Typological thinking in human genomics research contributes to the production and prominence of scientific racism

Public genomic datasets like the 1000 Genomes project (1KGP), Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), and the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) study are valuable public resources that facilitate scientific advancements in biology and enhance the scientific and economic impact of federally funded research projects. Regrettably, these datasets have often been developed and studied in ways that propagate outdated racialized and typological thinking, leading to fallacious reasoning among some readers that social and health disparities among the so-called races are due in part to innate biological differences between them. We highlight how this framing has set the stage for the racist exploitation of these datasets in two ways: First, we discuss the use of public biomedical datasets in studies that claim support for innate genetic differences in intelligence and other social outcomes between the groups identified as races. We further highlight recent instances of this which involve unauthorized access, use, and dissemination of public datasets. Second, we discuss the memification, use of simple figures meant for quick dissemination among lay audiences, of population genetic data to argue for a biological basis for purported human racial groups. We close with recommendations for scientists, to preempt the exploitation and misuse of their data, and for funding agencies, to better enforce violations of data use agreements.

The Negative Religiousness-IQ Nexus is a Jensen Effect on Individual-Level Data: A Refutation of Dutton et al.'s 'The Myth of the Stupid Believer'

A recent study by Dutton et al. (J Relig Health 59:1567-1579. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-019-00926-3 , 2020) found that the religiousness-IQ nexus is not on g when comparing different groups with various degrees of religiosity and the non-religious. It suggested, accordingly, that the nexus related to the relationship between specialized analytic abilities on the IQ test and autism traits, with the latter predicting atheism. The study was limited by the fact that it was on group-level data, it used only one measure of religiosity that measure may have been confounded by the social element to church membership and it involved relatively few items via which a Jensen effect could be calculated. Here, we test whether the religiousness-IQ nexus is on g with individual-level data using archival data from the Vietnam Experience Study, in which 4462 US veterans were subjected to detailed psychological tests. We used multiple measures of religiosity-which we factor-analysed to a religion-factor-and a large number of items. We found, contrary to the findings of Dutton et al. (2020), that the IQ differences with regard to whether or not subjects believed in God are indeed a Jensen effect. We also uncovered a number of anomalies, which we explore.

Half a century later and we're back where we started: How the problem of locality turned in to the problem of portability

In the 1970s, Lewontin sparked a debate about a problem of locality, by making the case that any given heritability estimate is local to the original population and environment studied, and could not be generalized to other populations and environments. Nearly 50 years later, a new problem of portability has emerged: the predictive accuracy of polygenic scores diminishes when applied to populations whose characteristics are different from the original population sample. This paper briefly reviews the nature of each problem and analyzes their similarities and differences in three areas: 1) conceptual underpinnings, 2) causal explanations, and 3) practical, social, and political implications. Although conceptually and methodologically different from the problem of locality in important respects, the problem of portability facing contemporary genomics today should come as no surprise, as it is an inevitable outcome of the kinds of problematic inferences detailed by Lewontin nearly half a century ago.

Between-Group Mean Differences in Intelligence in the United States Are >0% Genetically Caused: Five Converging Lines of Evidence

The past 30 years of research in intelligence has produced a wealth of knowledge about the causes and consequences of differences in intelligence between individuals, and today mainstream opinion is that individual differences in intelligence are caused by both genetic and environmental influences. Much more contentious is the discussion over the cause of mean intelligence differences between racial or ethnic groups. In contrast to the general consensus that interindividual differences are both genetic and environmental in origin, some claim that mean intelligence differences between racial groups are completely environmental in origin, whereas others postulate a mix of genetic and environmental causes. In this article I discuss 5 lines of research that provide evidence that mean differences in intelligence between racial and ethnic groups are partially genetic. These lines of evidence are findings in support of Spearman’s hypothesis, consistent results from tests of measurement invariance across American racial groups, the mathematical relationship that exists for between-group and within-group sources of heritability, genomic data derived from genome-wide association studies of intelligence and polygenic scores applied to diverse samples, and admixture studies. I also discuss future potential lines of evidence regarding the causes of average group differences across racial groups. However, the data are not fully conclusive, and the exact degree to which genes influence intergroup mean differences in intelligence is not known. This discussion applies only to native English speakers born in the United States and not necessarily to any other human populations.