Human Abductive Cognition Vindicated Computational Locked Strategies, Dissipative Brains, and Eco-Cognitive Openness

Why your doctor is not an algorithm: Exploring logical principles of different clinical inference methods using liver transplantation as a model

The development of machine learning (ML) tools in many different medical settings is largely increasing. However, the use of the resulting algorithms in daily medical practice is still an unsolved challenge. We propose an epistemological approach (i.e., based on logical principles) to the application of computational tools in clinical practice. We rely on the classification of scientific inference into deductive, inductive, and abductive comparing the characteristics of ML tools with those derived from evidence-based medicine [EBM] and experience-based medicine, as paradigms of well-known methods for generation of knowledge. While we illustrate our arguments using liver transplantation as an example, this approach can be applied to other aspects of the specialty. Regarding EBM, it generates general knowledge that clinicians apply deductively, but the certainty of its conclusions is not guaranteed. In contrast, automatic algorithms primarily rely on inductive reasoning. Their design enables the integration of vast datasets and mitigates the emotional biases inherent in human induction. However, its poor capacity for abductive inference (a logical mechanism inherent to human clinical experience) constrains its performance in clinical settings characterized by uncertainty, where data are heterogeneous, results are highly influenced by context, or where prognostic factors can change rapidly.

Hybrid computational model depicts the contribution of non-significant lobes of human brain during the perception of emotional stimuli

Emotions are synchronizing responses of human brain while executing cognitive tasks. Earlier studies had revealed strong correlation between specific lobes of the brain to different types of emotional valence. In the current study, a comprehensive three-dimensional mapping of human brain for executing emotion specific tasks had been formulated. A hybrid computational machine learning model customized from Custom Weight Allocation Model (CWAM) and defined as Custom Rank Allocation Model (CRAM). This regression-based hybrid computational model computes the allocated tasks to different lobes of the brain during their respective executive stage. Event Related Potentials (ERP) were obtained with significant effect at P1, P2, P3, N170, N2, and N4. These ERPs were configured at Pz, Cz, F3, and T8 regions of the brain with maximal responses; while regions like Cz, C4 and F4 were also found to make effective contributions to elevate the responses of the brain, and thus these regions were configured as augmented source regions of the brain. In another circumstance of frequent -deviant - equal (FDE) presentation of the emotional stimuli, it was observed that the brain channels C3, C4, P3, P4, O1, O2, and Oz were contributing their emotional quotient to the overall response of the brain regions; whereas, the interaction effect was found presentable at O2, Oz, P3, P4, T8 and C3 regions of brain. The proposed computational model had identified the potential neural pathways during the execution of emotional task.

How to Make AlphaGo’s Children Explainable

Under the rubric of understanding the problem of explainability of AI in terms of abductive cognition, I propose to review the lessons from AlphaGo and her more powerful successors. As AI players in Baduk (Go, Weiqi) have arrived at superhuman level, there seems to be no hope for understanding the secret of their breathtakingly brilliant moves. Without making AI players explainable in some ways, both human and AI players would be less-than omniscient, if not ignorant, epistemic agents. Are we bound to have less explainable AI Baduk players as they make further progress? I shall show that the resolution of this apparent paradox depends on how we understand the crucial distinction between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). Some further philosophical issues arising from explainable AI will also be discussed in connection with this distinction.