Perceptual adaptation to structure-from-motion depends on the size of adaptor and probe objects, but not on the similarity of their shapes

Modest effect of knowledge on bistable perception of structure-from-motion

When faced with ambiguous visual input, observers may experience various perceptual interpretations of the same input. Indeed, such input can cause perception to unpredictably switch between interpretations over time. Theories of such so-called multistable perception broadly fall into two categories: top-down theories that emphasize dependence on higher-level cognitive factors such as knowledge, and bottom-up theories that suggest more vital involvement of aspects of lower-order information processing such as adaptation in the visual system. Most present-day accounts hold that both factors play a role, so that perceptual reversals arise inevitably due to factors like adaptation, yet can be delayed or hastened by higher-level cognitive influences. We revisited a body of work that shows the occurrence of perceptual reversals to depend dramatically on the observer's knowledge that the input is, indeed, ambiguous: without such knowledge many observers in that work did not experience any reversals, in apparent conflict with the idea that reversals are inevitable. We used an ambiguous animation that allowed subjects to report perceptual reversals without realizing the ambiguity. We found that subjects who were aware of the animation's ambiguity reported slightly more perceptual reversals than uninformed subjects, but that this between-group difference was small, and was overshadowed by inter-observer variability within each group. These findings suggest that knowledge of ambiguity can influence perception of ambiguous stimuli, but only mildly, in keeping with most present-day accounts. We discuss potential explanations for the discrepancy with the earlier work.

Top-down resolution of visual ambiguity - knowledge from the future or footprints from the past?

Current theories about visual perception assume that our perceptual system weights the a priori incomplete, noisy and ambiguous sensory information with previous, memorized perceptual experiences in order to construct stable and reliable percepts. These theories are supported by numerous experimental findings. Theories about precognition have an opposite point of view. They assume that information from the future can have influence on perception, thoughts, and behavior. Several experimental studies provide evidence for precognition effects, other studies found no such effects. One problem may be that the vast majority of precognition paradigms did not systematically control for potential effects from the perceptual history. In the present study, we presented ambiguous Necker cube stimuli and disambiguated cube variants and systematically tested in two separate experiments whether perception of a currently observed ambiguous Necker cube stimulus can be influenced by a disambiguated cube variant, presented in the immediate perceptual past (perceptual history effects) and/or in the immediate perceptual future (precognition effects). We found perceptual history effects, which partly depended on the length of the perceptual history trace but were independent of the perceptual future. Results from some individual participants suggest on the first glance a precognition pattern, but results from our second experiment make a perceptual history explanation more probable. On the group level, no precognition effects were statistically indicated. The perceptual history effects found in the present study are in confirmation with related studies from the literature. The precognition analysis revealed some interesting individual patterns, which however did not allow for general conclusions. Overall, the present study demonstrates that any future experiment about sensory or extrasensory perception urgently needs to control for potential perceptual history effects and that temporal aspects of stimulus presentation are of high relevance.

The Certainty of Ambiguity in Visual Neural Representations

Some images evoke bistable percepts: two different visual experiences seen in alternation while continuously viewing an unchanged stimulus. The Necker Cube and Rubin's Vase are classic examples, each of which gives alternating percepts of different shapes. Other bistable percepts are alternating colors or directions of motion. Although stimuli that result in salient bistability are rare and sometimes cleverly constructed to emphasize ambiguity, they have been influential for over 150 years, since the work of von Helmholtz, who considered them to be evidence for perceptual visual processes that interpret retinal stimuli. While bistability in natural viewing is uncommon, the main point of this review is that implicit ambiguity in visual neural representations is pervasive. Resolving ambiguity, therefore, is a fundamental and ubiquitous process of vision that routinely affects what we see, not an oddity arising from cleverly crafted images. This review focuses on the causes of widespread ambiguity, historical perspectives on it, and modern knowledge and theory about resolving it.

Binocular rivalry reveals an out-of-equilibrium neural dynamics suited for decision-making

In ambiguous or conflicting sensory situations, perception is often 'multistable' in that it perpetually changes at irregular intervals, shifting abruptly between distinct alternatives. The interval statistics of these alternations exhibits quasi-universal characteristics, suggesting a general mechanism. Using binocular rivalry, we show that many aspects of this perceptual dynamics are reproduced by a hierarchical model operating out of equilibrium. The constitutive elements of this model idealize the metastability of cortical networks. Independent elements accumulate visual evidence at one level, while groups of coupled elements compete for dominance at another level. As soon as one group dominates perception, feedback inhibition suppresses supporting evidence. Previously unreported features in the serial dependencies of perceptual alternations compellingly corroborate this mechanism. Moreover, the proposed out-of-equilibrium dynamics satisfies normative constraints of continuous decision-making. Thus, multistable perception may reflect decision-making in a volatile world: integrating evidence over space and time, choosing categorically between hypotheses, while concurrently evaluating alternatives.

