, while bottom-up context (i.e., priming) merely acts as an undifferentiated trigger to perceptual bias. These findings characterize the temporal context sensitivity of Gestalt perception, shed light on the processes responsible for different perceptual outcomes of ambiguous stimuli, and identify some of the mechanisms controlling perceptual bias.

Seeing What You Believe or Believing What You See? Belief Biases Correlation Estimation

When an analyst or scientist has a belief about how the world works, their thinking can be biased in favor of that belief. Therefore, one bedrock principle of science is to minimize that bias by testing the predictions of one's belief against objective data. But interpreting visualized data is a complex perceptual and cognitive process. Through two crowdsourced experiments, we demonstrate that supposedly objective assessments of the strength of a correlational relationship can be influenced by how strongly a viewer believes in the existence of that relationship. Participants viewed scatterplots depicting a relationship between meaningful variable pairs (e.g., number of environmental regulations and air quality) and estimated their correlations. They also estimated the correlation of the same scatterplots labeled instead with generic 'X' and 'Y' axes. In a separate section, they also reported how strongly they believed there to be a correlation between the meaningful variable pairs. Participants estimated correlations more accurately when they viewed scatterplots labeled with generic axes compared to scatterplots labeled with meaningful variable pairs. Furthermore, when viewers believed that two variables should have a strong relationship, they overestimated correlations between those variables by an r-value of about 0.1. When they believed that the variables should be unrelated, they underestimated the correlations by an r-value of about 0.1. While data visualizations are typically thought to present objective truths to the viewer, these results suggest that existing personal beliefs can bias even objective statistical values people extract from data.

Attention and platypuses

This perspective piece discusses a set of attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection. We call these phenomena attentional platypuses, as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models are in need of a revision. We list a few instances of the "attentional platypuses" and then offer a new approach, that we term dynamically weighted prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attentional allocation. We propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Neuroscience > Cognition.

Typical viewpoints of objects are better detected than atypical ones

Previous work has claimed that canonical viewpoints of objects are more readily perceived than noncanonical viewpoints. However, all of these studies required participants to identify the object, a late perceptual process at best and arguably a cognitive process (Pylyshyn, 1999). Here, we extend this work to early vision by removing the explicit need to identify the objects. In particular, we asked participants to make an intact/scrambled discrimination of briefly presented objects that were viewed from either typical or atypical viewpoints. Notably, participants did not have to identify the object; only discriminate it from noise (scrambled). Participants were more sensitive in discriminating objects presented in typically encountered orientations than when objects were presented in atypical depth rotations (Experiment 1). However, the same effect for objects presented in atypical picture plane rotations (as opposed to typical ones) did not reach statistical significance (Experiments 2 and 3), suggesting that particular informative views may play a critical role in this effect. We interpret this enhanced perceptibility, for both these items and good exemplars and probable scenes, as deriving from their high real-world statistical regularity.

The N300: An Index for Predictive Coding of Complex Visual Objects and Scenes

Predictive coding models can simulate known perceptual or neuronal phenomena, but there have been fewer attempts to identify a reliable neural signature of predictive coding for complex stimuli. In a pair of studies, we test whether the N300 component of the event-related potential, occurring 250–350-ms poststimulus-onset, has the response properties expected for such a signature of perceptual hypothesis testing at the level of whole objects and scenes. We show that N300 amplitudes are smaller to representative (“good exemplars”) compared with less representative (“bad exemplars”) items from natural scene categories. Integrating these results with patterns observed for objects, we establish that, across a variety of visual stimuli, the N300 is responsive to statistical regularity, or the degree to which the input is “expected” (either explicitly or implicitly) based on prior knowledge, with statistically regular images evoking a reduced response. Moreover, we show that the measure exhibits context-dependency; that is, we find the N300 sensitivity to category representativeness when stimuli are congruent with, but not when they are incongruent with, a category pre-cue. Thus, we argue that the N300 is the best candidate to date for an index of perceptual hypotheses testing for complex visual objects and scenes.

Effects of Language on Visual Perception

Does language change what we perceive? Does speaking different languages cause us to perceive things differently? We review the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for the influence of language on perception, with an emphasis on the visual modality. Effects of language on perception can be observed both in higher-level processes such as recognition and in lower-level processes such as discrimination and detection. A consistent finding is that language causes us to perceive in a more categorical way. Rather than being fringe or exotic, as they are sometimes portrayed, we discuss how effects of language on perception naturally arise from the interactive and predictive nature of perception.

