A density explanation of valence asymmetries in recognition memory

Is good more alike than bad? Positive-negative asymmetry in the differentiation between options. A study on the evaluation of fictitious political profiles

Our research focuses on the perception of difference in the evaluations of positive and negative options. The literature provides evidence for two opposite effects: on the one hand, negative objects are said to be more differentiated (e.g., density hypothesis), on the other, people are shown to see greater differences between positive options (e.g., liking-breeds-differentiation principle). In our study, we investigated the perception of difference between fictitious political candidates, hypothesizing greater differences among the evaluations of favorable candidates. Additionally, we analyzed how positive and negative information affect candidate evaluation, predicting further asymmetries. In three experiments, participants evaluated various candidate profiles presented in a numeric and narrative manner. The evaluation tasks were designed as individual or joint assessments. In all three studies, we found more differentiation between positive than negative options. Our research suggests that after exceeding a certain, relatively small level of negativity, people do not see any further increase in negativity. The increase in positivity, on the other hand, is more gradual, with greater differentiation among positive options. Our findings are discussed in light of cognitive-experiential self-theory and density hypothesis.

Biased evaluations emerge from inferring hidden causes

How do we evaluate a group of people after a few negative experiences with some members but mostly positive experiences otherwise? How do rare experiences influence our overall impression? We show that rare events may be overweighted due to normative inference of the hidden causes that are believed to generate the observed events. We propose a Bayesian inference model that organizes environmental statistics by combining similar events and separating outlying observations. Relying on the model's inferred latent causes for group evaluation overweights rare or variable events. We tested the model's predictions in eight experiments where participants observed a sequence of social or non-social behaviours and estimated their average. As predicted, estimates were biased toward sparse events when estimating after seeing all observations, but not when tracking a summary value as observations accrued. Our results suggest that biases in evaluation may arise from inferring the hidden causes of group members' behaviours.

Explaining Negativity Dominance without Processing Bias

In a recent study, Shin and Niv explain both negativity and positivity biases in social evaluations as a function of the diversity and low frequency of events. We discuss why negative information is indeed more diverse and less frequent, and highlight the implications beyond social evaluations.

Intuitive Judgments in Depression and the Role of Processing Fluency and Positive Valence: A Preregistered Replication Study

Background

Recent preliminary evidence indicates that depression is associated with impaired intuitive information processing. The current study aimed at replicating these findings and to move one step further by exploring whether factors known as triggering intuition (positivity, processing fluency) also affect intuition in patients with depression.

Method

We pre-registered and tested five hypotheses using data from 35 patients with depression and 35 healthy controls who performed three versions of the Judgment of Semantic Coherence Task (JSCT, Bowers et al., 1990). This task operationalizes intuition as the inexplicable and sudden detection of semantic coherence.

Results

Results revealed that depressed patients and healthy controls did not differ in their general intuitive performance (Hypothesis 1). We further found that fluency did not significantly affect depressed patients' coherence judgments (H2a) and that the assumed effect of fluency on coherence judgments was not moderated by depression (H2b). Finally, we found that triads positive in valence were more likely to be judged as coherent as compared to negative word triads in the depressed sample (H3a), but this influence of positive (vs. negative) valence on coherence judgments did not significantly differ between the two groups (H3b).

Conclusion

Overall the current study did not replicate findings from previous research regarding intuitive semantic coherence detection deficits in depression. However, our findings suggest that enhancing positivity in depressed patients may facilitate their ability to see meaning in their environment and to take intuitive decision.

Virtual Reality Experiments on Emotional Face Recognition Find No Evidence of Mood-Congruent Effects

Mood-congruent effects have been demonstrated many times, but few studies have managed to replicate the effect with natural moods. Additionally, the ecological validity of mood induction and real-time observation deficiency remain unresolved. Using a newly developed, virtual-reality-based eye-tracking technique, the present study conducted real-time observations of mood effects on emotional face recognition with simulated “real-life” pleasant and grisly scenes. In experiment 1, participants performed an emotional face recognition task in both positive and negative virtual reality scenes. The recognition tests and gaze tracking results failed to support mood-congruent effects but did show a mood effect independent of a strong emotional face effect. In experiment 2, participants performed a neutral face recognition task in pleasant and grisly scenes that were matched for arousal levels, and the mood effect disappeared. The results also revealed a robust negativity bias in emotional face recognition, which was found to accompany a mood repair effect.

