Content-Free Awareness: EEG-fcMRI Correlates of Consciousness as Such in an Expert Meditator

Documenting and defining emergent phenomenology: theoretical foundations for an extensive research strategy

Meditation, psychedelics, and other similar practices or induction methods that can modulate conscious experience, are becoming increasingly popular in clinical and non-clinical settings. The phenomenology associated with such practices or modalities is vast. Many similar effects and experiences are also reported to occur spontaneously. We argue that this experiential range is still not fully described or understood in the contemporary literature, and that there is an ethical mandate to research it more extensively, starting with comprehensive documentation and definition. We review 50 recent clinical or scientific publications to assess the range of phenomena, experiences, effects, after-effects, and impacts associated with a broad variety of psychoactive compounds, meditative practices, and other modalities or events. This results in a large inventory synthesizing the reports of over 30,000 individual subjects. We then critically discuss various terms and concepts that have been used in recent literature to designate all or parts of the range this inventory covers. We make the case that specialized terminologies are needed to ground the nascent research field that is forming around this experiential domain. As a step in this direction, we propose the notion of "emergence" and some of its derivatives, such as "emergent phenomenology," as possibly foundational candidates.

Suspending the Embodied Self in Meditation Attenuates Beta Oscillations in the Posterior Medial Cortex

Human experience is imbued by the sense of being an embodied agent. The investigation of such basic self-consciousness has been hampered by the difficulty of comprehensively modulating it in the laboratory while reliably capturing ensuing subjective changes. The present preregistered study fills this gap by combining advanced meditative states with principled phenomenological interviews: 46 long-term meditators (19 female, 27 male) were instructed to modulate and attenuate their embodied self-experience during magnetoencephalographic monitoring. Results showed frequency-specific (high-beta band) activity reductions in frontoparietal and posterior medial cortices (PMC). Importantly, PMC reductions were driven by a subgroup describing radical embodied self-disruptions, including suspension of agency and dissolution of a localized first-person perspective. Neural changes were correlated with lifetime meditation and interview-derived experiential changes, but not with classical self-reports. The results demonstrate the potential of integrating in-depth first-person methods into neuroscientific experiments. Furthermore, they highlight neural oscillations in the PMC as a central process supporting the embodied sense of self.

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

Increased wakefulness as measured by the WAKE-16 is related to mindfulness and emotional self-regulation in experienced Buddhist meditators

INTRODUCTION

We tested and validated the German version of a new instrument for measuring "wakefulness," defined as "an expansive, higher-functioning, and stable state of being in which a person's vision of and relationship to the world are transformed, along with their subjective experience, their sense of identity and their conceptual outlook" (Taylor, 2017, p. 22).

METHODS

In order to test the construct validity of the new instrument (Inventory of Secular/Spiritual Wakefulness; WAKE-16), we performed a parametric comparison between a group of expert meditators (n=36) with a history of predominantly meditating in silence and demographically matched non-meditators (n=36) for the WAKE-16 and two conceptually related questionnaires of mindfulness and emotion regulation.

RESULTS

Significantly higher scores for the meditators on the WAKE-16 indicate construct validity of the new instrument. Meditators scored higher on the two mindfulness subscales "presence" and "acceptance," as well as on the SEE subscales of emotion regulation and body-related symbolization of emotions. Within the group of meditators, there were significant correlations between wakefulness and mindfulness, accepting one's own emotions, and experiencing overwhelming emotions. The only significant correlation in non-meditators was found between wakefulness and accepting one's own emotions.

DISCUSSION

The new instrument shows construct validity by discriminating between the two groups. Correlations between wakefulness and related psychological constructs indicate convergent validity. Future studies could attempt to increase discriminatory accuracy of the definition of wakefulness, as well as finding objective methods of measuring.

