Proactive and reactive metacontrol in task switching

The benefit of choice on task performance: Reduced difficulty effects in free-choice versus forced-choice tasks

We investigated how self-determined (free) versus imposed (forced) choices influence task performance. To this end, we examined how changes in perceptual and central decision-processing difficulties affect task performance in an environment where free-choice and forced-choice tasks were intermixed. In Experiments 1 (N = 43) and 2 (N = 42), perceptual processing difficulty was varied by altering colored dot proportions (easy vs. hard color discrimination task). In Experiment 3 (N = 58), decision-processing difficulty was adjusted by changing the rotation degree of letters (easy vs. hard letter rotation task). Across all experiments, both free-choice and forced-choice performance were more impaired with harder stimuli, but this effect was generally less pronounced in freely chosen tasks. Specifically, this was evident from significant interactions between processing mode (free vs. forced) and difficulty (easy vs. hard) in the mean reaction times (RTs) for the tasks with the difficulty manipulation. Thus, processing in free-choice tasks is generally less affected by environmental changes (i.e., variation in information difficulties). We discuss how the benefit of self-determined choices over imposed choices can be explained by motivational and performance-optimization accounts, while also considering the finding that participants adjusted their task choices toward tasks with easier stimuli (i.e., significant main effect of task difficulty on choosing the task with the difficulty manipulation). Specifically, we discuss how having control over task choices might lead to more stable information processing and allow people to choose more difficult tasks when this increased difficulty has a relatively small impact on their performance.

Contextual control demands determine whether stability and flexibility trade off against each other

Cognitive stability, the ability to focus on a current task, and cognitive flexibility, the ability to switch between different tasks, are traditionally conceptualized as opposing end-points on a one-dimensional continuum. This assumption obligates a stability-flexibility trade-off - greater stability equates to less flexibility, and vice versa. In contrast, a recent cued task-switching study suggested that stability and flexibility can be regulated independently, evoking a two-dimensional perspective where trade-offs are optional (Geddert & Egner, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 151, 3009-3027, 2022). This raises the question of under what circumstances trade-offs occur. We here tested the hypothesis that trade-offs are guided by cost-of-control considerations whereby stability and flexibility trade off in contexts that selectively promote stability or flexibility, but not when neither or both are promoted. This proposal was probed by analyzing whether a trial-level metric of a stability-flexibility trade-off, an interaction between task-rule congruency and task sequence, varied as a function of a broader block-level context that independently varied demands on stability or flexibility by manipulating the proportion of incongruent and switch trials, respectively. In Experiment 1, we reanalyzed data from Geddert and Egner, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 151, 3009-3027, (2022); Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication with a design tweak that controlled for potential confounds due to local trial history effects. The experiments produced robust evidence for independent stability and flexibility adaptation, and for a context-dependent expression of trial-level stability-flexibility trade-offs that generally conformed to the cost-of-control predictions. The current study thus documents that stability-flexibility trade-offs are not obligatory but arise in contexts where either stability or flexibility are selectively encouraged.

Learned switch readiness via concurrent activation of task sets: Evidence from task specificity and memory load

Cognitive flexibility increases when switch demands increase. In task switching experiments, repeated pairing of flexibility-demanding situations with specific contexts leads subjects to become more prepared to adapt to changing task demands in those contexts. One form of such upregulated cognitive flexibility has been demonstrated with a list-wide switch probability (LWSP) effect, where switch costs are smaller in lists with frequent switches than in lists with rare switches. According to a recent proposal, the LWSP effect is supported by a concurrent activation mechanism whereby both task rules are kept available simultaneously in working memory. We conducted four experiments to test two key features in this concurrent activation account of LWSP effects. First, we asked whether the LWSP effects are limited to only the trained tasks, and second, we asked whether concurrent working memory load would reduce the LWSP effects. In Experiment 1, we replicated and extended previous findings that the LWSP manipulation modulates both performance (switch costs) and voluntary switch rates, indicating that context-driven increases in flexibility are generalizable so long as the task-sets remain the same. Results of Experiments 2 and 3 showed that novel tasks do not benefit from the concurrent activation of the two other tasks, suggesting that the LWSP effect is task specific. Experiment 4 showed that holding additional information in working memory reduces the LWSP effect. While these findings support the hypothesis of concurrent activation underlying the increased flexibility in the LWSP effect, caveats remain; additional research is needed to further test this account.

