On the locus of priming and inverse priming effects

The Role of Subjective Experiences in Conflict Tasks: A Review

Cognitive control research is concerned with the question how we install adaptive behaviour in the case of (cognitive) conflict. In this review we focus on the role that awareness of this conflict plays in our ability to exert cognitive control. We will argue that visual conflict is not the only building block of metacognitive experiences of conflict and discuss how they are related to cognitive control. So, a first aim of the current review is to understand how these different metacognitive judgements are created. To do so, we draw some remarkable parallels with research on metacognition in decision making and memory research. Next, we elaborate on the relationship between metacognition and adaptive behaviour, with a specific focus on the role of subjective experiences in the Gratton effect. The grey areas that persist in the current literature are highlighted. In addition to deciphering the mechanisms of metacognitive judgements in cognitive control, this overview also aims to further enlarge our understanding of metacognitive abilities at a more general level.

Attentional modulation of masked semantic priming by visible and masked task cues

In contrast to classical theories of cognitive control, recent evidence suggests that cognitive control and unconscious automatic processing influence each other. First, masked semantic priming, an index of unconscious automatic processing, depends on attention to semantics induced by a previously executed task. Second, cognitive control operations (e.g., implementation of task sets indicating how to process a particular stimulus) can be activated by masked task cues, presented outside awareness. In this study, we combined both lines of research. We investigated in three experiments whether induction tasks and presentation of visible or masked task cues, which signal subsequent semantic or perceptual tasks but do not require induction task execution, comparably modulate masked semantic priming. In line with previous research, priming was consistently larger following execution of a semantic rather than a perceptual induction task. However, we observed in experiment 1 (masked letter cues) a reversed priming pattern following task cues (larger priming following cues signaling perceptual tasks) compared to induction tasks. Experiment 2 (visible letter cues) and experiment 3 (visible color cues) showed that this reversed priming pattern depended only on apriori associations between task cues and task elements (task set dominance), but neither on awareness nor on the verbal or non-verbal format of the cues. These results indicate that task cues have the power to modulate subsequent masked semantic priming through attentional mechanisms. Task-set dominance conceivably affects the time course of task set activation and inhibition in response to task cues and thus the direction of their modulatory effects on priming.

Cross-modal plasticity in the deaf enhances processing of masked stimuli in the visual modality

Compensatory changes as a result of auditory deprivation in the deaf lead to higher visual processing skills. In two experiments, we explored if such brain plasticity in the deaf modulates processing of masked stimuli in the visual modality. Deaf and normal-hearing participants responded to targets either voluntarily or by instruction. Masked primes related to the response were presented briefly before the targets at the center and the periphery. In Experiment 1, targets appeared only at the foveal region whereas, in Experiment 2, they appeared both at the fovea and the periphery. The deaf showed higher sensitivity to masked primes in both the experiments. They chose the primed response more often and also were faster during congruent responses compared to the normal hearing. These results suggest that neuroplasticity in the deaf modulates how they perceive and use information with reduced visibility for action selection and execution.

Moving Single Dots as Primes for Static Arrow Targets

In response priming, responses are typically faster and more accurate if the prime calls for the same response as the target (i.e., compatible trials) than when primes and targets trigger different responses (i.e., incompatible trials). With moving rows-of-dots as primes for static arrow targets, participants instead responded faster to incompatible targets with longer SOAs (stimulus onset asynchrony, > 200 ms). Until now, it is unclear whether this effect is specific to the material. In the present research, a single moving dot was used as a prime. Further, we analyzed compatibility effects depending on reaction times (RTs). Positive compatibility effects in reaction times were found with an SOA of 147 ms and even with a relatively long SOA of 360 ms; for very long SOAs (800-1,200 ms), negative effects were found. We interpreted this as evidence that the specific type of motion is irrelevant for the occurrence of a negative compatibility effect.