Whole-Brain Deactivations Precede Uninduced Mind-Blanking Reports

Mind-blanking (MB) is termed as the inability to report our immediate-past mental content. In contrast to mental states with reportable content, such as mind-wandering or sensory perceptions, the neural correlates of MB started getting elucidated only recently. A notable particularity that pertains to MB studies is the way MB is instructed for reporting, like by deliberately asking participants to "empty their minds." Such instructions were shown to induce fMRI activations in frontal brain regions, typically associated with metacognition and self-evaluative processes, suggesting that MB may be a result of intentional mental content suppression. Here, we aim at examining this hypothesis by determining the neural correlates of MB without induction. Using fMRI combined with experience-sampling in 31 participants (22 female), univariate analysis of MB reports revealed deactivations in occipital, frontal, parietal, and thalamic areas, but no activations in prefrontal regions. These findings were confirmed using Bayesian region-of-interest analysis on areas previously shown to be implicated in induced MB, where we report evidence for frontal deactivations during MB reports compared with other mental states. Contrast analysis between reports of MB and content-oriented mental states also revealed deactivations in the left angular gyrus. We propose that these effects characterize a neuronal profile of MB, where key thalamocortical nodes are unable to communicate and formulate reportable content. Collectively, we show that study instructions for MB lead to differential neural activation. These results provide mechanistic insights linked to the phenomenology of MB and point to the possibility of MB being expressed in different forms.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This study explores how brain activity changes when individuals report unidentifiable thoughts, a phenomenon known as mind-blanking (MB). It aims to detect changes in brain activations and deactivations when MB is reported spontaneously, as opposed to the neural responses that have been previously reported when MB is induced. By means of brain imaging and experience-sampling, the study points to reduced brain activity in a wide number of regions, including those mesio-frontally which were previously detected as activated during induced MB. These results enhance our understanding of the complexity of spontaneous thinking and contribute to broader discussions on consciousness and reportable experience.

Altered Brain Connectivity and Network Topological Organization in a Non-ordinary State of Consciousness Induced by Hypnosis

Hypnosis has been shown to be of clinical utility; however, its underlying neural mechanisms remain unclear. This study aims to investigate altered brain dynamics during the non-ordinary state of consciousness induced by hypnosis. We studied high-density EEG in 9 healthy participants during eyes-closed wakefulness and during hypnosis, induced by a muscle relaxation and eyes fixation procedure. Using hypotheses based on internal and external awareness brain networks, we assessed region-wise brain connectivity between six ROIs (right and left frontal, right and left parietal, upper and lower midline regions) at the scalp level and compared across conditions. Data-driven, graph-theory analyses were also carried out to characterize brain network topology in terms of brain network segregation and integration. During hypnosis, we observed (1) increased delta connectivity between left and right frontal, as well as between right frontal and parietal regions; (2) decreased connectivity for alpha (between right frontal and parietal and between upper and lower midline regions) and beta-2 bands (between upper midline and right frontal, frontal and parietal, also between upper and lower midline regions); and (3) increased network segregation (short-range connections) in delta and alpha bands, and increased integration (long-range connections) in beta-2 band. This higher network integration and segregation was measured bilaterally in frontal and right parietal electrodes, which were identified as central hub regions during hypnosis. This modified connectivity and increased network integration-segregation properties suggest a modification of the internal and external awareness brain networks that may reflect efficient cognitive-processing and lower incidences of mind-wandering during hypnosis.

Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Are They Nonconscious, Unconscious, or Subconscious? Expanding the Discussion

Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients. However, in the unconsciousness domain, there is the confusing array of terms that are regularly used interchangeably, making it quite challenging to comprehend what unconsciousness is and how it might be empirically grounded. In this opinion paper, we will provide a brief overview of the state of the field of unconsciousness and show how a rapidly evolving electroencephalogram (EEG) neuroimaging technique may offer empirical, theoretical, and practical tools to approach unconsciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness and also nonconsciousness with greater precision, particularly in cases that are borderline (as is typical in patients with DoC). Furthermore, we will provide a clear description of three distant notions of (un)consciousness (unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness) and discuss how they relate to the experiential selfhood which is essential for comprehending the moral significance of what makes life worth living.

An updated classification of meditation methods using principles of taxonomy and systematics

This paper revisits the proposal for the classification of meditation methods which we introduced in our initial 2013 publication, "Toward a Universal Taxonomy and Definition of Meditation". At that time, we advanced the thesis that meditation methods could be effectively segregated into three orthogonal categories by integrating the taxonomic principle of functional essentialism and the paradigm of Affect and Cognition; and we presented relevant research findings which supported that assertion. This iteration expands upon those theoretical and methodological elements by articulating a more comprehensive Three Tier Classification System which accounts for the full range of meditation methods; and demonstrates how recent neuroscience research continues to validate and support our thesis. This paper also introduces a novel criterion-based protocol for formulating classification systems of meditation methods, and demonstrates how this model can be used to compare and evaluate various other taxonomy proposals that have been published over the past 15 years.

