Nonintentional analogical inference in text comprehension

Transient Neural Activation of Abstract Relations on an Incidental Analogy Task

Although a large proportion of the lexicon consists of abstract concepts, little is known about how they are represented by the brain. Here, we investigated how the mind represents relations shared between sets of mental representations that are superficially unrelated, such as car-engine and dog-tongue, but that nonetheless share a more general, abstract relation, such as whole-part. Participants saw a pair of words on each trial and were asked to indicate whether they could think of a relation between them. Importantly, they were not explicitly asked whether different word pairs shared the same relation, as in analogical reasoning tasks. We observed representational similarity for abstract relations in regions in the "conceptual hub" network, even when controlling for semantic relatedness between word pairs. By contrast, we did not observe representational similarity in regions previously implicated in explicit analogical reasoning. A given relation was sometimes repeated across sequential word pairs, allowing us to test for behavioral and neural priming of abstract relations. Indeed, we observed faster RTs and greater representational similarity for primed than unprimed trials, suggesting that mental representations of abstract relations are transiently activated on this incidental analogy task. Finally, we found a significant correlation between behavioral and neural priming across participants. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate relational priming using functional neuroimaging and to show that neural representations are strengthened by relational priming. This research shows how abstract concepts can be brought to mind momentarily, even when not required for task performance.

Implicit Analogies in Learning: Supporting Transfer by Warming Up

Analogies between old and new concepts are common during classroom instruction. Previous transfer studies focused on how features of initial learning guide later, spontaneous transfer to new problem solving. We argue for a shift in the focus of analogical-transfer research toward understanding how to best support analogical transfer from previous learning when children are engaged in new learning episodes. Such research may have important implications for teaching and learning in mathematics, which relies heavily on analogies between old and new information. Some existing research promotes supporting explicit connections across old and new information within an analogy. Alternatively, we argue that teachers can invite implicit analogical reasoning through warm-up activities designed to activate relevant prior knowledge. Warm-up activities close the transfer space between old and new learning without additional direct instruction.

Evidence from machines that learn and think like people

We agree with Lake et al.'s trenchant analysis of deep learning systems, including that they are highly brittle and that they need vastly more examples than do people. We also agree that human cognition relies heavily on structured relational representations. However, we differ in our analysis of human cognitive processing. We argue that (1) analogical comparison processes are central to human cognition; and (2) intuitive physical knowledge is captured by qualitative representations, rather than quantitative simulations.

Inhibitory control during selective retrieval may hinder subsequent analogical thinking

Analogical reasoning is a complex cognitive activity that involves access and retrieval of pre-existing knowledge in order to find a suitable solution. Prior work has shown that analogical transfer and reasoning can be influenced by unconscious activation of relevant information. Based on this idea, we report two experiments that examine whether reduced access to relevant information in memory may further disrupt analogical reasoning unwittingly. In both experiments, we use an adaptation of the retrieval practice paradigm [1] to modulate memory accessibility of potential solutions to a subsequent set of analogy problems of the type 'A is to B as C is to ?'. Experiment 1 showed a retrieval-induced impairment in analogical problem solving. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that it cannot be due to the deliberative episodic retrieval of the solutions to the analogies. These findings, predictable from an inhibitory framework of memory control, provide a new focus for theories of analogical transfer and highlight the importance of unconscious memory processes that may modulate problem solving.

