A Review of Laboratory-Acquired Infections in the Asia-Pacific: Understanding Risk and the Need for Improved Biosafety for Veterinary and Zoonotic Diseases

Best practices for implementing biosafety inspections in a clinical laboratory: Evidence from a multi-site experimental study

OBJECTIVES

To explore the key components when designing best practice inspection interventions, so as to induce high compliance with safety guidelines for laboratory workers.

METHODS

Five key components of an inspection intervention, identified from a focus group discussion, were used as the attributes of a discrete choice experiment (DCE). In the DCE, participants were presented with two hypothetical scenarios and asked to choose the scenario in which they were more willing to comply with the laboratory safety guidelines. Data were collected from 35 clinical laboratories in seven healthcare institutes located in Chengdu, China. In total, 188 laboratory workers completed the DCE. The collected data were analyzed using conditional logit regression and latent class analysis.

RESULTS

Five key attributes were identified as the most important ones to best ensure laboratory safety: the inspector, the inspection frequency, the inspection timing, the communication of the inspection outcome, and a follow-up with either a reward or a punishment. By investigating the laboratory workers' responses to the attributes, properly implementing the five attributes could improve the workers' compliance from 25.86% (at the baseline case) to 74.54%. Compliance could be further improved with the consideration of the laboratory workers' heterogeneous reactions. In this study, two classes of workers, A and B, were identified. Compliance percentages for Classes A and B would be improved to 85.48% and 81.84%, respectively, when the key attributes were properly implemented for each class. The employment type and the size of the laboratory could be used to predict class membership.

CONCLUSION

The findings indicate the importance of an employee-centered approach in encouraging a worker's compliance. This approach also supports the design of tailored interventions by considering the laboratory workers' heterogeneous responses to the interventions.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Bacillus anthracis and Brucella melitensis

Introduction

Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers.

Methods

A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies.

Results

Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials.

Discussion

Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.

Determination of Virulence-Associated Genes and Antimicrobial Resistance Profiles in Brucella Isolates Recovered from Humans and Animals in Iran Using NGS Technology

Brucellosis is a common zoonotic disease in Iran. Antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) Brucella isolates have been reported from different developing countries, posing an imminent health hazard. The objective of this study was to evaluate AMR and virulence-associated factors in Brucella isolates recovered from humans and animals in different regions of Iran using classical phenotyping and next generation sequencing (NGS) technology. Our findings revealed that B. melitensis is the most common species in bovines, small ruminants and camels. B. abortus was isolated only from one human case. Probable intermediate or resistant phenotype patterns for rifampicin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, ampicillin-sulbactam and colistin were found. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) identified mprF, bepG, bepF, bepC, bepE, and bepD in all isolates but failed to determine other classical AMR genes. Forty-three genes associated with five virulence factors were identified in the genomes of all Brucella isolates, and no difference in the distribution of virulence-associated genes was found. Of them, 27 genes were associated with lipopolysaccharide (LPS), 12 genes were related to a type IV secretion system (virB1-B12), two were associated with the toll-interleukin-1 receptor (TIR) domain-containing proteins (btpA, btpB), one gene encoded the Rab2 interacting conserved protein A (ricA) and one was associated with the production of cyclic β-1,2 glucans (cgs). This is the first investigation reporting the molecular-based AMR and virulence factors in brucellae isolated from different animal hosts and humans in Iran. Iranian B. abortus and B. melitensis isolates are still in vitro susceptible to the majority of antibiotics used for the treatment of human brucellosis. WGS failed to determine classical AMR genes and no difference was found in the distribution of virulence-associated genes in all isolates. Still, the absence of classical AMR genes in genomes of resistant strains is puzzling, and investigation of phenotypic resistance mechanisms at the proteomic and transcriptomic levels is needed.

Effectiveness of international virtual training on biorisk management in the context of COVID-19

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in enormous increases in laboratory activities to keep pace with diagnostic testing and research efforts. However, traditional training, technical assistance, and capacity-building approaches were disrupted by the travel and movement restrictions put in place to control the spread of the disease. To address the needs of laboratorians and managers to conduct laboratory activities safely and securely during the pandemic, a highly interactive virtual training (IVT) workshop on biorisk management during COVID-19 was conducted through active learning strategies that connected speakers with participants. The objective of the training was to increase the basic knowledge and standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices, risk assessment, and control measures with reference specifically to the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and apply a rigorous evaluation methodology to assess the effectiveness of the IVT. The training covered a broad range of topics and encompassed national to international guidelines.

