Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Synchrony Influences Estimates of Cooperation in a Public-Goods Game

Benefiting from a cooperative interaction requires people to estimate how cooperatively other members of a group will act so that they can calibrate their own behavior accordingly. We investigated whether the synchrony of a group's actions influences observers' estimates of cooperation. Participants (recruited through Prolific) watched animations of actors deciding how much to donate in a public-goods game and using a mouse to drag donations to a public pot. Participants then estimated how much was in the pot in total (as an index of how cooperative they thought the group members were). Experiment 1 (N = 136 adults) manipulated the synchrony between players' decision-making time, and Experiment 2 (N = 136 adults) manipulated the synchrony between players' decision-implementing movements. For both experiments, estimates of how much was in the pot were higher for synchronous than asynchronous groups, demonstrating that the temporal dynamics of an interaction contain signals of a group's level of cooperativity.

Speakers are more cooperative and less individual when interacting in larger group sizes

Introduction

Cooperation, acoustically signaled through vocal convergence, is facilitated when group members are more similar. Excessive vocal convergence may, however, weaken individual recognizability. This study aimed to explore whether constraints to convergence can arise in circumstances where interlocutors need to enhance their vocal individuality. Therefore, we tested the effects of group size (3 and 5 interactants) on vocal convergence and individualization in a social communication scenario in which individual recognition by voice is at stake.

Methods

In an interactive game, players had to recognize each other through their voices while solving a cooperative task online. The vocal similarity was quantified through similarities in speaker i-vectors obtained through probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA). Speaker recognition performance was measured through the system Equal Error Rate (EER).

Results

Vocal similarity between-speakers increased with a larger group size which indicates a higher cooperative vocal behavior. At the same time, there was an increase in EER for the same speakers between the smaller and the larger group size, meaning a decrease in overall recognition performance.

Discussion

The decrease in vocal individualization in the larger group size suggests that ingroup cooperation and social cohesion conveyed through acoustic convergence have priority over individualization in larger groups of unacquainted speakers.

Association between Cooperative Attitude and High-Risk Behaviors on the Spread of COVID-19 Infection among Medical Students in Japan

The impact of high-risk behaviors on the spread of COVID-19 infection among young people is an important problem to address. This study analyzed the association between cooperativeness and high-risk behaviors. We conducted a cross-sectional study among fourth-year medical students at Tokyo Medical and Dental University. The students were asked about cooperative attitude in a hypothetical situation of performing a task together with an unfamiliar classmate, who did not cooperate to complete the task previously. The response items were as follows: "cooperate", "don't want to cooperate and do it alone (non-cooperative)", and "don't want to cooperate and let the partner do it alone (punishment)". Eating out and vaccine hesitancy were also treated as high-risk behaviors. Poisson regression was used to investigate the association between cooperative attitude and each high-risk behavior, adjusted for demographics. Of the 98 students, 23 (23.5%), 44 (44.9%), and 31 (31.6%) students chose "noncooperative", "cooperative", and "punishment", respectively. Cooperative-type students exhibited 2.77-fold (PR: 2.77, 95% CI: 1.03-7.46), and punishment-type students exhibited 3.16-fold greater risk of eating or drinking out (PR: 3.16, 95% CI: 1.14-8.75) compared with those of the noncooperative type. Among medical students, the "cooperative" type and "punishment" type comprised the high-risk group for eating out during the pandemic.

Beyond Reciprocity: Forgiveness, Generosity, and Punishment in Continuing Dyadic Interactions

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy and the social sciences about how selfishness and cooperation function in dyadic social exchanges. Dyads are the foundation of our social lives, and reciprocity has long been considered the dominant strategy for dyadic interactions. We will argue the repertoire of human behavior during social exchanges ranges from punishment to generosity, and that the nuances of the relationship and interaction will dictate which behavior is likely to occur. We will examine emotional consequences of punishment, reciprocity, and forgiveness in long-term dyadic social exchanges. Finally, we argue that dyads move beyond reciprocity to a more forgiving, generous strategy to reestablish cooperation, and continue the relationship when noncooperation arises, once the motivations shift has occurred.

