Learning changes the attentional status of prospective memories

Suppression on the basis of template for rejection is reactive: Evidence from human electrophysiology

According to most theories of attention, the selection of task-relevant visual information can be enhanced by holding them in visual working memory (VWM). However, there has been a long-standing debate concerning whether similar optimization can also be achieved for task-irrelevant information, known as a "template for rejection". The present study aimed to explore this issue by examining the consequence of cue distractors before visual search tasks. For this endeavor, we manipulated the display heterogeneity by using two distractor conditions, salient and non-salient, to explore the extent to which holding the distractor color in VWM might affect attentional selection. We measured the reaction times of participants while their EEG activity was recorded. The results showed that WM-matched distractors did not improve reaction times but rather slowed them down in both tasks. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed that the display heterogeneity had no modulatory effect on the degree of distractor suppression. Even in the salient distractor condition, the WM-matched distractor received no greater suppression. Furthermore, the WM-matched distractor but not the neutral distractor elicited an N2pc before the PD in salient distractor conditions. This suggests that the template for rejection operates reactively since suppression occurs after extra attentional processes to the distractor. Moreover, the presence of WM-matched distractors led to a reduction of P3b, indicating a competition between target processing and WM-matched distractor rejection. Our findings provide insights into the mechanisms underlying the optimization of attentional selection, and have implications for future studies aimed at understanding the role of VWM in cognition.

Internal attention is the only retroactive mechanism for controlling precision in working memory

Recent research has suggested that humans can assert control over the precision of working memory (WM) items. However, the mechanisms that enable this control are unclear. While some studies suggest that internal attention improves precision, it may not be the only factor, as previous work also demonstrated that WM storage is disentangled from attention. To test whether there is a precision control mechanism beyond internal attention, we contrasted internal attention and precision requirements within the same trial in three experiments. In every trial, participants memorized two items briefly. Before the test, a retro-cue indicated which item would be tested first, thus should be attended. Importantly, we encouraged participants to store the unattended item with higher precision by testing it using more similar lure colors at the probe display. Accuracy was analyzed on a small proportion of trials where the target-lure similarity, hence the task difficulty, was equal for attended and unattended items. Experiments 2 and 3 controlled for output interference by the first test and involuntary precision boost by the retro-cue, respectively. In all experiments, the unattended item had lower accuracy than the attended item, suggesting that individuals were not able to remember it more precisely than the attended item. Thus, we conclude that there is no precision control mechanism beyond internal attention, highlighting the close relationship between attentional and qualitative prioritization within WM. We discuss the important implications of these findings for our understanding of the fundamentals of WM and WM-driven behaviors.

Visual Working Memory Adapts to the Nature of Anticipated Interference

Visual working memory has been proven to be relatively robust against interference. However, little is known on whether such robust coding is obligatory, or can be flexibly recruited depending on its expected usefulness. To address this, participants remembered both the color and orientation of a grating. During the maintenance, we inserted a secondary color/orientation memory task, interfering with the primary task. Crucially, we varied the expectations of the type of interference by varying the probability of the two types of intervening task. Behavioral data indicate that to-be-remembered features for which interference is expected are bolstered, whereas to-be-remembered features for which no interference is expected are left vulnerable. This was further supported by fMRI data obtained from visual cortex. In conclusion, the flexibility of visual working memory allows it to strengthen memories for which it anticipates the highest risk of interference.

Theoretical distinction between functional states in working memory and their corresponding neural states

Working memory (WM) is important for guiding behaviour, but not always for the next possible action. Here we define a WM item that is currently relevant for guiding behaviour as the functionally "active" item; whereas items maintained in WM, but not immediately relevant to behaviour, are defined as functionally "latent". Traditional neurophysiological theories of WM proposed that content is maintained via persistent neural activity (e.g., stable attractors); however, more recent theories have highlighted the potential role for "activity-silent" mechanisms (e.g., short-term synaptic plasticity). Given these somewhat parallel dichotomies, functionally active and latent cognitive states of WM have been associated with storage based on persistent-activity and activity-silent neural mechanisms, respectively. However, in this article we caution against a one-to-one correspondence between functional and activity states. We argue that the principal theoretical requirement for active and latent WM is that the corresponding neural states play qualitatively different functional roles. We consider a number of candidate solutions, and conclude that the neurophysiological mechanisms for functionally active and latent WM items are theoretically independent of the distinction between persistent activity-based and activity-silent forms of WM storage.