Methods

Participants were selected through official channels at the national level, focusing on institutions within Pakistan. The sessions included lectures from international experts in biorisk management concepts, and incorporated poll questions as well as pre- and post-tests and feedback on the speakers' knowledge and presentation skills, to increase interactivity. The pre- and post-test comprised similar multiple-choice questions and provided to every participant to ascertain the impact of the training on awareness and knowledge of biorisk management topics and concepts, and results were compared using paired t-tests. For feedback on the speakers, participants were asked to submit their ratings measured on a five-point Likert scale. The reliability of the Likert scale was estimated using Cronbach's alpha. Analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel and SPSS version 23.

Results

In total, 52 individuals from different laboratories across Pakistan and Pakistani students from abroad (China) as well participated in at least one session of the IVT. The participants' pre- and post-test scores showed a significant increase in knowledge and awareness (p < 0.001). The obtained Cronbach's alpha score was >0.8, indicating high reliability of the generated feedback on the IVT approach and speakers.

Conclusion

The IVT on biosafety and biosecurity in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic proved beneficial for laboratory professionals and could be a useful model to continue in the future for raising awareness and knowledge.

Usage of FTA® Classic Cards for Safe Storage, Shipment, and Detection of Arboviruses

Infections caused by arthropod-borne RNA viruses are overrepresented among emerging infectious diseases. Effective methods for collecting, storing, and transporting clinical or biological specimens are needed worldwide for disease surveillance. However, many tropical regions where these diseases are endemic lack analytical facilities and possibility of continuous cold chains, which presents challenges from both a biosafety and material preservation perspective. Whatman^® FTA^® Classic Cards may serve as an effective and safe option for transporting hazardous samples at room temperature, particularly for RNA viruses classified as biosafety level (BSL) 2 and 3 pathogens, from sampling sites to laboratories. In this study, we investigated the biosafety and perseverance of representative alpha- and flaviviruses stored on FTA^® cards. To evaluate the virus inactivation capacity of FTA^® cards, we used Sindbis virus (SINV), chikungunya virus (CHIKV), and Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV). We inoculated susceptible cells with dilution series of eluates from viral samples stored on the FTA^® cards and observed for cytopathic effect to evaluate the ability of the cards to inactivate viruses. All tested viruses were inactivated after storage on FTA^® cards. In addition, we quantified viral RNA of JEV, SINV, and tick-borne encephalitis virus (TBEV) stored on FTA^® cards at 4 °C, 25 °C, and 37 °C for 30 days using two reverse transcriptase quantitative PCR assays. Viral RNA of SINV stored on FTA^® cards was not reduced at either 4 °C or 25 °C over a 30-day period, but degraded rapidly at 37 °C. For JEV and TBEV, degradation was observed at all temperatures, with the most rapid degradation occurring at 37 °C. Therefore, the use of FTA^® cards provides a safe and effective workflow for the collection, storage, and analysis of BSL 2- and 3-virus RNA samples, but there is a risk of false negative results if the cards are stored at higher temperatures for long periods of time. Conscious usage of the cards can be useful in disease surveillance and research, especially in tropical areas where transportation and cold chains are problematic.

Surveillance of laboratory exposures to human pathogens and toxins, Canada 2020

BACKGROUND

The Laboratory Incident Notification Canada surveillance system monitors laboratory incidents reported under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act and the Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations. The objective of this report is to describe laboratory exposures that were reported in Canada in 2020 and the individuals who were affected.

METHODS

Laboratory incident exposures occurring in licensed Canadian laboratories in 2020 were analyzed. The exposure incident rate was calculated and the descriptive statistics were performed. Exposure incidents were analyzed by sector, activity type, occurrence type, root cause and pathogen/toxin. Affected persons were analyzed by education, route of exposure sector, role and laboratory experience. The time between the incident and the reporting date was also analyzed.

RESULTS

Forty-two incidents involving 57 individuals were reported to Laboratory Incident Notification Canada in 2020. There were no suspected or confirmed laboratory acquired infections. The annual incident exposure rate was 4.2 incidents per 100 active licenses. Most exposure incidents occurred during microbiology activities (n=22, 52.4%) and/or were reported by the hospital sector (n=19, 45.2%). Procedural issues (n=16, 27.1%) and sharps-related incidents (n=13, 22.0%) were the most common occurrences. Most affected individuals were exposed via inhalation (n=28, 49.1%) and worked as technicians or technologists (n=36, 63.2%). Issues with standard operating procedures was the most common root cause (n=24, 27.0%), followed by human interactions (n=21, 23.6%). The median number of days between the incident and the reporting date was six days.