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Reputation and socio-ecology in humans

Reputation is a fundamental feature of human sociality as it sustains cooperative relationships among unrelated individuals. Research from various disciplines provides insights on how individuals form impressions of others, condition their behaviours based on the reputation of their interacting partners and spread or learn such reputations. However, past research has often neglected the socio-ecological conditions that can shape reputation systems and their effect on cooperation. Here, we outline how social environments, cultural values and institutions come to play a crucial role in how people navigate reputation systems. Moreover, we illustrate how these socio-ecological dimensions affect the interdependence underlying social interactions (e.g. potential recipients of reputational benefits, degree of dependence) and the extent to which reputation systems promote cooperation. To do so, we review the interdisciplinary literature that illustrates how reputation systems are shaped by the variation of prominent ecological features. Finally, we discuss the implications of a socio-ecological approach to the study of reputation and outline potential avenues for future research. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding

Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Gift Game Metatheory: Social Interaction and Interpersonal Growth

This paper analyzes Game Theory (GT) from the point of view of moral psychology and makes explicit some of its assumptions regarding the human person as a moral agent, as well as the ends of human action, and reciprocity. Using a largely philosophical methodology, we will argue that GT assumes an instrumental form of rationality underpinned by a logic of self-interest, hence placing individuals, communities, and their social practices in service of external goods and their maximization. Because of this, GT is not adequate to describe the entirety of human social existence and interaction. Nevertheless, by revealing these assumptions, GT can be amplified with another form of rationality based on realist ethics and a personalist anthropology reinforced by the logic of gift. This rationality values the singularity of each person as a holistic unity, as the center of the social realm and as an end in herself called to growth and flourishing with others, nurturing the human community through giving and receiving. We will thus provide a wider philosophical framework for GT with a series of non-mathematical axioms of what can be called a Game Metatheory (GMt). These axioms refer to society as a complex system, not to particular interactions. GMt axioms are not a model of social games, but rather an axiomatic description of social life as a game, revealing its systematic character, complexity, and possible deterioration.

Human Cooperation and the Crises of Climate Change, COVID-19, and Misinformation

Contemporary society is facing many social dilemmas-including climate change, COVID-19, and misinformation-characterized by a conflict between short-term self-interest and longer-term collective interest. The climate crisis requires paying costs today to benefit distant others (and oneself) in the future. The COVID-19 crisis requires the less vulnerable to pay costs to benefit the more vulnerable in the face of great uncertainty. The misinformation crisis requires investing effort to assess truth and abstain from spreading attractive falsehoods. Addressing these crises requires an understanding of human cooperation. To that end, we present (a) an overview of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, including mechanisms based on similarity and interaction; (b) a discussion of how reputation can incentivize cooperation via conditional cooperation and signaling; and (c) a review of social preferences that undergird the proximate psychology of cooperation, including positive regard for others, parochialism, and egalitarianism. We discuss the three focal crises facing our society through the lens of cooperation, emphasizing how cooperation research can inform our efforts to address them. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 73 is January 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Having a stake in the future and perceived population density influence intergenerational cooperation

Intergenerational common-pool resource games represent a new experimental paradigm in which the current generation's decision to cooperate or defect influences future generations who cannot reciprocate, providing key insights for sustainability science. We combine experimental and theoretical approaches to assess the roles of having a stake in the future (50% chance to pass the resource on to themselves in the next generation) and reminders of the presence of others (exposure to people-chatting sounds) on intergenerational cooperation. We find that, as expected, having a stake in the future increases cooperation with future generations, except when participants are also exposed to people-chatting sounds. We hypothesize that this interaction effect occurs because people-chatting sounds trigger a perception of large group size, which reduces the chance of individuals and their descendants benefiting from the pool in the future, thus reducing cooperation. Our results highlight the context-dependent effect of having a future stake on intergenerational cooperation for resource sustainability, and suggest an area of future work for environmental messaging.

Socializing willpower: Resolve from the outside in

Ainslie's account of willpower is conspicuously individualistic. Because other people, social influence, and culture appear only peripherally, it risks overlooking what may be resolve's deeply social roots. We identify a general "outside-in" explanatory strategy suggested by a range of recent research into human cognitive evolution, and suggest how it might illuminate the origins and more social aspects of resolve.

The Silent Killer: Consequences of Climate Change and How to Survive Past the Year 2050

There is strong scientific consensus that the climate is drastically changing due to increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and that these changes are largely due to human behavior. Scientific estimates posit that by 2050, we will begin to experience some of the most damaging consequences of climate change, which will only worsen as the world becomes more populated and resources become scarcer. Considerable progress has been made to explore technological solutions, yet useful insights from a psychological perspective are still lacking. Understanding whether and how individuals and groups cope with environmental dilemmas is the first step to combatting climate change. The key challenge is how can we reduce a tendency to inaction and to understand the psychological obstacles for behavioral change that reduce climate change. We provide a social dilemma analysis of climate change, emphasizing three important ingredients: people need to recognize their own impact on the climate, there is conflict between self-interest and collective interests, and there is a temporal dilemma involving a conflict between short-term and longer-term interest. Acknowledging these features, we provide a comprehensive overview of psychological mechanisms that support inaction, and close by discussing potential solutions. In particular, we offer recommendations at the level of individuals, communities, and governments.