Lack of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Transmission in Rabbits

Roles of Sialyl Glycans in HCoV-OC43, HCoV-HKU1, MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 Infections

Ongoing seasonal HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1 (common cold), an ongoing zoonotic infection of highly lethal MERS-CoV in humans (MERS disease), and an ongoing pandemic SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) with high mutability giving some variants causing severe illness and death have been reported to attach to sialyl receptors via their spike (S) glycoproteins and via additional short spikes, hemagglutinin-esterase (HE) glycoproteins, for HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1. There is lack of zoonotic viruses that are origins of HCoV-HKU1 and the first recorded pandemic CoV (SARS-CoV-2) for studies. In this chapter, we review current knowledge of the roles of sialyl glycans in infections with these viruses in distinct infection stages. Determination of the similarities and differences in roles of sialyl glycans in infections with these viruses could lead to a better understanding of the pathogenesis and transmission that is essential for combating infections with CoVs that recognize sialyl glycans.

Zoonotic and Reverse Zoonotic Transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is the first known pandemic caused by a coronavirus. Its causative agent, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), appears to be capable of infecting different mammalian species. Recent detections of this virus in pet, zoo, wild, and farm animals have compelled inquiry regarding the zoonotic (animal-to-human) and reverse zoonotic (human-to-animal) transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 with the potential of COVID-19 pandemic evolving into a panzootic.

It is important to monitor the global spread of disease and to assess the significance of genomic changes to support prevention and control efforts during a pandemic. An understanding of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology provides opportunities to prevent the risk of repeated re-infection of humans and requires a robust One Health-based investigation. This review paper describes the known properties and the existing gaps in scientific knowledge about the zoonotic and reverse zoonotic transmissibility of the novel virus SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 disease it causes.

SARS-CoV-2 in animals: From potential hosts to animal models

Within only one year after the first detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), nearly 100 million infections were reported in the human population globally, with more than two million fatal cases. While SARS-CoV-2 most likely originated from a natural wildlife reservoir, neither the immediate viral precursor nor the reservoir or intermediate hosts have been identified conclusively. Due to its zoonotic origin, SARS-CoV-2 may also be relevant to animals. Thus, to evaluate the host range of the virus and to assess the risk to act as potential animal reservoir, a large number of different animal species were experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2 or monitored in the field in the last months. In this review, we provide an update on studies describing permissive and resistant animal species. Using a scoring system based on viral genome detection subsequent to SARS-CoV-2 inoculation, seroconversion, the development of clinical signs and transmission to conspecifics or humans, the susceptibility of diverse animal species was classified on a semi-quantitative scale. While major livestock species such as pigs, cattle and poultry are mostly resistant, companion animals appear moderately susceptible, while several model animal species used in research, including several Cricetidae species and non-human primates, are highly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. By natural infections, it became obvious that American minks (Neovison vison) in fur farms, e.g., in the Netherlands and Denmark are highly susceptible resulting in local epidemics in these animals.

Particulate multivalent presentation of the receptor binding domain induces protective immune responses against MERS-CoV

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a WHO priority pathogen for which vaccines are urgently needed. Using an immune-focusing approach, we created self-assembling particles multivalently displaying critical regions of the MERS-CoV spike protein ─fusion peptide, heptad repeat 2, and receptor binding domain (RBD) ─ and tested their immunogenicity and protective capacity in rabbits. Using a "plug-and-display" SpyTag/SpyCatcher system, we coupled RBD to lumazine synthase (LS) particles producing multimeric RBD-presenting particles (RBD-LS). RBD-LS vaccination induced antibody responses of high magnitude and quality (avidity, MERS-CoV neutralizing capacity, and mucosal immunity) with cross-clade neutralization. The antibody responses were associated with blocking viral replication and upper and lower respiratory tract protection against MERS-CoV infection in rabbits. This arrayed multivalent presentation of the viral RBD using the antigen-SpyTag/LS-SpyCatcher is a promising MERS-CoV vaccine candidate and this platform may be applied for the rapid development of vaccines against other emerging viruses such as SARS-CoV-2.

Susceptibility to SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 from animal health perspective

Viruses are having great time as they seem to have bogged humans down. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and novel coronavirus (COVID-19) are the three major coronaviruses of present-day global human and animal health concern. COVID-19 caused by SARS-CoV-2 is identified as the newest disease, presumably of bat origin. Different theories on the evolution of viruses are in circulation, yet there is no denying the fact that the animal source is the skeleton. The whole world is witnessing the terror of the COVID-19 pandemic that is following the same path of SARS and MERS, and seems to be more severe. In addition to humans, several species of animals are reported to have been infected with these life-threatening viruses. The possible routes of transmission and their zoonotic potentialities are the subjects of intense research. This review article aims to overview the link of all these three deadly coronaviruses among animals along with their phylogenic evolution and cross-species transmission. This is essential since animals as pets or food are said to pose some risk, and their better understanding is a must in order to prepare a possible plan for future havoc in both human and animal health. Although COVID-19 is causing a human health hazard globally, its reporting in animals are limited compared to SARS and MERS. Non-human primates and carnivores are most susceptible to SARS-coronavirus and SARS-CoV-2, respectively, whereas the dromedary camel is susceptible to MERS-coronavirus. Phylogenetically, the trio viruses are reported to have originated from bats and have special capacity to undergo mutation and genomic recombination in order to infect humans through its reservoir or replication host. However, it is difficult to analyze how the genomic pattern of coronaviruses occurs. Thus, increased possibility of new virus-variants infecting humans and animals in the upcoming days seems to be the biggest challenge for the future of the world. One health approach is portrayed as our best way ahead, and understanding the animal dimension will go a long way in formulating such preparedness plans.