CONCLUSION

The rate of laboratory incidents were lower in 2020 than 2019, although the ongoing pandemic may have contributed to this decrease because of the closure of non-essential workplaces, including laboratories, for a portion of the year. The most common occurrence type was procedural while issues with not complying to standard operating procedures and human interactions as the most cited root causes.

ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS AND ANTI-ADHESION MATERIALS FOR MEDICAL AND SURGICAL GLOVES

Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) can be common in healthcare settings, such as the intensive care unit and surgical sites, if proper precautions are not followed. Although traditional techniques are encouraged, such as educating the public and healthcare workers to practice proper handwashing or to double glove, they have not been fully effective in combating HAIs. The use of surface-modified antimicrobial gloves may be an alternative approach to prevent the transmission of pathogens between healthcare workers and patients. This paper gives a comprehensive review of strategies to produce antimicrobial gloves. The chemistry of some potential chemically synthesized antimicrobial agents and nature-inspired superhydrophobic surfaces are discussed. The principles of killing microbes must be understood to effectively select these materials and to design and fabricate surfaces for the reduction of bacterial adhesion. Also, current company trends and technologies are presented for gloves proven to effectively kill bacteria. Such glove use, when coupled with in-depth research on diverse surgical procedures and medical examinations, could ease the burden of HAIs.

Assessment of biorisk management systems in high containment laboratories, 18 countries in Europe, 2016 and 2017

Europe-wide activities to improve biosafety and biosecurity performed within the frameworks of the European Union (EU)-funded Joint Actions EMERGE and QUANDHIP led to the development of an Integrated European Checklist for Laboratory Biorisk Management (ECL).

To better understand different approaches shaping biorisk management (BRM) systems on an operational level in high containment laboratories, the ECL was used to map the implementation of BRM in 32 high containment laboratories in 18 countries in Europe. The results suggest that the BRM elements referring to standard microbiological working practices and the handling of infectious material were fulfilled particularly well. The elements safety exercises involving internal and external emergency responders, and appropriate decommissioning plans were not fulfilled particularly well. BRM in Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 laboratories handling Risk Group (RG) 4 viruses appear to vary among each other less than BSL3 laboratories handling RG 3 bacteria. It is important to agree on comparable regulations in Europe as high containment laboratories are indispensable for a safe, quick and effective response to public health threats. As high containment laboratories may also present a public health risk it is crucial to have robust BRM on organisational and operational levels.

Assessment of the Biorisk Status of Veterinary Laboratories in Southwest Nigeria: Application of the Food and Agriculture Organization Laboratory Mapping Tool-Safety Module

Introduction

Because of the nature of work conducted in veterinary laboratories and potential exposures to pathogenic microorganisms, good laboratory practices, risk assessments, biosafety, and biosecurity capacity is becoming vital. In this study, the Food and Agriculture Organization Laboratory Mapping Tool-Safety Module was applied to demonstrate its practical implementation in the assessment of biosafety and biosecurity statuses of veterinary laboratories in Nigeria.

Methods

The Laboratory Mapping Tool-Safety Module, a standardized questionnaire, systematically and semiquantitatively gathered data on 98 subcategories covering 4 areas of biosafety and biosecurity capabilities: administrative, operational, engineering, and personal protective equipment.

Results

Overall, the various areas and categories covered by the Laboratory Mapping Tool-Safety Module were weak across the board, with a mean performance of 19.5% (95% confidence interval, 14.0%-25.1%; range, 0.8%-29.6%). The weakest functionality was in emergency preparedness (0.8%; ie, emergency responses and exercises such as fire drills, spill cleanup, and biological spill kit availability). Also, many laboratories were deficient in metrology procedures, biosafety cabinets, chemical hazard containment, regular maintenance and external calibration procedures for laboratory equipment, and personnel health and safety. However, a few functionalities within individual laboratories scored above average (50%), for example, a university microbiology laboratory animal facility (100%). Interlaboratory comparison indicated that biosafety and biosecurity performance was similar across laboratories (P = .07) and did not vary by location (P = .37).

Conclusions

Significant biosafety and biosecurity improvements are needed to guarantee the health and safety of workers and the global community, efficient responses to infectious disease containment, and compliance with the Global Health Security Agenda.