A Predictive Biomarker Model Using Quantitative Electroencephalography in Adolescent Major Depressive Disorder

Background: With evolving understanding of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, demand for biomarkers for psychiatric disorders in children and adolescents has grown dramatically. This study utilized quantitative electroencephalography (qEEG) to develop a predictive model for adolescent major depressive disorder (MDD). We hypothesized that youth with MDD compared to healthy controls (HCs) could be differentiated using a singular logistic regression model that utilized qEEG data alone. Methods: qEEG data and psychometric measures were obtained in adolescents aged 14-17 years with MDD (n = 35) and age- and gender-matched HCs (n = 14). qEEG in four frequency bands (alpha, beta, theta, and delta) was collected and coherence, cross-correlation, and power data streams obtained. A two-stage analytical framework was then used to develop the final logistic regression model, which was then evaluated using a receiver-operating characteristic curve (ROC) analysis. Results: Within the initial analysis, six qEEG dyads (all coherence) had significant predictive values. Within the final biomarkers, just four predictors, including F3-C3 (R frontal) alpha coherence, P3-O1 (R parietal) theta coherence, CZ-PZ (central) beta coherence, and P8-O2 (L parietal occipital) theta power were used in the final model, which yielded an ROC area of 0.8226. Conclusions: We replicated our previous findings of qEEG differences between adolescents and HCs and successfully developed a single-value predictive model with a robust ROC area. Furthermore, the brain areas involved in behavioral disinhibition and resting state/default mode networks were again shown to be involved in the observed differences. Thus, qEEG appears to be a potential low-cost and effective intermediate biomarker for MDD in youth.

Mind blanking is a distinct mental state linked to a recurrent brain profile of globally positive connectivity during ongoing mentation

Mind blanking (MB) is a waking state during which we do not report any mental content. The phenomenology of MB challenges the view of a constantly thinking mind. Here, we comprehensively characterize the MB's neurobehavioral profile with the aim to delineate its role during ongoing mentation. Using functional MRI experience sampling, we show that the reportability of MB is less frequent, faster, and with lower transitional dynamics than other mental states, pointing to its role as a transient mental relay. Regarding its neural underpinnings, we observed higher global signal amplitude during MB reports, indicating a distinct physiological state. Using the time-varying functional connectome, we show that MB reports can be classified with high accuracy, suggesting that MB has a unique neural composition. Indeed, a pattern of global positive-phase coherence shows the highest similarity to the connectivity patterns associated with MB reports. We interpret this pattern's rigid signal architecture as hindering content reportability due to the brain's inability to differentiate signals in an informative way. Collectively, we show that MB has a unique neurobehavioral profile, indicating that nonreportable mental events can happen during wakefulness. Our results add to the characterization of spontaneous mentation and pave the way for more mechanistic investigations of MB's phenomenology.

Beyond the veil of duality-topographic reorganization model of meditation

Meditation can exert a profound impact on our mental life, with proficient practitioners often reporting an experience free of boundaries between a separate self and the environment, suggesting an explicit experience of "nondual awareness." What are the neural correlates of such experiences and how do they relate to the idea of nondual awareness itself? In order to unravel the effects that meditation has on the brain's spatial topography, we review functional magnetic resonance imaging brain findings from studies specific to an array of meditation types and meditator experience levels. We also review findings from studies that directly probe the interaction between meditation and the experience of the self. The main results are (i) decreased posterior default mode network (DMN) activity, (ii) increased central executive network (CEN) activity, (iii) decreased connectivity within posterior DMN as well as between posterior and anterior DMN, (iv) increased connectivity within the anterior DMN and CEN, and (v) significantly impacted connectivity between the DMN and CEN (likely a nonlinear phenomenon). Together, these suggest a profound organizational shift of the brain's spatial topography in advanced meditators-we therefore propose a topographic reorganization model of meditation (TRoM). One core component of the TRoM is that the topographic reorganization of DMN and CEN is related to a decrease in the mental-self-processing along with a synchronization with the more nondual layers of self-processing, notably interoceptive and exteroceptive-self-processing. This reorganization of the functionality of both brain and self-processing can result in the explicit experience of nondual awareness. In conclusion, this review provides insight into the profound neural effects of advanced meditation and proposes a result-driven unifying model (TRoM) aimed at identifying the inextricably tied objective (neural) and subjective (experiential) effects of meditation.

