Confidence and central tendency in perceptual judgment

Estimation bias and serial dependence in speed perception

Studies have found that feature estimates are systematically compressed towards the distribution center, showing a central tendency. Additionally, the estimate of current features is affected by the previously seen feature, showing serial dependence or adaptation effect. However, these all remain unclear in the speed estimation. To address this question, we asked participants to estimate the speed of moving Gabor patches. In Experiment 1, speeds were selected from three uniform distributions with different lower and upper boundaries (i.e., slow, moderate, and fast ranges). In Experiment 2, speeds were arranged in an increasing, uniform, or decreasing distribution. The boundaries of three distributions were the same. The results found that speed estimates were systematically compressed towards the center of the uniform distribution center, showing a central tendency, and its size increased with the range boundaries. However, in the decreasing and increasing distributions, aside from central tendency, the speed estimates were also showed a bias away from the heavy tail of the distributions. Moreover, there was an attractive serial dependence that was not affected by the speed range. In summary, the current study, along with previous studies that reveal a slow-speed bias, comprehensively reveals various estimation biases in speed perception.

Emergent perceptual biases from state-space geometry in trained spiking recurrent neural networks

A stimulus held in working memory is perceived as contracted toward the average stimulus. This contraction bias has been extensively studied in psychophysics, but little is known about its origin from neural activity. By training recurrent networks of spiking neurons to discriminate temporal intervals, we explored the causes of this bias and how behavior relates to population firing activity. We found that the trained networks exhibited animal-like behavior. Various geometric features of neural trajectories in state space encoded warped representations of the durations of the first interval modulated by sensory history. Formulating a normative model, we showed that these representations conveyed a Bayesian estimate of the interval durations, thus relating activity and behavior. Importantly, our findings demonstrate that Bayesian computations already occur during the sensory phase of the first stimulus and persist throughout its maintenance in working memory, until the time of stimulus comparison.

Conflicts between short- and long-term experiences affect visual perception through modulating sensory or motor response systems: Evidence from Bayesian inference models

The independent effects of short- and long-term experiences on visual perception have been discussed for decades. However, no study has investigated whether and how these experiences simultaneously affect our visual perception. To address this question, we asked participants to estimate their self-motion directions (i.e., headings) simulated from optic flow, in which a long-term experience learned in everyday life (i.e., straight-forward motion being more common than lateral motion) plays an important role. The headings were selected from three distributions that resembled a peak, a hill, and a flat line, creating different short-term experiences. Importantly, the proportions of headings deviating from the straight-forward motion gradually increased in the peak, hill, and flat distributions, leading to a greater conflict between long- and short-term experiences. The results showed that participants biased their heading estimates towards the straight-ahead direction and previously seen headings, which increased with the growing experience conflict. This suggests that both long- and short-term experiences simultaneously affect visual perception. Finally, we developed two Bayesian models (Model 1 vs. Model 2) based on two assumptions that the experience conflict altered the likelihood distribution of sensory representation or the motor response system. The results showed that both models accurately predicted participants' estimation biases. However, Model 1 predicted a higher variance of serial dependence compared to Model 2, while Model 2 predicted a higher variance of the bias towards the straight-ahead direction compared to Model 1. This suggests that the experience conflict can influence visual perception by affecting both sensory and motor response systems. Taken together, the current study systematically revealed the effects of long- and short-term experiences on visual perception and the underlying Bayesian processing mechanisms.

A unifying theory explains seemingly contradictory biases in perceptual estimation

Perceptual biases are widely regarded as offering a window into the neural computations underlying perception. To understand these biases, previous work has proposed a number of conceptually different, and even seemingly contradictory, explanations, including attraction to a Bayesian prior, repulsion from the prior due to efficient coding and central tendency effects on a bounded range. We present a unifying Bayesian theory of biases in perceptual estimation derived from first principles. We demonstrate theoretically an additive decomposition of perceptual biases into attraction to a prior, repulsion away from regions with high encoding precision and regression away from the boundary. The results reveal a simple and universal rule for predicting the direction of perceptual biases. Our theory accounts for, and yields, new insights regarding biases in the perception of a variety of stimulus attributes, including orientation, color and magnitude. These results provide important constraints on the neural implementations of Bayesian computations.

