Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality

The Construct Validity of the Childhood Joint Attention Rating Scale (C-JARS) in School-Aged Autistic Children

Preliminary evidence from the Childhood Joint Attention Rating Scale (C-JARS; Mundy et al., 2017) suggests symptoms related to diminished joint attention and the spontaneous sharing of experience with others can be assessed with a parent-report measure in children and adolescents with autism. This study was designed to expand on the previous study by examining the validity of both a Social Symptom (SS) and a Prosocial (PS) scale of the C-JARS in a study of school-aged autistic children (n  = 89) with and without co-occurring intellectual disability (ID), as well as an age matched neurotypical sample (n  = 62). Results indicated that both C-JARS scales were sensitive and specific with respect to identifying the diagnostic status of the children. In addition, the PS scale was sensitive to differences in cognitive abilities (IQ) and sex differences in the autism group. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that joint attention and spontaneous sharing of experience symptoms are not only characteristic of preschool children with autism but may also constitute a developmentally continuous dimension of the social phenotype of autism that can be measured in school-aged children.

Analysis of the cognitive processes involved in creating and sustaining cooperative group activity

A cooperative group activity (CGA) and shared intentionality are two phenomena whereby two or more individuals engage in an activity with the intention that the group will succeed, that is, to act as a "we. " This ability to act together as a "we" is an important human psychological feature and has been argued to demarcate an important developmental step. Many CGA and shared intentionality theories have centered around philosophical problems of what counts as a "we" and how to give a cognitively plausible account of children's engagement in such activities, e.g., pretend play by toddlers. The aims of this paper are (i) to highlight the importance of distinguishing between creating and sustaining a CGA, since they require different cognitive abilities, (ii) to give a cognitively plausible account of the creation of a CGA, and iii) to present a formal framework of the sustainability of a CGA that can illuminate how engagement in a CGA stimulates cognitive change in its members. In the first part (section Creating cooperative group activity) of the paper, several theoretical problems are discussed, including the common knowledge problem, the jointness problem, the central problem, and the cognitively plausible explanation problem. The section ends with a cognitively plausible account of the creation of a CGA. The second part (section Sustainability of cooperative group activity) of the paper presents a formal framework of belief compatibility and trust relations. It explores how engagement in a CGA places certain cognitive constraints on its members while stimulating cognitive change and development. The paper ends with a discussion of empirical postulations derived from this account.

Showing and giving: from incipient to conventional forms

Understanding humans' motivation and capacity for social interaction requires understanding communicative gestures. Gestures are one of the earliest means that infants employ to communicate with others, and showing and giving are among the earliest-emerging gestures. However, there are limited data on the processes that lead up to the emergence of conventional showing and giving gestures. This study aimed to provide such data. Twenty-five infants were assessed longitudinally at monthly intervals from 6 to 10 months of age using a variety of methods (elicitation procedures, free play observations and maternal interviews), as well as via questionnaires conducted at 11-12 months. A particular focus was on pre-conventional, incipient gestures, behaviours that involved some components of conventional gestures, but lacked other important components. We present observational evidence that at least some of these behaviours (observed as early as 7 months of age) were communicative and make the case for how conventional showing and giving may emerge gradually in the context of social interactions. We also discuss the influence of maternal interpretations of these early behaviours on their development. Overall, the study seeks to draw attention to the importance of understanding the cognitive, motor and interactional processes that lead to the emergence of infants' earliest communicative gestures. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Two modes of being together: The levels of intersubjectivity and human relatedness in neuroscience and psychoanalytic thinking

The notion of intersubjectivity has achieved a primary status in contemporary psychoanalytic debate, stimulating new theoretical proposals as well as controversies. This paper presents an overview of the main contributions on inter-subjectivity in the field of neurosciences. In humans as well as-probably-in other species, the ability for emotional resonance is guaranteed early in development. Based on this capacity, a primary sense of connectedness is established that can be defined inter-subjective in that it entails sharing affective states and intentions with caregivers. We propose to define such a form of inter-subjectivity as contingent, since the infant's early abilities for resonance do not imply the more generalized capacity to permanently conceive of the relationship outside the realm of current interactions and the infant-caregiver's mutual correspondence of internal states. This form of connection, hence, results in a self-referential, bodily, and affectively codified, context- and time dependent, like-me experience of interactions. The gradual maturation of brain structures and processes as well as interactive experiences allow proper intersubjectivity exchanges, grounded on new intentional and representational capacities, to evolve. In this more mature form of intersubjectivity, the individual is allowed to conceive of her own psychic space both as distinct and as possibly connected with the other's contents and experience, even in the absence of current behavioral indicators of such correspondence. This multi-layered model of intersubjectivity, which is embraced by current neuroscience research, seems to allow for new interpretations of psychoanalytic models of human relatedness based upon classic clinical observations.

Early Attachment and the Development of Social Communication: A Neuropsychological Approach

Social communication forms the foundation of human relationships. Social communication, i.e., the appropriate understanding and use of verbal and non-verbal communication within a social context, profoundly impacts mental health across the lifespan and is also highly vulnerable to neurodevelopmental threats and social adversities. There exists a strong interconnection between the development of language and other higher cognitive skills, mediated, in part, through the early attachment relationship. Consideration of how attachment links to brain development can help us understand individuals with social communication difficulties across the lifespan. The early attachment relationship supports the development of the foundational constructs of social communication. In this paper, a neuropsychological perspective was applied to social communication, which integrated evidence from early attachment theory, examining the underpinnings of social communication components identified by the SoCom model, namely socio-cognitive, socio-emotional, and socio-linguistic constructs. A neuropsychological perspective underscores the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration. This should also inform approaches to prevention, policy, intervention, and advocacy for individuals with or at risk for social communication impairments, as well as their families.

Language, Childhood, and Fire: How We Learned to Love Sharing Stories

Stories do not fossilize. Thus, exploring tales shared during prehistory, the longest part of human history inevitably becomes speculative. Nevertheless, various attempts have been made to find a more scientifically valid way into our deep human past of storytelling. Following the social brain hypothesis, we suggest including into the theory of human storytelling more fine-grained and evidence-based findings (from archaeology, the cognitive sciences, and evolutionary psychology) about the manifold exaptation and adaptation, genetic changes, and phenotypic plasticity in the deep human past, which all shaped the emergence of storytelling in hominins. We identify three preconditions for humans sharing stories: first, the long evolution of language in the different taxa as one of the preconditions of ostensive signaling; second, the pivotal role of childhood in the evolution of collaborative intentionality; and third, the role of fireside chats in the rise of elaborative (i.e., narrative) sharing of stories. We propose that humans, albeit perhaps no other hominins learned to understand others through sharing stories, not only as intentional agents, but also as mental ones.