Generating explanations via analogical comparison

Generating explanations can be highly effective in promoting learning in both adults and children. Our interest is in the mechanisms that underlie this effect and in whether and how they operate in early learning. In adult reasoning, explanation may call on many subprocesses-including comparison, counterfactual reasoning, and reasoning by exclusion; but it is unlikely that all these processes are available to young children. We propose that one process that may serve both children and adults is comparison. In this study, we asked whether children would use the results of a comparison experience when asked to explain why a model skyscraper was stable. We focused on a challenging principle-that diagonal cross-bracing lends stability to physical structures (Gentner et al., Cognitive Science, 40, 224-240, 2016). Six-year-olds either received no training or interacted with model skyscrapers in one of three different conditions, designed to vary in their potential to invite and support comparison. In the Single Model condition, children interacted with a single braced model. In the comparison conditions (Low Alignability and High Alignability), children compared braced and unbraced models. Following experience with the models, children were asked to explain why the braced model was stable. They then received two transfer tasks. We found that children who received highly alignable pairs were most likely to (a) produce brace-based explanations and (b) transfer the brace principle to a dissimilar context. This provides evidence that children can benefit from analogical comparison in generating explanations and also suggests limitations on this ability.

Representation and Computation in Cognitive Models

One of the central issues in cognitive science is the nature of human representations. We argue that symbolic representations are essential for capturing human cognitive capabilities. We start by examining some common misconceptions found in discussions of representations and models. Next we examine evidence that symbolic representations are essential for capturing human cognitive capabilities, drawing on the analogy literature. Then we examine fundamental limitations of feature vectors and other distributed representations that, despite their recent successes on various practical problems, suggest that they are insufficient to capture many aspects of human cognition. After that, we describe the implications for cognitive architecture of our view that analogy is central, and we speculate on roles for hybrid approaches. We close with an analogy that might help bridge the gap.

Eye Movements Reveal Optimal Strategies for Analogical Reasoning

Analogical reasoning refers to the process of drawing inferences on the basis of the relational similarity between two domains. Although this complex cognitive ability has been the focus of inquiry for many years, most models rely on measures that cannot capture individuals' thought processes moment by moment. In the present study, we used participants' eye movements to investigate reasoning strategies in real time while solving visual propositional analogy problems (A:B::C:D). We included both a semantic and a perceptual lure on every trial to determine how these types of distracting information influence reasoning strategies. Participants spent more time fixating the analogy terms and the target relative to the other response choices, and made more saccades between the A and B items than between any other items. Participants' eyes were initially drawn to perceptual lures when looking at response choices, but they nonetheless performed the task accurately. We used participants' gaze sequences to classify each trial as representing one of three classic analogy problem solving strategies and related strategy usage to analogical reasoning performance. A project-first strategy, in which participants first extrapolate the relation between the AB pair and then generalize that relation for the C item, was both the most commonly used strategy as well as the optimal strategy for solving visual analogy problems. These findings provide new insight into the role of strategic processing in analogical problem solving.

Spatial analogies pervade complex relational reasoning: Evidence from spontaneous gestures

How do people think about complex phenomena like the behavior of ecosystems? Here we hypothesize that people reason about such relational systems in part by creating spatial analogies, and we explore this possibility by examining spontaneous gestures. In two studies, participants read a written lesson describing positive and negative feedback systems and then explained the differences between them. Though the lesson was highly abstract and people were not instructed to gesture, people produced spatial gestures in abundance during their explanations. These gestures used space to represent simple abstract relations (e.g., increase) and sometimes more complex relational structures (e.g., negative feedback). Moreover, over the course of their explanations, participants' gestures often cohered into larger analogical models of relational structure. Importantly, the spatial ideas evident in the hands were largely unaccompanied by spatial words. Gesture thus suggests that spatial analogies are pervasive in complex relational reasoning, even when language does not.

Spatial analogies pervade complex relational reasoning: Evidence from spontaneous gestures

How do people think about complex phenomena like the behavior of ecosystems? Here we hypothesize that people reason about such relational systems in part by creating spatial analogies, and we explore this possibility by examining spontaneous gestures. In two studies, participants read a written lesson describing positive and negative feedback systems and then explained the differences between them. Though the lesson was highly abstract and people were not instructed to gesture, people produced spatial gestures in abundance during their explanations. These gestures used space to represent simple abstract relations (e.g., increase) and sometimes more complex relational structures (e.g., negative feedback). Moreover, over the course of their explanations, participants’ gestures often cohered into larger analogical models of relational structure. Importantly, the spatial ideas evident in the hands were largely unaccompanied by spatial words. Gesture thus suggests that spatial analogies are pervasive in complex relational reasoning, even when language does not.