The Future of Decisions From Experience: Connecting Real-World Decision Problems to Cognitive Processes

In many important real-world decision domains, such as finance, the environment, and health, behavior is strongly influenced by experience. Renewed interest in studying this influence led to important advancements in the understanding of these decisions from experience (DfE) in the last 20 years. Building on this literature, we suggest ways the standard experimental design should be extended to better approach important real-world DfE. These extensions include, for example, introducing more complex choice situations, delaying feedback, and including social interactions. When acting upon experiences in these richer and more complicated environments, extensive cognitive processes go into making a decision. Therefore, we argue for integrating cognitive processes more explicitly into experimental research in DfE. These cognitive processes include attention to and perception of numeric and nonnumeric experiences, the influence of episodic and semantic memory, and the mental models involved in learning processes. Understanding these basic cognitive processes can advance the modeling, understanding and prediction of DfE in the laboratory and in the real world. We highlight the potential of experimental research in DfE for theory integration across the behavioral, decision, and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, this research could lead to new methodology that better informs decision-making and policy interventions.

Serial dependence bias can predict the overall estimation error in visual perception

Although visual feature estimations are accurate and precise, overall estimation errors (i.e., the difference between estimates and actual values) tend to show systematic patterns. For example, estimates of orientations are systematically biased away from horizontal and vertical orientations, showing an oblique illusion. Additionally, many recent studies have demonstrated that estimations of current visual features are systematically biased toward previously seen features, showing a serial dependence. However, no study examined whether the overall estimation errors were correlated with the serial dependence bias. To address this question, we enrolled three groups of participants to estimate orientation, motion speed, and point-light-walker direction. The results showed that the serial dependence bias explained over 20% of overall estimation errors in the three tasks, indicating that we could use the serial dependence bias to predict the overall estimation errors. The current study first demonstrated that the serial dependence bias was not independent from the overall estimation errors. This finding could inspire researchers to investigate the neural bases underlying the visual feature estimation and serial dependence.

Independent short- and long-term dependencies in perception

Perception is biased by stimulus history. Both long-term effects such as the central-tendency bias (CTB) and short-term effects such as serial dependence (SD) have been described, but research into the two has remained largely separate. The sources of these effects, however, are highly correlated in stimulus statistics, which can result in a misinterpretation of experimental data. We compared CTB and SD in the perception of color and line length. Observers judged the relative hue or length of consecutive stimuli in a delayed-matching task. Two interstimulus intervals were used to investigate whether elapsed time or the number of stimulus occurrences was more important for SD. We estimated biases by fitting psychometric functions to the data split based on the history features, and we also fit generalized linear mixed models with either CTB, SD, or both included as regressors. We found biases to both recent stimulus history and the cumulative average of stimulus values for both color and line length judgments. The strength and pattern of each of the biases depended on whether all sources of bias were included in the analysis. Within the range of interstimulus intervals tested, the number of intervening stimuli was more important than elapsed time for SD. We conclude that both SD and CTB independently affect perceptual judgments, and that one effect is not an artifact caused by the other. Failing to consider both effects in data analysis can give an erroneous picture of the phenomenon under study.

Effects of contraction bias on the decision process in the macaque prefrontal cortex

Our representation of magnitudes such as time, distance, and size is not always veridical because it is affected by multiple biases. From a Bayesian perspective, estimation errors are considered to be the result of an optimization mechanism for the behavior in a noisy environment by integrating previous experience with the incoming sensory information. One influence of the distribution of past stimuli on perceptual decisions is represented by the regression toward the mean, a type of contraction bias. Using a spatial discrimination task with 2 stimuli presented sequentially at different distances from the center, we show that this bias is also present in macaques when comparing the magnitude of 2 distances. We found that the contraction of the first stimulus magnitude toward the center of the distribution accounted for some of the changes in performance, even more so than the effect of difficulty related to the ratio between stimulus magnitudes. At the neural level in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the coding of the decision after the presentation of the second stimulus reflected the effect of the contraction bias on the discriminability of the stimuli at the behavioral level.

