Subjective Confidence in the Response to Personality Questions: Some Insight Into the Construction of People's Responses to Test Items

Subjective Confidence as a Monitor of the Replicability of the Response

Confidence is commonly assumed to monitor the accuracy of responses. However, intriguing results, examined in the light of philosophical discussions of epistemic justification, suggest that confidence actually monitors the reliability of choices rather than (directly) their accuracy. The focus on reliability is consistent with the view that the construction of truth has much in common with the construction of reality: extracting reliable properties that afford prediction. People are assumed to make a binary choice by sampling cues from a "collective wisdomware," and their confidence is based on the consistency of these cues, in line with the self-consistency model. Here, however, I propose that internal consistency is taken to index the reliability of choices themselves-the likelihood that they will be repeated. The results of 10 studies using binary decisions from different domains indicated that confidence in a choice predicts its replicability both within individuals and across individuals. This was so for domains for which choices have a truth value and for those for which they do not. For the former domains, differences in replicability mediated the prediction of accuracy whether confidence was diagnostic or counterdiagnostic of accuracy. Metatheoretical, methodological, and practical implications are discussed.

Strengthening the Link between Vaccine Predispositions and Vaccine Advocacy through Certainty

Background. Instruments designed to assess individual differences in predispositions towards vaccination are useful in predicting vaccination-related outcomes. Despite their importance, there is relatively little evidence regarding the conditions under which these instruments are more predictive. The current research was designed to improve the ability of these kinds of instruments to predict vaccination advocacy by considering the certainty associated with the responses to vaccination scales. Method. Across two studies, participants completed the Beliefs about Medicines Questionnaire BMQ scale (Study 1) or the Vaccination Attitudes Examination (VAX) scale (Study 2). The certainty participants had in their responses to each scale was either measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2). Intentions to advocate in favor of vaccination served as the criterion measure in both studies. Results. As expected, the scales significantly predicted vaccination advocacy, contributing to enhancing the predictive validity of the instruments used in the studies. Most relevant, certainty moderated the extent to which these scales predicted vaccination advocacy, with greater consistency between the initial scores and the subsequent advocacy willingness obtained for those with higher certainty. Conclusions. Certainty can be useful to predict when the relationship between vaccination-related cognitions (i.e., beliefs or attitudes) and advocacy willingness is likely to be stronger.

"You don't know what this means to me" - Uncovering idiosyncratic influences on metamemory judgments

Studies of the mind often focus on general effects on cognitive processes, whereas influences of idiosyncratic interactions between participants and items evade experimental control or assessment. For instance, assessments of one's own learning and memory processes-metamemory judgments-are attributed to people's reliance on commonly shared characteristics of study materials (e.g., word frequency) or learning conditions (e.g., number of study opportunities). By contrast, few studies have investigated how idiosyncratic information such as the personal significance of items affects memory and metamemory. We propose that hitherto elusive idiosyncratic influences on metamemory can be measured by the C component of Egon Brunswik's (1952) lens model. In two experiments, we made randomly chosen items personally significant (Experiment 1) or assessed the personal significance of items (Experiment 2). Personal significance increased both metamemory judgments and memory performance. Including personal significance as a predictor in the lens model reduced C, whereas including familiarity from a previous encounter did not. Hence, at least part of the lens model's C parameter captures idiosyncratic influences on metamemory. The C parameter may serve as a useful tool for future research.