Survey of Suspected Laboratory-Acquired Infections and Biosafety Practices in Research, Clinical, and Veterinary Laboratories in Karachi, Pakistan

Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs), an occupational illness, are defined as all infections acquired through laboratory or laboratory-related activities. A report published in 1898 described an LAI resulting from Corynebacterium diphtheriae being transmitted through mouth pipetting. Despite all efforts, LAIs continue, especially in developing countries like Pakistan, which has been fighting to curb many infectious diseases. As reflected in the published literature, the biosafety culture is severely lacking in many laboratories, and there are no data available from Pakistan on LAIs. Our objective was to ascertain the frequency and rate of LAIs in various labs with versatile portfolios in relation to biosafety and biosecurity practices in Karachi. Ours is a descriptive multicenter cross-sectional study conducted in 30 laboratories located in Karachi from November 2017 to April 2018. Data were collected from laboratories including the university hospital labs, research labs, animal labs, and biomedical labs. Out of 30 facilities, half (n = 15) were clinical/biomedical laboratories, 16.6% (n = 5) were university hospital laboratories, 26.6% (n = 8) were R&D laboratories, and 6.6% (n = 2) were animal laboratories. Needle stick was found to be the most common injury, followed by animal bite/scratch, cut on mucous membrane, falling of personnel, and burn injury.

Biosafety and biosecurity requirements for Orientia spp. diagnosis and research: recommendations for risk-based biocontainment, work practices and the case for reclassification to risk group 2

Scrub typhus is an important arthropod-borne disease causing significant acute febrile illness by infection with Orientia spp.Using a risk-based approach, this review examines current practice, the evidence base and regulatory requirements regarding matters of biosafety and biosecurity, and presents the case for reclassification from Risk Group 3 to Risk Group 2 along with recommendations for safe working practices of risk-based activities during the manipulation of Orientia spp. in the laboratory.We recommend to reclassify Orientia spp. to Risk Group 2 based on the classification for RG2 pathogens as being moderate individual risk, low community risk. We recommend that low risk activities, can be performed within a biological safety cabinet located in a Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 core laboratory using standard personal protective equipment. But when the risk assessment indicates, such as high concentration and volume, or aerosol generation, then a higher biocontainment level is warranted. For, the majority of animal activities involving Orientia spp., Animal BSL 2 (ABSL2) is recommended however where high risk activities are performed including necropsies, Animal BSL (ABSL3) is recommended.

Effective methods for the inactivation of Francisella tularensis

Francisella tularensis (F. tularensis) is highly pathogenic to humans and must be handled under biosafety level 3 conditions. Samples used for the diagnosis and experimental analysis must be completely inactivated, although methods for the inactivation of F. tularensis are limited. In this study, effective methods for the inactivation of F. tularensis SCHU P9 and five other strains were determined by comparisons of colony-forming units between treated and control samples. The results showed that F. tularensis SCHU P9 was denatured by heat treatment (94°C for 3 min and 56°C for 30 min), filtration with a 0.22 μm filter, and the use of various solutions (i.e. >70% ethanol, methanol, acetone, and 4% paraformaldehyde). F. tularensis SCHU P9 remained viable after treatment with 50% ethanol for 1 min, filtration with a 0.45 μm filter, and treatments with detergents (i.e. 1% lithium dodecyl sulfate buffer, 1% Triton X-100 and 1% Nonidet P-40) at 4°C for 24 h. Additionally, F. tularensis SCHU P9 suspended in fetal bovine serum in plastic tubes was highly resistant to ultraviolet radiation compared to suspensions in water and chemically defined medium. The methods for inactivation of F. tularensis SCHU P9 was applicable to the other five strains of F. tularensis. The data presented in this study could be useful for the establishment of guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOP) to inactivate the contaminated samples in not only F. tularensis but also other bacteria.

Surveillance of laboratory exposures to human pathogens and toxins: Canada 2018

Background

The Laboratory Incident Notification Canada (LINC) surveillance system monitors laboratory incidents reported under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act. The year 2018 marks the third complete year of data.

Objective

To describe the laboratory exposure and laboratory-acquired infection incidents that occurred in Canada in 2018 compared to previous years, and then by sector, human pathogens and toxins involved, number of affected persons, incident type and root causes.

Methods

Laboratory incidents that occurred in 2018 were reported through the LINC system. The number of laboratory incidents, people exposed and laboratory-acquired infections were compared to previous years, then the incidents were analyzed by sector, human pathogen or toxin involved, the type of incident, people exposed, route of exposure and root causes. Microsoft Excel 2016 was used for descriptive analysis.