Perceptual history biases in serial ensemble representation

Ensemble perception refers to the visual system's ability to efficiently represent groups of similar objects as a unified percept using their summary statistical information. Most studies focused on extraction of current trial averages, giving little attention to prior experience effects, although a few recent studies found that ensemble mean estimations contract toward previously presented stimuli, with most of these focusing on explicit perceptual averaging of simultaneously presented item ensembles. Yet, the time element is crucial in real dynamic environments, where we encounter ensemble items over time, aggregating information until reaching summary representations. Moreover, statistical information of objects and scenes is learned over time and often implicitly and then used for predictions that shape perception, promoting environmental stability. Therefore, we now focus on temporal aspects of ensemble statistics and test whether prior information, beyond the current trial, biases implicit perceptual decisions. We designed methods to separate current trial biases from those of previously seen trial ensembles. In each trial, six circles of different sizes were presented serially, followed by two test items. Participants were asked to choose which was present in the sequence. Participants unconsciously rely on ensemble statistics, choosing stimuli closer to the ensemble mean. To isolate the influence of earlier trials, the two test items were sometimes equidistant from the current trial mean. Results showed membership judgment biases toward current trial mean, when informative (largest effect). On equidistant trials, judgments were biased toward previously experienced stimulus statistics. Comparison of similar conditions with a shifted stimulus distribution ruled out a bias toward an earlier, presession, prototypical diameter. We conclude that ensemble perception, even for temporally experienced ensembles, is influenced not only by current trial mean but also by means of recently seen ensembles and that these influences are somewhat correlated on a participant-by-participant basis.

Trait somatic anxiety is associated with reduced directed exploration and underestimation of uncertainty

Anxiety has been related to decreased physical exploration, but past findings on the interaction between anxiety and exploration during decision making were inconclusive. Here we examined how latent factors of trait anxiety relate to different exploration strategies when facing volatility-induced uncertainty. Across two studies (total N = 985), we demonstrated that people used a hybrid of directed, random and undirected exploration strategies, which were respectively sensitive to relative uncertainty, total uncertainty and value difference. Trait somatic anxiety, that is, the propensity to experience physical symptoms of anxiety, was inversely correlated with directed exploration and undirected exploration, manifesting as a lesser likelihood for choosing the uncertain option and reducing choice stochasticity regardless of uncertainty. Somatic anxiety is also associated with underestimation of relative uncertainty. Together, these results reveal the selective role of trait somatic anxiety in modulating both uncertainty-driven and value-driven exploration strategies.

Mental control of uncertainty

Can you reduce uncertainty by thinking? Intuition suggests that this happens through the elusive process of attention: if we expend mental effort, we can increase the reliability of our sensory data. Models based on "rational inattention" formalize this idea in terms of a trade-off between the costs and benefits of attention. This paper surveys the origin of these models in economics, their connection to rate-distortion theory, and some of their recent applications to psychology and neuroscience. We also report new data from a numerosity judgment task in which we manipulate performance incentives. Consistent with rational inattention, people are able to improve performance on this task when incentivized, in part by increasing the reliability of their sensory data.

Noradrenergic deficits contribute to apathy in Parkinson's disease through the precision of expected outcomes

Apathy is a debilitating feature of many neuropsychiatric diseases, that is typically described as a reduction of goal-directed behaviour. Despite its prevalence and prognostic importance, the mechanisms underlying apathy remain controversial. Degeneration of the locus coeruleus-noradrenaline system is known to contribute to motivational deficits, including apathy. In healthy people, noradrenaline has been implicated in signalling the uncertainty of expectations about the environment. We proposed that noradrenergic deficits contribute to apathy by modulating the relative weighting of prior beliefs about action outcomes. We tested this hypothesis in the clinical context of Parkinson's disease, given its associations with apathy and noradrenergic dysfunction. Participants with mild-to-moderate Parkinson's disease (N = 17) completed a randomised double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover study with 40 mg of the noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor atomoxetine. Prior weighting was inferred from psychophysical analysis of performance in an effort-based visuomotor task, and was confirmed as negatively correlated with apathy. Locus coeruleus integrity was assessed in vivo using magnetisation transfer imaging at ultra-high field 7T. The effect of atomoxetine depended on locus coeruleus integrity: participants with a more degenerate locus coeruleus showed a greater increase in prior weighting on atomoxetine versus placebo. The results indicate a contribution of the noradrenergic system to apathy and potential benefit from noradrenergic treatment of people with Parkinson's disease, subject to stratification according to locus coeruleus integrity. More broadly, these results reconcile emerging predictive processing accounts of the role of noradrenaline in goal-directed behaviour with the clinical symptom of apathy and its potential pharmacological treatment.