I Don't See It Your Way: The Dot Perspective Task Does Not Gauge Spontaneous Perspective Taking

Spontaneous visual perspective-taking with constant attention cue: A modified dot-perspective task paradigm

It has been argued that humans can employ mentalizing implicitly and automatically, even with others' visual experiences. In terms of visual perspective-taking (i.e., inferring another's visual experience), the Dot Perspective Task has been considered to provide evidence for this hypothesis. People were found to respond slower when their visual experience was inconsistent with others' (referred to as the consistency effect). However, the specific underlying cognitive process of the consistency effect has been a topic of intense debate, i.e., whether the consistency effect represents a process of social cognition such as mentalizing. Here, we introduce a modified version of the Dot Perspective Task, in which all the targets appear at the position where the avatar is gazing, while some of the targets are invisible to the avatar due to a barrier that may block the avatar's line of sight. Therefore, the effect of perspective-taking and attention-cueing can be better disassociated in the modified paradigm. The results of Experiment 1 illustrated a significant consistency effect, which was further confirmed in Experiment 2. More importantly, the consistency effect was absent in Experiment 3, where the avatar sat with his back to the participants. These findings imply that the consistency effect reflects the automatic computation of others' visual information, and rule out the attention-cueing account of the consistency effect.

I prefer what you can see: The role of visual perspective-taking on the gaze-liking effect

Individuals' gaze on an object usually leads others to prefer that object, which is called the gaze-liking effect. However, it is still unclear whether this effect is driven by social factors (i.e., visual perspective-taking) or the domain-general processing (i.e., attention cueing). This research explored the mechanism of the gaze-liking effect by manipulating the objects' visibility to an avatar in six online one-shot experiments. The results showed that participants' affective evaluation for the object was modulated by the avatar's visual perspective. Specifically, the visible object to the avatar received a higher rating of liking degree. However, when the avatar was replaced with a non-social stimulus, the experimental effect was absent. Furthermore, the gaze-liking effect was robust while controlling for confounding factors such as the distance between the object and the avatar or type of stimuli. These findings provided convincing evidence that the gaze-liking effect involves a process of the other's visual experience and is not merely a by-product of the gaze-cueing effect.

Relationships between the race implicit association test and other measures of implicit and explicit social cognition

Background

The race-based Implicit Association Test (IAT) was proposed to measure individual differences in implicit racial bias subsumed within social cognition. In recent years, researchers have debated the theoretical tenets underpinning the IAT, questioning whether performance on this task: (1) measures implicit attitudes that operate automatically outside of conscious awareness; (2) reflects individual differences in social cognition; and (3) can predict social behavior. One way to better address these research questions is to assess whether the race-IAT correlates with other implicit processes that are subsumed within social cognition.

Aims

The current study assessed whether the race-IAT was related to other commonly used individual difference measures of implicit (and explicit) social cognition. Experiment 1 assessed whether dissociable patterns of performance on the race-IAT were related to measures of implicit imitative tendencies, emotion recognition and perspective taking toward White task actors, as well as explicit measures of trait and state affective empathy and racial bias. Overcoming limitations of task conceptual correspondence, Experiment 2 assessed whether these latter tasks were sensitive in detecting racial biases by using both White and Black task actors and again examined their relationships with the race-IAT.

Method

In two lab-based experiments, 226 and 237 participants completed the race-IAT followed by an extensive battery of social cognition measures.

Results

Across both experiments, pro-White/anti-Black bias on the race-IAT was positively related to a pro-White bias on explicit measures of positive affective empathy. However, relationships between the race-IAT and implicit imitative tendencies, perspective taking, emotion recognition, and explicit trait and negative state affective empathy were statistically equivalent.

Conclusion

The race-IAT was consistently related to explicit measures of positive state affective empathy but not to other individual difference measures of implicit social cognition. These findings are discussed with regards to the theoretical underpinnings of the race-IAT as an individual difference measure of implicit social cognition, as well as alternative explanations relating to the reliability of social cognition measures and the various combinations of general-purpose (social and non-social) executive processes that underpin performance on these tasks.