The strategic allocation theory of vigilance

Despite its importance in different occupational and everyday contexts, vigilance, typically defined as the capacity to sustain attention over time, is remarkably limited. What explains these limits? Two theories have been proposed. The Overload Theory states that being vigilant consumes limited information-processing resources; when depleted, task performance degrades. The Underload Theory states that motivation to perform vigilance tasks declines over time, thereby prompting attentional shifts and hindering performance. We highlight some conceptual and empirical problems for both theories and propose an alternative: the Strategic Allocation Theory. For the Strategic Allocation Theory, performance on vigilance tasks optimizes as a function of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, including metacognitive factors such as the expected value of effort and the expected value of planning. Limited capacities must be deployed across task sets to maximize expected reward. The observed limits of vigilance reflect changes in the perceived value of, among other things, sustaining attention to a task rather than attending to something else. Drawing from recent computational theories of cognitive control and meta-reasoning, we argue that the Strategic Allocation Theory explains more phenomena related to vigilance behavior than other theories, including self-report data. Finally, we outline some of the testable predictions the theory makes across several experimental paradigms. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Psychology > Attention.

The temporal dynamics of task processing and choice in a novel multitasking paradigm

This study investigated the temporal dynamics of task performance and voluntary task choice within a multitasking paradigm in which the task-related processing outcomes themselves determined the to-be-performed task. In the novel forced-no-go trials, the stimulus for one task required an overt response, but the stimulus for the other task was associated with a no-go response. Task performance results showed that participants often processed the no-go task's stimulus before switching to the go-task. Dual-task interference effects and switch costs indicated various forms of multitasking interference, with their underlying causes appearing to overlap, as engagement in parallel processing seemed to be limited by switch-related reconfiguration processes. Intermixing free-choice trials, where both stimuli were associated with overt responses, revealed costs associated with switching between processing modes, providing new evidence that the distinctions between free and forced task goals stem from differences in their internal representations rather than alterations in processing due to different presentations in the environment. Task choice results align with this perspective, demonstrating a preference for repeating a free- over a forced-choice task. Furthermore, these free-choice results illuminate the interplay of cognitive (task-repetition bias) and environmental constraints (first-task bias) in shaping task choices: It appears that task-specific information increases goal activations for both task goals concurrently, with participants favoring central processing of the second- over the first-presented task to optimize their behavior when shorter central processing is required (task repetition). Overall, this study offers new insights into the dynamics of task processing and choice in environments requiring the balance of multiple tasks.

Frontal P300 asymmetry and congruence judgment: Retroactive switching is impaired during school day mornings in female adolescents

Investigating frontal EEG asymmetry as a possible biomarker of cognitive control abilities is especially important in ecological contexts such as school and work. We used a novel approach combining judgment performance and hemispheric frontal event-related potential (ERP) P300 asymmetry (fP3As) to evaluate aspects of cognitive control (i.e., repetition and switching) in adolescent females over a two-week ordinary school period. While undergoing electroencephalographic recording, students performed a word-colour "Stroop-like" congruence judgment task during morning and afternoon sessions, on Mondays and Wednesdays. Proportion of incongruence and congruence trials was 75% and 25%, respectively. ERP analysis revealed larger "novelty" right hemispheric fP3As amplitude for infrequent congruence but equivalent or significantly smaller than left hemispheric fP3As amplitude for frequent incongruence. RTs increased with extent of right fP3As shift. Behaviorally, repeat trial pairs (i.e., congruent followed by congruent, incongruent followed by incongruent) generally did not differ by time or day and were associated with near-ceiling accuracy. In contrast, switch trial pairs (i.e., congruent followed by incongruent, incongruent followed by congruent) in the afternoon were slower and associated with lower accuracy at the expected 75% criterion rate (i.e., judging incongruence by default), dropping significantly below 75% in the mornings. Crucially, compared to afternoon, morning fP3As patterns did not change adaptively with switch trial pairs. Although retroactive switching during congruence judgment was affected at all testing times, we conclude it was most impaired in the mornings of both early and mid school weeks, supporting misalignment between adolescent circadian cycle and school start time. We discuss some implications for optimal learning of adolescents at school.

Insights into control over cognitive flexibility from studies of task-switching

Cognitive flexibility denotes the ability to disengage from a current task and shift one's focus to a different activity. An individual's level of flexibility is not fixed; rather, people adapt their readiness to switch tasks to changing circumstances. We here review recent studies in the task-switching literature that have produced new insights into the contextual factors that drive this adaptation of flexibility, as well as proposals regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms and learning processes. A fast-growing literature suggests that there are several different means of learning the need for, and implementing, changes in one's level of flexibility. These, in turn, have distinct consequences for the degree to which adjustments in cognitive flexibility are transferrable to new stimuli and tasks.

