Priming analogical reasoning with false memories

Individual differences in theory of mind correlate with the occurrence of false memory: A study with the DRM task

Although long-term memory and Theory of Mind (ToM) are closely related across the whole lifespan, little is known about the relationship between ToM and semantic memory. Clinical studies have documented the co-occurrence of ToM impairments and semantic memory abnormalities in individuals with autism or semantic dementia. However, to date, no study has directly investigated the existence of a relationship between ToM and semantic memory in the typical population. We addressed this gap on a sample of 103 healthy adults (M age = 22.96 years; age range = 19-35 years). Participants completed a classical false memory task tapping on semantic processes, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, and two ToM tasks, the Triangles and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. They also completed the vocabulary scale from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Results showed that participants' semantic performance in the DRM task was significantly related to that in the Triangles task. Specifically, the higher participants' ToM in the Triangles task, the higher participants' reliance on semantic memory while making false memories in the DRM task. Our findings are consistent with the Fuzzy Trace Theory and the Weak Central Coherence account and suggest that a (partially) common cognitive process responsible for global versus detailed-focus information processing could underlie these two abilities.

Constructive episodic retrieval processes underlying memory distortion contribute to creative thinking and everyday problem solving

Constructive episodic retrieval processes play an adaptive role in supporting divergent thinking (i.e., creatively combining diverse bits of information) and means-end problem solving (i.e., generating steps to solve a social problem). However, the constructive nature of episodic memory that supports these adaptive functions also leads to memory error. In three experiments we aimed to identify a direct link between divergent thinking and means-end problem solving - as assessed in the Alternative Uses Task (AUT) and Means-End Problem Solving (MEPS) task - with the generation of false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. In Experiment 1, we replicated prior findings where false memory was positively correlated with performance on the AUT, and also showed for the first time that increased performance in the MEPS task is associated with increased false recall. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that the link between false recall and performance on the MEPS task did not extend to other forms of problem solving, as assessed with the Everyday Descriptions Task (EDT). In Experiment 3, we showed that when the EDT was preceded by the MEPS task in an attempt to influence participants to engage in a similar episodic-problem solving strategy, performance in both tasks was correlated with false memory. These findings provide evidence for a direct link between the adaptive benefits of constructive episodic processes, in the form of enhanced divergent creative thinking and problem solving, and costs, in the form of increased memory error.

The seven sins of memory: an update

Memory serves critical functions in everyday life, but it is also vulnerable to error and illusion. Two decades ago, I proposed that memory errors could be classified into seven basic categories or "sins": transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. I argued that each of the seven sins provides important insights concerning the fundamentally constructive nature of human memory, while at the same time reflecting its adaptive features. In this article I briefly summarise some key developments during the past two decades that have increased our understanding of the nature, consequences, and adaptive functions of the memory sins.

Priming older adults and people with mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease problem-solving with false memories

In two experiments we investigated whether older adult controls (OACs) and people with mild and moderate Alzheimer's disease (AD) benefit from false memory priming effects in subsequent problem-solving tasks. In addition, and unlike in previous false memory priming studies with older adults, we examined latency measures in the recognition phase. In Experiment 1 participants were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been preceded by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures (CLs) were also the solutions to those problems. In Experiment 2, we used a similar paradigm but investigated whether CLs could prime solutions to subsequent analogical reasoning problems. In this latter experiment, we also examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the CL term occurred during the memory task (was presented as part of the list; i.e., true memories) or when these items were not presented but arose during encoding due to spreading activation (i.e., false memories). We found that all three groups' performance on these tasks was facilitated only by false memories spontaneously generated from the prior presentation of DRM lists. That is, performance on CRATs and analogical reasoning tasks was better (greater accuracy and faster speed) when those problems were preceded by DRM lists whose CLs also served as the solution to those problems. These findings are consistent with previous results from studies with children, young adults, and older adults and extends them to people with more moderate AD.

Priming older adults and people with Alzheimer's disease analogical problem-solving with true and false memories

We investigated the extent to which activation of specific information in associative networks during a memory task could facilitate subsequent analogical problem solving in healthy older adults as well as those with early onset Alzheimer's disease. We also examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the critical solution term during the memory task occurred when the item was actually presented (true memories) or when this item arose due to spreading activation to a related but nonpresented item (false memory). Older adult controls (OACs) and people with Alzheimer's disease (AD) were asked to solve 9 verbal proportional analogies, 3 of which had been primed by Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented as a word in the list (true memory), 3 of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical lures were spontaneously activated during list presentation (false memory), and 3 of which were unprimed. As expected, OACs were better (both in terms of speed and accuracy) at solving problems than people with AD and both groups were better when false memories were primes than when true memories were primes or there were no primes. There were no reliable differences between unprimed and true prime problems. These findings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies in OACs and people with AD, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the production of false memories.

Inhibitory control during selective retrieval may hinder subsequent analogical thinking

Analogical reasoning is a complex cognitive activity that involves access and retrieval of pre-existing knowledge in order to find a suitable solution. Prior work has shown that analogical transfer and reasoning can be influenced by unconscious activation of relevant information. Based on this idea, we report two experiments that examine whether reduced access to relevant information in memory may further disrupt analogical reasoning unwittingly. In both experiments, we use an adaptation of the retrieval practice paradigm [1] to modulate memory accessibility of potential solutions to a subsequent set of analogy problems of the type 'A is to B as C is to ?'. Experiment 1 showed a retrieval-induced impairment in analogical problem solving. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that it cannot be due to the deliberative episodic retrieval of the solutions to the analogies. These findings, predictable from an inhibitory framework of memory control, provide a new focus for theories of analogical transfer and highlight the importance of unconscious memory processes that may modulate problem solving.

Sleep and mindfulness meditation as they relate to false memory

By a systematic analysis of the current literature, we compare two states of sleep and meditation in terms of their role in the formation or suppression of Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory. We aim to suggest that the occurrence of false memory under these two states is a result of reinforcing some abilities and changes in cognitive systems which can ultimately improve some aspects of cognitive functions. In our analogy, we propose that: (1) both sleep and meditation may improve source monitoring ability whose failure is one of the most important mechanisms in producing false memories, and (2) despite improvement in source monitoring ability, adaptive cognitive processes, as mechanisms which are common in sleep and meditation, can still produce false memories. In conclusion, we propose that in spite of their contribution to false memory through adaptive processes, the beneficial role of sleep and meditation in cognition may be more prominent than their harmful role.

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.

Exploring the consequences of nonbelieved memories in the DRM paradigm

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants' statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour

Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

Effects of Sulpiride on True and False Memories of Thematically Related Pictures and Associated Words in Healthy Volunteers

Episodic memory, working memory, emotional memory, and attention are subject to dopaminergic modulation. However, the potential role of dopamine on the generation of false memories is unknown. This study defined the role of the dopamine D2 receptor on true and false recognition memories. Twenty-four young, healthy volunteers ingested a single dose of placebo or 400 mg oral sulpiride, a dopamine D2-receptor antagonist, just before starting the recognition memory task in a randomized, double-blind, and placebo-controlled trial. The sulpiride group presented more false recognitions during visual and verbal processing than the placebo group, although both groups had the same indices of true memory. These findings demonstrate that dopamine D2 receptors blockade in healthy volunteers can specifically increase the rate of false recognitions. The findings fit well the two-process view of causes of false memories, the activation/monitoring failures model.