Do we remember templates better so that we can reject distractors better?

Feature Integration Theory proposed that attention shifted between target-like representations in our visual field. However, the nature of the representations that determined what was target like received less specification than the nature of the attention shifts. In recent years, visual search research has focused on the nature of the memory representations that we use to guide our shifts of attention. Sensitive measures of memory quality indicate that the template representations are remembered better than other, merely maintained, memories. Here we tested the hypothesis that we prepare for difficult search tasks by storing a higher fidelity target representation in working memory than we do when preparing for an easy search task. To test this hypothesis, we explicitly tested participants' memory of the target color they searched for (i.e., the attentional template) versus another memory that was not used to guide attention (i.e., an accessory representation) following blocks of searches with easy-to-find targets (i.e., distractors were homogeneously colored) to blocks of searches with hard-to-find targets (i.e., distractors were heterogeneously colored). Although homogeneous-distractor searches required minimal precision for distractor rejection, we found that templates were still remembered better than accessories, just like we found in a heterogeneous-distractor search. As a consequence, we suggest that stronger memories for templates likely reflects the need to decide whether new perceptual inputs match the template, and not an attempt to create a better template representation in anticipation of difficult searches.

The Flexible Nature of the Interaction Between Attention and Working Memory

In the research literature, attention and working memory are often intimately linked. In his excellent target article, Oberauer concludes that attention is not a necessary requirement for working memory maintenance. In our reply, we argue that attention is an emergent property of maintaining the current task goal. Humans can flexibly transfer the storage of information between different states and different memory systems as the need arises. Only information in service of currently active task goals requires attentional resources for maintenance. In this state, memoranda can bias behavior and are susceptible to interference from additional attention demanding tasks.

Prospectively reinstated memory drives conscious access of matching visual input

Maintaining information in visual working memory (VWM) biases attentional selection of concurrent visual input, by favoring VWM-matching over VWM-mismatching visual input. Recently, it was shown that this bias disappears when the same item is memorized on consecutive occasions (as memoranda presumably transit from VWM to long-term memory), but reemerges when observers anticipate to memorize a novel item on a subsequent trial. Here, we aimed to conceptually replicate and extend this intriguing finding, by investigating whether prospectively reinstated memory drives conscious access of memory-matching visual input. We measured the time it took for participants to detect interocularly suppressed target stimuli, which were either from the same color category as a concurrently memorized color or not. Our results showed that the advantage of memory-matching targets in overcoming suppression progresses non-monotonically across consecutive memorizations of the same color ('repetitions'): the advantage for memory-matching visual input initially declined to asymptote, before being fully revived on the last repetition. This revival was not observed in a control experiment in which targets were not interocularly suppressed. The results suggest that, as observers anticipate to memorize a novel item imminently, VWM usage is prospectively reinstated, causing memory-matching visual input to gain accelerated access to consciousness again.

Hide and seek: Directing top-down attention is not sufficient for accelerating conscious access

At any moment in time, we have a single conscious visual experience representing a minute part of our visual world. As such, the visual input stimulating our retinae is in continuous competition for reaching conscious access. Many complex cognitive operations can only be applied to consciously accessible visual information, thereby raising the question whether humans have the ability to select which parts of their visual input reaches consciousness. Top-down attention allows humans to flexibly assign more processing resources to certain parts of our visual input, making it a likely mechanism to volitionally bias conscious access. Here, we investigated whether directing top-down attention to a particular location or feature accelerates conscious access of an initially suppressed visual stimulus at the attended location, or of the attended feature. We instructed participants to attend a spatial location (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2) for a speeded discrimination task, using a highly predictive cue. The predictive cues were highly effective in prompting sustained attention towards the cued location or color, as evidenced by faster discrimination of cued relative to uncued targets. We simultaneously measured detection times to interocularly suppressed probes that were either of the cued (i.e., attended) color/location or not, and were visually distinct from the targets used for the discrimination task. Despite our successful manipulation of top-down attention, suppressed probes were not released from suppression faster when they were presented at the attended location, or in the attended color. In contrast, when observers were cued to attend a color for locating targets of an ill-defined shape (inciting a broader attentional template), we did observe faster conscious access of probes in the attended color (Experiment 3). We discuss our findings in light of the specificity of attentional templates, and the inherent limitations that this poses for top-down attentional biases on conscious access.