The "Golden Age" of Behavior Genetics?

The search for genetic risk factors underlying the presumed heritability of all human behavior has unfolded in two phases. The first phase, characterized by candidate-gene-association (CGA) studies, has fallen out of favor in the behavior-genetics community, so much so that it has been referred to as a "cautionary tale." The second and current iteration is characterized by genome-wide association studies (GWASs), single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) heritability estimates, and polygenic risk scores. This research is guided by the resurrection of, or reemphasis on, Fisher's "infinite infinitesimal allele" model of the heritability of complex phenotypes, first proposed over 100 years ago. Despite seemingly significant differences between the two iterations, they are united in viewing the discovery of risk alleles underlying heritability as a matter of finding differences in allele frequencies. Many of the infirmities that beset CGA studies persist in the era of GWASs, accompanied by a host of new difficulties due to the human genome's underlying complexities and the limitations of Fisher's model in the postgenomics era.

Between-Group Mean Differences in Intelligence in the United States Are >0% Genetically Caused: Five Converging Lines of Evidence

The past 30 years of research in intelligence has produced a wealth of knowledge about the causes and consequences of differences in intelligence between individuals, and today mainstream opinion is that individual differences in intelligence are caused by both genetic and environmental influences. Much more contentious is the discussion over the cause of mean intelligence differences between racial or ethnic groups. In contrast to the general consensus that interindividual differences are both genetic and environmental in origin, some claim that mean intelligence differences between racial groups are completely environmental in origin, whereas others postulate a mix of genetic and environmental causes. In this article I discuss 5 lines of research that provide evidence that mean differences in intelligence between racial and ethnic groups are partially genetic. These lines of evidence are findings in support of Spearman’s hypothesis, consistent results from tests of measurement invariance across American racial groups, the mathematical relationship that exists for between-group and within-group sources of heritability, genomic data derived from genome-wide association studies of intelligence and polygenic scores applied to diverse samples, and admixture studies. I also discuss future potential lines of evidence regarding the causes of average group differences across racial groups. However, the data are not fully conclusive, and the exact degree to which genes influence intergroup mean differences in intelligence is not known. This discussion applies only to native English speakers born in the United States and not necessarily to any other human populations.

Genetic Risk Prediction of COVID-19 Susceptibility and Severity in the Indian Population

Host genetic variants can determine their susceptibility to COVID-19 infection and severity as noted in a recent Genome-wide Association Study (GWAS). Given the prominent genetic differences in Indian sub-populations as well as differential prevalence of COVID-19, here, we compute genetic risk scores in diverse Indian sub-populations that may predict differences in the severity of COVID-19 outcomes. We utilized the top 100 most significantly associated single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from a GWAS by Pairo-Castineira et al. determining the genetic susceptibility to severe COVID-19 infection, to compute population-wise polygenic risk scores (PRS) for populations represented in the Indian Genome Variation Consortium (IGVC) database. Using a generalized linear model accounting for confounding variables, we found that median PRS was significantly associated (p < 2 x 10⁻¹⁶) with COVID-19 mortality in each district corresponding to the population studied and had the largest effect on mortality (regression coefficient = 10.25). As a control we repeated our analysis on randomly selected 100 non-associated SNPs several times and did not find significant association. Therefore, we conclude that genetic susceptibility may play a major role in determining the differences in COVID-19 outcomes and mortality across the Indian sub-continent. We suggest that combining PRS with other observed risk-factors in a Bayesian framework may provide a better prediction model for ascertaining high COVID-19 risk groups and to design more effective public health resource allocation and vaccine distribution schemes.