Results

In 2018, there were 89 exposure incidents to human pathogens and 235 people were exposed. There were five suspected and one confirmed laboratory-acquired infections. This was approximately twice the number of exposure incidents that were reported in 2017 (n=44) and 2016 (n=46). The highest number of exposure incidents occurred in the academic and hospital sectors, and the ratio of incidence to licences was the lowest in the private sector. The majority of incidents (n=50; 56%) involved Risk Group 2 human pathogens that were manipulated in a Containment Level 2 laboratory. Most exposures were related to sharps or procedures and the most common people exposed were laboratory technicians. Human interaction and standard operating procedures were the leading root causes.

Conclusion

Although overall the annual incidence of laboratory exposures in Canada remains relatively low, the incidence was higher in 2018 than in previous years. Whether this is a true increase in incidence or an increase in reporting is not known at this time as baseline estimates are still being established.

Biosafety and Biosecurity Challenges Facing Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories in Lower-Middle Income Countries in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Thailand

Introduction:

Global concerns over emerging and transboundary infectious zoonotic diseases have increased disease diagnostic demands, especially in the veterinary sector. In developing or newly developed countries where the sector often works under limited capacity, biosafety and biosecurity are unlikely to be high-priority issues. A recent development program supported by the Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency funded by the US government aimed to increase biosafety and biosecurity measures of government veterinary diagnostic and research laboratories in Thailand.

Objective:

The purpose of this article is to identify biosafety and biosecurity challenges, opportunities, and recommendations.

Methods:

Eleven government laboratory centers were assessed against the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) requirements checklist. The BMBL assessment outcomes were then combined with the outcomes of discussion sessions, and the results of pre- and post-test questionnaires conducted during biosafety assessment workshops and self-evaluation reports using the Food and Agriculture Organization Biosafety Laboratory Mapping Tool of each laboratory center were reviewed and summarized.

Results:

Despite established national policies on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, major challenges included (1) harmonization and enforcement of these policies, especially at the regional level, and (2) engagement of personnel in implementations of biosafety and biosecurity measures.

Conclusion:

Consistent biosafety policy and allocated resources together with regular training are required to develop sustainable biosafety and biosecurity at the national level. Collaboration between regional countries, international organizations, and donors is essential for improving biosafety and biosecurity on a global scale through setting regional priorities, enacting regulatory standards, and providing technical and financial support.

Laboratory-acquired Scrub Typhus and Murine Typhus Infections: The Argument for a Risk-based Approach to Biosafety Requirements for Orientia tsutsugamushi and Rickettsia typhi Laboratory Activities

This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931 to 2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the preantibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that the highest-risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation, or bite-related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require that only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high-containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low-risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL-2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet.

Improved Biosafety and Biosecurity Measures and/or Strategies to Tackle Laboratory-Acquired Infections and Related Risks

Herein, we reviewed laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) along with their health-related biological risks to provide an evidence base to tackle biosafety/biosecurity and biocontainment issues. Over the past years, a broad spectrum of pathogenic agents, such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, parasites, or genetically modified organisms, have been described and gained a substantial concern due to their profound biological as well as ecological risks. Furthermore, the emergence and/or re-emergence of life-threatening diseases are of supreme concern and come under the biosafety and biosecurity agenda to circumvent LAIs. Though the precise infection risk after an exposure remains uncertain, LAIs inspections revealed that Brucella spp., Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., Rickettsia spp., and Neisseria meningitidis are the leading causes. Similarly, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) as well as hepatitis B (HBV) and C viruses (HCV), and the dimorphic fungi are accountable for the utmost number of viral and fungal-associated LAIs. In this context, clinical laboratories at large and microbiology, mycology, bacteriology, and virology-oriented laboratories, in particular, necessitate appropriate biosafety and/or biosecurity measures to ensure the safety of laboratory workers and working environment, which are likely to have direct or indirect contact/exposure to hazardous materials or organisms. Laboratory staff education and training are indispensable to gain an adequate awareness to handle biologically hazardous materials as per internationally recognized strategies. In addition, workshops should be organized among laboratory workers to let them know the epidemiology, pathogenicity, and human susceptibility of LAIs. In this way, several health-related threats that result from the biologically hazardous materials can be abridged or minimized and controlled by the correct implementation of nationally and internationally certified protocols that include proper microbiological practices, containment devices/apparatus, satisfactory facilities or resources, protective barriers, and specialized education and training of laboratory staffs. The present work highlights this serious issue of LAIs and associated risks with suitable examples. Potential preventive strategies to tackle an array of causative agents are also discussed. In this respect, the researchers and scientific community may benefit from the lessons learned in the past to anticipate future problems.