Learning of role-governed and thematic categories

Natural categories are often based on intrinsic characteristics, such as shared features, but they can also be based on extrinsic relationships to items outside the categories. Examples of relational categories include items that share a thematic relation or items that share a common role. Five experiments used an artificial category learning paradigm to investigate whether people can learn role-governed and thematic categories without explicit instruction or linguistic support. Participants viewed film clips in which objects were engaged in similar actions and then were asked to group together objects that they believed were in the same category. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that while people spontaneously grouped items using both role-governed and thematic relations, when forced to choose between the two, most preferred role-governed categories. In Experiment 3, category labels increased this preference. Experiment 4 found that people failed to group items based on more abstract role relations when the specific relations differed (e.g., objects that prevented different actions). However, Experiment 5 showed that people could identify them with the aid of comparison. We concluded that people can form role-governed categories even with minimal perceptual and linguistic cues.

When Challenging Art Gets Liked: Evidences for a Dual Preference Formation Process for Fluent and Non-Fluent Portraits

Although fluency theory predominates psychological research on human aesthetics, its most severe limitation may be to explain why art that challenges or even violates easy processing can nevertheless be aesthetically rewarding. We discuss long-standing notions on art's potential to offer mental growth opportunities and to tap into a basic epistemic predisposition that hint at a fluency counteracting aesthetic pleasure mechanism. Based on divergent strands of literature on empirical, evolutionary, and philosophical aesthetics, as well as research on disfluency, we presumed that challenging art requires deliberate reflexive processing at the level of "aboutness" in order to be experientially pleasing. Here, we probed such a cognitive mastering mechanism, achieved by iterative cycles of elaboration, as predicted by our model of aesthetic experiences. For the study, two kinds of portraits were applied, one associable to a high fluency and one to a high stimulation potential (according to results of an extensive rating study). In Experiment 1, we provided a repeated evaluation task, which revealed a distinctive preference effect for challenging portraits that was absent in the visual exposition conditions of a familiarity and a mere exposure task (Experiment 2). In a follow-up task (Experiment 3) this preference effect was observed with a novel and more encompassing pool of portraits, which corroborated its stability and robustness. In an explorative stimulus-transfer task (Experiment 4), we investigated the presumed underlying mechanism by testing whether the observed effect would generalize onto novel portraits of the same artist-specific styles. Results discounted an alternative interpretation of a perceptual adaptation effect and hinted at meaning-driven mental activity. Conjointly, findings for inexperienced viewers were indicative of an elaboration based mastering mechanism that selectively operated for mentally challenging portraits. Moreover, findings were in line with a dual-process view of human preference formation with art. Theoretical implications and boundary conditions are discussed.

Mimicry Is Presidential: Linguistic Style Matching in Presidential Debates and Improved Polling Numbers

The current research used the contexts of U.S. presidential debates and negotiations to examine whether matching the linguistic style of an opponent in a two-party exchange affects the reactions of third-party observers. Building off communication accommodation theory (CAT), interaction alignment theory (IAT), and processing fluency, we propose that language style matching (LSM) will improve subsequent third-party evaluations because matching an opponent's linguistic style reflects greater perspective taking and will make one's arguments easier to process. In contrast, research on status inferences predicts that LSM will negatively impact third-party evaluations because LSM implies followership. We conduct two studies to test these competing hypotheses. Study 1 analyzed transcripts of U.S. presidential debates between 1976 and 2012 and found that candidates who matched their opponent's linguistic style increased their standing in the polls. Study 2 demonstrated a causal relationship between LSM and third-party observer evaluations using negotiation transcripts.