Individually different weighting of multiple processes underlies effects of metacontrast masking

Metacontrast masking occurs when a mask follows a target stimulus in close spatial proximity. Target visibility varies with stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target and mask in individually different ways leading to different masking functions with corresponding phenomenological reports. We used individual differences to determine the processes that underlie metacontrast masking. We assessed individual masking functions in a masked target discrimination task using different masking conditions and applied factor-analytical techniques on measures of sensitivity. Results yielded two latent variables that (1) contribute to performance with short and long SOA, respectively, (2) relate to specific stimulus features, and (3) differentially correlate with specific subjective percepts. We propose that each latent variable reflects a specific process. Two additional processes may contribute to performance with short and long SOAs, respectively. Discrimination performance in metacontrast masking results from individually different weightings of two to four processes, each of which contributes to specific subjective percepts.

Only pre-cueing but no retro-cueing effects emerge with masked arrow cues

The impact of masked stimulation on cognitive control processes is investigated with much interest. In many cases, masked stimulation suffices to initiate and employ control processes. Shifts of attention either happen in the external environment or internally, for example, in working memory. In the former, even masked cues (i.e., cues that are presented for a period too short to allow strategic use) were shown efficient for shifting attention to particular locations in pre-cue paradigms. Internal attention shifting can be investigated using retro-cues: long after encoding, a valid cue indicates the location to-be-tested via change detection, and this improves performance (retro-cue effect). In the present experiment, participants performed in both a pre- and a retro-cue task with masked and normally presented cues. While the masked cues benefitted performance in the pre-cue task, they did not in the retro-cue task. These results inform about limits of masked stimulation.

Adjustments of response speed and accuracy to unconscious cues

Controlling response parameters like the speed and accuracy of responses allows us to adjust our behavior according to particular situational task demands. We investigated whether exertion of cognitive control over speed-accuracy settings is not exclusively based on conscious representations, but can also be elicited by stimuli that are not consciously represented. Participants were instructed to point and click on a target, with a cue signaling before each response whether to prioritize accuracy of the response over speed, or vice versa. In half of the trials, the cue was masked to prevent a conscious representation of the cue. With visible cues, response patterns showed typical speed-accuracy tradeoffs, with faster and less accurate responses after speed cues, and slower but more accurate responses after accuracy cues. Crucially, this was found with masked cues as well. Our results are in line with recent findings on the relation of consciousness and cognitive control processes like task-set activation and response inhibition: masked cues are able to impact on cognitive control processes.

The reversal of perceptual and motor compatibility effects differs qualitatively between metacontrast and random-line masks

In masked priming tasks, participants typically respond faster to compatible than to incompatible primes, an effect that has been dubbed as the positive compatibility effect (PCE). However, when the interval between the prime and the mask is relatively long, responses are faster to incompatible than to compatible primes. This inversion is called the negative compatibility effect (NCE). Two main origins of the NCE have been proposed. The object-updating theory holds that when the masks share stimulus features with the primes, both perceptual and motor processes generate an NCE. As an example, for masks composed of overlaid left and right prime arrows, the NCE is thought to be positive priming induced by the arrow of the mask pointing in the opposite direction of the prime. In contrast, the motor inhibition theories hold that the origin of the NCE is purely motor and can be demonstrated when masks do not share features with primes. To test both hypotheses, the present study aims at delineating the respective contributions of perceptual and motor components of the NCE in the context of different types of masks. Consistent with the object-updating hypothesis, we found both perceptual and motor NCEs at the long SOA with metacontrast masks (with internal contours corresponding to left and right overlaid arrows). Consistent with the motor inhibition hypothesis, we found motor NCE but no perceptual NCE at the long SOA with random-line masks (containing no prime features). The study thus suggests that the origin of the NCE depends on the type of mask.