Global Ancestry and Cognitive Ability

Using data from the Philadelphia Neurodevelopmental Cohort, we examined whether European ancestry predicted cognitive ability over and above both parental socioeconomic status (SES) and measures of eye, hair, and skin color. First, using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis, we verified that strict factorial invariance held between self-identified African and European-Americans. The differences between these groups, which were equivalent to 14.72 IQ points, were primarily (75.59%) due to difference in general cognitive ability (g), consistent with Spearman’s hypothesis. We found a relationship between European admixture and g. This relationship existed in samples of (a) self-identified monoracial African-Americans (B = 0.78, n = 2,179), (b) monoracial African and biracial African-European-Americans, with controls added for self-identified biracial status (B = 0.85, n = 2407), and (c) combined European, African-European, and African-American participants, with controls for self-identified race/ethnicity (B = 0.75, N = 7,273). Controlling for parental SES modestly attenuated these relationships whereas controlling for measures of skin, hair, and eye color did not. Next, we validated four sets of polygenic scores for educational attainment (eduPGS). MTAG, the multi-trait analysis of genome-wide association study (GWAS) eduPGS (based on 8442 overlapping variants) predicted g in both the monoracial African-American (r = 0.111, n = 2179, p < 0.001), and the European-American (r = 0.227, n = 4914, p < 0.001) subsamples. We also found large race differences for the means of eduPGS (d = 1.89). Using the ancestry-adjusted association between MTAG eduPGS and g from the monoracial African-American sample as an estimate of the transracially unbiased validity of eduPGS (B = 0.124), the results suggest that as much as 20%–25% of the race difference in g can be naïvely explained by known cognitive ability-related variants. Moreover, path analysis showed that the eduPGS substantially mediated associations between cognitive ability and European ancestry in the African-American sample. Subtest differences, together with the effects of both ancestry and eduPGS, had near-identity with subtest g-loadings. This finding confirmed a Jensen effect acting on ancestry-related differences. Finally, we confirmed measurement invariance along the full range of European ancestry in the combined sample using local structural equation modeling. Results converge on genetics as a potential partial explanation for group mean differences in intelligence.

Should Cognitive Differences Research Be Forbidden?

Some authors have proposed that research on cognitive differences, including differences between ethnic and racial groups, needs to be prevented because it produces true knowledge that is dangerous and socially undesirable. From a consequentialist perspective, this contribution investigates the usually unstated assumptions about harms and benefits behind these proposals. The conclusion is that intelligence differences provide powerful explanations of many important real-world phenomena, and that denying their causal role requires the promotion of alternative false beliefs. Acting on these false beliefs almost invariably prevents the effective management of societal problems while creating new ones. The proper questions to ask are not about the nature of the research and the results it is expected to produce, but about whether prevailing value systems can turn truthful knowledge about cognitive differences into benign outcomes, whatever the truth may be. These value systems are the proper focus of action. Therefore, the proposal to suppress knowledge about cognitive ability differences must be based on the argument that people in modern societies will apply such knowledge in malicious rather than beneficial ways, either because of universal limitations of human nature or because of specific features of modern societies.

The Fallacy of Equating the Hereditarian Hypothesis with Racism

There is a large amount of evidence that groups differ in average cognitive ability. The hereditarian hypothesis states that these differences are partly or substantially explained by genetics. Despite being a positive claim about the world, this hypothesis is frequently equated with racism, and scholars who defend it are frequently denounced as racists. Yet equating the hereditarian hypothesis with racism is a logical fallacy. The present article identifies ten common arguments for why the hereditarian hypothesis is racist and demonstrates that each one is fallacious. The article concludes that society will be better served if the hereditarian hypothesis is treated the same way as any other scientific claim—critically, but dispassionately.

The Original Industrial Revolution. Did Cold Winters Select for Cognitive Ability?

Rushton and Jensen argued that cognitive ability differs between human populations. But why are such differences expectable? Their answer: as modern humans spread out of Africa and into northern Eurasia, they entered colder and more seasonal climates that selected for the ability to plan ahead, in order to store food, make clothes, and build shelters for winter. This cold winter theory is supported by research on Paleolithic humans and recent hunter-gatherers. Tools become more diverse and complex as effective temperature decreases, apparently because food has to be obtained during limited periods and over large areas. There is also more storage of food and fuel and greater use of untended traps and snares. Finally, shelters have to be sturdier, and clothing more cold-resistant. The resulting cognitive demands are met primarily by women because the lack of opportunities for food gathering pushes them into more cognitively demanding tasks, like garment making, needlework, weaving, leatherworking, pottery, and kiln operation. The northern tier of Paleolithic Eurasia thus produced the “Original Industrial Revolution”—an explosion of creativity that preadapted its inhabitants for later developments, i.e., farming, more complex technology and social organization, and an increasingly future-oriented culture. Over time, these humans would spread south, replacing earlier populations that could less easily exploit the possibilities of the new cultural environment. As this environment developed further, it selected for further increases in cognitive ability. Indeed, mean intelligence seems to have risen during recorded history at temperate latitudes in Europe and East Asia. There is thus no unified theory for the evolution of human intelligence. A key stage was adaptation to cold winters during the Paleolithic, but much happened later.

Reflections on Sixty-Eight Years of Research on Race and Intelligence

I first encountered the question of race and intelligence sixty-eight years ago[...]