1
|
Espino O, Orenes I, Moreno-Ríos S. Illusory inferences in conditional expressions. Mem Cognit 2024:10.3758/s13421-024-01571-2. [PMID: 38689204 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01571-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/11/2024] [Indexed: 05/02/2024]
Abstract
A robber points a gun at a cashier and says: "Only one of these two options is true: If you conceal the combination to the safe, then I kill you; otherwise, if you don´t conceal the combination to the safe, then I kill you." Hearing this statement, most people conclude that, in either case, "I kill you." This is an illusory response, in fact; the valid conclusion states "I don´t kill you." The research reported here studied the roles that different expressions of conditionals ("if-then," "only if," and "if and only if") play in the illusory response. Three experiments show that participants inferred the conclusion "I kill you" from the conditional "if-then" and "I may or may not kill you" from the conditional "only if," while selecting both options with similar frequency for the biconditional "if and only if." These results shed light on the main theories of deductive reasoning.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Orlando Espino
- Department of Cognitive, Social, and Organizational Psychology, University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain.
| | - Isabel Orenes
- Department of Basic Psychology, National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, Spain
| | - Sergio Moreno-Ríos
- Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology & CIMCYC, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Ragni M, Johnson-Laird P. Reasoning about epistemic possibilities. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2020; 208:103081. [PMID: 32497740 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2019] [Revised: 03/09/2020] [Accepted: 04/24/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Reasoning about epistemic possibilities - those based on knowledge - is fundamental in daily life. It is formalized in modal logics, of which there are infinitely many, based on the semantics of 'possible worlds'. An alternative psychological theory postulates that possibilities (and probabilities) in daily life are based on the human ability to construct mental models of finite alternatives, which can each be realized in an indefinite number of different ways. This account leads to three main predictions that diverge from normal modal logics. First, the assertion of an epistemic possibility, A, presupposes the possibility of not-A, in default of knowledge to the contrary. Second, reasoners condense multiple possibilities into one, contravening modal logics, but reducing the load on working memory, e.g.: When knowledge shows that this condensation would be inconsistent, reasoners resist it. Epistemic possibilities are akin to non-numerical probabilities, forming a scale that runs from impossible to certain. In contrast, epistemic necessities state a necessary condition for some other proposition, e.g.: "It is necessary that it rains tomorrow for the plants to survive." The article reports five experiments corroborating these predictions. Their results challenge current conceptions of human reasoning.
Collapse
|
3
|
Johnson-Laird PN, Ragni M. Possibilities as the foundation of reasoning. Cognition 2019; 193:103950. [PMID: 31374514 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2019] [Accepted: 04/22/2019] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Reasoning about possibilities is fundamental in daily life. Yet, it has been little studied in psychology. We present a psychological theory in which it is the foundation of human reasoning. The theory explains how possibilities have distinct interpretations (deontic, epistemic, and alethic), how people represent them in models, and how these models yield inferences. Key principles are that the semantics of possibilities are the same finitary alternatives underlying probabilities, that speech acts can create obligations inexpressible as probabilities, that compound assertions - conditionals and disjunctions - refer to conjunctions of possibilities holding in default of knowledge to the contrary, and that mental models condense multiple consistent possibilities into one. The theory is incompatible with all normal modal logics and with probabilistic logic. Yet, experiments have corroborated its predictions. The article discusses its precursors, rivals, and potentials.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- P N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA; Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA.
| | - Marco Ragni
- Cognitive Computation Lab, Institut für Informatik, Technische Fakultät, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Georges-Köhler-Allee, Geb. 052, 79110 Freiburg, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Khemlani SS, Byrne RMJ, Johnson-Laird PN. Facts and Possibilities: A Model-Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning. Cogn Sci 2018; 42:1887-1924. [PMID: 29968343 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12634] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/08/2017] [Revised: 04/17/2018] [Accepted: 05/03/2018] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
This article presents a fundamental advance in the theory of mental models as an explanation of reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities. It postulates that the meanings of compound assertions, such as conditionals (if) and disjunctions (or), unlike those in logic, refer to conjunctions of epistemic possibilities that hold in default of information to the contrary. Various factors such as general knowledge can modulate these interpretations. New information can always override sentential inferences; that is, reasoning in daily life is defeasible (or nonmonotonic). The theory is a dual process one: It distinguishes between intuitive inferences (based on system 1) and deliberative inferences (based on system 2). The article describes a computer implementation of the theory, including its two systems of reasoning, and it shows how the program simulates crucial predictions that evidence corroborates. It concludes with a discussion of how the theory contrasts with those based on logic or on probabilities.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sangeet S Khemlani
- Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence, US Naval Research Laboratory
| | - Ruth M J Byrne
- School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin
| | - Philip N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University
- Department of Psychology, New York University
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
|
6
|
Toward a Unified Theory of Reasoning. PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 2013. [DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-12-407187-2.00001-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/03/2023]
|
7
|
|
8
|
Abstract
To be rational is to be able to reason. Thirty years ago psychologists believed that human reasoning depended on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. This hypothesis ran into difficulties, which led to an alternative view: reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the starting point--a perception of the world, a set of assertions, a memory, or some mixture of them. We construct mental models of each distinct possibility and derive a conclusion from them. The theory predicts systematic errors in our reasoning, and the evidence corroborates this prediction. Yet, our ability to use counterexamples to refute invalid inferences provides a foundation for rationality. On this account, reasoning is a simulation of the world fleshed out with our knowledge, not a formal rearrangement of the logical skeletons of sentences.
Collapse
|
9
|
Goldvarg E, Johnson-Laird P. Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. Cogn Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog2504_3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 119] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
|
10
|
|
11
|
|
12
|
Shtulman A, Carey S. Improbable or impossible? How children reason about the possibility of extraordinary events. Child Dev 2007; 78:1015-32. [PMID: 17517019 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01047.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 97] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
The present study investigated the development of possibility-judgment strategies between the ages of 4 and 8. In Experiment 1, 48 children and 16 adults were asked whether a variety of extraordinary events could or could not occur in real life. Although children of all ages denied the possibility of events that adults also judged impossible, children frequently denied the possibility of events that adults judged improbable but not impossible. Three additional experiments varied the manner in which possibility judgments were elicited and confirmed the robustness of preschoolers' tendency to judge improbable events impossible. Overall, it is argued that children initially mistake their inability to imagine circumstances that would allow an event to occur for evidence that no such circumstances exist.
Collapse
|
13
|
|
14
|
Rauh R, Hagen C, Knauff M, Kuss T, Schlieder C, Strube G. Preferred and Alternative Mental Models in Spatial Reasoning. SPATIAL COGNITION AND COMPUTATION 2005. [DOI: 10.1207/s15427633scc052&3_7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
|
15
|
|
16
|
Abstract
The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- P N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, New Jersey 08544, USA.
| | | |
Collapse
|
17
|
|
18
|
|
19
|
Abstract
The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of situations described in premises. These models normally make explicit only what is true according to the premises. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence of illusions in inferences: Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Previous studies have corroborated the existence of such illusions. The present study reports the first effective antidote to them. For example, most people incorrectly answer "yes" to the following problem: Only one of the following statements is true ... /At least some of the plastic beads are not red./None of the plastic beads are red./Is it possible that none of the red beads are plastic? In two experiments, we progressively eliminated this fallacy and others by using instructions designed to overcome the bias toward truth. The difference between the illusory and the control problems disappeared when the participants were instructed to work out both the case in which the first premise was true and second premise was false and the case in which the second premise was true and the first premise was false.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Y Yang
- Department of Psychology, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA.
| | | |
Collapse
|
20
|
|