Designing a neuroclinical assessment of empathy deficits in psychopathy based on the Zipper Model of Empathy

Ho, M.H., Kemp, B.T., Eisenbarth, H. & Rijnders, R.J.P. Designing a neuroclinical assessment of empathy deficits in psychopathy based on the Zipper Model of Empathy. NEUROSCI BIOBEHAV REV YY(Y) XXX-XXX, 2023. The heterogeneity of the literature on empathy highlights its multidimensional and dynamic nature and affects unclear descriptions of empathy in the context of psychopathology. The Zipper Model of Empathy integrates current theories of empathy and proposes that empathy maturity is dependent on whether contextual and personal factors push affective and cognitive processes together or apart. This concept paper therefore proposes a comprehensive battery of physiological and behavioral measures to empirically assess empathy processing according to this model with an application for psychopathic personality. We propose using the following measures to assess each component of this model: (1) facial electromyography; (2) the Emotion Recognition Task; (3) the Empathy Accuracy task and physiological measures (e.g., heart rate); (4) a selection of Theory of Mind tasks and an adapted Dot Perspective Task, and; (5) an adjusted Charity Task. Ultimately, we hope this paper serves as a starting point for discussion and debate on defining and assessing empathy processing, to encourage research to falsify and update this model to improve our understanding of empathy.

Both the domain-general and the mentalising processes affect visual perspective taking

People's attention cannot help being affected by what others are looking at. The dot-perspective task has been often employed to investigate this visual attentional shift. In this task, participants are presented with virtual scenes with a cue facing some targets and must judge how many targets are visible from their own or the cue perspective. Typically, this task shows an interference pattern: Participants record slower reaction times (RTs) and more errors when the cue is facing away from the targets. Interestingly, this occurs also when participants take their own perspective. Two accounts contend the explanation of this interference. The mentalising account focuses on the social relevance of the cue, while the domain-general account focuses on the directional features of the cue. To investigate the relative contribution of the two accounts, we developed a Social_Only cue, a cue having only social features and compared its effects with a Social+Directional cue, which had both social and directional features. Results show that while the Social+Directional cue generates the typical interference pattern, the Social_Only cue does not generate interference in the RTs, only in the error rate. We advance an integration between the mentalising and the domain-general accounts. We suggest that the dot-perspective task requires two processes: an orienting process, elicited by the directional features of the cue and measured by the RTs, and a decisional process elicited by the social features of the cue and measured also by the error rate.

The self-consistency effect seen on the Dot Perspective Task is a product of domain-general attention cueing, not automatic perspective taking

It has been proposed that humans automatically compute the visual perspective of others. Evidence for this view comes from the Dot Perspective Task. In this task, participants view a room in which a human actor is depicted, looking either leftwards or rightwards. Dots can appear on either the left wall of the room, the right wall, or both. At the start of each trial, participants are shown a number. Their speeded task is to decide whether the number of dots visible matches the number shown. On consistent trials the participant and the actor can see the same number of dots. On inconsistent trials, the participant and the actor can see a different number of dots. Participants respond faster on consistent trials than on inconsistent trials. This self-consistency effect is cited as evidence that participants compute the visual perspective of others automatically, even when it impedes their task performance. According to a rival interpretation, however, this effect is a product of attention cueing: slower responding on inconsistent trials simply reflects the fact that participants' attention is directed away from some or all of the to-be-counted dots. The present study sought to test these rival accounts. We find that desk fans, a class of inanimate object known to cue attention, also produce the self-consistency effect. Moreover, people who are more susceptible to the effect induced by fans tend to be more susceptible to the effect induced by human actors. These findings suggest that the self-consistency effect is a product of attention cueing.

Visual perspective-taking in complex natural scenes

Studies of visual perspective-taking have shown that adults can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other peoples’ viewpoints, but they experience difficulties when the two perspectives are inconsistent. We tested whether these egocentric (i.e., interference from one’s own perspective) and altercentric biases (i.e., interference from another person’s perspective) persist in ecologically valid complex environments. Participants (N = 150) completed a dot-probe visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in natural scenes containing real people, first only according to their own perspective and then judging both their own and another person’s perspective. Results showed that the other person’s perspective did not disrupt self perspective-taking judgements when the other perspective was not explicitly prompted. In contrast, egocentric and altercentric biases were found when participants were prompted to switch between self and other perspectives. These findings suggest that altercentric visual perspective-taking can be activated spontaneously in complex real-world contexts, but is subject to both top-down and bottom-up influences, including explicit prompts or salient visual stimuli.