Reducing and deducing the structures of consciousness through meditation

According to many first-person accounts, consciousness comprises a subject-object structure involving a mental action or attitude starting from the “subjective pole” upon an object of experience. In recent years, many paradigms have been developed to manipulate and empirically investigate the object of consciousness. However, well-controlled investigation of subjective aspects of consciousness has been more challenging. One way, subjective aspects of consciousness are proposed to be studied is using meditation states that alter its subject-object structure. Most work to study consciousness in this way has been done using Buddhist meditation traditions and techniques. There is another meditation tradition that has been around for at least as long as early Buddhist traditions (if not longer) with the central goal of developing a fine-grained first-person understanding of consciousness and its constituents by its manipulation through meditation, namely the Tantric tradition of Yoga. However, due to the heavy reliance of Yogic traditions on the ancient Indian Samkhya philosophical system, their insights about consciousness have been more challenging to translate into contemporary research. Where such translation has been attempted, they have lacked accompanying phenomenological description of the procedures undertaken for making the precise subject-object manipulations as postulated. In this paper, I address these issues by first detailing how Tantric Yoga philosophy can be effectively translated as a systematic phenomenological account of consciousness spanning the entirety of the subject-object space divided into four “structures of consciousness” from subject to object. This follows from the work of the 20th century polymath and founder of the Tantric Yoga school of Ananda Marga, Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar, who expounded on the “cognitivization” of Samkhya philosophy. I then detail stepwise meditation procedures that make theoretical knowledge of these structures of consciousness a practical reality to a Tantric Yoga meditator in the first-person. This is achieved by entering meditative states through stepwise experiential reduction of the structures of consciousness from object to subject, as part of their meditative goal of “self-realization.” I end by briefly discussing the overlap of these putative meditation states with proposed states from other meditation traditions, and how these states could help advance an empirical study of consciousness.

Changes in Subjective Time and Self during Meditation

Simple Summary

Meditation induces an altered state of consciousness, which is often described by meditators as being in the present moment and losing one’s sense of time and self. Few studies have assessed these experiences. We invited 22 experienced meditators to participate in two experimental sessions lasting 20 min each (1) to meditate and (2) to read a story as a control condition. We measured their heart and breathing rates during these two sessions and conducted a metronome task before and after each session. In this task, participants had to group metronome beats into perceptual units, a measure of the duration of the present moment. In comparison to the reading condition, the heart and breathing rates showed a mix of increased as well as decreased bodily activity in the meditation condition. In the meditation condition, participants subjectively perceived their body boundaries less strongly, paid less attention to time, and felt time pass more quickly compared to the control condition. No differences between conditions were apparent for the metronome task. This study is the first to show how the sense of self and time are relatively diminished during meditation.

Abstract

This study examined the effects of meditative states in experienced meditators on present-moment awareness, subjective time, and self-awareness while assessing meditation-induced changes in heart-rate variability and breathing rate. A sample of 22 experienced meditators who practiced meditation techniques stressing awareness of the present moment (average 20 years of practice) filled out subjective scales pertaining to sense of time and the bodily self and accomplished a metronome task as an operationalization of present-moment awareness before and after a 20 min meditation session (experimental condition) and a 20 min reading session (control condition) according to a within-subject design. A mixed pattern of increased sympathetic and parasympathetic activity was found during meditation regarding heart-rate measures. Breathing intervals were prolonged during meditation. Participants perceived their body boundaries as less salient during meditation than while reading the story; they also felt time passed more quickly and they paid less attention to time during meditation. No significant differences between conditions became apparent for the metronome task. This is probably the first quantitative study to show how the experience of time during a meditation session is altered together with the sense of the bodily self.