An association between biased impression updating and relationship facilitation: A behavioral and fMRI investigation

Is ingroup bias associated with any benefit for maintaining close relationships? We examined the link between biased impression updating for ingroup members (i.e., friends) and relationship maintenance, as measured by the number of friends participants reported having (Studies 1 and 2). We also investigated the underlying neural basis of this possible effect, focusing on activity in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ), a region of the social brain involved in moral updating (Study 2). Specifically, we tested whether selectively discounting negative information about close others, manifested in reduced impression updating, and indexed by reduced RTPJ activity, is related to maintaining close relationships. In Study 1, after imagining a friend and a stranger performing different positive and negative behaviors, participants who were reluctant to update how close they felt to their friend (friend-closeness) reported having more friends in real life. In Study 2, participants were led to believe that a friend and a stranger gave money to them or took money away from them, while they were in the scanner. Participants who engaged in less negative updating of friends versus strangers reported having more friends. Participants who engaged in less friend-closeness updating also showed reduced RTPJ activity when their friend took money from them, and this neural pattern was associated with reports of having more friends. Together, these findings suggest that selectively discounting close others' negative behavior is linked to maintaining close relationships, indicating a potential social benefit of ingroup bias.

Illusory correlations despite equated category frequencies: A test of the information loss account

Illusory correlations (IC) are the perception of covariation, where none exists. For example, people associate majorities with frequent behavior and minorities with infrequent behavior even in the absence of such an association. According to the information loss account, ICs result from greater fading of infrequent group-behavior combinations in memory. We conducted computer simulations based on this account which showed that ICs are expected under standard conditions with skewed category frequencies (i.e. 2:1 ratio for positive and negative descriptions), but not under conditions with equated category frequencies (i.e. 1:1 ratio for positive and negative descriptions). Contrary to these simulations, our behavioral experiments revealed an IC under both conditions, which did not decrease over time. Thus, information loss alone is not sufficient as an explanation for the formation of ICs. These results imply that negative items contribute to ICs not only due to their infrequency, but also due to their emotional salience.

The influence of articulation dynamics on recognition memory

Previous research has demonstrated an effect of consonantal direction on preference, showing that words following inward articulation dynamics (e.g., EMOK or OPIK) are generally liked more than words following outward dynamics (e.g., EKOM or OKIP). The present studies extended this line of research by hypothesizing an effect of consonantal direction on recognition memory, specifically familiarity. In a total of 7 experimental studies (N = 1043), we tested and confirmed this hypothesis, consistently finding increased hits and false alarms for inward compared to outward pseudo-words. This difference was found to be based on a higher perceived familiarity for inward compared to outward pseudo-words. Alternative explanations of an affirmation tendency or a recollection advantage were ruled out in Experiments 4 and 5. Experiments 6a and 6b examined the role of articulation fluency and liking as potential mediators of the effect, but found that neither mediated the influence of consonantal direction on familiarity. Thus, the in-out familiarity effect documented here seems to be a phenomenon that is distinct from the previously described in-out preference effect.

A Cognitive-Ecological Explanation of Intergroup Biases

People often hold negative attitudes toward out-groups and minority groups. We argue that such intergroup biases may result from an interaction of basic cognitive processes and the structure of the information ecology. This cognitive-ecological model assumes that groups such as minorities and out-groups are often novel to a perceiver. At the level of cognition, novel groups are primarily associated with their unique attributes, that is, attributes that differentiate them from other groups. In the information ecology, however, unique attributes are likely to be negative. Thus, novel groups, and by proxy minorities and out-groups, tend to be associated with negative attributes, leading to an evaluative disadvantage. We demonstrated this disadvantage in three experiments in which participants successively formed impressions about two fictional groups associated with the same number of positive and negative attributes. Participants preferred the first group over the novel group as long as the groups’ unique attributes were negative.

Inferential Costs of Trait Centrality in Impression Formation: Organization in Memory and Misremembering

An extension of the DRM paradigm was used to study the impact of central traits (Asch, 1946) in impression formation. Traits corresponding to the four clusters of the implicit theory of personality-intellectual, positive and negative; and social, positive and negative (Rosenberg et al., 1968)-were used to develop lists containing several traits of one cluster and one central trait prototypical of the opposite cluster. Participants engaging in impression formation relative to participants engaging in memorization not only produced higher levels of false memories corresponding to the same cluster of the list traits but, under response time pressure at retrieval, also produced more false memories of the cluster corresponding to the central trait. We argue that the importance of central traits stems from their ability to activate their corresponding semantic space within a specialized associative memory structure underlying the implicit theory of personality.

