Kidneys for Sale: Empirical Evidence From Iran

Challenges to establishing and maintaining kidney transplantation programs in developing countries: What are the coping strategies?

Kidney transplantation (KT) is the optimal form of renal replacement therapy for patients with end-stage renal diseases. However, this health service is not available to all patients, especially in developing countries. The deceased donor KT programs are mostly absent, and the living donor KT centers are scarce. Single-center studies presenting experiences from developing countries usually report a variety of challenges. This review addresses these challenges and the opposing strategies by reviewing the single-center experiences of developing countries. The financial challenges hamper the infrastructural and material availability, coverage of transplant costs, and qualification of medical personnel. The sociocultural challenges influence organ donation, equity of beneficence, and regular follow-up work. Low interests and motives for transplantation may result from high medicolegal responsibilities in KT practice, intense potential psychosocial burdens, complex qualification protocols, and low productivity or compensation for KT practice. Low medical literacy about KT advantages is prevalent among clinicians, patients, and the public. The inefficient organizational and regulatory oversight is translated into inefficient healthcare systems, absent national KT programs and registries, uncoordinated job descriptions and qualification protocols, uncoordinated on-site investigations with regulatory constraints, and the prevalence of commercial KT practices. These challenges resulted in noticeable differences between KT services in developed and developing countries. The coping strategies can be summarized in two main mechanisms: The first mechanism is maximizing the available resources by increasing the rates of living kidney donation, promoting the expertise of medical personnel, reducing material consumption, and supporting the establishment and maintenance of KT programs. The latter warrants the expansion of the public sector and the elimination of non-ethical KT practices. The second mechanism is recruiting external resources, including financial, experience, and training agreements.

Public Opinions on Removing Disincentives and Introducing Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposing a European Research Agenda

The shortage of organs for transplantations is increasing in Europe as well as globally. Many initiatives to the organ shortage, such as opt-out systems for deceased donation and expanding living donation, have been insufficient to meet the rising demand for organs. In recurrent discussions on how to reduce organ shortage, financial incentives and removal of disincentives, have been proposed to stimulate living organ donation and increase the pool of available donor organs. It is important to understand not only the ethical acceptability of (dis)incentives for organ donation, but also its societal acceptance. In this review, we propose a research agenda to help guide future empirical studies on public preferences in Europe towards the removal of disincentives and introduction of incentives for organ donation. We first present a systematic literature review on public opinions concerning (financial) (dis)incentives for organ donation in European countries. Next, we describe the results of a randomized survey experiment conducted in the United States. This experiment is crucial because it suggests that societal support for incentivizing organ donation depends on the specific features and institutional design of the proposed incentive scheme. We conclude by proposing this experiment's framework as a blueprint for European research on this topic.

A fair exchange: why living kidney donors in England should be financially compensated

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one 'buyer'-in this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the 'crowding out' of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England.