Contingent capture of involuntary visual attention interferes with detection of auditory stimuli

The involuntary capture of attention by salient visual stimuli can be influenced by the behavioral goals of an observer. For example, when searching for a target item, irrelevant items that possess the target-defining characteristic capture attention more strongly than items not possessing that feature. Such contingent capture involves a shift of spatial attention toward the item with the target-defining characteristic. It is not clear, however, if the associated decrements in performance for detecting the target item are entirely due to involuntary orienting of spatial attention. To investigate whether contingent capture also involves a non-spatial interference, adult observers were presented with streams of visual and auditory stimuli and were tasked with simultaneously monitoring for targets in each modality. Visual and auditory targets could be preceded by a lateralized visual distractor that either did, or did not, possess the target-defining feature (a specific color). In agreement with the contingent capture hypothesis, target-colored distractors interfered with visual detection performance (response time and accuracy) more than distractors that did not possess the target color. Importantly, the same pattern of results was obtained for the auditory task: visual target-colored distractors interfered with sound detection. The decrement in auditory performance following a target-colored distractor suggests that contingent capture involves a source of processing interference in addition to that caused by a spatial shift of attention. Specifically, we argue that distractors possessing the target-defining characteristic enter a capacity-limited, serial stage of neural processing, which delays detection of subsequently presented stimuli regardless of the sensory modality.

Perceptual strength is different from sensorimotor strength: evidence from the centre-periphery asymmetry in masked priming

Near-threshold prime stimuli can facilitate or hinder responses to target stimuli, creating either a positive compatibility effect (PCE) or a negative compatibility effect (NCE). An asymmetry has been reported between primes presented in near periphery, which produced a PCE, and foveal primes, which produced an NCE under comparable conditions. This asymmetry has been attributed to the difference in retinal sensitivity, but it remains unclear whether this means that equating discrimination performance for primes in fovea and periphery, in order to account for differences in perceptual sensitivity, would make the priming effects the same. Wider work indicates that perceptual ability can dissociate from visuomotor effects, predicting that equating perceptual ability for fovea and periphery would not equate priming. We tested these opposite possibilities by matching discrimination performance for masked Gabor patches in fovea and near periphery (6°) and using these as primes in a masked priming paradigm expected to elicit NCEs. We found the asymmetry remained: NCE for fovea and PCE for periphery. We replicated this with both blocked and randomized procedures to check for attentional effects. We conclude that equating perceptual strength (discriminability) of stimuli does not equate their sensorimotor impact due to differences in the relative importance of different visual pathways and differing temporal dynamics in perceptual and sensorimotor processes.

A cue from the unconscious - masked symbols prompt spatial anticipation

Anticipating where an event will occur enables us to instantaneously respond to events that occur at the expected location. Here we investigated if such spatial anticipations can be triggered by symbolic information that participants cannot consciously see. In two experiments involving a Posner cueing task and a visual search task, a central cue informed participants about the likely location of the next target stimulus. In half of the trials, this cue was rendered invisible by pattern masking. In both experiments, visible cues led to cueing effects, that is, faster responses after valid compared to invalid cues. Importantly, even masked cues caused cueing effects, though to a lesser extent. Additionally, we analyzed effects on attention that persist from one trial to the subsequent trial. We found that spatial anticipations are able to interfere with newly formed spatial anticipations and influence orienting of attention in the subsequent trial. When the preceding cue was visible, the corresponding spatial anticipation persisted to an extent that prevented a noticeable effect of masked cues. The effects of visible cues were likewise modulated by previous spatial anticipations, but were strong enough to also exert an impact on attention themselves. Altogether, the results suggest that spatial anticipations can be formed on the basis of unconscious stimuli, but that interfering influences like still active spatial anticipations can suppress this effect.