Inferential Integrity and Attention

How should we define inferential reasoning in high-level cognition? Can non-conscious representations guide or even determine high-level cognition? If so, what are the properties of such non-conscious representations? Two contemporary debates on high-level cognition center on these issues. The first concerns the possibility of cognitive penetration, or the degree and extent to which high-level cognition influences or determines low-level cognition. The second focuses on the epistemic status of conscious cognition, and on whether or not non-conscious cognition could play a similar, albeit not as fundamental, justificatory role as conscious cognition. This latter issue is at the heart of the question concerning the epistemic status of conscious awareness. This paper focuses on the epistemic standard required for inference, or inferential reasoning, to count as justificatory. The debates on the epistemic status of consciousness and cognitive penetration typically assume such a standard because high-level cognition is associated with rationality, inferentially structured thought, and the epistemic responsibility one has for the conclusions drawn through one’s inferences. The paper proposes an account of inferential-attention that explains how cognitive penetration of non-phenomenally conscious cognition and perception is possible, and why there are unconscious processes that should be considered as essential components of high-level cognition. Sections “Defining Inference” and “Accuracy Constraints: The Agency-First Account of Inference” provide a theoretical framework for understanding the multiple criteria that an adequate account of inference and rational thought must satisfy. Sections “Attention: High- and Low-Level Inferential Cognition in Various Domains” and “Advantages Concerning Rule-Following and Rationality: Not Necessarily-Phenomenal Inferential Reasoning” articulate the inferential-attention account and explain how it meets the descriptive and normative criteria for epistemic responsibility and rationality. In particular, section “Attention: High- and Low-Level Inferential Cognition in Various Domains” defends an agential interpretation of inferential-attention, which offers a resolution of the tension between conservative or consciousness-based approaches to inference and liberal approaches that allow for types of unconscious or subdoxastic processes. An agency condition on inference explains how inference is a psychological process under the control of the agent, and at the same time, it satisfies the normative condition that an inference should be responsive to reasons or evidence by being cognitively available for personal level assessment and evaluation. The key is to identify this kind of epistemic agency with attention. Section “Advantages Concerning Rule-Following and Rationality: Not Necessarily-Phenomenal Inferential Reasoning” compares this inferential-attention account with an influential agential account of inference based on conscious intuition, and it argues that the former account is preferable. This section also demonstrates the significance of inferential-attention in higher cognition, even when it is non-phenomenally conscious.

The cognitive penetrability of perception: A blocked debate and a tentative solution

Despite the extensive body of psychological findings suggesting that cognition influences perception, the debate between defenders and detractors of the cognitive penetrability of perception persists. While detractors demand more strictness in psychological experiments, proponents consider that empirical studies show that cognitive penetrability occurs. These considerations have led some theorists to propose that the debate has reached a dead end. The issue about where perception ends and cognition begins is, I argue, one of the reasons why the debate is cornered. Another reason is the inability of psychological studies to present uncontroversial interpretations of the results obtained. To dive into other kinds of empirical sources is, therefore, required to clarify the debate. In this paper, I explain where the debate is blocked, and suggest that neuroscientific evidence together with the predictive coding account, might decant the discussion on the side of the penetrability thesis.

The eyes know it: Toddlers' visual scanning of sad faces is predicted by their theory of mind skills

The current research explored toddlers' gaze fixation during a scene showing a person expressing sadness after a ball is stolen from her. The relation between the duration of gaze fixation on different parts of the person's sad face (e.g., eyes, mouth) and theory of mind skills was examined. Eye tracking data indicated that before the actor experienced the negative event, toddlers divided their fixation equally between the actor's happy face and other distracting objects, but looked longer at the face after the ball was stolen and she expressed sadness. The strongest predictor of increased focus on the sad face versus other elements of the scene was toddlers' ability to predict others' emotional reactions when outcomes fulfilled (happiness) or failed to fulfill (sadness) desires, whereas toddlers' visual perspective-taking skills predicted their more specific focusing on the actor's eyes and, for boys only, mouth. Furthermore, gender differences emerged in toddlers' fixation on parts of the scene. Taken together, these findings suggest that top-down processes are involved in the scanning of emotional facial expressions in toddlers.

Native Language Promotes Access to Visual Consciousness

Can our native language influence what we consciously perceive? Although evidence that language modulates visual discrimination has been accumulating, little is known about the relation between language structure and consciousness. We employed electroencephalography and the attentional-blink paradigm, in which targets are often unnoticed. Native Greek speakers ( N = 28), who distinguish categorically between light and dark shades of blue, showed boosted perception for this contrast compared with a verbally unmarked green contrast. Electrophysiological signatures of early visual processing predicted this behavioral advantage. German speakers ( N = 29), who have only one category for light and dark shades of blue, showed no differences in perception between blue and green targets. The behavioral consequence of categorical perception was replicated with Russian speakers ( N = 46), reproducing this novel finding. We conclude that linguistic enhancement of color contrasts provides targets with a head start in accessing visual consciousness. Our native language is thus one of the forces that determine what we consciously perceive.

