EEG Correlates of Involuntary Cognitions in the Reflexive Imagery Task

The habituation of higher-order conscious processes: Evidence from mental arithmetic

A recurring idea in psychology is that one is conscious only of the "outputs" of mental operations, but not of the operations themselves. Often, such "entry into consciousness" occurs involuntarily. To investigate involuntary entry, some experimentalists have used the reflexive imagery task (RIT). The RIT has revealed that, under certain conditions, external stimuli (e.g., line drawings) can elicit involuntary entry of high-level cognitions. In the basic version of the task, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed not to subvocalize (i.e., say in one's head) the names of these objects. Participants cannot suppress these subvocalizations on a majority of the trials. It has been proposed that, if RIT effects resemble a reflex, then perhaps they will habituate as reflexes do. In the "habituation" variant of the RIT, the same stimulus object (e.g., CAT) is presented on ten consecutive trials (ten "instantiations"), in order to induce habituation (i.e., a weakened RIT effect). It remains unknown whether such habituation effects arise for stimulus-elicited processes that depend, not on subvocalization, but on more complex processes, such as mental arithmetic. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a conceptual replication of the "habituation" RIT that involves, on each trial, the participant trying not to add two numbers (e.g., 14 and 2). We assessed whether the habituation effects were stimulus-specific or set-specific. Understanding the boundary conditions of the RIT effect and its habituation illuminates the limits of unconscious processes and the role of conscious processing.

Involuntary refreshing of mental representations

Laboratory tasks have revealed that mental representations (e.g., mental imagery) can enter consciousness in a manner that is involuntary, reliable, and insuppressible. These effects illuminate the capacities of involuntary processes as well as the function of voluntary, conscious processing. The Reflexive Imagery Task was developed a decade ago to investigate these involuntary effects systematically. Can refreshing yield such involuntary effects? Refreshing is the reactivating in mind of a mental representation that was activated moments ago. It is associated with mental rehearsal and executive function. We investigated whether a mental representation (subvocalization of an object name) can arise in consciousness involuntarily after a delayed interval, when the relevant stimulus is no longer present, and in response to a cue. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed not to refresh a previously presented (6 s before) stimulus in response to a cue. Involuntary refreshing occurred on a substantive proportion (0.56) of the trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding (proportion of the trials = 0.53) with a refreshing task that was more challenging than that of Experiment 1. Our findings suggest that mental representations arising from processes such as refreshing can occur involuntarily. We discuss the theoretical implications of this conclusion.

Insuppressible cognitions in the reflexive imagery task: Insights and future directions

In 1959, Neal Miller made the bold claim that the Stimulus-Response, Behaviorist models of that era were describing the way in which stimuli lead to the entry of contents into consciousness ("entry," for short). Today, researchers have begun to investigate the link between external stimuli and involuntary entry, using paradigms such as the reflexive imagery task (RIT), the focus of our review. The RIT has revealed that stimuli can elicit insuppressible entry of high-level cognitions. Knowledge of the boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminates the limitations of involuntary processes and the role of consciousness in the regulation of behavior. We review the boundary conditions of this paradigm as well as its systematic effects. Systematic effects are unlikely to be due to experimental demand. While reviewing each effect, we consider its theoretical implications. In addition, throughout our review, we discuss future directions for the study of insuppressible entry using the RIT. Last, we discuss a theoretical development (passive frame theory) that stems from the RIT and illuminates how involuntary entry and encapsulation, though at times disadvantageous for the actor, are essential for adaptive action selection during the course of ontogeny.

Exploring resting frontal EEG and reflective functioning in maternal substance use

Maternal substance use is associated with altered neural activity and poor offspring outcomes, which may be facilitated by suboptimal caregiving in the form of impaired parental reflective functioning (PRF). To investigate these associations, the resting-state frontal electroencephalography (EEG) power of 48 substance-using mothers and 37 non-substance-using mothers were examined, specifying seven frequency bands: delta, theta, alpha, alpha1, alpha2, beta, and gamma. Substance-using mothers exhibited enhanced beta and gamma spectral power compared to non-substance-using mothers, potentially reflecting higher arousal states in substance-using mothers. There were no between-group differences in any component of PRF (i.e., levels of pre-mentalizing, certainty, and interest and curiosity). Whole-sample analyses revealed significant positive correlations between pre-mentalizing and delta spectral power. Taken together, these findings suggest potential neural correlates of maternal substance use and PRF, providing an important next step into examining associations between maternal substance use and poor child outcomes.