Neural correlates of control operations in inverse priming with relevant and irrelevant masks

The inverse priming paradigm can be considered one example which demonstrates the operation of control processes in the absence of conscious experience of the inducing stimuli. Inverse priming is generated by a prime that is followed by a mask and a subsequent imperative target stimulus. With "relevant" masks that are composed of the superposition of both prime alternatives, the inverse priming effect is typically larger than with "irrelevant" masks that are free of task-relevant features. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural substrates that are involved in the generation of inverse priming effects with relevant and irrelevant masks. We found a network of brain areas that is accessible to unconscious primes, including supplementary motor area (SMA), anterior insula, middle cingulate cortex, and supramarginal gyrus. Activation of these brain areas were involved in inverse priming when relevant masks were used. With irrelevant masks, however, only SMA activation was involved in inverse priming effects. Activation in SMA correlated with inverse priming effects of individual participants on reaction time, indicating that this brain area reflects the size of inverse priming effects on the behavioral level. Findings are most consistent with the view that a basic inhibitory mechanism contributes to inverse priming with either type of mask and additional processes contribute to the effect with relevant masks. This study provides new evidence showing that cognitive control operations in the human cortex take account of task relevant stimulus information even if this information is not consciously perceived.

Conditional automaticity in subliminal morphosyntactic priming

We used a gender-classification task to test the principles of subliminal morphosyntactic priming. In Experiment 1, masked, subliminal feminine or masculine articles were used as primes. They preceded a visible target noun. Subliminal articles either had a morphosyntactically congruent or incongruent gender with the targets. In a gender-classification task of the target nouns, subliminal articles primed the responses: responses were faster in congruent than incongruent conditions (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, we tested whether this congruence effect depended on gender relevance. In line with a relevance-dependence, the congruence effect only occurred in a gender-classification task but was absent in another categorical discrimination of the target nouns (Experiment 2). The congruence effect also depended on correct word order. It was diminished when nouns preceded articles (Experiment 3). Finally, the congruence effect was replicated with a larger set of targets but only for masculine targets (Experiment 4). Results are discussed in light of theories of subliminal priming in general and of subliminal syntactic priming in particular.

Executive control over unconscious cognition: attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing

Unconscious priming is a prototypical example of an automatic process, which is initiated without deliberate intention. Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive control mechanisms. In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets. This article provides an overview of the latest research on executive control influences on unconscious information processing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity with a particular focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition which is specifically developed to account for various attentional influences on different types of unconscious information processing. In support of the attentional sensitization model, empirical evidence is reviewed demonstrating executive control influences on unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets. This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive control settings. I discuss that the assumption of attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing can accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity of processes in many areas of cognition and emotion. This theoretical view has the potential to stimulate future research on executive control of unconscious processing in healthy and clinical populations.

Consciousness and cognitive control

The implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. It seems that we exert control over our behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. Recent research suggests, however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. Here we give a brief review of this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest some lines of future research. Specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked either because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. While the former type of control seems to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously registered events that call for control.

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual perception: From a plethora of phenomena to general principles

Psychological and neuroscience approaches have promoted much progress in elucidating the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie phenomenal visual awareness during the last decades. In this article, we provide an overview of the latest research investigating important phenomena in conscious and unconscious vision. We identify general principles to characterize conscious and unconscious visual perception, which may serve as important building blocks for a unified model to explain the plethora of findings. We argue that in particular the integration of principles from both conscious and unconscious vision is advantageous and provides critical constraints for developing adequate theoretical models. Based on the principles identified in our review, we outline essential components of a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception. We propose that awareness refers to consolidated visual representations, which are accessible to the entire brain and therefore globally available. However, visual awareness not only depends on consolidation within the visual system, but is additionally the result of a post-sensory gating process, which is mediated by higher-level cognitive control mechanisms. We further propose that amplification of visual representations by attentional sensitization is not exclusive to the domain of conscious perception, but also applies to visual stimuli, which remain unconscious. Conscious and unconscious processing modes are highly interdependent with influences in both directions. We therefore argue that exactly this interdependence renders a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception valuable. Computational modeling jointly with focused experimental research could lead to a better understanding of the plethora of empirical phenomena in consciousness research.