Iconicity as structure mapping

Linguistic and psycholinguistic evidence is presented to support the use of structure-mapping theory as a framework for understanding effects of iconicity on sign language grammar and processing. The existence of structured mappings between phonological form and semantic mental representations has been shown to explain the nature of metaphor and pronominal anaphora in sign languages. With respect to processing, it is argued that psycholinguistic effects of iconicity may only be observed when the task specifically taps into such structured mappings. In addition, language acquisition effects may only be observed when the relevant cognitive abilities are in place (e.g. the ability to make structural comparisons) and when the relevant conceptual knowledge has been acquired (i.e. information key to processing the iconic mapping). Finally, it is suggested that iconicity is better understood as a structured mapping between two mental representations than as a link between linguistic form and human experience.

Detecting analogies unconsciously

Analogies may arise from the conscious detection of similarities between a present and a past situation. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we tested whether young volunteers would detect analogies unconsciously between a current supraliminal (visible) and a past subliminal (invisible) situation. The subliminal encoding of the past situation precludes awareness of analogy detection in the current situation. First, participants encoded subliminal pairs of unrelated words in either one or nine encoding trials. Later, they judged the semantic fit of supraliminally presented new words that either retained a previously encoded semantic relation (“analog”) or not (“broken analog”). Words in analogs versus broken analogs were judged closer semantically, which indicates unconscious analogy detection. Hippocampal activity associated with subliminal encoding correlated with the behavioral measure of unconscious analogy detection. Analogs versus broken analogs were processed with reduced prefrontal but enhanced medial temporal activity. We conclude that analogous episodes can be detected even unconsciously drawing on the episodic memory network.

Theory of Mind Deficit versus Faulty Procedural Memory in Autism Spectrum Disorders

Individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have impairments in social interaction, communicative capacity, and behavioral flexibility (core triad). Three major cognitive theories (theory of mind deficit, weak central coherence, and executive dysfunction) seem to explain many of these impairments. Currently, however, the empathizing-systemizing (a newer version of the theory of mind deficit account) and mnesic imbalance theories are the only ones that attempt to explain all these core triadic symptoms of ASD On the other hand, theory of mind deficit in empathizing-systemizing theory is the most influential account for ASD, but its counterpart in the mnesic imbalance theory, faulty procedural memory, seems to occur earlier in development; consequently, this might be a better solution to the problem of the etiology of ASD, if it truly meets the precedence criterion. Hence, in the present paper I review the reasoning in favor of the theory of mind deficit but with a new interpretation based on the mnesic imbalance theory, which posits that faulty procedural memory causes deficits in several cognitive skills, resulting in poor performance in theory of mind tasks.

Motion as manipulation: implementation of force-motion analogies by event-file binding and action planning

Tool-improvisation analogies are structure-mapping inferences implemented, in many species, by event-file binding and pre-motor action planning. These processes act on multi-modal representations of currently perceived situations and eventuate in motor acts that can be directly evaluated for success or failure; they employ implicit representations of force-motion relations encoded by the pre-motor system and do not depend on explicit, language-like representations of relational concepts. A detailed reconstruction of the analogical reasoning steps involved in Rutherford's and Bohr's development of the first quantized-orbit model of atomic structure is used to show that human force-motion analogies can in general be implemented by these mechanisms. This event-file manipulation model of the implementation of force-motion analogies is distinguished from the standard view that structure-mapping analogies require the manipulation of explicit, language-like representations of relational concepts.

Reviving inert knowledge: analogical abstraction supports relational retrieval of past events

We present five experiments and simulation studies to establish late analogical abstraction as a new psychological phenomenon: Schema abstraction from analogical examples can revive otherwise inert knowledge. We find that comparing two analogous examples of negotiations at recall time promotes retrieving analogical matches stored in memory-a notoriously elusive effect. Another innovation in this research is that we show parallel effects for real-life autobiographical memory (Experiments 1-3) and for a controlled memory set (Experiments 4 and 5). Simulation studies show that a unified model based on schema abstraction can capture backward (retrieval) effects as well as forward (transfer) effects.