Concurrent expectation and experience-based metacontrol: EEG insights and the role of working memory capacity

We investigated the simultaneous influence of expectation and experience on metacontrol, which we define as the instantiation of context-specific control states. These states could entail heightened control states in preparation for frequent task switching or lowered control states for task repetition. Specifically, we examined whether "expectations" regarding future control demands prompt proactive metacontrol, while "experiences" with items associated with specific control demands facilitate reactive metacontrol. In Experiment 1, we utilized EEG with a high temporal resolution to differentiate between brain activities associated with proactive and reactive metacontrol. We successfully observed cue-locked and image-locked ERP patterns associated with proactive and reactive metacontrol, respectively, supporting concurrent instantiation of two metacontrol modes. In Experiment 2, we focused on individual differences to investigate the modulatory role of working memory capacity (WMC) in the concurrent instantiation of two metacontrol modes. Our findings revealed that individuals with higher WMC exhibited enhanced proactive metacontrol, indicated by smaller response time variability (RTV). Additionally, individuals with higher WMC showed a lower tendency to rely on reactive metacontrol, indicated by a smaller item-specific switch probability (ISSP) effect. In conclusion, our results suggest that proactive and reactive metacontrol can coexist, but their interplay is influenced by individuals' WMC. Higher WMC promotes the use of proactive metacontrol while attenuating reliance on reactive metacontrol. This study provides insights into the interplay between proactive and reactive metacontrol and highlights the impact of WMC on their concurrent instantiation.

Principles of cognitive control over task focus and task switching

Adaptive behaviour requires the ability to focus on a task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability) and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). Burgeoning research literatures have aimed to understand how people achieve task focus and task switch readiness. In this Perspective, I integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of cognitive stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and task switch readiness are supported by independent mechanisms. However, I also suggest that the strategic regulation of both mechanisms is governed by shared learning principles: an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic) and episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic). Finally, I discuss algorithmic and neural implementations of these processes, as well as clinical implications.

Alpha ERS-ERD Pattern during Divergent and Convergent Thinking Depends on Individual Differences on Metacontrol

The role of metacontrol in creativity is theoretically assumed, but experimental evidence is still lacking. In this study, we investigated how metacontrol affects creativity from the perspective of individual differences. Sixty participants completed the metacontrol task, which was used to divide participants into a high-metacontrol group (HMC) versus a low (LMC) group. Then, these participants performed the alternate uses task (AUT; divergent thinking) and the remote associates test (RAT; convergent thinking), while their EEG results were recorded continuously. Regarding their behavior, the HMC group showed superior creative performance in the AUT and RAT, compared with the LMC group. For the electrophysiology, the HMC group showed larger stimulus-locked P1 and P3 amplitudes than the LMC group. Furthermore, the HMC group exhibited smaller alpha desynchronization (ERD) than the LMC group at the initial stages of the AUT task, followed by a flexible switching between alpha synchronization and desynchronization (ERS-ERD) during the process of selective retention in the AUT. In addition, the HMC group evoked smaller alpha ERD during the initial retrieval and the backtracking process in the RAT, associated with cognitive control adaptability. The aforementioned results indicate that metacontrol reliably contributes to the idea generation process, and HMC individuals could flexibly adjust their cognitive control strategies according to the demand for creative idea generation.

Contextual adaptation of cognitive flexibility in kindergartners and fourth graders

This study investigated the development of children's ability to find the optimal balance between flexibility and stability as a function of the frequency of required task switches. This question was addressed in two situations contrasting the dynamics of engagement of reconfiguration processes (reactive vs. proactive). A cued task-switching paradigm was presented to kindergartners and fourth graders, who are known to differ in their preferential mode of control engagement. Flexibility adaptation was examined through the modulation of switching costs by switch proportion, the so-called list-wide switch proportion (LWSP) effect. When the situation forced the use of reactive control (Experiment 1: simultaneous presentation of the cue and the stimulus), we found the LWSP effect with a greater magnitude in kindergartners than in fourth graders. In the situation inducing proactive control (Experiment 2: task cue presented before and until the stimulus), flexibility adaptation was obtained when error rates were considered but not response times. By demonstrating that even young children are capable of flexibility adaptation to contextual demands, these findings support the hypothesis that implicitly triggered adaptation of control may develop as early as the end of the preschool years despite the immaturity of cognitive control during this period.