The presence of other-race people disrupts spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking is an essential skill for effective social interaction. Previous studies have tested various perceiver-based factors that affect intentional perspective taking; however, the factors affecting spontaneous perspective taking remain unknown. To fill this gap, the present study used a novel spontaneous visual perspective taking paradigm to explore how an agent's race and emotion affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. In Experiment 1, the participants completed a mental rotation task while a human agent simultaneously gazed at the target with positive, negative, or neutral facial expressions. The agent was African, Caucasian, or Chinese. The results revealed that the other-race agents disrupted the participants' spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking, while emotion weakly affected it. Experiment 2 retested whether emotion could affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking while only own-race agents were used. The participants completed the same task as that in Experiment 1. The results revealed that emotions weakly affected spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. In summary, the present study first examined what target-based factors affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. The results extend the representation and incorporation of the close others' responses (RICOR) model. Specifically, people routinely construct representations of other people's points of view when they share the same racial group.

Perspective-taking is spontaneous but not automatic

Data from a range of different experimental paradigms—in particular (but not only) the dot perspective task—have been interpreted as evidence that humans automatically track the perspective of other individuals. Results from other studies, however, have cast doubt on this interpretation, and some researchers have suggested that phenomena that seem like perspective-taking might instead be the products of simpler behavioural rules. The issue remains unsettled in significant part because different schools of thought, with different theoretical perspectives, implement the experimental tasks in subtly different ways, making direct comparisons difficult. Here, we explore the possibility that subtle differences in experimental method explain otherwise irreconcilable findings in the literature. Across five experiments we show that the classic result in the dot perspective task is not automatic (it is not purely stimulus-driven), but nor is it exclusively the product of simple behavioural rules that do not involve mentalising. Instead, participants do compute the perspectives of other individuals rapidly, unconsciously, and involuntarily, but only when attentional systems prompt them to do so (just as, for instance, the visual system puts external objects into focus only as and when required). This finding prompts us to clearly distinguish spontaneity from automaticity. Spontaneous perspective-taking may be a computationally efficient means of navigating the social world.

Taking time to take perspective? Rapidly changing reference frames in the avatar-Simon task

The avatar-Simon task demonstrates that even task irrelevant avatars cause compatibility effects from their point of view, a result that can be interpreted within the frameworks of spontaneous spatial perspective taking and referential coding. In the present study, we used an avatar-Simon task with rapidly changing avatar positions and with simultaneous and non-simultaneous presentations to investigate the time course of this phenomenon. The results showed that participants took the avatar's perspective into account even when the avatar's position was randomized on a trial-by-trial basis. This avatar-compatibility effect was also observed when avatar and stimulus were presented simultaneously, even though the participants had no time to adopt the avatar's perspective in advance. However, the effect was much more pronounced when a delay between avatar and stimulus presentation was in place.

The Role of Perspective Taking on Attention: A Review of the Special Issue on the Reflexive Attentional Shift Phenomenon

Attention is a process that alters how cognitive resources are allocated, and it allows individuals to efficiently process information at the attended location. The presence of visual or auditory cues in the environment can direct the focus of attention toward certain stimuli even if the cued stimuli are not the individual’s primary target. Samson et al. demonstrated that seeing another person in the scene (i.e., a person-like cue) caused a delay in responding to target stimuli not visible to that person: “alter-centric intrusion.” This phenomenon, they argue, is dependent upon the fact that the cue used resembled a person as opposed to a more generic directional indicator. The characteristics of the cue are the core of the debate of this special issue. Some maintain that the perceptual-directional characteristics of the cue are sufficient to generate the bias while others argue that the cuing is stronger when the cue has social characteristics (relates to what another individual can perceive). The research contained in this issue confirms that human attention is biased by the presence of a directional cue. We discuss and compare the different studies. The pattern that emerges seems to suggest that the social relevance of the cue is necessary in some contexts but not in others, depending on the cognitive demand of the experimental task. One possibility is that the social mechanisms are involved in perspective taking when the task is cognitively demanding, while they may not play a role in automatic attention allocation.