A PRP-study to determine the locus of target priming effects

Visual stimuli that are made invisible by a following mask can nonetheless affect motor responses. To localize the origin of these target priming effects we used the psychological refractory period paradigm. Participants classified tones as high or low, and responded to the position of a visual target that was preceded by a prime. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between both tasks varied. In Experiment 1 the tone task was followed by the position task and SOA dependent target priming effects were observed. When the visual position task preceded the tone task in Experiment 2, with short SOA the priming effect propagated entirely to the tone task yielding faster responses to tones on visually congruent trials and delayed responses to tones on visually incongruent trials. Together, results suggest that target priming effects arise from processing before and at the level of the central bottleneck such as sensory analysis and response selection.

Unconscious activation of task sets

Using an explicit task cuing paradigm, we tested whether masked cues can trigger task-set activation, which would suggest that unconsciously presented stimuli can impact cognitive control processes. Based on a critical assessment of previous findings on the priming of task-set activation, we present two experiments with a new method to approach this subject. Instead of using a prime, we varied the visibility of the cue. These cues either directly signaled particular tasks in Experiment 1, or certain task transitions (i.e., task repetitions or switches) in Experiment 2. While both masked task and transition cues affected task choice, only task cues affected the speed of task performance. This observation suggests that task-specific stimulus-response rules can be activated only by masked cues that are uniquely associated with a particular task. Taken together, these results demonstrate that unconsciously presented stimuli have the power to activate corresponding task sets.

PRP-paradigm provides evidence for a perceptual origin of the negative compatibility effect

Visual stimuli (primes) that are made invisible by masking can affect motor responses to a subsequent target stimulus. When a prime is followed by a mask which is followed by a target stimulus, an inverse priming effect (or negative compatibility effect) has been found: Responses are slow and frequently incorrect when prime and target stimuli are congruent, but fast and accurate when prime and target stimuli are incongruent. To functionally localize the origins of inverse priming effects, we applied the psychological refractory period (PRP-) paradigm which distinguishes a perceptual level, a central bottleneck, and a level of motor execution. Two dual-task experiments were run with the PRP-paradigm to localize the inverse priming effect relative to the central bottleneck. Together, results of the Effect-Absorption and the Effect-Propagation Procedure suggest that inverse priming effects are generated by perceptual mechanisms. We suggest two perceptual mechanisms as the source of inverse priming effects.

Negative and positive masked-priming - implications for motor inhibition

Masked stimuli can prime responses to subsequent target stimuli, causing response benefits when the prime is similar to the target. However, one masked-prime paradigm has produced counter-intuitive negative compatibility effects (NCE), such that performance costs occur when prime and target are similar. This NCE has been interpreted as an index of an automatic self-inhibition mechanism that suppresses the partial motor activation caused by the prime. However, several alternative explanations for the NCE have been proposed and supported by new evidence. As a framework for discussion, I divide the original theory into five potentially separable issues and briefly examine each with regard to alternative theories and current evidence. These issues are: 1) whether the NCE is caused by motor inhibition or perceptual interactions; 2) whether inhibition is self-triggered or stimulus-triggered; 3) whether prime visibility plays a causal role; 4) whether there is a threshold for triggering inhibition; 5) whether inhibition is automatic. Lastly, I briefly consider why NCEs have not been reported in other priming paradigms, and what the neural substrate for any automatic motor inhibition might be.

Priming by motion too rapid to be consciously seen

When a rapidly rotating ring of dots was briefly flashed, observers saw only a solid ring with no discriminable rotation. However, when this stimulus served as a prime that was followed by a target that consisted of a clearly rotating ring of dots, response times (RTs) to report the target's rotation were shorter when the prime and target directions were congruent than when they were incongruent. In accord with shape priming data, this priming effect increased monotonically with the prime-target stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA). The prime also biased the perceived direction of an ambiguous apparent motion target, but only at an intermediate SOA. At the same SOA, we also found that target presentations enabled above-chance discrimination of prime's rotation direction. These outcomes demonstrate the processing of motion direction information that is not phenomenally represented. They suggest a common mechanism may mediate the priming of RTs by shape and motion, whereas a different mechanism mediates perceptual measures of motion priming.