Well under control: Control demand changes are sufficient for metacontrol

Metacontrol arises from the efficient retrieval of cognitive control by environmental cues that are predictive of the upcoming control demands. Previous studies have demonstrated that proactive and reactive metacontrol can be indexed by a list-wide switch probability (LWSP) and an item-specific switch probability (ISSP) effect, respectively. However, what triggers metacontrol in the first place has not been clearly articulated. While a "mere-experience" hypothesis attributes metacontrol to changes in control demands, an "affective-signaling" hypothesis suggests that high control demands are aversive and aversiveness drives metacontrol. In two experiments, we adjudicated between these hypotheses by considering the modes of metacontrol (proactive vs. reactive) and temporal dynamics of background valence (sustained vs. transient and positive vs. negative). We induced metacontrol (proactive or reactive) in a task-switching paradigm and created background valence by using positive and negative images as stimuli. With valence being an irrelevant aspect of the task, the design allows us to test whether (task-irrelevant) background valence would modulate metacontrol. While we were able to replicate the LWSP effect in Experiment 1 and the ISSP effect in Experiment 2, we did not find valence modulating either effect, regardless of the background valence being a sustained (Experiment 1) or a transient one (Experiment 2). These findings together suggest that negative valence (i.e., aversiveness) does not necessarily benefit metacontrol, and control demand variations are sufficient to induce metacontrol.

The ERP correlates of color-based center-surround inhibition in working memory

The color-based center-surround inhibition (CSI) in working memory (WM) refers to that remembering a color inhibits the memory of similar colors but not of distinct colors. This study aimed to investigate the neural activity of color-based CSI in WM. Two WM items (distance 0°, 10°, 20°, 30°, 40°, 50°, or 60° in color space) were displayed sequentially, then one of them was retrieved to compare with a later probe. Behavioral results revealed that participants showed longer RTs for distances 20° and 30° than distances 0° and 40°, suggesting a CSI between similar items. ERP results revealed that: 1) WM item-induced late positive component (LPC) was more positive for distance 30° than the other distances, suggesting an enhanced resource allocation process for encoding similar items; 2) Cue-induced LPC was more positive for distances 20° and 30° than distances 0° and 60°, suggesting a greater difficulty for retrieving similar items; Cue-induced contingent negative variation was less negative for distance 20° than distances 40°, 50°, and 60°, suggesting a reduced response preparation process during retrieving similar items; 3) Probe-induced LPC was more positive for distances 20° and 30° than distances 50° and 60°, suggesting a greater effort for comparing probe with one item retrieved from two similar items. These results revealed a colored-based CSI during WM encoding and retrieval processes. An enhanced top-down control might be required to resolve the greater interference between similar items than identical or distinct items conditions.

Instructing item-specific switch probability: expectations modulate stimulus-action priming

Both active response execution and passive listening to verbal codes (a form of instruction) in single prime trials lead to item-specific repetition priming effects when stimuli re-occur in single probe trials. This holds for task-specific classification (stimulus-classification, SC priming, e.g., apple-small) and action (stimulus-action, SA priming, e.g., apple-right key press). To address the influence of expectation on item-specific SC and SA associations, we tested if item-specific SC and SA priming effects were modulated by the instructed probability of re-encountering individual SC or SA mappings (25% vs. 75% instructed switch probability). Importantly, the experienced item-specific switch probability was always 50%. In Experiment 1 (N = 78), item-specific SA/SC switch  expectations affected SA, but not SC priming effects exclusively following active response execution. Experiment 2 (N = 40) was designed to emphasize SA priming by only including item-specific SC repetitions. This yielded stronger SA priming for 25% vs. 75% expected switch probability, both following response execution as in Experiment 1 and also following verbally coded SA associations. Together, these results suggest that SA priming effects, that is, the encoding and retrieval of SA associations, is modulated by item-specific switch expectation. Importantly, this expectation effect cannot be explained by item-specific associative learning mechanisms, as stimuli were primed and probed only once and participants experienced item-specific repetitions/switches equally often across stimuli independent of instructed switch probabilities. This corroborates and extends previous results by showing that SA priming effects are modulated by  expectation not only based on experienced item-specific switch probabilities, but also on mere instruction.