Studying the Cognitive Map of the U.S. States

What are the spontaneous stereotypes that U.S. citizens hold about the U.S. states? We complemented insights from theory-driven approaches to this question with insights from a novel data-driven approach. Based on pile sorting and spatial arrangement similarity ratings for the states, we computed two cognitive maps of the states. Based on ratings for the states on ∼20 candidate dimensions, we interpreted the dimensions that spanned the two maps (Studies 1 and 2). Consistent with the agency/socioeconomic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion (ABC) model of spontaneous stereotypes, these dimensions that participants spontaneously used to rate the states’ similarity included prosperity (A) and ideology (B) stereotypes (states seen as more liberal and atheist were seen as more educated and wealthy). Study 3 showed that states seen as more average on A and B were stereotyped as more likable. Additionally, Study 3 showed that interstate similarity in stereotypic ideology and prosperity mattered, as it predicted interstate prejudice.

The More Negative the More Impact

Abstract. The present research investigates the relation between different domain satisfactions (e.g., health, income, etc.) and overall life satisfaction. Based on theorizing on the differences between positive and negative information, we assumed that specific domain satisfactions particularly are correlated with overall life satisfaction when the specific domain satisfactions (a) are low rather than high and (b) have declined rather than increased. Relying on a nationally representative sample of the German population (Socio-Economic Panel), we tested these considerations with both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal design. The findings strongly support that the more negative the domain satisfaction the more pronounced was the relation between domain and overall life satisfaction – both when negativity was assessed relative to other domains as well as when negativity was assessed relative to prior satisfaction with the same domain.

Decision-related factors in pupil old/new effects: Attention, response execution, and false memory

In this study, we investigate the effects of decision-related factors on recognition memory in pupil old/new paradigms. In Experiment 1, we used an old/new paradigm with words and pseudowords and participants made lexical decisions during recognition rather than old/new decisions. Importantly, participants were instructed to focus on the nonword-likeness of presented items, not their word-likeness. We obtained no old/new effects. In Experiment 2, participants discriminated old from new words and old from new pseudowords during recognition, and they did so as quickly as possible. We found old/new effects for both words and pseudowords. In Experiment 3, we used materials and an old/new design known to elicit a large number of incorrect responses. For false alarms ("old" response for new word), we found larger pupils than for correctly classified new items, starting at the point at which response execution was allowed (2750ms post stimulus onset). In contrast, pupil size for misses ("new" response for old word) was statistically indistinguishable from pupil size in correct rejections. Taken together, our data suggest that pupil old/new effects result more from the intentional use of memory than from its automatic use.

How Orthogonal Are the Big Two of Social Perception? On the Curvilinear Relation Between Agency and Communion

Humans make sense of their social environment by forming impressions of others that allow predicting others’ actions. In this process of social perception, two types of information carry pivotal importance: other entities’ communion (i.e., warmth and trustworthiness) and agency (i.e., status and power). Although commonly thought of as orthogonal dimensions, we propose that these Big Two of social perception are curvilinearly related. Specifically, as we delineate from four different theoretical explanations, impressions of communion should peak at average agency, while entities too high or too low on agency should be perceived as low on communion. We show this pattern for social groups across one novel and five previously published data sets, including a meta-analysis of the most comprehensive data collection in the group perception literature, consisting of 36 samples from more than 20 countries. Addressing the generalizability of this curvilinear relation, we then report recent and unpublished experiments establishing the effect for the perception of individuals and animals. On the basis of the proposed curvilinear relation, we revisit the primacy of processing communion (rather than agency) information. Finally, we discuss the possibility of a more general curvilinear relation between communion and dimensions other than agency.

Halo Effects in Trait Assessment Depend on Information Valence

We propose stronger halo effects in trait assessments from positive information relative to negative information. Due to positive information’s higher similarity, positive information should foster both indirect (from a global impression to traits) and direct halo effects (from traits to traits). Negative information’s relative distinctiveness should foster only direct halo effects, leading to weaker halo effects overall. Four experiments support these predictions using agency traits and communion traits and behaviors. Further supporting the predictions, halo effects from positive information were visible both within (i.e., from communion/agency information to communion/agency traits) and across (i.e., from agency/communion information to communion/agency traits) these fundamental dimensions of social perception. Halo effects from negative information were visible only within dimensions. The study thereby explains why halo effects from negative information are usually weaker; it supports different processes underlying halo effects; and it provides a case in person perception where positive information has more impact than negative information.