Nothingness Is All There Is: An Exploration of Objectless Awareness During Sleep

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called objectless awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labeled as “nothingness phase” since it described what participants took to be an experience of “nothingness.” This common phase was characterized by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being “somewhere”—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded.

Stable Consciousness? The "Hard Problem" Historically Reconstructed and in Perspective of Neurophenomenological Research on Meditation

Finding a scientific, third-person explanation of subjective experience or phenomenal content is commonly called the "hard problem" of consciousness. There has recently been a surge in neuropsychological research on meditation in general and long-term meditators in particular. These experimental subjects are allegedly capable of generating a stable state of consciousness over a prolonged period of time, which makes experimentation with them an interesting paradigm for consciousness research. This perspective article starts out with a historical reconstruction of the "hard problem," tracing it back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Emil du Bois-Reymond in the 18th and 19th century, respectively, and the problem of introspection as already acknowledged by Wilhelm Wundt in the 19th century. It then discusses the prospects of research on long-term meditators from a contemporary perspective and with respect to the neurophenomenological research program already advocated by Francisco J. Varela.

Tackling the Electro-Topography of the Selves Through the Sphere Model of Consciousness

In the current hypothesis paper, we propose a novel examination of consciousness and self-awareness through the neuro-phenomenological theoretical model known as the Sphere Model of Consciousness (SMC). Our aim is to create a practical instrument to address several methodological issues in consciousness research. We present a preliminary attempt to validate the SMC via a simplified electrophysiological topographic map of the Self. This map depicts the gradual shift from faster to slower frequency bands that appears to mirror the dynamic between the various SMC states of Self. In order to explore our hypothesis that the SMC's different states of Self correspond to specific frequency bands, we present a mini-review of studies examining the electrophysiological activity that occurs within the different states of Self and in the context of specific meditation types. The theoretical argument presented here is that the SMC's hierarchical organization of three states of the Self mirrors the hierarchical organization of Focused Attention, Open Monitoring, and Non-Dual meditation types. This is followed by testable predictions and potential applications of the SMC and the hypotheses derived from it. To our knowledge, this is the first integrated electrophysiological account that combines types of Self and meditation practices. We suggest this electro-topographic framework of the Selves enables easier, clearer conceptualization of the connections between meditation types as well as increased understanding of wakefulness states and altered states of consciousness.

Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such

Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a two-dimensional (2D) map that has global levels or states on one axis and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, awareness is conflated either with general alertness or with phenomenal content. This contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously, I have proposed that consciousness as such or nondual awareness-a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation-is a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by this 2D map of states and contents. Here, I propose an implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the z-axis to the existing 2D map of consciousness. This gradient informs about the degree to which nondual awareness is manifest in any experience, independent of the specifics of global state or local content. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties. In the first part, I outline nondual awareness or consciousness as such in terms of its phenomenal description, its function and its neural correlates. In the second part, I explore the implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness and how including it as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind-altering substances or spontaneously.

Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution

Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by 'subjective valuation'-a deep inference about the precision or 'predictability' of the self-evidencing ('fitness-promoting') outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of 'selflessness'; in particular the 'totally selfless' states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.

First-person dimensions of mental agency in visual counting of moving objects

Counting objects, especially moving ones, is an important capacity that has been intensively explored in experimental psychology and related disciplines. The common approach is to trace the three counting principles (estimating, subitizing, serial counting) back to functional constructs like the Approximate Number System and the Object Tracking System. While usually attempts are made to explain these competing models by computational processes at the neural level, their first-person dimensions have been hardly investigated so far. However, explanatory gaps in both psychological and philosophical terms may suggest a methodologically complementary approach that systematically incorporates introspective data. For example, the mental-action debate raises the question of whether mental activity plays only a marginal role in otherwise automatic cognitive processes or if it can be developed in such a way that it can count as genuine mental action. To address this question not only theoretically, we conducted an exploratory study with a moving-dots task and analyze the self-report data qualitatively and quantitatively on different levels. Building on this, a multi-layered, consciousness-immanent model of counting is presented, which integrates the various counting principles and concretizes mental agency as developing from pre-reflective to increasingly conscious mental activity.