Animal models for the risk assessment of viral pandemic potential

Pandemics affect human lives severely and globally. Experience predicts that there will be a pandemic for sure although the time is unknown. When a viral epidemic breaks out, assessing its pandemic risk is an important part of the process that characterizes genomic property, viral pathogenicity, transmission in animal model, and so forth. In this review, we intend to figure out how a pandemic may occur by looking into the past influenza pandemic events. We discuss interpretations of the experimental evidences resulted from animal model studies and extend implications of viral pandemic potentials and ingredients to emerging viral epidemics. Focusing on the pandemic potential of viral infectious diseases, we suggest what should be assessed to prevent global catastrophes from influenza virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, dengue and Zika viruses.

Genetically Engineering a Susceptible Mouse Model for MERS-CoV-Induced Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome

Since 2012, monthly cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) continue to cause severe respiratory disease that is fatal in ~35% of diagnosed individuals. The ongoing threat to global public health and the need for novel therapeutic countermeasures have driven the development of animal models that can reproducibly replicate the pathology associated with MERS-CoV in human infections. The inability of MERS-CoV to replicate in the respiratory tracts of mice, hamsters, and ferrets stymied initial attempts to generate small animal models. Identification of human dipeptidyl peptidase IV (hDPP4) as the receptor for MERS-CoV infection opened the door for genetic engineering of mice. Precise molecular engineering of mouse DPP4 (mDPP4) with clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)/Cas9 technology maintained inherent expression profiles, and limited MERS-CoV susceptibility to tissues that naturally express mDPP4, notably the lower respiratory tract wherein MERS-CoV elicits severe pulmonary pathology. Here, we describe the generation of the 288-330^+/+ MERS-CoV mouse model in which mice were made susceptible to MERS-CoV by modifying two amino acids on mDPP4 (A288 and T330), and the use of adaptive evolution to generate novel MERS-CoV isolates that cause fatal respiratory disease. The 288-330^+/+ mice are currently being used to evaluate novel drug, antibody, and vaccine therapeutic countermeasures for MERS-CoV. The chapter starts with a historical perspective on the emergence of MERS-CoV and animal models evaluated for MERS-CoV pathogenesis, and then outlines the development of the 288-330^+/+ mouse model, assays for assessing a MERS-CoV pulmonary infection in a mouse model, and describes some of the challenges associated with using genetically engineered mice.

Species-Specific Colocalization of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Attachment and Entry Receptors

MERS-CoV uses the S1^B domain of its spike protein to attach to its host receptor, dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4). The tissue localization of DPP4 has been mapped in different susceptible species. On the other hand, the S1^A domain, the N-terminal domain of this spike protein, preferentially binds to several glycotopes of α2,3-sialic acids, the attachment factor of MERS-CoV. Here we show, using a novel method, that the S1^A domain specifically binds to the nasal epithelium of dromedary camels, alveolar epithelium of humans, and intestinal epithelium of common pipistrelle bats. In contrast, it does not bind to the nasal epithelium of pigs or rabbits, nor does it bind to the intestinal epithelium of serotine bats and frugivorous bat species. This finding supports the importance of the S1^A domain in MERS-CoV infection and tropism, suggests its role in transmission, and highlights its potential use as a component of novel vaccine candidates.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) uses the S1^B domain of its spike protein to bind to dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4), its functional receptor, and its S1^A domain to bind to sialic acids. The tissue localization of DPP4 in humans, bats, camelids, pigs, and rabbits generally correlates with MERS-CoV tropism, highlighting the role of DPP4 in virus pathogenesis and transmission. However, MERS-CoV S1^A does not indiscriminately bind to all α2,3-sialic acids, and the species-specific binding and tissue distribution of these sialic acids in different MERS-CoV-susceptible species have not been investigated. We established a novel method to detect these sialic acids on tissue sections of various organs of different susceptible species by using nanoparticles displaying multivalent MERS-CoV S1^A. We found that the nanoparticles specifically bound to the nasal epithelial cells of dromedary camels, type II pneumocytes in human lungs, and the intestinal epithelial cells of common pipistrelle bats. Desialylation by neuraminidase abolished nanoparticle binding and significantly reduced MERS-CoV infection in primary susceptible cells. In contrast, S1^A nanoparticles did not bind to the intestinal epithelium of serotine bats and frugivorous bat species, nor did they bind to the nasal epithelium of pigs and rabbits. Both pigs and rabbits have been shown to shed less infectious virus than dromedary camels and do not transmit the virus via either contact or airborne routes. Our results depict species-specific colocalization of MERS-CoV entry and attachment receptors, which may be relevant in the transmission and pathogenesis of MERS-CoV.

IMPORTANCE MERS-CoV uses the S1^B domain of its spike protein to attach to its host receptor, dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4). The tissue localization of DPP4 has been mapped in different susceptible species. On the other hand, the S1^A domain, the N-terminal domain of this spike protein, preferentially binds to several glycotopes of α2,3-sialic acids, the attachment factor of MERS-CoV. Here we show, using a novel method, that the S1^A domain specifically binds to the nasal epithelium of dromedary camels, alveolar epithelium of humans, and intestinal epithelium of common pipistrelle bats. In contrast, it does not bind to the nasal epithelium of pigs or rabbits, nor does it bind to the intestinal epithelium of serotine bats and frugivorous bat species. This finding supports the importance of the S1^A domain in MERS-CoV infection and tropism, suggests its role in transmission, and highlights its potential use as a component of novel vaccine candidates.