Large EEG amplitude effects are highly similar across Necker cube, smiley, and abstract stimuli

The information available through our senses is noisy, incomplete, and ambiguous. Our perceptual systems have to resolve this ambiguity to construct stable and reliable percepts. Previous EEG studies found large amplitude differences in two event-related potential (ERP) components 200 and 400 ms after stimulus onset when comparing ambiguous with disambiguated visual information ("ERP Ambiguity Effects"). These effects so far generalized across classical ambiguous figures from different visual categories at lower (geometry, motion) and intermediate (Gestalt perception) levels. The present study aimed to examine whether these ERP Effects are restricted to ambiguous figures or whether they also occur for different degrees of visibility. Smiley faces with low and high visibility of emotional expressions, as well as abstract figures with low and high visibility of a target curvature were presented. We thus compared ambiguity effects in geometric cube stimuli with visibility in emotional faces, and with visibility in abstract figures. ERP Effects were replicated for the geometric stimuli and very similar ERP Effects were found for stimuli with emotional face expressions but also for abstract figures. Conclusively, the ERP amplitude effects generalize across fundamentally different stimulus categories and show highly similar effects for different degrees of stimulus ambiguity and stimulus visibility. We postulate the existence of a high-level/meta-perceptual evaluation instance, beyond sensory details, that estimates the certainty of a perceptual decision. The ERP Effects may reflect differences in evaluation results.

Shape specificity of neural persistence for the kinetic-depth effect matches perceptual adaptation but not sensory memory

When multistable displays-stimuli that are compatible with several comparably likely perceptual interpretations-are presented intermittently, the perceptual state at the stimulus onset shows a complex dependence on the duration of the preceding blank interval. Specifically, perception is maximally destabilized for interruptions that are approximately 500 ms long, but it is stabilized by the use of shorter or longer blank intervals. This nonmonotonic dependence of perceptual stability on the blank interval duration raises questions about a number of history effects that are involved and about their nature, including the underlying neural representations. One way to characterize history effects is by looking at their specificity to the change of display properties. Here we measured the shape specificity for perception of the kinetic-depth effect when interruptions were brief (50 ms). For this time interval, perception is thought to be stabilized by neural persistence, a lingering trace of the prior neural activity. We found that perceptual stability depended on the shapes of the objects presented both before and after the break, but not on the similarity between the objects. These results matched earlier reports of the shape specificity of neural adaptation (destabilizing aftereffect for blanks 200-800 ms long). However, our results were markedly different from the shape specificity of sensory memory of multistable perception (a stabilizing effect for blanks > 800-1,000 ms). We concluded that whereas neural persistence and adaptation both act on the same motion-selective neural representation, sensory memory depends on another, possibly partially overlapping, shape-selective neural ensemble.

Switch rates for orthogonally oriented kinetic-depth displays are correlated across observers

When continuously viewing multistable displays, which are compatible with several comparably likely interpretations, perception perpetually switches between available alternatives. Prior studies typically report the lack of consistent individual switch rates across different displays. However, this comparison is based on an assumption that neural representations of physically identical displays are consistent across observers. Yet, given how different individuals are already at the level of the retina, it is likely that the difference in other relevant factors might mask the correlation. To address this issue, we compared switch rates in two kinetic-depth displays (KDE) that rotated around orthogonal axes (45° counterclockwise vs. 45° clockwise relative to the vertical). This ensured that dynamics of multistable perception was based on highly similar, but different and independent neural representations. We also included a Necker cube (NC) display as a control. We report that switch rates were correlated between two kinetic-depth effect displays, but not between either of the KDE and NC displays. This demonstrates that the usual lack of correlation may not be evidence for the lack of a shared pacesetter mechanism of multistable perception, but reflect other factors, such as differently modulated inputs to competing representations. In addition, we asked participants to speed-up or slow-down perceptual alternations and found that only the former ability was correlated across different displays. This indicates that these two types of volitional control may differ in their use of attentional resources.

What happens in the brain of meditators when perception changes but not the stimulus?

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.

Positive and negative hysteresis effects for the perception of geometric and emotional ambiguities

AIM

The present study utilizes perceptual hysteresis effects to compare the ambiguity of Mona Lisa's emotional face expression (high-level ambiguity) and of geometric cube stimuli (low-level ambiguity).

METHODS

In two experiments we presented series of nine Mona Lisa variants and nine cube variants. Stimulus ambiguity was manipulated by changing Mona Lisa's mouth curvature (Exp. 1) and the cubes' back-layer luminance (Exp. 2). Each experiment consisted of three conditions, two with opposite stimulus presentation sequences with increasing and decreasing degrees of ambiguity, respectively, and a third condition with a random presentation sequence. Participants indicated happy or sad face percepts (Exp. 1) and alternative 3D cube percepts (Exp. 2) by key presses. We studied the influences of a priori perceptual biases (long-term memory) and presentation order (short-term memory) on perception.

RESULTS

Perception followed sigmoidal functions of the stimulus ambiguity morphing parameters. The morphing parameter for the functions' inflection points depended strongly on stimulus presentation order with similar effect sizes but different signs for the two stimulus types (positive hysteresis / priming for the cubes; negative hysteresis / adaptation for Mona Lisa). In the random conditions, the inflection points were located in the middle between those from the two directional conditions for the Mona Lisa stimuli. For the cube stimuli, they were superimposed on one sigmoidal function for the ordered condition.