The Phenomenology of “Pure” Consciousness as Reported by an Experienced Meditator of the Tibetan Buddhist Karma Kagyu Tradition. Analysis of Interview Content Concerning Different Meditative States

A philosopher and a cognitive neuroscientist conversed with Buddhist lama Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt (TLB) about the unresolved phenomenological concerns and logical questions surrounding “pure” consciousness or minimal phenomenal experience (MPE), a quasi-contentless, non-dual state whose phenomenology of “emptiness” is often described in terms of the phenomenal quality of luminosity that experienced meditators have reported occurs in deep meditative states. Here, we present the excerpts of the conversation that relate to the question of how it is possible to first have and later retrieve such non-dual states of selflessness and timelessness that are unrelated to sensory input. According to TLB, a “pure” experience of consciousness contains the phenomenal quality of luminous clarity, which is experienced solely in the transitional phase from the non-dual state of absolute emptiness to the state of minimal emptiness, when the person gradually returns to duality. However, this quality of luminous clarity can also be experienced in non-minimal states as in the experiential mode of being awakened. TLB describes this transition as a kind of ephemeral afterglow in the form of a maximally abstract phenomenal quality, i.e., luminosity, which justifies the conclusion of having been in a state of “pure” consciousness.

The plasticity of well-being: A training-based framework for the cultivation of human flourishing

Research indicates that core dimensions of psychological well-being can be cultivated through intentional mental training. Despite growing research in this area and an increasing number of interventions designed to improve psychological well-being, the field lacks a unifying framework that clarifies the dimensions of human flourishing that can be cultivated. Here, we integrate evidence from well-being research, cognitive and affective neuroscience, and clinical psychology to highlight four core dimensions of well-being-awareness, connection, insight, and purpose. We discuss the importance of each dimension for psychological well-being, identify mechanisms that underlie their cultivation, and present evidence of their neural and psychological plasticity. This synthesis highlights key insights, as well as important gaps, in the scientific understanding of well-being and how it may be cultivated, thus highlighting future research directions.

Correlates of Silence: Enhanced Microstructural Changes in the Uncinate Fasciculus

Silence is an important aspect of various meditation practices, but little work has focused specifically on the underlying neurophysiology of silence-related meditative practice, and on how it relates to the self-reported experiences of practitioners. To expand current knowledge regarding the neurophenomenology of silence in meditation, we directly investigated first-person reports of silence-related experiences during the practice of Quadrato Motor Training (QMT) and their association with changes in fractional anisotropy (FA). Participants recorded their cognitive, emotional, and physical experiences upon beginning QMT and again after 6 weeks of QMT practice. These reports were evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively. Findings showed that change between the two time points in self-reported silence-related experiences was negatively correlated with change in attentional effort, and positively correlated with changes in the left uncinate fasciculus. These results expand current knowledge regarding the neuroanatomical correlates of silence-related experiences during meditation.

15 Years MR-encephalography

Objective

This review article gives an account of the development of the MR-encephalography (MREG) method, which started as a mere ‘Gedankenexperiment’ in 2005 and gradually developed into a method for ultrafast measurement of physiological activities in the brain. After going through different approaches covering k-space with radial, rosette, and concentric shell trajectories we have settled on a stack-of-spiral trajectory, which allows full brain coverage with (nominal) 3 mm isotropic resolution in 100 ms. The very high acceleration factor is facilitated by the near-isotropic k-space coverage, which allows high acceleration in all three spatial dimensions.

Methods

The methodological section covers the basic sequence design as well as recent advances in image reconstruction including the targeted reconstruction, which allows real-time feedback applications, and—most recently—the time-domain principal component reconstruction (tPCR), which applies a principal component analysis of the acquired time domain data as a sparsifying transformation to improve reconstruction speed as well as quality.

Applications

Although the BOLD-response is rather slow, the high speed acquisition of MREG allows separation of BOLD-effects from cardiac and breathing related pulsatility. The increased sensitivity enables direct detection of the dynamic variability of resting state networks as well as localization of single interictal events in epilepsy patients. A separate and highly intriguing application is aimed at the investigation of the glymphatic system by assessment of the spatiotemporal patterns of cardiac and breathing related pulsatility.

Discussion

MREG has been developed to push the speed limits of fMRI. Compared to multiband-EPI this allows considerably faster acquisition at the cost of reduced image quality and spatial resolution.