Head impacts and cognitive performance in men's lacrosse

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this investigation was to record head impacts and assess cognitive function throughout a NCAA Division III men's lacrosse season.

METHODS

Fifteen NCAA Div III men's lacrosse players (age = 21.1 ± 1.5 years; height = 179 ± 7.00cm; weight = 80.74 ± 8.00kg) wore Smart Impact Monitors (SIM) (Triax Technologies, Inc., Norwalk, CT) within headbands, in 28 practices and 9 home games of one season. The SIM devices communicated with the Triax Technologies SKYi, which confirmed activated SIMs and obtained data of linear acceleration, rotational acceleration, rotational velocity, direction, and location of each head impact. A minimum threshold of 15g of force was set for head impacts to register with the SIMs. The Comprehensive Trail Making Test and Stroop Color and Word Test were administered at preseason, midseason, and postseason to assess cognitive function performance.

RESULTS

There was no significant difference found between all measures of frequency and magnitude of head impacts between games and practices. There was also no significant difference for peak linear acceleration of head impacts between different positions and no significant difference between the magnitude of force and the location of impact on the head. There was a significant increase in CTMT performance from preseason to midseason, from midseason to postseason, and preseason to postseason. There was no significant difference in Stroop test performance throughout the season.

CONCLUSION

Subconcussive head impacts in men's lacrosse appear to occur at the same magnitude in practices and games, and do not appear to be position dependent, nor head location dependent. Men's lacrosse athletes' cognitive function as measured by the CTMT, can improve, while cognitive function as measured by the Stroop test remained unchanged.

Neural Decoding of Bistable Sounds Reveals an Effect of Intention on Perceptual Organization

Auditory signals arrive at the ear as a mixture that the brain must decompose into distinct sources based to a large extent on acoustic properties of the sounds. An important question concerns whether listeners have voluntary control over how many sources they perceive. This has been studied using pure high (H) and low (L) tones presented in the repeating pattern HLH-HLH-, which can form a bistable percept heard either as an integrated whole (HLH-) or as segregated into high (H-H-) and low (-L-) sequences. Although instructing listeners to try to integrate or segregate sounds affects reports of what they hear, this could reflect a response bias rather than a perceptual effect. We had human listeners (15 males, 12 females) continuously report their perception of such sequences and recorded neural activity using MEG. During neutral listening, a classifier trained on patterns of neural activity distinguished between periods of integrated and segregated perception. In other conditions, participants tried to influence their perception by allocating attention either to the whole sequence or to a subset of the sounds. They reported hearing the desired percept for a greater proportion of time than when listening neutrally. Critically, neural activity supported these reports; stimulus-locked brain responses in auditory cortex were more likely to resemble the signature of segregation when participants tried to hear segregation than when attempting to perceive integration. These results indicate that listeners can influence how many sound sources they perceive, as reflected in neural responses that track both the input and its perceptual organization.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Can we consciously influence our perception of the external world? We address this question using sound sequences that can be heard either as coming from a single source or as two distinct auditory streams. Listeners reported spontaneous changes in their perception between these two interpretations while we recorded neural activity to identify signatures of such integration and segregation. They also indicated that they could, to some extent, choose between these alternatives. This claim was supported by corresponding changes in responses in auditory cortex. By linking neural and behavioral correlates of perception, we demonstrate that the number of objects that we perceive can depend not only on the physical attributes of our environment, but also on how we intend to experience it.

#TheDress: Categorical perception of an ambiguous color image

We present a full analysis of data from our preliminary report (Lafer-Sousa, Hermann, & Conway, 2015) and test whether #TheDress image is multistable. A multistable image must give rise to more than one mutually exclusive percept, typically within single individuals. Clustering algorithms of color-matching data showed that the dress was seen categorically, as white/gold (W/G) or blue/black (B/K), with a blue/brown transition state. Multinomial regression predicted categorical labels. Consistent with our prior hypothesis, W/G observers inferred a cool illuminant, whereas B/K observers inferred a warm illuminant; moreover, subjects could use skin color alone to infer the illuminant. The data provide some, albeit weak, support for our hypothesis that day larks see the dress as W/G and night owls see it as B/K. About half of observers who were previously familiar with the image reported switching categories at least once. Switching probability increased with professional art experience. Priming with an image that disambiguated the dress as B/K biased reports toward B/K (priming with W/G had negligible impact); furthermore, knowledge of the dress's true colors and any prior exposure to the image shifted the population toward B/K. These results show that some people have switched their perception of the dress. Finally, consistent with a role of attention and local image statistics in determining how multistable images are seen, we found that observers tended to discount as achromatic the dress component that they did not attend to: B/K reporters focused on a blue region, whereas W/G reporters focused on a golden region.