DISCUSSION

The hysteresis effects reflect the influence of short-term memory during the perceptual disambiguation of ambiguous sensory information. The effects for the two stimulus types are of similar size, explaining up to 34% of the perceptual variance introduced by the paradigm. We explain the qualitative difference between positive and negative hysteresis with adaptation for Mona Lisa and with priming for the cubes. In addition, the hysteresis paradigm allows a quantitative determination of the impact of adaptation and priming during the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. The asymmetric shifts of inflection points in the case of the cube stimuli is likely due to an a priori perceptual bias, reflecting an influence of long-term memory. Whether corresponding influences also exist for the Mona Lisa variants is so far unclear.

Perceptual coupling induces co-rotation and speeds up alternations in adjacent bi-stable structure-from-motion objects

When two bi-stable structure-from-motion (SFM) spheres are presented simultaneously, they tend to rotate in the same direction. This effect reflects a common state bias that is present for various multistable displays. However, it was also reported that when two spheres are positioned so that they touch each other, they tend to counterrotate instead. The latter effect is interpreted as a frictional interaction, indicating the influence of the embedded physics on our visual perception. Here, we examined the interplay between these two biases in two experiments using a wide range of conditions. Those included two SFM shapes, two types of disambiguation cues, the presence or absence of the disambiguation cues, different layout options, and two samples of observers from two different universities (in sum 26 participants). Contrary to the prior report, we observed a robust common state bias for all conditions, including those that were optimized for frictional and "gear meshing" interactions. We found that stronger coupling of perceptual states is accompanied by more frequent synchronous perceptual reversals of the two objects. However, we found that the simultaneity of the individual switches does not predict the duration of the following dominance phase. Finally, we report that stronger perceptual coupling speeds up perceptual alternations.

Transformation priming helps to disambiguate sudden changes of sensory inputs

Retinal input is riddled with abrupt transients due to self-motion, changes in illumination, object-motion, etc. Our visual system must correctly interpret each of these changes to keep visual perception consistent and sensitive. This poses an enormous challenge, as many transients are highly ambiguous in that they are consistent with many alternative physical transformations. Here we investigated inter-trial effects in three situations with sudden and ambiguous transients, each presenting two alternative appearances (rotation-reversing structure-from-motion, polarity-reversing shape-from-shading, and streaming-bouncing object collisions). In every situation, we observed priming of transformations as the outcome perceived in earlier trials tended to repeat in subsequent trials and this repetition was contingent on perceptual experience. The observed priming was specific to transformations and did not originate in priming of perceptual states preceding a transient. Moreover, transformation priming was independent of attention and specific to low level stimulus attributes. In summary, we show how "transformation priors" and experience-driven updating of such priors helps to disambiguate sudden changes of sensory inputs. We discuss how dynamic transformation priors can be instantiated as "transition energies" in an "energy landscape" model of the visual perception.

Temporal dynamics of different cases of bi-stable figure-ground perception

Segmentation of a visual scene in "figure" and "ground" is essential for perception of the three-dimensional layout of a scene. In cases of bi-stable perception, two distinct figure-ground interpretations alternate over time. We were interested in the temporal dynamics of these alternations, in particular when the same image is presented repeatedly, with short blank periods in-between. Surprisingly, we found that the intermittent presentation of Rubin's classical "face-or-vase" figure, which is frequently taken as a standard case of bi-stable figure-ground perception, often evoked perceptual switches during the short presentations and stabilization was not prominent. Interestingly, bi-stable perception of Kanizsa's anomalous transparency figure did strongly stabilize across blanks. We also found stabilization for the Necker cube, which we used for comparison. The degree of stabilization (and the lack of it) varied across stimuli and across individuals. Our results indicate, against common expectation, that the stabilization phenomenon cannot be generally evoked by intermittent presentation. We argue that top-down feedback factors such as familiarity, semantics, expectation, and perceptual bias contribute to the complex processes underlying the temporal dynamics of bi-stable figure-ground perception.

What you see depends on what you saw, and what else you saw: the interactions between motion priming and object priming

Both visual object priming and motion priming have been reported independently, but the interactions between the two are still largely unexplored. Here we investigated this question using a novel type of SFM stimuli, 3-D helixes, and found that the motion direction perception of an ambiguous helix can be biased by the motion direction of a preceding SFM stimulus - a classic motion priming effect. However, the effectiveness of motion priming depends on object priming: a neutral object priming produced a weak motion priming, a congruent object priming led to a strong motion priming, and critically, an incongruent object priming abolished and overpowered the motion priming. In contrast, object priming alone (in the absence of motion overlap) had little effects biasing motion perception. Taken together, these results suggest that there exists an integrated neural representation of motion and structure of 3-D SFM stimuli, and motion priming of 3-D SFM stimuli might happen at an intermediate stage between MT/V5 (which is not shape selective) and LO (lateral occipital, which is not motion selective). This novel type of stimuli, 3-D helixes, along with the prime-target paradigm, thus might offer a unique tool to examine neural bases underlying the perception of 3-D SFM stimuli and perceptual priming.