Understanding the Nature of Oneness Experience in Meditators Using Collective Intelligence Methods

Research on meditation and mindfulness practice has flourished in recent years. While much of this research has focused on well-being outcomes associated with mindfulness practice, less research has focused on how perception of self may change as a result of mindfulness practice, or whether these changes in self-perception may be mechanisms of mindfulness in action. This is somewhat surprising given that mindfulness derives from traditions often described as guiding people to realize and experience the non-separation of self from the world or its "oneness" with the whole of reality. The current study used a collective intelligence methodology, Interactive Management (IM), to explore the nature of oneness experiences. Five IM sessions were conducted with five separate groups of experienced meditators. Participants generated, clarified, and selected oneness self-perceptions they believed most characterized their experience both during meditation and in their everyday experience in the world. Each group also developed structural models describing how highly ranked aspects of oneness self-perceptions are interrelated in a system. Consistent themes and categories of oneness experience appeared across the five IM sessions, with changes in the sense of space (unboundedness), time, identity, wholeness, and flow highlighted as most influential. Results are discussed in light of emerging theory and research on oneness self-perception and non-dual awareness.

Reflections on Inner and Outer Silence and Consciousness Without Contents According to the Sphere Model of Consciousness

In the current hypothesis paper, we propose that focusing attention on silence can be used as a paradigm conceptually similar to sensory deprivation, to study consciousness without content. We briefly overview recent influential models of consciousness and consider how they assess the relationship between consciousness and contents. After discussing the strengths and weaknesses of current models, we suggest an extension based on the Sphere Model of Consciousness (SMC) and introduce new definitions for identification and self-awareness as states of consciousness. We further compare Paoletti's theoretical model for the development of self with other influential models, highlighting similarities and differences. We conclude with a discussion of how attentional focus on silence can be empirically tested.

Consciousness Without Content: A Look at Evidence and Prospects

Many traditions in the East have proposed that consciousness without content is possible and could be achieved with mental training. However, it is not clear whether such a state is possible given that intentionality is a critical property of mentality and consciousness in many theories of consciousness. A prominent recent attempt to account for such states of "minimal phenomenal experience" is the ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS) model, which proposes a specific type of non-conceptual representational content to address such a state. Consciousness without content can also be understood by studying related or similar states of minimal phenomenal experience and this paper discusses such findings from such states including dreamless sleep experience and their implications. One way to argue for the need for proposing consciousness without content is to locate a property of consciousness that would necessitate postulating it. A continuous state of consciousness without content may be needed to understand continuity of conscious experience. Finally, I discuss the implications of consciousness without content for current theories of consciousness.

Inner Experience - Direct Access to Reality: A Complementarist Ontology and Dual Aspect Monism Support a Broader Epistemology

Ontology, the ideas we have about the nature of reality, and epistemology, our concepts about how to gain knowledge about the world, are interdependent. Currently, the dominant ontology in science is a materialist model, and associated with it an empiricist epistemology. Historically speaking, there was a more comprehensive notion at the cradle of modern science in the middle ages. Then “experience” meant both inner, or first person, and outer, or third person, experience. With the historical development, experience has come to mean only sense experience of outer reality. This has become associated with the ontology that matter is the most important substance in the universe, everything else—consciousness, mind, values, etc., —being derived thereof or reducible to it. This ontology is insufficient to explain the phenomena we are living with—consciousness, as a precondition of this idea, or anomalous cognitions. These have a robust empirical grounding, although we do not understand them sufficiently. The phenomenology, though, demands some sort of non-local model of the world and one in which consciousness is not derivative of, but coprimary with matter. I propose such a complementarist dual aspect model of consciousness and brain, or mind and matter. This then also entails a different epistemology. For if consciousness is coprimary with matter, then we can also use a deeper exploration of consciousness as happens in contemplative practice to reach an understanding of the deep structure of the world, for instance in mathematical or theoretical intuition, and perhaps also in other areas such as in ethics. This would entail a kind of contemplative science that would also complement our current experiential mode that is exclusively directed to the outside aspect of our world. Such an epistemology might help us with various issues, such as good theoretical and other intuitions.

What happens in the brain of meditators when perception changes but not the stimulus?

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.